Case: 1:21-cv-02847 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/26/21 Page 1 of 108 PageID #:1
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`
`COLUMBIA MEATS, INC. and GREENVILLE
`MEATS, INC., Plaintiffs,
`
`COMPLAINT
`
`Jury Trial Demanded
`
`v.
`
`NORMAN W. FRIES, INC., d/b/a CLAXTON
`POULTRY FARMS (“CLAXTON”); FOSTER
`FARMS, LLC; HARRISON POULTRY, INC.;
`HOUSE OF RAEFORD FARMS, INC.; KOCH
`FOODS, INC.; JCG FOODS OF ALABAMA,
`LLC; JCG FOODS OF GEORGIA, LLC; KOCH
`MEAT CO., INC.; MAR-JAC POULTRY, INC.;
`MOUNTAIRE FARMS, INC.; MOUNTAIRE
`FARMS, LLC; MOUNTAIRE FARMS OF
`DELAWARE, INC.; O.K. FOODS, INC.; O.K.
`FARMS, INC.; O.K. INDUSTRIES, INC.;
`PERDUE FARMS, INC.; PERDUE FOODS,
`LLC; PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION;
`SANDERSON FARMS, INC.; SANDERSON
`FARMS, INC. (FOOD DIVISION);
`SANDERSON FARMS, INC. (PRODUCTION
`DIVISION); SANDERSON FARMS, INC.
`(PROCESSING DIVISION); SIMMONS
`FOODS, INC.; TYSON FOODS, INC.; TYSON
`CHICKEN, INC.; TYSON BREEDERS, INC.;
`TYSON POULTRY, INC.; WAYNE FARMS,
`LLC; CASE FOODS, INC., CASE FARMS,
`LLC, CASE FARMS PROCESSING, INC.,
`KEYSTONE FOODS, LLC, EQUITY GROUP
`EUFAULA DIVISION, LLC, , EQUITY GROUP
`KENTUCKY DIVISION, LLC, EQUITY
`GROUP GEORGIA DIVISION, LLC, and AGRI
`STATS, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`

`

`Case: 1:21-cv-02847 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/26/21 Page 2 of 108 PageID #:2
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page(s)
`
`I. NATURE OF THE ACTION ................................................................................................. 1
`
`II. PARTIES ................................................................................................................................ 6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`PLAINTIFFS ...........................................................................................................6
`
`DEFENDANTS .......................................................................................................7
`
`Case Foods.................................................................................................. 7
`i.
`Claxton Poultry Farms ................................................................................ 8
`ii.
`Foster Farms, LLC...................................................................................... 8
`iii.
`Harrison Poultry, Inc................................................................................... 8
`iv.
`House of Raeford Farms, Inc...................................................................... 8
`v.
`Keystone Foods........................................................................................... 9
`vi.
`The Koch Defendants ............................................................................... 10
`vii.
`viii. Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc.................................................................................. 11
`ix.
`The Mountaire Farms Defendants ............................................................ 11
`x.
`The O.K. Foods Defendants...................................................................... 11
`xi.
`The Perdue Defendants............................................................................. 12
`xii.
`Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation...................................................................... 13
`xiii.
`The Sanderson Farms Defendants ............................................................ 13
`xiv.
`Simmons Foods......................................................................................... 14
`xv.
`The Tyson Defendants .............................................................................. 14
`xvi. Wayne Farms, LLC................................................................................... 15
`xvii. Agri Stats .................................................................................................. 16
`
`III. CO-CONSPIRATORS.......................................................................................................... 17
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`PRODUCER-CO CONSPIRATOR AMICK ........................................................17
`
`PRODUCER-CO CONSPIRATOR FIELDALE ..................................................18
`
`PRODUCER-CO CONSPIRATOR GEORGE’S..................................................18
`
`PRODUCER-CO CONSPIRATOR PECO ...........................................................19
`
`IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ........................................................................................... 20
`
`V. TRADE AND COMMERCE................................................................................................ 21
`
`VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................... 23
`
`A.
`
`AGRI STATS PARTICIPATED IN, AND ACTIVELY FACILITATED,
`DEFENDANTS’ COMMUNICATIONS AMONG THEMSELVES, AND
`
`i
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`

