Case: 1:22-cv-00385 Document #: 1 Filed: 01/24/22 Page 1 of 79 PageID #:1
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`Civil Action No.: 1:22-cv-00385
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`COMPLAINT
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`Jury Trial Demanded
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` ALDI INC.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`AGRI STATS, INC.; CLEMENS FOOD
`GROUP, LLC; CLEMENS FAMILY
`CORPORATION; HORMEL FOODS
`CORPORATION; HORMEL FOODS
`LLC; SEABOARD CORPORATION;
`SEABOARD FOODS LLC; SMITHFIELD
`FOODS, INC.; TRIUMPH FOODS, LLC;
`TYSON FOODS, INC.; TYSON
`PREPARED FOODS, INC.; and TYSON
`FRESH MEATS, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
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`

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`Table of Contents
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`NATURE OF ACTION ..................................................................................................................... 1
`I.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ........................................................................................................ 4
`II.
`PARTIES ........................................................................................................................................ 5
`III.
`A. Plaintiff ALDI INC. ....................................................................................................................... 5
`B. Defendants ...................................................................................................................................... 5
`a. Agri Stats .................................................................................................................................... 5
`b. Clemens ...................................................................................................................................... 6
`c. Hormel ........................................................................................................................................ 6
`d.
`Seaboard ..................................................................................................................................... 7
`e.
`Smithfield ................................................................................................................................... 8
`f.
`Triumph...................................................................................................................................... 8
`g.
`Tyson ........................................................................................................................................... 8
`h. Co-Conspirators ........................................................................................................................ 9
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ...................................................................................................... 10
`IV.
`A. Agri Stats’ Central Role in Collusion in the Broiler Industry ................................................. 10
`B. Agri Stats Markets its Collusive Scheme to Defendants........................................................... 12
`C. Agri Stats’ Detailed Reports Enable the Producer Defendants to Accurately Assess and
`Monitor their Competitors’ Production Levels ................................................................................. 18
`D.
`Producer Defendants Are Vertically-Integrated Companies that Control the Production
`and Supply of Pork in the United States ............................................................................................. 26
`E. The Pork Industry is Highly-Concentrated, Which was Optimal for Defendants’
`Conspiratorial Scheme ......................................................................................................................... 30
`F. Barriers to Entry .......................................................................................................................... 35
`G.
`Inelastic Demand and Standardized, Commodity Products Where Competition is
`Principally on Price Facilitated Collusion in the Pork Industry ...................................................... 35
`H.
`Opportunities to Collude at Industry Conferences and Trade Association Meetings.... 36
`V.
`THE PRODUCER DEFENDANTS’ CURTAILMENT OF PORK PRODUCTION ........... 43
`A.
`Smithfield ............................................................................................................................. 46
`B.
` Tyson ........................................................................................................................................ 47
`C.
` Hormel ..................................................................................................................................... 47
`D.
`Seaboard............................................................................................................................... 48
`E. Triumph.................................................................................................................................... 48
`F.
` Clemens ................................................................................................................................... 48
`G.
`Co-Conspirator Indiana Packers ....................................................................................... 49
`ABNORMAL PRICING AND THE EFFECT ON PLAINTIFF IN THE FORM OF
`VI.
`HIGHER PRICES .................................................................................................................................... 61
`
`

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`VII. OVERCHARGES FROM THE CARTEL REFLECTED IN HIGHER PORK PRICES
`PLAINTIFF PAID .................................................................................................................................... 65
`VIII.
`DOJ's CRIMINAL ANTITRUST PROSECUTION IN BROILER CHICKENS
`SUPPORTS AN INFERENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SIMILAR CONSPIRACY IN PORK
`69
`PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE TIMELY ................................................................................... 70
`IX.
`A. Continuing Violation ................................................................................................................... 70
`B. American Pipe Tolling .................................................................................................................. 70
`C. Fraudulent Concealment ............................................................................................................. 71
`X.
`ANTITRUST INJURY ................................................................................................................ 72
`XI.
`VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT ..................................................... 73
`XII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................................... 75
`XIII.
