Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:39
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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`LAWRENCE RICE, individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`DREYER’S GRAND ICE CREAM, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 1:21-cv-03814
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`Hon. Gary S. Feinerman
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`DEFENDANT DREYER’S GRAND ICE CREAM, INC.’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
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`
`
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`Dale J. Giali (pro hac vice)
`Keri E. Borders (pro hac vice)
`C. Mitchell Hendy (pro hac vice)
`dgiali@mayerbrown.com
`kborders@mayerbrown.com
`mhendy@mayerbrown.com
`350 South Grand Avenue, 25th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071-1503
`Tel: (213) 229-9500
`Fax: (213) 576-8185
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 2 of 21 PageID #:40
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
`BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................... 4
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 5
`I.
`Plaintiff Has Not Stated A Plausible Claim That The Ice Cream Bars’
`Packaging Violates The ICFA ............................................................................... 6
`A.
`Plaintiff’s ICFA Claim Is A Preempted Attempt To Privately
`Enforce FDA Regulations .......................................................................... 6
`The Label Is Entirely True, And No Reasonable Consumer Could
`Be Deceived ............................................................................................... 9
`Plaintiff’s Tag-Along Claims Are Not Well Pleaded .......................................... 14
`II.
`Plaintiff Lacks Standing To Sue For Injunctive Relief ........................................ 15
`III.
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 15
`
`B.
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`-i-
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 3 of 21 PageID #:41
`
`
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Backus v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,
`122 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N. D. Cal. 2015) ....................................................................................14
`
`Barreto v. Westbrae Nat., Inc.,
`518 F. Supp. 3d 795 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)..................................................................................7, 14
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................................................................................................5, 12, 13
`
`Bell v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.,
`982 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 2020) .........................................................................................9, 12, 13
`
`Bober v. Glaxo Wellcome PLC,
`246 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001) .....................................................................................................6
`
`Brodsky v. Aldi, Inc.,
`2021 WL 4439304 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2021) ..........................................................................13
`
`Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,
`531 U.S. 341 (2001) ...............................................................................................................6, 7
`
`Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.,
`761 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................15
`
`Cosgrove v. Or. Chai, Inc.,
`520 F. Supp. 3d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)......................................................................................14
`
`Dashnau v. Unilever Mfg. (US), Inc.,
`2021 WL 1163716 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021) .........................................................................13
`
`Davis v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc.,
`297 F. Supp. 3d 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ...............................................................................10, 11
`
`Fitzgerald v. Polar Corp.,
`2020 WL 6586628 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2020) ...........................................................................9
`
`Fuchs v. Menard, Inc.,
`2017 WL 4339821 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017) ..........................................................................10
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 4 of 21 PageID #:42
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Galanis v. Starbucks Corp.,
`2016 WL 6037962 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2016)..................................................................6, 10, 14
`
`Guajardo v. Skechers USA, Inc.,
`2021 WL 4302532 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2021) ......................................................................6, 13
`
`Harris v. Mondelēz Glob. LLC,
`2020 WL 4336390 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2020) ....................................................................10, 11
`
`Ibarrola v. Kind, LLC,
`83 F. Supp. 3d 751 (N.D. Ill. 2015) .....................................................................................6, 15
`
`Loreto v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`515 F. App’x 576 (6th Cir. 2013) ..............................................................................................7
`
`Manley v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc.,
`417 F. Supp. 3d 1114 (N.D. Ill. 2019) .....................................................................................14
`
`In re Medtronic,
`623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................7
`
`Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co.,
`4 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2021) ......................................................................................................13
`
`Patane v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc.,
`314 F. Supp. 3d 375 (D. Conn. 2018) ........................................................................................7
`
`Perez v. Nidek Co.,
`711 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................6
`
`Pichardo v. Only What You Need, Inc.,
`2020 WL 6323775 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020) ..........................................................................10
`
`Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co.,
`631 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................................................5
`
`Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc.,
`574 F. Supp. 2d 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)......................................................................................12
`
`Reyes v. Crystal Farms Refrigerated Distrib. Co.,
`2019 WL 3409883 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2019) ....................................................................10, 11
`
`iii
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 5 of 21 PageID #:43
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`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page(s)
`
`
`Sarr v. BEF Foods, Inc.,
`2020 WL 729883 (E.D.N.Y. Feb 13, 2020).............................................................................10
`
`Scherr v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
`703 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................15
`
