Case: 1:22-cv-02480 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/11/22 Page 1 of 33 PageID #:1
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`Case No. 1:22-cv-02480
`
`ADRIAN COSS and MARIBEL OCAMPO,
`individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
`
`v.
`
`SNAP INC.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`Defendant.
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`NOW COME the Plaintiffs, ADRIAN COSS and MARIBEL OCAMPO, by and
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`through their counsel, James C. Vlahakis, and state as follows:
`
`I.
`
`Introduction & Summary of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
`
`1.
`
`Plaintiffs MARIBEL OCAMPO and ADRIAN COSS (hereafter “Plaintiffs”) are
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`citizens of Illinois and reside in the Northern District of Illinois.
`
`2.
`
`Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ privacy rights as codified
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`by the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. (“BIPA”).
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`3.
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`BIPA was enacted in 2008 for the purpose of addressing a "very serious
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`need for protections for the citizens of Illinois when it [comes to their] biometric
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`information." Illinois House Transcript, 2008 Reg. Session No. 276.
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`4.
`
`BIPA’s express Legislative Findings provide as follows:
`
`(a) The use of biometrics is growing in the business and security
`screening sectors and appears to promise streamlined financial
`transactions and security screenings.
`
`(b) Major national corporations have selected the City of Chicago and
`other locations in this State as pilot testing sites for new applications
`of biometric-facilitated financial transactions, including finger-scan
`technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias.
`
`(c) Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to
`access finances or other sensitive information. For example, social
`security numbers, when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics,
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`however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once
`compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for
`identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated
`transactions.
`
`(d) An overwhelming majority of members of the public are weary of the
`use of biometrics when such information is tied to finances and other
`personal information.
`
`law regulating the collection, use,
`limited State
`(e) Despite
`safeguarding, and storage of biometrics, many members of the public
`are deterred
`from partaking
`in biometric
`identifier-facilitated
`transactions.
`
`(f) The full ramifications of biometric technology are not fully known.
`
`(g) The public welfare, security, and safety will be served by regulating
`the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and
`destruction of biometric identifiers and information.
`
`740 ILCS 14/5.
`
`
`5.
`
`BIPA prohibits private entities from collecting, capturing, purchasing,
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`receiving through trade, or otherwise obtaining a person's biometric information unless
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`the private entity: (1) informs that person in writing that identifiers and information will
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`be collected and/or stored; (2) informs the person in writing of the specific purpose and
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`length for which the identifiers or information is being collected, stored or used; (3)
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`receives a written release from the person for the collection of that data; and (4)
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`publishes publicly available written retention schedules and guidelines for permanently
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`destroying said data. See 740 ILCS 14/15(a) and (b).
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`6.
`
`The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that BIPA was enacted to
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`preserve an individual’s right to privacy and control over his/her/their biometric data:
`
`Through the Act, our General Assembly has codified that individuals
`possess a right to privacy in and control over their biometric identifiers
`and biometric information. The duties imposed on private entities by
`section 15 of the Act (740 ILCS 14/15 (West 2016)) regarding the
`collection, retention, disclosure, and destruction of a person's or
`customer's biometric identifiers or biometric information define the
`contours of that statutory right. Accordingly, when a private entity fails to
`comply with one of section 15's requirements, that violation constitutes an
`invasion, impairment, or denial of the statutory rights of any person or
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`customer whose biometric identifier or biometric information is subject to
`the breach.
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`* * *
`
`The Act vests in individuals and customers the right to control their
`biometric information by requiring notice before collection and giving them
`the power to say no by withholding consent. . . . When a private entity fails
`to adhere to the statutory procedures, as defendants are alleged to have
`done here, "the right of the individual to maintain his or her biometric
`privacy vanishes into thin air. The precise harm the Illinois legislature
`sought to prevent is then realized." This is no mere "technicality." The
`injury is real and significant.
`
`Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 432 Ill. Dec. 654, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (Ill. 2019)).