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED .................................................................................................. 75
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`

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`Plaintiff ALDI INC., by and through its undersigned counsel, files this Complaint against
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`the Defendants identified below for their illegal conspiracy, which increased the prices of pork
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`sold in the United States beginning at least as early as 2009 and continuing through the present.
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`Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants for treble damages, and for such other damages to
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`the maximum extent allowed under the antitrust laws of the United States, and demands a trial by
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`jury.
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`I.
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`NATURE OF ACTION
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`1.
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`The pork producer defendants are the leading suppliers of pork in an industry with
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`approximately $20 billion in annual commerce in the United States. The United States pork
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`industry is highly concentrated, with a small number of large companies controlling the supply.
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`Defendants and their Co-Conspirators collectively control over 80 percent of the wholesale pork
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`market.
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`2.
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`Defendants Agri Stats, Clemens, Hormel, Seaboard, Smithfield, Triumph, and
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`Tyson entered, along with Co-Conspirator Indiana Packers Corporation, into a conspiracy from at
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`least 2009 to the present (the “Conspiracy Period”) to fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the price
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`of pork.1 The defendants, other than Agri Stats, are referred to here collectively as the “Producer
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`Defendants.”
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`1 For the purposes of this Complaint, “pork” includes, but is not limited to, a variety of meat products from
`pigs (also referred to in the industry as porcine or swine) purchased fresh, frozen, processed, rendered or
`non-rendered, including but not limited to any and all processed pork products, (e.g., smoked ham, sausage,
`bacon, pepperoni, lunch meats), and other processed products and by-products containing pork. “Pork by-
`products” can include, but is not limited to, offal and individual parts or organs from pigs used in pet foods
`(e.g., livers, kidneys, lungs, hearts, cheeks) and/or rendered products (e.g., meat meals and bone meals).
`From time to time in this complaint, “pork” and “swine” are used interchangeably, particularly when
`referring to the pork or swine industry.
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`

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`3.
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`One method by which Defendants implemented and executed their conspiracy was
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`by coordinating output and limiting production with the intent and expected result of increasing
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`pork prices in the United States.
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`4.
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`In furtherance of their conspiracy, the Producer Defendants exchanged detailed,
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`competitively sensitive, and closely guarded non-public information, such as prices, capacity,
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`production, sales volume, and demand, including through their co-conspirator, Defendant Agri Stats.
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`5.
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`Beginning in at least 2009, Defendant Agri Stats began providing highly sensitive
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`“benchmarking” reports to the Producer Defendants. Legitimate benchmarking allows competitors
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`to compare their profits or performance against that of other companies. Yet Agri Stats’ reports
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`are unlike those of lawful industry reports; rather, Agri Stats gathers detailed financial and
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`production data from each of the Producer Defendants and their Co-Conspirator Indiana Packers,
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`standardizes this information, and produces customized reports and graphs for the conspirators.
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`The type of information available in these reports is not the type of information that competitors
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`would provide each other in a normal, competitive market.
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`6.
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`On at least a monthly basis, and often far more frequently (e.g., weekly or every other
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`week), Agri Stats provides the Producer Defendants with current and forward-looking sensitive
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`information (such as profits, costs, prices and slaughter information), and regularly provides the keys
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`to deciphering which data belong to which participant. The effect of this information exchange was
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`to allow the pork producers to monitor each other’s production, and therefore control supply and price
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`in furtherance of their anticompetitive scheme.
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`7.
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`The data exchanged through Agri Stats also bears all the hallmarks of the
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`enforcement and implementation mechanism of a price-fixing scheme. First, the data are current
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`and forward-looking—which courts have consistently held has “the greatest potential for generating
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`2
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`

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`anticompetitive effects.”2 Second, information contained in Agri Stats reports is specific to pork
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`producers—including information on profits, prices, costs, and production levels—instead of being
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`aggregated as industry averages to avoid transactional specificity and the easy identification of
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`specific producers. Third, none of the Agri Stats information was publicly available. Agri Stats is a
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`subscription service that required the Co-Conspirators to pay millions of dollars over the Conspiracy
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`Period—far in excess of any other pricing and production indices. Agri Stats ensured that its detailed,
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`sensitive business information was available only to the co-conspirators and not to any buyers in the
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`market. Defendants utilize the information exchanges through Agri Stats in furtherance of their
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`conspiracy to fix, raise, stabilize, and maintain artificially inflated prices for pork sold in the United
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`States.
