Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:537
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`ISELA CARMEAN, on behalf of herself and
`all others similarly situated,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Case Nos.: 1:21-cv-135
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`v.
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`Judge: Sharon Johnson Coleman
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`MACY’S RETAIL HOLDINGS, INC.
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`Magistrate Judge: Maria Valdez
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`Defendant.
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`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MACY’S RETAIL HOLDINGS,
`INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
`UNDER F.R.C.P. 12(B)(1) AND 28 U.S.C. 1407
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`Defendant Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc. (“Macy’s”)1, through its attorneys, and pursuant
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`to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1407, submits this memorandum in support of its
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`motion to dismiss (“Motion”) the claims raised by the multi-district litigation plaintiffs (“MDL
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`Plaintiffs”) against Macy’s for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This is a case where one purported MDL Plaintiff has brazenly and repeatedly used legal
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`gamesmanship (including dismissal) to avoid complying with a Court Order, briefing schedule,
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`local rules, and well-established case authorities — all for the improper purpose of forum
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`shopping. This Motion seeks to terminate those efforts.
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`On April 9, 2021, the MDL Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Complaint in this MDL that
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`named Macy’s as a defendant. In so doing, the MDL Plaintiffs circumvented the December 15,
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`2020 order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) (the “JPML Order”), which
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`1 Although the prefatory paragraph of the Consolidated Complaint references “Macy’s, Inc.” as one of the defendants,
`a subsequent allegation describes “Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc.” as the proper party. See Consolidated Complaint, ⁋
`18 (defining the term “Macy’s” to mean “Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc.”). The MDL Plaintiffs also served the
`pleadings upon “Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc.” and not “Macy’s, Inc.” See Dkts. 33, 35. Neither entity is a proper
`defendant, in part, because Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., recently became Macy’s Retail Holdings, LLC.
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 2 of 12 PageID #:538
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`consolidated every underlying case between individual plaintiffs and Clearview AI, Inc.
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`(“Clearview”) into the current MDL, but kept one case out, over the MDL Plaintiffs’ objection:
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`Carmean v. Macy’s, Case No. 20-cv-4589 (the “4589 Case”). The 4589 Case was assigned at the
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`time to the calendar of Judge Marvin E. Aspen (“Judge Aspen”). Macy’s filed a Motion to Dismiss
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`in the 4589 Case (the “4589 Case Motion to Dismiss”), and Judge Aspen set a briefing schedule
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`for it. Three days before Carmean’s brief was due, she voluntarily dismissed her case. Now, she
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`and the MDL Plaintiffs have attempted to insert these same claims against Macy’s into the MDL
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`merely by filing the Consolidated Complaint and adding Macy’s, despite the fact that (1) Carmean
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`never moved any court to transfer the 4589 Case to the MDL, and (2) the 4589 Case no longer
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`exists. Courts across the country have held that an MDL cannot receive a new plaintiff or defendant
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`absent an underlying case involving the party that is properly transferred to the MDL.
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`The fact that Carmean voluntarily dismissed the 4589 Case against Macy’s eliminates any
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`underlying case that could be consolidated into the MDL, and deprives this Court of subject matter
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`jurisdiction. And, even if the 4589 Case still existed, the JPML Order mandated that the case stay
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`with Judge Aspen until a proper transfer request be made, which has never occurred. Thus, by
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`flouting the JPML Order, and filing claims against Macy’s in the MDL without ever making a
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`transfer request, Carmean and the MDL Plaintiffs underscore the lack of subject matter
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`jurisdiction. The claims against Macy’s must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
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`under Rule 12(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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`Separately, equitable reasons favor dismissal of any claim against Macy’s. Carmean and
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`the MDL Plaintiffs have engaged in blatant forum-shopping, which should be discouraged. Such
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`tactics have undermined the respect for Judge Aspen’s courtroom and the significant judicial
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`resources he has expended to date on the 4589 Case. And, it would be unfair to Macy’s, which
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`has expended significant financial resources defending against Carmean’s previous claims, to be
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`2
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 3 of 12 PageID #:539
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`deprived of having its 4589 Case Motion to Dismiss heard due to Carmean’s dismissal of the 4589
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`Case and refiling of it in the MDL. This Court should dismiss the MDL claims against Macy’s in
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`the interest of federal jurisdiction and notions of fairness.