`Schiesser v. Ford Motor Co.,
`2016 WL 6395457 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2016)......................................................................14, 15
`
`Sencen v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc.,
`No. 7:20cv4024 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 24, 2020)....................................................................3, 4
`
`Simic v. City of Chicago,
`851 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................15
`
`Spector v. Mondelēz Int’l, Inc.,
`178 F. Supp. 3d 657 (N.D. Ill. 2016) .................................................................................14, 15
`
`Steele v. Wegman Food Mkts., Inc.,
`472 F. Supp. 3d 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)..................................................................................10, 11
`
`Thorner v. Fleetwood,
`2002 WL 1998285 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2002) ..........................................................................14
`
`Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,
`475 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................................14
`
`Turek v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,
`662 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................................................6
`
`Twohig v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc.,
`519 F. Supp. 3d 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)......................................................................................12
`
`Weinstein v. eBay, Inc.,
`819 F. Supp. 2d 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)........................................................................................9
`
`Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc.,
`722 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................15
`
`Yu v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc.,
`No. 1:20cv8512 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 13, 2020) ........................................................................4
`
`iv
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 6 of 21 PageID #:44
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page(s)
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`Zurliene v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc.,
`No. 3:21cv747 (S.D. Ill. filed June 28, 2021) ............................................................................4
`
`Statutes and Regulations
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`15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) .......................................................................................................................14
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`21 U.S.C. § 337(a) .......................................................................................................................6, 7
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`21 U.S.C. § 343-1 ........................................................................................................................6, 7
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`Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act,
`815 ILCS 505/1–12 .......................................................................................................... passim
`
`21 C.F.R. § 101.3(b)(2) ....................................................................................................................8
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`21 C.F.R. § 133.106(a).....................................................................................................................8
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`21 C.F.R. § 163.155 .....................................................................................................................5, 7
`
`
`
`v
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 7 of 21 PageID #:45
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendant Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. manufacturers a variety of Häagen-Dazs® ice
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`cream bars. The flavor here—“Vanilla Milk Chocolate Almond Ice Cream Bars”—includes vanilla
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`ice cream, dipped in a coating of milk chocolate and almonds. That product name quickly helps
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`potential consumers distinguish this variety from other ice cream confectionary products.
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`Plaintiff Lawrence Rice challenges the phrase
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`“milk chocolate” as used on the front label
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`depicted to the left (and at Compl., ¶ 1). He
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`does not allege that the ice cream bars don’t
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`contain milk chocolate. Nor could he. And he
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`admits that the ingredient panel on the back
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`label prominently (and truthfully) discloses
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`that “Milk Chocolate” is the number one
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`ingredient in the bars’ coating. Compl. ¶ 44.
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`Nor does plaintiff contend that the label
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`expressly disclaims the presence of oil (the
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`label makes no such disclaimer) or that the
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`ingredient list is wrong (it isn’t). Instead, the
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`complaint alleges that the front packaging
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`describing the product as “vanilla ice cream dipped in rich milk chocolate and almonds” is
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`deceptive because it somehow imparts an implied representation that the chocolate coating does
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`not include coconut oil.
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`Put simply, that is not a plausible theory of consumer deception. Nothing about the truthful
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`identifying information on the front panel as pictured and quoted above could lead a reasonable
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`consumer to conclude that the product does not have vegetable oil (or any other ingredients). The
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`name of the product is not an ingredient list or an ingredient exclusion list, and no reasonable
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`consumer would think otherwise. The front labeling says nothing about oil—and it certainly
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`1
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 8 of 21 PageID #:46
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`doesn’t in any way disclaim the presence of oil. What’s more, oil is disclosed on the label four
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`times, including once in bold, in the ingredient list—the precise place that consumers know to look
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`for objective detailed information about a product’s ingredients (infra, n.2):
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`Compl., ¶ 44. There is no contrary messaging anywhere on the label.