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`8.
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`While Defendants went to great lengths to keep the existence of the conspiracy a
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`secret, they admitted in public calls that they had discussed production cuts at least once and
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`publicly signaled to each other that no supply increases would happen. Furthermore, each
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`Defendant engaged in acts in furtherance of the conspiracy by participating in such supply cuts
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`and by limiting increases in supply that otherwise would have occurred.
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`9.
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`In addition, there are numerous “plus factors” in the pork industry during the
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`relevant period, including but not limited to multiple industry characteristics which facilitate
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`collusion, such as vertically integrated operations, high barriers to entry preventing competitors
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`from coming into the market, high pork industry consolidation and concentration, inelastic supply
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`and demand, and homogeneity of pork products.3
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`2 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 2011 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (quoting United States v. Gypsum
`Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
`3 Pork is homogenous within cut type—e.g., pork bellies produced by two different Defendants are
`virtually indistinguishable.
`
`3
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`

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`10.
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`Defendants’ purposeful restriction of pork supply had the intended effect of
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`increasing pork prices to Plaintiff. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff paid
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`artificially inflated prices for pork during the Conspiracy Period. Such prices exceeded the amount
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`Plaintiff would have paid if the price for pork had been determined by a competitive market. Thus,
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`Plaintiff was injured in its businesses or property by Defendants’ unlawful conduct.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`11.
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`This action arises under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and Section
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`4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), and seeks to recover treble damages, costs of suit, and
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`reasonable attorneys’ fees for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff resulting from Defendants’
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`conspiracy to restrain trade in the pork market. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28
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`U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), 1407, and 15 U.S.C. § 15.
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`12.
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`Venue is proper in this District under 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a); 22 and 28 U.S.C. §§
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`1391(b); (c); and (d) because during the relevant period, Defendants resided, transacted business,
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`were found, or had agents in this District, and a substantial portion of Defendants’ alleged wrongful
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`conduct affecting interstate trade and commerce was carried out in this District.
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`13.
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`Defendants are amenable to service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)
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`and the Illinois long-arm statute 735 ILCS 5/2-209, because each Defendant has transacted
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`business in this state and because the Illinois long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the limits of
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`Due Process, and each Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Illinois to
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`satisfy Due Process.
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`14.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant because each Defendant
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`– throughout the U.S. and including in this District and the state of Illinois – has transacted
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`business, maintained substantial contacts, or committed overt acts in furtherance of its illegal
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`scheme and conspiracy. The alleged scheme and conspiracy have been directed at, and had the
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`4
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`intended effect of, causing injury to persons and entities residing in, located in, or doing business
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`throughout the U.S., including in this District and the state of Illinois.
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`III. PARTIES
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`A.
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`15.
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`Plaintiff ALDI INC.
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`Plaintiff ALDI is an Illinois corporation with its headquarters in Batavia, Illinois.
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`From 2009 to the present, Plaintiff and/or its affiliates purchased pork at artificially inflated prices
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`directly from one or more Producer Defendants, and/or their affiliates or agents, and suffered injury
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`to its business or property as a direct or proximate result of all Defendant’s wrongful conduct.
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`B.
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`Defendants
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`a.
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`Agri Stats
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`16.
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`Agri Stats, Inc. is an Indiana corporation located in Fort Wayne, Indiana and was,
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`for a portion of the Conspiracy Period, a subsidiary of Eli Lilly & Co., a publicly held corporation
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`headquartered in Indianapolis. Agri Stats is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Agri Stats Omega
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`Holding Co. LP, a limited partnership based in Indiana. Agri Stats is a co-conspirator of the
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`Producer Defendants and has knowingly played an important and active role by participating in
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`and facilitating the Producer Defendants’ collusive scheme detailed in this Complaint. Agri Stats
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`has a unique and deep relationship with the pork industry generally, and specifically with each of
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`the Defendants identified below, all of which are Agri Stats’ primary customers. Defendants
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`Clemens, Hormel, Seaboard, Triumph, Smithfield, and Tyson, and Co-Conspirator Indiana
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`Packers, are all Agri Stats subscribers and report a wide variety of information to Agri Stats, which,
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`according to a 2016 Eli Lilly earnings call, is used by “over 90% of the poultry and pig market” in
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`the United States.