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`FACTUAL TIMELINE
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`The following facts are undisputed and relevant for purposes of this Motion:
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`Carmean Files Her Case before Judge Aspen
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`One of the MDL Plaintiffs in this matter, Isela Carmean (“Carmean”), previously filed a
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`lawsuit against Macy’s on August 5, 2020. See 4589 Complaint, attached as Exhibit A to this
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`Motion. This case was assigned to Judge Aspen (Carmean v. Macy’s, Case No. 20-cv-4589) (the
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`“4589 Case”). In the 4589 Case, Carmean alleged that Macy’s violated the Illinois Biometric
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`Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) because it allegedly contracted with Clearview to use the
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`latter’s products, and thus purportedly profited from the biometric information of Carmean and
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`others. Clearview was not a named party in the 4589 Case.
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`The JPML Order and the Creation of the MDL
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`Meanwhile, Clearview moved before the JPML to consolidate several lawsuits that were
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`pending against it in various jurisdictions across the country. None of these cases named Macy’s
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`as a defendant.2 Despite this fact, Carmean’s counsel filed a Notice of Potential Tag Along Action
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`requesting that the JPML include the 4589 Case in the consolidation. See Notice of Potential Tag-
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`Along Action/Related Action, In Re: Clearview AI, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litigation, MDL No.
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`2967, Dkt. 21, attached as Exhibit B to this Motion. Macy’s filed an “interested party response”
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`before the JPML opposing this request. On December 15, 2020, the JPML consolidated every
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`case where Clearview was a named defendant into the MDL, but did not include the 4589 Case
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`before Judge Aspen. See MDL No. 2967, Dkt. 50 (“JPML Order”), attached as Exhibit C to this
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`2 None of these cases named any other defendant that allegedly contracted with Clearview for services.
`3
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 4 of 12 PageID #:540
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`Motion. To the contrary, the JPML ordered any requests for reassignment to be made in
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`accordance with the local rules:
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`Because the Carmean potential tag-along action already is pending in the Northern District
`of Illinois, we need not determine whether its inclusion in the MDL is appropriate. Rather,
`requests for assignment of this potential tag-along action to the Section 1407 transferee
`judge should be made in accordance with local rules for the assignment of related actions.
`See Panel Rule 7.2(a).
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`Ex. C (emphasis added).
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`Carmean Unsuccessfully Attempts to Halt the 4589 Case
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`Carmean’s attempt to move the 4589 Case out of Judge Aspen’s courtroom did not stop
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`there. After Macy’s filed the 4589 Case Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing and failure to
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`plead under FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), (attached as Exhibit D to this Motion), and after Judge
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`Aspen set a briefing schedule on Macy’s motion, Carmean attempted to stay the 4589 Case to
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`allow for her to seek reassignment of it to the MDL. Judge Aspen initially granted a stay one day
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`after Carmean’s request, but subsequently dissolved it, after Macy’s explained to Judge Aspen the
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`prejudice Macy’s would face if a stay continued. See Macy’s Motion to Dissolve the Stay, attached
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`as Exhibit E to this Motion; Judge Aspen’s Dissolution of the Stay, attached as Exhibit F.
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`Judge Aspen then set a new deadline for Carmean to respond to Macy’s motion to dismiss:
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`March 18, 2021. See id. Rather than respond to Macy’s motion to dismiss, Carmean abruptly
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`filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on March 15, 2021, without explanation to Macy’s or the
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`court. The case was voluntarily dismissed on March 16, 2021, two days before Carmean’s
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`response brief was due. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, attached as Exhibit G to this Motion;
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`Dismissal Order, attached as Exhibit H.