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`Given that the ice cream bars contain milk chocolate and the label accurately discloses the
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`presence of oil, from where does plaintiff conjure his theory of deception? As the complaint
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`explains, the theory of deception relies on plaintiff’s counsel’s interpretation and application of a
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`technical food labeling regulation promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration. See Compl.
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`¶¶ 9, 12, 16, 55. But that fails for three reasons. First, private plaintiffs cannot sue to enforce FDA
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`regulations—only the FDA has that authority. Second, plaintiff’s interpretation and application of
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`the regulation is incorrect: the ice cream bars are accurately labelled and do not violate FDA
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`regulations. Third, and most relevant to this motion, alleged violation of an FDA food labeling
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`regulation is not synonymous with consumer deception and here, regardless of compliance with
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`FDA regulations, Dreyer’s provides plaintiff and the reasonable consumer with the information
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`needed—at their fingertips—to make informed purchasing decisions.
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`In the comprehensive ingredient list, Dreyer’s made a purposeful choice to use component
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`labelling. That is, rather than compiling all the individual ingredients in a single list in descending
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`order of predominance, Dreyer’s separated out the ingredients of the bars into the product’s two
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`main components—the ice cream and the coating—each identified in a bold font, with that
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`component’s associated ingredients listed in order of predominance. The two components are:
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` VANILLA ICE CREAM
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` MILK CHOCOLATE AND VEGETABLE OIL COATING WITH ALMONDS
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`2
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 9 of 21 PageID #:47
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`The breakdown further details that just as the vanilla ice cream is made up of several
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`ingredients (“CREAM, SKIM MILK, SUGAR, EGG YOLKS, VANILLA EXTRACT”), so too is
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`the coating made up of three components: Milk chocolate, “almonds roasted in vegetable oil,” and
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`coconut oil. The ingredients in the milk chocolate are further specified to show that it is made with
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`“sugar, whole milk powder, chocolate, cocoa butter, soy lecithin, [and] vanilla extract.” Compl.
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`¶ 44. As plaintiff concedes, those are the ingredients of “actual” chocolate, not “something less
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`than chocolate.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 54. So the ingredient list confirms the truth of the brief description that
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`comes from the front-of-package label. Vanilla ice cream? Check. Milk chocolate? Check.
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`Almonds? Check. Based on these uncontested facts that the ice cream bars contain milk chocolate,
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`plaintiff is wrong to say that the use of the phrase “milk chocolate” or pictures of chocolate is
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`misleading because of the presence of oil as another ingredient. Id. ¶ 44.
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`In short, the ice cream bar delivers exactly what the front label promises. There is no basis
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`to be surprised that the ice cream bar contains vegetable oil—which, as it turns out, is necessary
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`to bind the melted chocolatey coating to the frozen ice cream and to make the coating crunchy—
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`because Dreyer’s discloses the oil’s presence and never makes any contrary representation.
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`Plaintiff’s misinterpretation of FDA regulations, on the other hand—again, regulations not
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`relevant to whether plaintiff has stated a consumer deception claim—stems from incorrectly
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`conflating the ingredient milk chocolate, with the ice cream bar’s coating (a composite of
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`ingredients in which chocolate is the main one) and a stand-alone chocolate candy bar. See Compl.
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`¶¶ 17, 56 (quoting candy website owner’s expectations of “chocolate bars”). Unlike a chocolate
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`candy bar, an ice cream bar is a heterogeneous product, as the front packaging signals that the bar
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`contains ice cream, milk chocolate, and almonds. Indeed, those are the three primary ingredients
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`as detailed in the unchallenged ingredient statement. Id. ¶ 44.
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`This is the fourth time that plaintiff’s counsel, Spencer Sheehan, has sued Dreyer’s alleging
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`this precise deception theory. Mr. Sheehan filed two cases in the Southern District of New York,
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`and three weeks before filing the instant suit, he filed another copycat in the Southern District of
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`Illinois. See Sencen v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. 7:20cv4024 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 24,
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`3
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 10 of 21 PageID #:48
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`2020); Yu v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. 1:20cv8512 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 13, 2020);
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`Zurliene v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. 3:21cv747 (S.D. Ill. filed June 28, 2021). After a
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`motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Mr. Sheehan voluntarily dismissed Sencen. A motion to
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`dismiss in Yu is fully briefed and under submission. No. 1:20cv8512 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF Nos. 24, 25,
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`& 26. A summary of Mr. Sheehan’s history of dismissing and re-filing the same case before
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`different judges can be found at Sencen, No. 7:20cv4024 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 27, and at Kamara
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`v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., No. 1:20cv9012 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 32.