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`PROVIDED DATA NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE, MONITOR AND
`ENFORCE THE CONSPIRACY ..........................................................................23
`
`(i)
`
`(ii)
`
`(iii)
`
`Agri Stats’ Detailed Reports Enable Defendants to Accurately
`Assess and Monitor their Competitors’ Production Levels and
`Breeder Flocks ...........................................................................................26
`
`Agri Stats’ Critical Role in the Chicken Industry......................................29
`
`Defendants’ Public Statements Show the Relevance of Agri Stats’
`Data to their Collective Efforts to Cut Production.....................................32
`
`B.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ CONSPIRACY ARTIFICIALLY INCREASED AND
`MAINTAINED CHICKEN PRICES.....................................................................35
`
`(i)
`
`(ii)
`
`(a)
`
`(b)
`
`(c)
`
`(d)
`
`(e)
`
`(iii)
`
`(a)
`
`(b)
`
`Defendants’ Historical Methods of Controlling Chicken Supply
`Are Ineffective in the Year Immediately Preceding the Conspiracy .........35
`
`The Conspiracy’s First Prong: Defendants Depart from Historical
`Practice by Collectively Reducing Breeder Flocks in
`Unprecedented Amounts Beginning in 2008.............................................37
`
`Defendants’ Executives Publicly Decried the Effect of Oversupply
`on “Our Industry,” Telling Their Competitors That Unified Action
`Was Necessary...........................................................................................38
`
`Defendants Begin to Cut Production in Concert........................................40
`
`Defendants’ Chicken Production Cuts, from 2008 to Early 2009,
`Included Unprecedented Reductions to Chicken Breeder Flocks..............50
`
`Defendants’ Conspiracy, Hatched in the Great Recession
`Continued into 2011 With Another Round of Collective Production
`Cuts ............................................................................................................52
`
`Drastically Reduced Breeder Flocks Boost Chicken Prices and
`Raise Defendants’ Profits to Record Levels ..............................................58
`
`The Conspiracy’s Second Prong: Collusively Manipulating the
`Georgia Dock Benchmark Price Index ......................................................63
`
`The Georgia Dock Pricing Methodology and Its Susceptibility to
`Manipulation..............................................................................................65
`
`Georgia Dock Prices Diverged from the USDA Composite and
`Urner Barry Price Indices Beginning in 2013............................................69
`
`ii
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`

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`C.
`
`D.
`
`THE STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHICKEN
`MARKET MAKE IT HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO COLLUSION....................71
`
`DEFENDANTS COLLUSIVELY ADOPTED ADDITIONAL
`STRATEGIES TO REINFORCE THEIR CONSPIRACY...................................74
`
`(i)
`
`(ii)
`
`A Collective Shift Away from Long-Term Fixed-Price Contracts............74
`
`Inter-Defendant Sales.................................................................................75
`
`(iii)
`
`Atypical Increases in Defendants’ Exporting of Chickens........................77
`
`E.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE TIMELY...............................................................78
`
`VII. ANTITRUST IMPACT ........................................................................................................ 82
`
`VIII.CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AND CAUSES OF ACTION........................................................ 83
`
`COUNT I VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1 (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
`FOR OUTPUT RESTRICTION)...........................................................................83
`COUNT II VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1 (AGAINST THE GEORGIA DOCK
`DEFENDANTS FOR PRICE-FIXING)................................................................84
`COUNT III VIOLATION OF GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-4(a) AND 16-14-6
`(GEORGIA RICO) (AGAINST THE GEORGIA DOCK DEFENDANTS
`FOR ACQUIRING MONEY THROUGH RACKETEERING
`ACTIVITY) ...........................................................................................................85
`COUNT IV VIOLATION OF GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-4(b) AND 16-14-6
`(GEORGIA RICO) (AGAINST THE GEORGIA DOCK DEFENDANTS
`FOR VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1 (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
`FOR OUTPUT RESTRICTION)...........................................................................90
`COUNT V VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) AND 1964(c) (FEDERAL
`RICO) (AGAINST THE GEORGIA DOCK DEFENDANTS) ............................95
`COUNT VI VIOLATION OF S.C. CODE ANN §§ 39-3-10, ET SEQ.
`(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS) .....................................................................100
`COUNT VII VIOLATION OF S.C. CODE ANN §§ 39-5-10, ET SEQ.
`(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS) .....................................................................101
`DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT........................................................................................ 103
`JURY DEMAND............................................................................................................ 103
`
`iii
`
`