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`17.
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`All of Agri Stats’ wrongful actions described in this Complaint are part of, and in
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`furtherance of, the unlawful conduct alleged herein, and were authorized, ordered, or engaged in
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`5
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`by Agri Stats’ various officers, agents, employers, or other representatives while actively engaged
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`in the management and operation of Agri Stats’ business affairs within the course and scope of
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`their duties and employment, or with Agri Stats’ actual apparent or ostensible authority. Agri Stats
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`used the instrumentalities of interstate commerce to facilitate the conspiracy, and its conduct was
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`within the flow of, was intended to, and did have a substantial effect on the interstate commerce
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`of the U.S., including in this District.
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`b.
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`Clemens
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`18.
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`Clemens Food Group, LLC is a limited-liability company headquartered in
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`Hatfield, Pennsylvania. During the Conspiracy Period, Clemens Food Group, LLC and/or its
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`predecessors, wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold pork in interstate
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`commerce, directly or through its wholly owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United
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`States, including in this District.
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`19.
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`The Clemens Family Corporation is a Pennsylvania corporation headquartered in
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`Hatfield, Pennsylvania, and the parent company of Clemens Food Group, LLC. During the
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`Conspiracy Period, The Clemens Family Corporation and/or its predecessors, wholly owned or
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`controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly
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`owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States, including in this District.
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`20.
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`The Clemens Food Group, LLC and the Clemens Family Corporation are referred
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`to here collectively as “Clemens.” Clemens reports a wide variety of pork data to Agri Stats,
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`including, without limitation, highly-detailed, confidential information regarding its production
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`and sales of pork.
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`c.
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`Hormel
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`21.
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`Hormel Foods Corporation is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Austin,
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`Minnesota. During the Conspiracy Period, Hormel Foods Corporation and/or its predecessors,
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`6
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`wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates, including but not limited to Hormel Foods,
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`LLC sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly owned or controlled affiliates,
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`to purchasers in the United States, including in this District.
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`22.
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`Hormel Foods, LLC is a Minnesota corporation headquartered in Austin,
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`Minnesota. Hormel Foods, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Hormel Foods
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`Corporation. During the Conspiracy Period, Hormel Foods Corporation and/or its predecessors,
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`wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold pork in interstate commerce, directly
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`or through its wholly owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States, including
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`in this District.
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`23.
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`Hormel Foods, LLC and Hormel Foods Corporation are referred to here
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`collectively as “Hormel.” Hormel reports a wide variety of pork data to Agri Stats, including,
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`without limitation, highly-detailed, confidential information regarding its production and sales of
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`pork.
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`d.
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`Seaboard
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`24.
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`Seaboard Foods LLC is a limited-liability company headquartered in Shawnee
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`Mission, Kansas, and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Seaboard Corporation. During the
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`Conspiracy Period, Seaboard Foods LLC and/or its predecessors, wholly owned or controlled
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`subsidiaries, or affiliates sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly owned
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`or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States, including in this District.
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`25.
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`Seaboard Corporation is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Merriam,
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`Kansas, and is the parent company of Seaboard Foods LLC. During the Conspiracy Period,
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`Seaboard Corporation and/or its predecessors, wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or
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`affiliates sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly owned or controlled
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`affiliates, to purchasers in the United States, including in this District.
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`7
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`26.
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`Seaboard Corporation and Seaboard Foods LLC are referred to here collectively
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`as “Seaboard.” Seaboard reports a wide variety of pork data to Agri Stats, including, without
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`limitation, highly-detailed, confidential information regarding its production and sales of pork.
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`e.
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`Smithfield
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`27.
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`Smithfield Foods, Inc. is incorporated in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and an
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`indirect wholly owned subsidiary of WIT Group Limited, a Chinese company. Smithfield Foods
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`is headquartered in Smithfield, Virginia, and reports a wide variety of pork data to Agri Stats,
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`including, without limitation, highly-detailed, confidential information regarding its production
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`and sales of pork. During the Conspiracy Period, Smithfield Foods, Inc. and/or its predecessors,
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`wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or
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`through its wholly owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States, including in
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`this District.