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`Regardless of the repeated filings and different forums, Mr. Sheehan’s theory of consumer
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`deception does not improve. Similarly, the complaint’s tag-along claims should also be dismissed.
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`Besides resting on the same implausible theory of deception as the false advertising claim, these
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`secondary causes of action suffer their own flaws and do not plead plausible claims for relief.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. manufactures, markets, and sells Häagen-Dazs® Vanilla
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`Milk Chocolate Almond Ice Cream Bars along with other varieties of coated ice cream bars.
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`Plaintiff Lawrence Rice alleges that the front packaging of the ice cream bars, which contains the
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`statement “vanilla ice cream dipped in rich milk chocolate and almonds” is deceptive because
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`plaintiff expected “a Product with a coating that contained chocolate ingredients and not an
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`appreciable amount of chocolate substitutes.” Compl. ¶ 98.
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`That allegation only begs the question, as plaintiff’s theory of deception hinges on how he
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`chooses to define “chocolate ingredients” and “chocolate substitutes.” As noted above, his
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`preferred definition for purposes of litigation comes from inapposite FDA ingredient-naming
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`regulations under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Plaintiff expressly and repeatedly
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`defines chocolate based on those regulations. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 55. In plaintiff’s view, those
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`regulations demand that if an ice cream bar coating contains both milk chocolate and oil, a
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`manufacturer must—each time the chocolate is mentioned on the label—reference the presence of
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`oil. As detailed below, however, plaintiff’s understanding is fundamentally wrong. The FDA
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`regulations expressly allow oil to be used in an ice cream bar’s chocolate coating provided that the
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`4
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 11 of 21 PageID #:49
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`
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`ingredient statement—where each ingredient is named in full—identifies the presence of the oil.
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`See 21 C.F.R. § 163.155. Adding oil to the ice cream bar’s chocolate coating does not make the
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`chocolate component any less chocolate regardless whether the presence of the oil in the coating
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`is declared each and every time chocolate is mentioned on the label.
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`ARGUMENT
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`To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
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`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
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`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility” only “when
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`the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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`defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Courts insist on “‘specificity in pleading’ . . .
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`to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with ‘no reasonably founded
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`hope’” of success. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (citations omitted).
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`In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court “begin[s] by
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`identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
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`assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. After that filtration, the court determines whether the
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`remaining factual allegations, accepted as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
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`This evaluation is necessarily “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
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`its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. (emphasis added). If the well-pleaded facts do not
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`permit the court “to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint fails to
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`show “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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`Claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS
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`505/1–12 (ICFA)—along with common law claims for fraud and fraud-based unjust enrichment—
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`are also subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened “particularity” standard. See, e.g., Pirelli Armstrong Tire
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`Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 441–42 (7th Cir. 2011).
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`
`
`5
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 12 of 21 PageID #:50
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`
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`I.
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`Plaintiff Has Not Stated A Plausible Claim That The Ice Cream Bars’ Packaging
`Violates The ICFA.
`
`To state a claim under the ICFA, plaintiff must demonstrate that the ice cream bars are
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`likely to mislead a reasonable consumer. Galanis v. Starbucks Corp., 2016 WL 6037962, at *2
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`(N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2016). Under this objective standard, courts ask whether the challenged
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`statement “can be read to create a likelihood of deception or to have the capacity to deceive.”
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`Bober v. Glaxo Wellcome PLC, 246 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001). A court may dismiss an ICFA
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`claim at the pleading stage “if the challenged statement was not misleading as a matter of law.”
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`Ibarrola v. Kind, LLC, 83 F. Supp. 3d 751, 756 (N.D. Ill. 2015); see also Guajardo v. Skechers
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`USA, Inc., 2021 WL 4302532, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2021) (ICFA claim dismissed at pleading
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`stage where plaintiff failed to allege “any direct statements . . . that contain material omissions.”).
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`A.