`
`7.
`
`Defendant Snap Inc. (“Defendant” or “Snap”) is a Delaware corporation
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`with its principal place of business located in Santa Monica, California.
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`8.
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`Defendant is a publicly traded company, and is listed on the New York
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`Stock Exchange under the trading symbol "SNAP."
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`9.
`
`Defendant is the owner and operator of a “Snapchat”.
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`10. Defendant has described itself as “a camera company.” See, Defendant’s
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`Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2022, at p. 10.
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`11.
`
`Snap’s Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2022, is located at
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`https://investor.snap.com/financials/sec-filings/sec-filings-
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`details/default.aspx?FilingId=157450811
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`12. Defendant has described “Snapchat” as its “flagship product. Id.
`
`13.
`
`Snapchat “is a camera application that was created to help people
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`communicate through short videos and images called ‘Snaps.’” Id.
`
`14.
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`As detailed below, Snapchat utilizes technology that is subject to BIPA.
`
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`1 A pdf version of this document is hosted at https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-
`0001564408/c10435fc-36f6-4f32-b8f0-f1617a9e1e8a.pdf
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`15.
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`As detailed below, certain technology utilized by Snapchat required
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`Defendant to obtain informed written consent from Shapchat users before Defendant
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`was able to acquire the biometric identifiers and/or biometric information of Snapchat
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`users.
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`16.
`
`Plaintiff Coss has utilized the Snapchat app. to create and post Snaps by
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`and through the Snapchat app.
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`17.
`
`Plaintiff Ocampo has utilized the Snapchat app. to create and post Snaps
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`by and through the Snapchat app.
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`18.
`
`Plaintiff Coss has utilized the Snapchat app. to create and post
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`photographic based Snaps where the Snaps involved their unique facial features.
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`19.
`
`Plaintiff Ocampo has utilized the Snapchat app. to create and post
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`photographic based Snaps where the Snaps involved their unique facial features.
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`20.
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`Plaintiff Coss has utilized the Snapchat app. to create and post video based
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`Snaps where the Snaps involved their unique facial features.
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`21.
`
`Plaintiff Ocampo utilized the Snapchat app. to create and post video based
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`Snaps where the Snaps involved their unique facial features.
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`22.
`
`Plaintiff Coss has utilized the Snapchat app. to create and post Snaps that
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`depicted their unique voices.
`
`23.
`
`Plaintiff Ocampo utilized the Snapchat app. to create and post Snaps that
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`depicted their unique voices.
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`24.
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`As described below, Defendant has violated Plaintiffs’ privacy rights in
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`violation of rights and prohibitions set forth by BIPA.
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`25. On November 26, 2021, Plaintiff Coss has opted out of Defendant’s
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`arbitration clause that was contained within Defendant’s Terms of Service dated
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`November 15, 2021.
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`26. Defendant acknowledged receipt of Plaintiff Coss’ opt-out request at 1:13
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`p.m. on November 26, 2021.
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`27. On November 28, 2021, Plaintiff Ocampo has opted out of Defendant’s
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`arbitration clause that was contained within Defendant’s Terms of Service dated
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`November 15, 2021.
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`28.
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`In November and December of 2020, More than forty (40) Illinois users of
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`Snapchat have opted out of opted out of Defendant’s arbitration clause that was
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`contained within Defendant’s Terms of Service dated November 15, 2021.
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`II.
`
`Jurisdiction and Venue
`
`29.
`
`Section 20 of BIPA provides Plaintiffs with a private right of action to assert
`
`violations of BIPA. See, Rosenbach, 432 Ill. Dec. at 660, 129 N.E.3d at 1203; Bryant v.
`
`Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2020).
`
`30.
`
`The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d),
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`provides jurisdiction for civil action on the basis of a diversity of citizenship, if the
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`amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.
`
`31. CAFA, in relevant part, states as follows:
`
`(2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
`in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
`$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in
`which—
`
`(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
`from any defendant[.]