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`Plaintiffs Columbia Meats, Inc. and Greenville Meats, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action
`
`for treble damages under the federal antitrust laws against the Defendants identified below.
`
`Plaintiffs seek damages commencing from at least January 1, 2008 through at least December 31,
`
`2016 (the “Relevant Period”) for their purchases of chickens directly from Defendants and their
`
`co-conspirators at supra-competitive prices, and allege as follows, based upon information and
`
`belief except as to allegations relating to themselves:
`
`I.
`
`NATURE OF THE ACTION
`
`1.
`
`This is a case about how a cartel of America’s chicken producers succeeded in
`
`illegally increasing chicken prices. Defendants’ cartel had two prongs. One focused on the
`
`beginning of the distribution chain by reducing the supply of chickens into the market. The other
`
`prong focused on the end of the distribution chain by manipulating a price index used to set
`
`wholesale chicken prices for buyers in Illinois and across the nation.
`
`2.
`
`The first prong of Defendants’ scheme curtailed the supply of chickens in the
`
`market via unprecedented cuts at the top of the supply chain in the form of jointly and
`
`collusively reducing “breeder flocks” that produce chickens ultimately slaughtered for meat
`
`consumption. Historically, when faced with low market prices, Defendants relied primarily on
`
`mechanisms that temporarily reduced production – at the middle or end of the supply chain, such
`
`as reducing eggs placements, killing newly hatched chicks, or idling processing plants – but
`
`which still allowed them to ramp up production within weeks if chicken prices rose.
`
`3.
`
`By way of background, the pattern of annual increases in chicken production
`
`became so entrenched over decades of experience that by the 2000s, a widely repeated industry
`
`quip was that life only held three certainties: death, taxes, “and 3% more broilers.” A leading
`
`industry publication noted in early 2009 that chicken “production in the U.S. used to be just like
`
`government spending, it never went down and cutbacks only resulted in slowing the rate of
`
`1
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-02847 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/26/21 Page 6 of 108 PageID #:6
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`growth, but not anymore,” because for “the first time in decades, total broiler production in 2008
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`remained virtually unchanged from the year before.”
`
`4.
`
`In 2008, faced with cratering prices and anemic profits, Defendants collectively
`
`began cutting their ability to ramp up production in the long-term – up to 18 months – by
`
`materially reducing their breeder flocks. While in the past, Defendants undertook traditional,
`
`short-term production cuts, this was a significant shift in their behavior. Defendants’ collective
`
`market-changing cuts to breeder flocks – a first round from 2008 to early 2009, and a subsequent
`
`round from 2011 to 2012 as the conspiracy continued into the current decade – effectively
`
`eliminated their ability to meaningfully increase supply for years.
`
`5.
`
`Defendants’ joint efforts to impose supply-side “discipline” included public
`
`statements by their senior executives about a Defendant’s individual commitment to production
`
`cuts as well as the importance of instituting and maintaining this “discipline” within the industry
`
`as a whole. Defendants’ public statements on the need for, and benefits of, industry-wide supply
`
`“discipline” marked a significant departure from past industry practice.
`
`6.
`
`Defendants’ coordinated output restriction scheme was successfully facilitated by,
`
`monitored and policed using reports purchased, at significant cost, from Defendant Agri Stats,
`
`Inc. (“Agri Stats”), a former subsidiary of global pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly & Co. Agri
`
`Stats collects detailed, proprietary data from all Defendants and their Co-Conspirators, including
`
`housing used, breed of chicks, average size, and production and breeder flock levels. Although
`
`certain Defendants had used Agri Stats before 2008, the output-restriction part of Defendants’
`
`conspiracy began when Defendant Tyson Foods – which had stopped using Agri Stats sometime
`
`in the mid-2000s – became a subscriber again in early 2008 (as confirmed by the CEO in a
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`January 28, 2008 earnings call).
`
`2
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`