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`Plaintiff’s ICFA Claim Is A Preempted Attempt To Privately Enforce FDA
`Regulations.
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`To begin, the source of plaintiff’s supposed deception is a federal regulation defining a
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`standardized ingredient with the name “milk chocolate and [insert name of vegetable] oil coating.”
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`Compl. ¶¶ 12, 55 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 163.155(c)).
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`Plaintiff’s reliance on the regulation fails for at least three reasons: First, and as addressed
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`in the next section, even assuming violation of an FDA regulation, that is not synonymous with
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`consumer deception. Second, plaintiff lacks the power to enforce those regulations (21 U.S.C.
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`§ 337(a)) and a back-door attempt to enforce them through a state-law delivery device is impliedly
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`preempted. “[T]he Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not create a private right of action.” Turek
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`v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2011). Rather, “[t]he FDCA leaves no doubt that it is
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`the Federal Government rather than private litigants who are authorized to file suit for
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`noncompliance with its provisions.” Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349
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`n.4 (2001). What’s more, a consumer—in whatever state-law form—may not impose labelling
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`requirements that are not identical to federal requirements. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1. So when a litigant
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`brings a state law claim that also implicates regulated aspects of a food label, the complaint must
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`thread a “narrow gap” to escape implied preemption. Perez v. Nidek Co., 711 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th
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`6
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 13 of 21 PageID #:51
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`
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`Cir. 2013). “The plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the FDCA (or else the claim is
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`expressly preempted by [21 U.S.C. § 343-1]1), but the plaintiff must not be suing because his
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`conduct violates the FDCA (such a claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman).” In re
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`Medtronic, 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other
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`words, “private litigants may not ‘bring a state-law claim against a defendant when the state-law
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`claim is in substance (even if not in form) a claim for violating the FDCA.’” Loreto v. Procter &
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`Gamble Co., 515 F. App’x 576, 579 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
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`In repeatedly invoking FDA regulations about milk chocolate, the complaint reveals that,
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`“in substance,” plaintiff alleges that the ice cream bars’ front label is not compliant with 21 C.F.R.
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`§ 163.155(c). Id.; see Compl. ¶ 55. That regulation (among others) relates to a formalized
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`definition of chocolate—which is a standardized food (meaning, in FDA parlance, there is a
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`“standard of identity”). Standardized foods have specific elements (including ingredients)
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`identified in FDA regulations.
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`Plaintiff’s theory seeks to spin FDA regulations about standardized food into a state-law
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`consumer deception claim. In that way, he tries the same gambit that plaintiff’s same counsel
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`unsuccessfully tried elsewhere. See Barreto v. Westbrae Nat., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 3d 795, 805
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2021) (holding that alleged violations of FDA labeling requirements “cannot be re-
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`characterized as ‘deceptive’ simply on the grounds that they violate another statute which does not
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`allow for private enforcement” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The attempt should fail
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`here for the same reasons—plaintiff cannot plausibly claim that the phrase “milk chocolate” is
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`deceptive to a reasonable consumer without relying on the FDA’s regulations. See Patane v. Nestlé
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`Waters N. Am., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 375, 387 (D. Conn. 2018) (“Where a state law claim would
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`not exist but for a FDCA regulation, § 337(a) impliedly preempts the claim.”).
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`Third, plaintiff’s theory also fails because his interpretation of the FDA regulations is
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`legally incorrect. The pleading’s selective excerpts from FDA regulations ignore other provisions
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`1 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 is the FDCA food preemption counterpart to the FDCA preemption provision
`at issue in Buckman and Medtronic.
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`
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`7
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 14 of 21 PageID #:52
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`that undermine plaintiff’s proffered interpretation of food regulation. Most centrally, plaintiff’s
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`theory of liability conflates a “standard of identity” with a “statement of identity.” As noted in the
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`preceding paragraphs, standards of identity define the elements that must be present in
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`standardized food to qualify as the given food. For instance, to identify a product as “blue cheese”
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`the food must have a maximum moisture content of 46% by weight, must contain the mold
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`Penicillium roquefortii, and must be at least 60 days old. See 21 C.F.R. § 133.106(a).