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`4
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 5 of 12 PageID #:541
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`The Consolidated Complaint
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`Less than one month later, on April 9, 2021, the MDL Plaintiffs filed the Consolidated
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`Complaint, adding Macy’s as a defendant in the MDL for the first time. See Dkt. 29. Notably,
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`Carmean is now included amongst the MDL Plaintiffs, and her same counsel in the 4589 Case is
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`included as one of the counsel for the MDL Plaintiffs. The Consolidated Complaint alleges the
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`same facts as the 4589 Case, as they pertain to Macy’s, i.e., that Macy’s is somehow liable under
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`BIPA because it allegedly contracted with Clearview to use the latter’s products, and therefore
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`allegedly accessed and profited from the biometric information of Carmean and others. Except,
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`there are no allegations in the Consolidated Complaint that Carmean or any other plaintiff actually
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`visited a Macy’s store (and thus could even be in a position to allegedly have biometric information
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`collected). Moreover, the Consolidated Complaint does not acknowledge the existence of the 4589
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`Case, or Macy’s previously-filed Motion to Dismiss in the 4589 Case.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A plaintiff seeking to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss must establish that the
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`district court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Zuniga v. Asset Recovery Sols., No. 17-CV-05119,
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`2018 WL 1519162, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2018). If subject matter jurisdiction “is not evident
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`on the face of the complaint, then the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is analyzed like any other motion to
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`dismiss, by assuming for the purposes of the motion that the allegations in the complaint are true.”
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`Id. (internal citations omitted). “Ordinarily, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of
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`demonstrating that the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over her case and that it falls
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`within the ‘Judicial Power’ conferred in Article III.” Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 20-3249,
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`2021 WL 128170, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 14, 2021).
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`5
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 6 of 12 PageID #:542
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`ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Macy’s pursuant to Rule
`12(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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`This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Macy’s because no case against Macy’s
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`has ever been consolidated into the MDL by any court (including the JPML), and presently there
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`is no case to even consolidate, because Carmean chose to voluntarily dismiss the 4589 Case.
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`Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and only possess the power authorized by the
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`Constitution and federal statutes. See Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926) (“A plaintiff
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`suing in a federal court must show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of
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`whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction, and, if he does not do so, the court, on having the
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`defect called to its attention or on discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless the defect
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`be corrected by amendment.”).
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`The limited jurisdiction of a multi-district litigation proceeding is governed by 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1407, which provides a process to “consolidate existing civil actions pending in different
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`districts,” and “not to create new actions.” See In re FCA US LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift
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`Litig., No. 16-MD-02744, 2017 WL 6402992, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2017) (striking the
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`addition of new plaintiffs where there were no underlying cases including them); see also 28
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`§ U.S.C. 1407(a) (“When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
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`pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
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`consolidated pretrial proceedings.”) (emphasis added). In other words, Section 1407 makes clear
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`that a multi-district litigation court cannot entertain new cases brought within it in the first instance,
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`and only has the power to coordinate and streamline the consolidated cases in existence prior to
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`the consolidation. This is not a mere technicality. Cases in a multi-district litigation must be
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`returned at some point to their original dockets, which means that the cases must have existed prior
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`to being transferred to the multi-district litigation. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended
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`6
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 7 of 12 PageID #:543
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`Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., 785 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930 (C.D. Cal.
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`2011) (stating that an MDL should not “be managed in a manner that fails to take into account that
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`the cases are destined to be returned to their transferee jurisdictions”); see also Section 1407(a)
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`(“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
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`pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been
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`previously terminated. . . .”).
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`For this reason, courts have repeatedly dismissed claims brought against new parties in a
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`multidistrict litigation where the plaintiff did not properly transfer a prior existing case to the multi-
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`district litigation, or where the prior case no longer exists. In either scenario, the multi-district
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`litigation judge has no jurisdictional authority under Section 1407 to consolidate the new case and
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`parties. See In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., No. 08-MDL-1952, 2011 WL 6178891, at *9 (E.D.