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`7.
`
`While the Agri Stats reports “anonymize” individual producer information, they
`
`are sufficiently detailed so that any reasonably informed producer may discern the identity of its
`
`competitors’ information, including breeder flocks, and other production, capacity and cost data.
`
`Agri Stats, as detailed below, plays both a unique role in the chicken industry and an important
`
`role in the conspiracy alleged here, by enabling Defendants to know exactly what each other was
`
`doing.
`
`8.
`
`The information available to Defendants in these Agri Stats reports is not the kind
`
`of information that, in a competitive market, would be disclosed by one competitor to another.
`
`Agri Stats reports include individual lines (sometimes called “rows”) of facility-level data for
`
`over 100 of Defendants’ chicken integrated production facilities. Most of these vast facilities,
`
`referred to as “complexes,” include housing for Defendants’ breeder flocks and hatcheries where
`
`breeder flock hens lay the eggs that will ultimately become the chickens sold to the market.
`
`9.
`
`The Agri Stats reports identify each complex with unique numbers, including a
`
`coding system identifying the region and sub-region, for each chicken complex, with the cover
`
`pages of each sub-regional report identifying by name the companies whose complexes are
`
`covered in the report itself. For example, “Region 20” includes “Sub-Region 21 – Upper Mid
`
`Atlantic,” identifying, with a unique number, sixteen chicken complexes, including four Tyson
`
`complexes, four Perdue complexes, three Mountaire complexes, two Pilgrim’s Pride complexes,
`
`and one George’s complex.1
`
`1 Agri Stats reports also include specific data for Defendants’ chicken complexes (listed by
`producer and location) in: North Carolina (“Sub-Region 22”); Northern Georgia and Tennessee
`(“Sub-Region 31”); Southern Georgia, Florida and South Carolina (“Sub-Region 32”); Alabama
`and Mississippi (sub-regions 41 and 42); lower Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas (“Sub-Region
`51”); upper Arkansas and Missouri (“Sub-Region 52”); Kentucky, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana and
`Wisconsin (“Sub-Region 60”); and California and the Pacific Northwest (“Region 10)” (which is
`composed solely of Defendant Foster Farms’ three complexes).
`
`3
`
`

`

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`10.
`
`Agri Stats’ reports are not publicly available, and with very limited exceptions,
`
`Defendants closely guard the reports’ contents and the degree of Defendants’ participation in
`
`Agri Stats’ data-gathering and -dissemination processes. But despite the secrecy of the Agri
`
`Stats reports, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s extensive investigation has confirmed that every Defendant
`
`named in this Complaint reports detailed data to Agri Stats on a regular basis, typically weekly,
`
`and Agri Stats both facilitated and participated in the conspiracy because, among other things:
`
` Agri Stats’ coding system made it “easy” for Defendants’ personnel to decipher,
`simply by eyeballing the “rows” in a given report, the production, feed, sales and
`other competitively sensitive metrics of their competitors, many of whom had
`complexes “right down the road from” each other in the same Agri Stats sub-region;
`
` Agri Stats’ regular meetings with each Defendant allowed Agri Stats to share
`production information among the Defendants.
`For example, mid-level Tyson
`personnel working at complexes in the Mid-Atlantic region were advised by their
`complex managers about competitors’ production following quarterly meetings
`between the Tyson complex managers and Agri Stats account managers; and
`
` Agri Stats account managers created, for each of their Defendant customers, a series
`of data compilations known as “books,” based on the competitively sensitive data that
`a particular Defendant had submitted to Agri Stats. On a number of occasions, Agri
`Stats personnel sent copies of one Defendant’s “books” to other Defendants.
`
`11.
`
`The other prong of Defendants’ conspiracy to illegally increase and maintain
`
`chicken prices was the manipulation and artificial inflation of prices on the “Georgia Dock,” a
`
`widely used weekly benchmark price compiled and disseminated by the Georgia Department of
`
`Agriculture (the “GDA”) in the agency’s Poultry Market News (sometimes referred to as the
`
`“PMN”) publication. Chicken buyers across the nation, including purchasers in Illinois, paid
`
`prices based on the Georgia Dock. The Georgia Dock also formed the basis of many chicken
`
`purchasing contracts and other business transactions between Plaintiffs and one or more of the
`
`Defendants. Unlike other price indices available to chicken buyers, the Georgia Dock benchmark
`
`price is a self-reported number from a group of chicken producers identified below as the
`
`4
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`