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`There is no standard of identity for ice cream bars (there is one for ice cream). While there
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`is a standard of identity for “milk chocolate and vegetable fat coating” (Comp., ¶ 55), that doesn’t
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`apply here (let alone support consumer deception claims) because the product is not and does not
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`purport to be the standardized food “milk chocolate and vegetable oil.” Rather, those are two
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`ingredients in the product, and the product is an ice cream bar. And, as repeatedly stated already,
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`the ice cream bars’ ingredient list accurately identifies the chocolate with oil ingredient.
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`A statement of identity (rather than a standard of identity) is FDA’s nomenclature for the
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`name of the product, usually expressed as the “common or usual name of the food.” 21 C.F.R.
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`§ 101.3(b)(2). While only some foods have a standard of identity (required elements and defined
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`characteristics), all food products have a statement of identity (a name). The front label of the
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`food—also called the principal display panel—must include the statement of identity (i.e., the
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`name). Id. § 101.3(a). In other words, the front of the package must tell the consumer what the
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`product is (not what all of its elements, ingredients, and characteristics are). In trying to state a
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`claim, plaintiff blurs all of this.
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`Here, the common and usual name is “ice cream bars.” As they grab them from the grocer’s
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`freezer, consumers readily distinguish the bars from standard ice cream or chocolate bars, as they
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`know the coating and ice cream are the predominant features of the product. The product name
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`does not purport to declare the product as the standardized food “milk chocolate” or “milk
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`chocolate and vegetable oil.” Instead, a consumer immediately understands statements such as
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`“vanilla ice cream dipped in rich milk chocolate and almonds” as identifying what the ice cream
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`bar will taste like and what the overall product experience will be. The products’ principal display
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`
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`8
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 15 of 21 PageID #:53
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`panel accurately describes what the product is—using the common and usual name familiar to
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`consumers. The ingredient list, on the other hand, accurately discloses twice—and, counting the
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`“almonds roasted in vegetable oil,” four times—that vegetable oil can be found in the coating.
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`That is where that information should appear and where a consumer knows to look if the consumer
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`is interested in that information. These truthful statements comply with FDA regulations and
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`provide a consumer the information to make an informed purchasing decision.
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`B.
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`The Label Is Entirely True, And No Reasonable Consumer Could Be
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`Deceived.
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`Separate from plaintiff’s preempted attempt to base his claims on a (non-existent) violation
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`of federal food labeling regulations, the complaint fails to state a cause of action because no
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`reasonable consumer could be deceived by the ice cream bars’ label. Under the Seventh Circuit’s
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`“reasonable consumer” standard, a deceptive advertising claim that rests “on unreasonable or
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`fanciful interpretations of labels” can be “justifi[ably]” dismissed at the pleading stage. Bell v.
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`Publix Super Markets, Inc., 982 F.3d 468, 477 (7th Cir. 2020).
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`Plaintiff’s complaint fits the bill. Plaintiff’s idiosyncratic and strained interpretation of the
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`phrase “milk chocolate” to mean “no vegetable oils” cannot support a plausible deception claim.
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`An allegation of deception has nothing to do with conformity (or non-conformity) with federal
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`food standards or regulations, as “average consumers are not likely to be aware of the nuances of
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`the FDA’s regulations.” Id. at 482. It bears emphasizing that this is a “reasonable consumer” test—
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`not a standard based on the “least sophisticated consumer.” Weinstein v. eBay, Inc., 819 F. Supp.
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`2d 219, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Consumer protection statutes such as the ICFA “depend[ ] on the
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`likely reaction of a reasonable consumer rather than an ignoramus.” Fitzgerald v. Polar Corp.,
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`2020 WL 6586628, at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2020) (dismissing complaint that soft drink “made
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`from real ginger” label suggested health benefits).
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`Here, plaintiff cannot mount a plausible claim that reasonable consumers could be deceived
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`when an ice cream bar’s label says, “milk chocolate,” the product actually contains milk chocolate,
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`and it also contains oil (less than the milk chocolate and almonds), all of which is accurately listed
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`9
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`Case: 1:21-cv-03814 Document #: 17 Filed: 11/08/21 Page 16 of 21 PageID #:54
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`on the label and no label statement disclaims the presence of oil.2 Thus, there cannot be