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`Mich. Dec. 12, 2011) (criticizing plaintiffs for ignoring “basic Article III principles” when they
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`simply named new parties in consolidated complaint instead of following “the appropriate MDL
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`process for consolidation” of claims); In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (Mers) Litig., No. MD-
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`09-02119-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 3931820, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2016) (“Mers”) (“A plaintiff may
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`not unilaterally add actions in the MDL that have not been pending in federal court elsewhere or
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`which were not transferred to the transferee court through the MDL process.”); aff’d sub nom. In
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`re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., Litig., 719 F. App’x 550 (9th Cir. 2017).
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`The MDL Plaintiffs’ attempt to bring Macy’s into the MDL without any actual transfer
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`authority, or even an existing underlying case, is identical to the scenario faced in In re Mortgage
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`Electronic Registration Systems (Mers) Litigation. There, after the multi-district litigation was
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`formed, a new plaintiff named certain defendants in the multi-district litigation, without moving
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`to transfer any underlying case according to the relevant local rules, precisely because there was
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`no underlying case involving the plaintiff. Mers, 2016 WL 3931820, at **1-2. The court held that
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`7
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 8 of 12 PageID #:544
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`it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to add a new plaintiff and allow it to name defendants in
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`the multi-district litigation, without there being (1) a separate existing claim by the plaintiff and
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`against the defendants (2) that was properly transferred to the multi-district litigation. Id. *6
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`(“Here, Plaintiffs did not request consolidation or assignment of [defendant’s] claims to this Court,
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`the transferee judge, as a tag-along action to the multidistrict litigation. In actuality, Plaintiffs did
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`not even file [the new plaintiff’s] action in the transferee district or in any court, and [the new
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`plaintiff] did not have any civil action pending which could have been transferred to this Court by
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`the Judicial Panel.”). The Mers court noted that the entire purpose of multi-district litigation is to
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`coordinate discovery and common issues, but after this is completed, the cases eventually are
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`transferred back to their respective original courts. But, because there was no underlying litigation,
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`the claims added by the new plaintiff had “no home federal court to which this Court may
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`eventually remand them, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1407(a).” Id. *7.
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`Other courts have reached the same result. See, e.g., In re Farmers Ins. Exch. Claims
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`Representatives’ Overtime Pay Litig., No. MDL 33-1439, 2008 WL 4763029, at *3 (D. Or. Oct.
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`28, 2008) (“Because plaintiffs’ claims under Colorado, Minnesota, Illinois, and New Mexico law
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`were not transferred to this court through proper MDL procedures but, rather, were simply added
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`by fiat, they had no ‘home federal court’ to which [the court] could eventually remand them.”); In
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`re FCA US LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litig., No. 16-MD-02744, 2017 WL 6402992, at *1
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`(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2017) (holding that the multi-district litigation consolidated complaint, which
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`added new parties where no underlying cases existed, amounted “to an improper overreach by the
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`plaintiffs’ steering committee and its lead counsel” and lacked subject matter jurisdiction). And,
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`in In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 261 F.R.D. 577, 581 (D. Kan. 2009), the
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`court upheld the magistrate’s refusal to allow the multi-district plaintiffs to add new defendants in
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`the litigation, finding that to allow such additions would cause the defendants “undue prejudice.”
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`8
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 9 of 12 PageID #:545
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`See id. at 581 (“Therefore, to the extent plaintiffs wish to add new plaintiffs and/or new defendants
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`in the underlying cases currently consolidated in this MDL litigation, the court denies plaintiffs’
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`motion. In making such ruling, however, the court is not precluding the filing of new cases against
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`existing defendants (or new defendants) in the underlying jurisdictions.”).