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`“Georgia Dock Defendants” (namely, Defendants Pilgrim’s Pride, Tyson, Perdue, Sanderson
`
`Farms, Koch Foods, Claxton, Harrison Poultry, Mar-Jac, Wayne Farms and co-conspirator
`
`Fieldale Farms). Senior executives from eight of the ten Georgia Dock Defendants were
`
`members of a secretive “Georgia Dock Advisory Board,” which played a role in the compilation
`
`and manipulation of the Georgia Dock benchmark price.
`
`12.
`
`Following intense scrutiny, first
`
`in mid-2016 from the U.S. Department of
`
`Agriculture (“USDA”), and then by the press, which in late 2016 first revealed the easily
`
`manipulated methodology used to create the Georgia Dock benchmark price, the GDA, on
`
`November 28, 2016, suspended reporting it. Realizing the antitrust implications of how the
`
`Georgia Dock benchmark price inputs were compiled and how the Georgia Dock benchmark
`
`price was computed,
`
`the GDA attempted to implement new price-reporting requirements,
`
`including the submission of an affidavit by each Georgia Dock Defendant vouching for the
`
`accuracy of their submitted price inputs. However, the Georgia Dock Defendants balked at these
`
`new rules, so in late November 2016, the GDA stopped publishing the Georgia Dock benchmark
`
`index altogether, citing a “lack of submissions” under the new reporting requirements.
`
`13.
`
`The November 23, 2016 Georgia Dock benchmark whole-bird price of
`
`$1.0975/lb. was the last one reported by the GDA, although at least one Defendant continued for
`
`several more months to peg its wholesale prices to that final $1.0975/lb. price point. The GDA
`
`later introduced the “Georgia Premium Poultry Price Index,” which purported to be a more
`
`transparent, accurate, and verifiable pricing mechanism – but abandoned the new index in
`
`February 2017 due to a lack of participation by chicken producers. The Antitrust Section of the
`
`Florida Attorney General’s office is currently investigating the chicken industry for
`
`anticompetitive practices, including the manipulation of the Georgia Dock.
`
`5
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`

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`14.
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`Both prongs of Defendants’ conspiracy were instigated in a market with
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`numerous characteristics making it highly susceptible to collusion, including: (a) a highly
`
`concentrated market dominated by vertically integrated producers; (b) high barriers to market
`
`entry; (c) a standardized, commodity product where competition is based principally on price; (d)
`
`inelastic demand for the product; (e) numerous opportunities for cartel members to conspire
`
`through a number of regularly scheduled trade association meetings; and (f) access to
`
`competitors’ data through Agri Stats. Indeed, an internal memorandum drafted by the Antitrust
`
`Section of the Florida Attorney General’s office as part of its ongoing investigation stated that
`
`the chicken industry has the “hallmarks of an industry susceptible to collusion,” including high
`
`consolidation, “predictable demand” in a “commodity market,” and “routine, public display of
`
`prices to deter cheating.”
`
`A. Plaintiffs
`
`II.
`
`PARTIES
`
`15.
`
`Plaintiff Columbia Meats,
`
`Inc.
`
`(“Columbia Meats”)
`
`is a South Carolina
`
`corporation with its principal place of business in Columbia, South Carolina. During the
`
`Relevant Period, Columbia Meats purchased chicken at artificially inflated prices directly from
`
`one or more of the Defendants and suffered injury to its business or property as a direct and
`
`proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct.
`
`16.
`
`Plaintiff Greenville Meats, Inc. (“Greenville Meats”),
`
`is a South Carolina
`
`corporation with its principal place of business in Greenville, South Carolina. During the
`
`Relevant Period, Greenville Meats purchased chicken at artificially inflated prices directly from
`
`one or more of the Defendants and suffered injury to its business or property as a direct and
`
`proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct.
`
`6
`
`

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`B. Defendants
`
`i.
`
`Case Foods
`
`17.
`
`Case Foods, Inc. is a privately held Delaware corporation with its corporate
`
`headquarters in Troutman, North Carolina. During the time period relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims,
`
`Case Foods, Inc. and/or its predecessors, wholly-owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates
`
`sold chickens in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly-owned or controlled
`
`affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.
`
`18.
`
`Case Farms, LLC is a privately held Delaware limited liability company with its
`
`corporate headquarters in Troutman, North Carolina, and with facilities and operations in Ohio
`
`and North Carolina. Case Farms, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Case Foods, Inc. During
`
`the time period relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, Case Farms, LLC and/or its predecessors, wholly-
`
`owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold chickens in interstate commerce, directly or
`
`through its wholly- owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.
`
`19.
`
`Case Farms Processing, Inc. is a privately held North Carolina corporation with
`
`its corporate headquarters in Troutman, North Carolina, and with facilities and operations in
`
`North Carolina. Case Farms Processing, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Case Foods, Inc.
`
`During the time period relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, Case Farms Processing, Inc. and/or its
`
`predecessors, wholly-owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold chickens in interstate
`
`commerce, directly or through its wholly- owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the
`
`United States.
`
`20.
`
`Case Foods reports a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including, without
`
`limitation, highly detailed, confidential
`
`information regarding its production and sales of
`
`chickens.
`
`7
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`