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`f.
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`Triumph
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`28.
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`Triumph Foods, LLC is a limited-liability company headquartered in St. Joseph,
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`Missouri, and reports a wide variety of pork data to Agri Stats, including, without limitation,
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`highly-detailed, confidential information regarding its production and sales of pork. During the
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`Conspiracy Period, Triumph Foods, LLC and/or its predecessors, wholly owned or controlled
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`subsidiaries, or affiliates (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Triumph”) sold pork in interstate
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`commerce, directly or through its wholly owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United
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`States, including in this District.
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`g.
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`Tyson
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`29.
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`Tyson Foods, Inc. is a publicly traded Delaware corporation headquartered in
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`Springdale, Arkansas. During the Conspiracy Period, Tyson Foods, Inc. and/or its predecessors,
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`wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or
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`8
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`through its wholly owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States, including in
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`this District.
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`30.
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`Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Springdale,
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`Arkansas and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc. During the Conspiracy Period,
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`Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc. sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly-owned
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`or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States, including in this District.
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`29.
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`Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Springdale,
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`Arkansas and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc. During the Conspiracy Period,
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`Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly-owned or
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`controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States, including in this District.
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`30.
`
`Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc. and Tyson Foods, Inc. are
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`referred to here collectively as “Tyson.” Tyson reports a wide variety of pork data to Agri Stats,
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`including, without limitation, highly-detailed, confidential information regarding its production
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`and sales of pork.
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`h.
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`Co-Conspirators
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`31.
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`Co-Conspirator Indiana Packers Corporation
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`is an Indiana corporation
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`headquartered in Delphi, Indiana, and reports a wide variety of pork data to Agri Stats, including,
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`without limitation, highly-detailed, confidential information regarding its production and sales of
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`pork. During the Conspiracy Period, Indiana Packers Corporation and/or its predecessors, wholly
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`owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Indiana
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`Packers”) sold pork in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly owned or controlled
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`affiliates, to purchasers in the United States. Indiana Packers Corporation’s parent companies are
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`Itoham Foods, Inc., Mitsubishi Corporation, and Mitsubishi Corporation (Americas).
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`9
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`32.
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`Various other persons, firms, and corporations not named as defendants have
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`performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy. Defendants are jointly and
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`severally liable for the acts of their Co-Conspirators whether or not named as defendants in this
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`Complaint. Throughout this Complaint, Indiana Packers and the other persons, firms, and
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`corporations not named as defendants that performed acts and made statements in furtherance of
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`the conspiracy are collectively referred to as “Co-Conspirators.”
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`IV.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`
`33.
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`Starting in at least 2009 and continuing to the present, each of Defendants and
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`their Co-conspirators conspired to fix, raise, maintain and stabilize pork prices. To effectuate and
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`ensure the stability of their anticompetitive agreement, each of the Producer Defendants relied on
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`a unique industry data sharing service provided by Defendant Agri Stats, Inc. Agri Stats provided
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`a means for each of the Producer Defendants to obtain and monitor critical and competitively
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`sensitive business information regarding each other’s production metrics, thereby serving as a
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`central and critical part of each of the Defendants’ price-fixing scheme, resulting in a stable and
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`successful anticompetitive cartel.
`
`A.
`
`34.
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`Agri Stats’ Central Role in Collusion in the Broiler Industry
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`Agri Stats has played a central role in collusion in other industries, including
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`involvement in the broiler chicken industry. As alleged in the In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust
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`Litigation, No. 16-cv-08637 (N.D. Ill.), the broiler producers used Agri Stats to implement their
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`conspiracy to restrain production and inflate prices.
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`35.