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`Applying this judicial consensus, the MDL Plaintiffs’ claims against Macy’s in the
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`Consolidated Complaint lack subject matter jurisdiction because there is no underlying BIPA
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`claim against Macy’s, or any other claim brought by the MDL Plaintiffs outside of the MDL. To
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`the contrary, Carmean chose to voluntarily dismiss her claims against Macy’s in the 4589 Case,
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`and thus there is no case against Macy’s to be transferred to the MDL. And, even if the 4589 Case
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`still existed, the JPML ordered Carmean to follow the local rules regarding any transfer request,
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`something she clearly did not do. For these reasons, the Consolidated Complaint’s claims against
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`Macy’s should be dismissed pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1).
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`B.
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`Dismissing this case preserves the integrity of Judge Aspen’s courtroom, and
`allows for any future case brought by Carmean against Macy’s to be
`automatically transferred to Judge Aspen so he may continue his analysis of
`Macy’s motion to dismiss arguments.
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`The Seventh Circuit has long recognized “a strong federal policy against collusion and
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`forum shopping” of claims. Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Mach. Works, Inc., 673 F.2d 196, 198
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`(7th Cir. 1982). This policy is at stake here. Significant judicial and party resources were
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`expended in the 4589 Case — and yet Carmean avoided responding to Macy’s 4589 Case Motion
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`to Dismiss arguments, voluntarily dismissed the 4589 Case, and reasserted the same claims here
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`before the MDL.
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`This Court should dismiss the MDL Plaintiffs’ claims against Macy’s to preserve the
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`sanctity of Judge Aspen’s courtroom and the respect that should have been accorded to his calendar
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`and judicial resources. Prior to Carmean’s dismissal of the 4589 Case, Judge Aspen had already
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`issued several rulings that clearly showed that he intended to rule upon Macy’s 4589 Case Motion
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`9
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 10 of 12 PageID #:546
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`to Dismiss. For example, Judge Aspen initially set a briefing schedule on this motion. Then, he
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`stayed the case because Carmean asked to be allowed an opportunity to seek a reassignment of the
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`case. But, he swiftly changed his mind and dissolved the stay after Macy’s presented arguments
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`as to the prejudice it would suffer if the Motion to Dismiss was not heard. Judge Aspen then set a
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`prompt briefing schedule on Macy’s motion. In short, Judge Aspen expended significant judicial
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`resources in the 4589 Case, and these should not have been in vain, merely because Carmean chose
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`to forum-shop her claims into the MDL.
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`Dismissing the claims against Macy’s would force Carmean to refile them in an underlying
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`action, and, to the extent that she re-filed them in federal court, Local Rule 40.3(b)(2) would
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`require that such claims be automatically transferred to Judge Aspen.3 This would allow Judge
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`Aspen to continue his consideration of the arguments raised in the 4589 Case Motion to Dismiss.
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`More importantly, this result forces the MDL Plaintiffs and Carmean to give a sitting Article III
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`federal judge the respect he deserves, and not maneuver around his jurisdiction.
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`C.
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`Dismissing the Claims against Macy’s would protect it from further undue
`prejudice as a result of Carmean’s actions.
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`Keeping Macy’s in the MDL would cause significant prejudice to Macy’s. It would mean
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`that all of Macy’s litigation efforts in the 4589 Case — including its repeated opposition to
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`consolidation, and the drafting of the 4589 Case Motion to Dismiss — would have all been for
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`naught, because Carmean would have been allowed to simply dismiss her case, avoid Judge
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`Aspen’s rulings, and refile in the MDL. Macy’s has expended significant financial resources in
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`3 Local Rule 40.3(b)(2) states the following: “Re-filing of Cases Previously Dismissed. When a case is dismissed with
`prejudice or without, and a second case is filed involving the same parties and relating to the same subject matter, the
`second case shall be assigned to the judge to whom the first case was assigned. The designation sheet presented at the
`time the second case is filed shall indicate the number of the earlier case and the name of the judge to whom it was
`assigned.” (Emphasis added.) See DirecTV, Inc. v. Blahuta, No. 03 C 6287, 2003 WL 22225585, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
`25, 2003) (dismissing case for misjoinder and stating that “LR 40.3(b)(2) provides that when any action is dismissed
`and when a second action is filed involving the same parties and relating to the same subject matter, the second case
`is to be assigned not at random but to the judge who had the original case on his or her calendar”).