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`21.
`
`Defendants Case Foods, Inc., Case Farms, LLC and Case Farms Processing, Inc.
`
`are collectively referred to as “Case Foods.”
`
`ii.
`
`Claxton Poultry Farms
`
`22.
`
`Defendant Norman W. Fries, Inc., d/b/a Claxton Poultry Farms (“Claxton”) is a
`
`Georgia corporation headquartered in Claxton, Georgia. Claxton reports to Agri Stats a wide
`
`variety of data, including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity and its
`
`Claxton, Georgia complex. Until the Georgia Dock benchmark price stopped being published by
`
`the GDA in late November 2016, Claxton was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and
`
`artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. Its CEO also served on the Georgia Dock Advisory
`
`Board. Claxton is a Georgia Dock Defendant.
`
`iii.
`
`Foster Farms, LLC
`
`23.
`
`Defendant Foster Farms, LLC (“Foster”) is a privately held California corporation
`
`headquartered in Modesto, California. Foster reports a wide variety of data to Agri Stats,
`
`including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes
`
`in Fresno, California, Livingston, California, and the Pacific Northwest.
`
`iv.
`
`Harrison Poultry, Inc.
`
`24.
`
`Defendant Harrison Poultry,
`
`Inc.
`
`(“Harrison”)
`
`is a Georgia corporation
`
`headquartered in Bethlehem, Georgia. Harrison reports a wide variety of data to Agri Stats,
`
`including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its Bethlehem,
`
`Georgia complex. Until the Georgia Dock benchmark price index stopped being published by
`
`the GDA in late November 2016, Harrison was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false
`
`and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. Its owner and CEO served on the Georgia Dock
`
`Advisory Board. Harrison is a Georgia Dock Defendant.
`
`v.
`
`House of Raeford Farms, Inc.
`
`8
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`