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`In the broiler industry, Agri Stats collected and disseminated to the other members
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`of the conspiracy disaggregated financial information (such as monthly operating profit, sales and
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`cost per live pound), production volumes, capacity, slaughter information, inventory levels, and
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`sales data by finished product form and type, amongst other competitively sensitive business
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`10
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`information. Agri Stats reports contain line-by-line entries for plants, lines, and yields of various
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`broiler facilities. Agri Stats relied upon (and the co-conspirators agreed to) a detailed audit process
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`to verify the accuracy of data from each broiler producer’s facilities, sometimes directly contacting
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`co-conspirators to verify the data. Agri Stats also provided detailed price reports to the broiler
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`industry through its subsidiary, Express Markets, Inc., also known as EMI. Agri Stats collected
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`data from the broiler producers weekly and provided its reports to broiler producers weekly and
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`monthly.
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`36.
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`The detail of these reports ensured that the broiler chicken producers could
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`quickly decode the information of their purported competitors. It was common knowledge that the
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`detail of these Agri Stats reports allowed any reasonably informed producer to discern the identity
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`of the competitors’ individual broiler complexes and facilities. The broiler reports, in parts,
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`contained so few producers participating that the identities were obvious. Other reports contained
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`such detailed data that it could be matched with the publicly stated aggregate data for larger broiler
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`co-conspirators such as Tyson. Agri Stats purposefully circulated this information to top
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`executives to facilitate their agreement on supply constraints and price.
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`37.
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`In the broiler industry, Agri Stats – known to its co-conspirators as a willing
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`conduit for illicit information exchanges – conveyed information to the broiler chicken co-
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`conspirators that furthered the conspiracy’s purposes by reassuring them that production cuts
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`would continue, and inducing the broiler chicken co-conspirators to continue to act in concert to
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`ensure that the cuts continued. Agri Stats’ statements in the broiler industry facilitated the
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`implementation of the agreement to restrict supply.
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`11
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`

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`Case: 1:22-cv-00385 Document #: 1 Filed: 01/24/22 Page 15 of 79 PageID #:15
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`38.
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`When it denied motions to dismiss in In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation,
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`the district court noted that given the nature of the Agri Stats reports, the co-conspirators were
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`sharing information, which raises significant antitrust concerns.4
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`B.
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`39.
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`Agri Stats Markets its Collusive Scheme to Defendants
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`The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), the U.S. Department of Agriculture
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`(“USDA”), and various other entities publish publicly available aggregated daily, weekly,
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`monthly, and annual supply and pricing information concerning the U.S. pork industry, including:
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`the CME Lean Hog Index, which reflects prices paid for hogs in the U.S.; the CME Pork Cutout
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`Index, which reflects the prices paid for pork (a “cutout’ is the approximate value of a hog
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`calculated using the prices paid for wholesale cuts of pork); and USDA’s National Daily Hog and
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`Pork Summary. The pricing and production information in those reports and indices is completely
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`anonymous and aggregated (or averaged), and indeed the USDA reports clearly state that certain
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`prices are “not reported due to confidentiality.”
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`40.
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`Only Agri Stats receives from each of the Producer Defendants, and then provides
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`to all of the Producer Defendants, detailed information to accurately determine producer-specific
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`production, costs, and general efficiency. Agri Stats is a company that generates confidential pork
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`industry data considerably more detailed than any similar types of available reports, and the Agri
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`Stats reports include the following data categories:
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`a) Performance Summary;
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`b) Feed Mill;
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`c)
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`Ingredient Purchasing;
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`d) Weaned-Pig Production;
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`4 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 11, In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, No. 16-cv-
`08637 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2017), ECF No. 541.
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`12
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`Case: 1:22-cv-00385 Document #: 1 Filed: 01/24/22 Page 16 of 79 PageID #:16
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`e) Nursery;
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`f) Finishing;
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`g) Wean-to-Finish;
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`h) Market Haul; and
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`i) Financial information, including profits and sales.
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`41.
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`Much of the information shared by Agri Stats and the Producer Defendants was
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`unnecessary to achieve any benefits for pork producers. Exchanging individual company data
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`(particularly current data on prices and costs) is not required to achieve major efficiencies. In a
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`competitive market, the participants would closely protect such proprietary information from
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`disclosure as providing it to competitors would be disadvantageous—unless, of course, there is an
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`agreement that the competitors will use the information to the joint benefit of each other as was
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`the situation in the pork industry.
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`42.
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`Agri Stats describes itself as a “benchmarking” service that “allows organizations
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`to develop plans on how to ado