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`10
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 11 of 12 PageID #:547
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`litigating the 4589 Case, and it would cause significant prejudice to Macy’s for it to have to repeat
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`its litigation steps in the MDL. And these steps become much more complicated in the MDL,
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`where there are more than two dozen parties having no connection to Macy’s, and where the focus
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`of the MDL is on Clearview, not Macy’s. As proof of this, there has been a recent flurry of motions
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`and briefs that were filed in the MDL, none of which even mention Macy’s. See Dkts. 39, 43, 44,
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`45, 47. This MDL is and always has been about claims against Clearview, not Macy’s, which is
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`precisely why the JPML previously declined to consolidate the case against Macy’s in the MDL.
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`Dismissal here would also likely move the claims against Macy’s to a swifter conclusion,
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`because Judge Aspen will rule on the dispositive arguments raised by Macy’s in the 4589 Case
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`Motion to Dismiss. In this motion, and pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Macy’s argued
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`that the BIPA claims against it should be dismissed because Carmean’s conclusions of covert
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`biometric information collections by Macy’s are not supported by any facts, but rather were
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`derived solely from Internet “news” articles Plaintiff allegedly read (but conveniently failed to
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`attach or quote in her Complaint), which do not relate to her personally. Ex. D. In the 4589 Case,
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`Carmean alleged that, based upon these online articles and nothing else, a court should somehow
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`infer that Macy’s utilized Clearview’s software approximately 6,000 times (which is unsupported),
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`and that, therefore, she must be the inevitable subject of one of these searches as a “regular
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`customer” of Macy’s. Id. As Macy’s demonstrated in the 4589 Case Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s
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`speculation, derived from her online internet surfing, does not even remotely satisfy Article III’s
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`requirement that a plaintiff show an actual injury-in-fact caused by the defendant, or the Rule
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`12(b)(6) standard set in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
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`550 U.S. 544 (2007), which require a plaintiff to plead actual facts, and not conclusions, that state
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`a plausible claim. Id.4
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`4 Indeed, the Consolidated Complaint does not contain even the scant factual allegations that Plaintiff provided in the
`4589 Case about how Macy’s alleged use of Clearview AI’s technology harmed Plaintiff Carmean. Rather, the
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 57 Filed: 05/12/21 Page 12 of 12 PageID #:548
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`These arguments will be heard by Judge Aspen swiftly if Carmean is forced to refile her
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`claims and they are reassigned in accordance with the Local Rules. Carmean and the MDL
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`Plaintiffs should not be allowed to circumvent her pleading obligations and federal jurisdiction
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`prerequisites altogether merely because of forum-shopping tactics. The claims against Macy’s in
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`this MDL should be dismissed.
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`CONCLUSION
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`Carmean has zealously deployed a multitude of tactics to avoid Judge Aspen’s courtroom
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`and, instead, to prosecute its claim in the MDL: disregarding a Court Order, local rules and well-
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`established case authorities — and dismissal of an action. Enough is enough. Macy’s asks this
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`Court to dismiss the claims against it raised in the Consolidated Complaint for lack of subject
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`matter jurisdiction, and grant any other relief that this Court deems proper.
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`Dated: May 12, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Daniel R. Saeedi
`Daniel R. Saeedi (ARDC #6296493)
`dsaeedi@taftlaw.com
`Rachael L. Schaller (ARDC #6306921)
`rschaller@taftlaw.com
`Andrew S. Murphy (ARDC #6328808)
`amurphy@taftlaw.com
`TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP
`111 E. Wacker Drive, 28th Floor
`Chicago, IL 60601
`Telephone: (312) 527-4000
`Fax: (312) 754-2373
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc.
`
`Consolidated Complaint merely purports to name Macy’s as a “representative” of an undefined class of Clearview’s
`clients, without providing any factual allegations about how Plaintiff Carmean or any other person in particular was
`harmed by Macy’s alleged use of Clearview AI’s technology.
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