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`25.
`
`Defendant House of Raeford Farms, Inc. (“Raeford”) is a privately held North
`
`Carolina corporation headquartered in Rose Hill, North Carolina. Raeford reports a wide variety
`
`of data to Agri Stats, including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and
`
`data for its North Carolina and Louisiana complexes.
`
`vi.
`
`Keystone Foods
`
`26.
`
`Keystone Foods LLC was formerly a subsidiary of Marfrig Alimentos, S.A., a
`
`Brazilian company (“Marfrig”). On November 30, 2018, Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson
`
`Foods”) announced it had completed its acquisition of Keystone Foods LLC from Marfrig.
`
`Tyson Foods characterized the acquisition of Keystone Foods LLC as Tyson Foods’ latest
`
`investment in furtherance of its growth strategy and expansion of its value-added protein
`
`capabilities.
`
`27.
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`Equity Group Eufaula Division, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with
`
`its headquarters in Bakerhill, Alabama and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Keystone Foods
`
`LLC.
`
`28.
`
`Equity Group Kentucky Division LLC is a Delaware limited liability company
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`with its headquarters in Franklin, Kentucky, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Grow-Out
`
`Holdings LLC.
`
`29.
`
`Equity Group – Georgia Division LLC is a Delaware limited liability company
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`with its headquarters in Camilla, Georgia, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Keystone Foods
`
`LLC.
`
`30.
`
`As a result of Tyson Foods’ acquisition of Keystone Foods LLC, Tyson also
`
`acquired all of the assets and liabilities of Equity Group Eufaula Division, LLC, Equity Group
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`Kentucky Division LLC, and Equity Group – Georgia Division LLC.
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`9
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`31.
`
`Keystone Foods LLC, Equity Group Eufaula Division, LLC, Equity Group
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`Kentucky Division LLC, and Equity Group – Georgia Division LLC are collectively referred to
`
`as “Keystone Foods” in this Complaint.
`
`32.
`
`Keystone Foods reports a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information
`
`about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Alabama, Georgia,
`
`and Kentucky.
`
`vii.
`
`The Koch Defendants
`
`33.
`
`Defendant Koch Foods, Inc. is a privately held Illinois corporation headquartered
`
`in Park Ridge, Illinois.
`
`34.
`
`Defendant JCG Foods of Alabama, LLC, an Alabama limited liability corporation
`
`headquartered in Park Ridge, Illinois, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Koch Foods,
`
`Inc.
`
`35.
`
`Defendant JCG Foods of Georgia, LLC, a Georgia limited liability corporation
`
`headquartered in Park Ridge, Illinois, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Koch Foods,
`
`Inc.
`
`36.
`
`Defendant Koch Meat Co., Inc., an Illinois corporation headquartered in Chicago,
`
`is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Koch Foods, Inc.
`
`37.
`
`Defendants Koch Foods, Inc., JCG Foods of Alabama, LLC, JCG Foods of
`
`Georgia, LLC and Koch Meat Co., Inc. are collectively referred to as “Koch” in this Complaint.
`
`Koch reports a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its breeder flocks
`
`and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama. Until the
`
`Georgia Dock benchmark price index stopped being published by the GDA in late November
`
`2016, Koch, through JCG Foods of Georgia, LLC, was one of the ten Defendants that submitted
`
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`Case: 1:21-cv-02847 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/26/21 Page 15 of 108 PageID #:15
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`false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. Its vice-president of sales served on the
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`Georgia Dock Advisory Board. Koch is a Georgia Dock Defendant.
`
`viii. Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc.
`
`38.
`
`Defendant Mar-Jac Poultry,
`
`Inc.
`
`(“Mar-Jac”)
`
`is a Delaware corporation
`
`headquartered in Gainesville, Georgia. Mar-Jac reports a wide variety of data to Agri Stats,
`
`including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its Gainesville,
`
`Georgia complex. Until the Georgia Dock benchmark price index stopped being published by the
`
`GDA in late November 2016, Mar-Jac was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and
`
`artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. Its vice president of operations served on the
`
`Georgia Dock Advisory Board. Mar-Jac is a Georgia Dock Defendant.
`
`ix.
`
`The Mountaire Farms Defendants
`
`39.
`
`Defendant Mountaire Farms, Inc.
`
`is a privately held Delaware corporation
`
`headquartered in Millsboro, Delaware.
`
`40.
`
`Defendant Mountaire Farms, LLC, a privately held Arkansas limited liability
`
`corporation headquartered in Little Rock, Arkansas, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant
`
`Mountaire Farms, Inc.
`
`41.
`
`Defendant Mountaire Farms of Delaware, Inc., a privately held Delaware
`
`corporation headquartered in Millsboro, Delaware, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant
`
`Mountaire Farms, Inc.
`
`42.
`
`Defendants Mountaire Farms, Inc., Mountaire Farms, LLC and Mountaire Farms
`
`of Delaware, Inc. are collectively referred to as “Mountaire Farms” in this Complaint. Mountaire
`
`reports a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its breeder flocks and
`
`hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Delaware and North Carolina.
`
`x.
`
`The O.K. Foods Defendants
`
`11
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`43.
`
`Defendant O.K. Foods, Inc. is an Arkansas corporation headquartered in Fort
`
`Smith, Arkansas.
`
`44.
`
`O.K. Farms, Inc., an Arkansas corporation headquartered in Fort Smith, Arkansas,
`
`is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant O.K. Foods, Inc.
`
`45.
`
`O.K. Industries, Inc., an Arkansas corporation headquartered in Fort Smith,
`
`Arkansas, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant O.K. Foods, Inc.
`
`46.
`
`Defendants O.K. Foods, Inc., O.K. Farms, Inc. and O.K. Industries, Inc. are
`
`collectively referred to collectively as “O.K. Foods” in this Complaint. O.K. Foods, which is a
`
`subsidiary of the Mexican poultry conglomerate Industrias Bachoco, reports a wide variety of
`
`data to Agri Stats, including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data
`
`for its Fort Smith, Arkansas complex.
`
`xi.
`
`The Perdu