`
`***
`
`(6) In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall
`be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds
`the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
`
`28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1332(d)(6).
`
`32.
`
`For federal jurisdiction to exist under CAFA, more than 100 putative class
`
`members should theoretically exist. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
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`33. Under CAFA, claims of individual class members are aggregated for the
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`purposes of ascertaining whether jurisdiction is proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
`
`34.
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`As discussed in the previous Section, Plaintiffs are citizens of the State of
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`Illinois and Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
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`located in Santa Monica, California. Based upon this diversity of citizenship, Plaintiffs
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`have satisfied Section 1332(d)(2) of CAFA.
`
`35.
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`This civil action is styled as a putative class action where liquidated
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`damages for each violation of BIPA may result in liquidated damages of up to $5,000.
`
`36. Defendant’s most recent Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-
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`Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2022, claims that “Daily Active Users, or
`
`DAUs, increased 18% year-over-year to 332 million in Q1 2022.” See, Defendant’s Form
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`10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2022, at p. 25.
`
`37. Defendant defines “Daily Active Users” “as a registered Snapchat user who
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`opens the Snapchat application at least once during a defined 24-hour period.” Id. at p.
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`26.
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`38. Given the volume of Snapchat users, is plausible to allege that at least
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`50,000 to 500,000 Snaps have been created and posted by putative class members who
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`are residents of the State of Illinois.
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`39. CAFA jurisdiction is satisfied pursuant to Sections 1332(d)(2) and (6) of
`
`CAFA because even if a trier of fact determines that Defendant negligently violated BIPA,
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`liability as to 5,001 violations would result in 5 million dollars in liquidated damages.
`
`40. CAFA jurisdiction is also satisfied pursuant to Sections 1332(d)(2) and (6)
`
`of CAFA because if a trier of fact in this civil action determines that Defendant
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`intentionally or recklessly violated a provision of BIPA, a finding of 1,001 violations
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`would result in over 5 million dollars of liquidated damages.
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`41.
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`As reported in Defendant’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending
`
`March 31, 2022, Defendant has recognized that BIPA litigation “could seriously harm
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`our business”. See, Defendant’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31,
`
`2022, pdf at p. 62.
`
`42. Defendant’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2022,
`
`states as follows:
`
`From time to time, we are involved in class-action lawsuits and
`other litigation matters that are expensive and time-consuming
`and could seriously harm our business.
`
`We are involved in numerous lawsuits, including putative class-
`action lawsuits brought by users and investors, some of which may
`claim statutory damages. We anticipate that we will continue to be a
`target for lawsuits in the future. Because we have millions of users,
`class-action lawsuits against us that are purportedly filed by or on
`behalf of users typically claim enormous monetary damages in the
`aggregate even if the alleged per-user harm is small or nonexistent. For
`example, in November 2020, a putative class filed an action against us
`in Illinois, alleging that we violated Illinois’ Biometric Information
`Privacy Act, or BIPA, with respect to many Illinois users of Snapchat
`and that we are liable to those users for statutory damages. We
`compelled arbitration, which the court granted, dismissing the case
`and ordering the parties to arbitrate the matter; that ruling compelling
`arbitration was recently upheld on appeal. Some plaintiffs’ attorneys
`have also indicated a desire to initiate arbitrations against us, arguing
`that we violated BIPA, in some cases on behalf of large numbers of
`Illinois users. We believe we have meritorious defenses to these
`lawsuits and arbitrations, but an unfavorable outcome in these
`lawsuits or arbitrations could seriously harm our business.
`
`See, Defendant’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2022, at p. 62.
`
`43.
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) provides that “[a] civil action may be brought in –
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`(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise
`
`to the claim occurred[.]”
`
`44.
`
`Venue is proper in this judicial district, a substantial part of the events or
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`omissions giving rise to Defendant’s below described violations of BIPA took place within
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`the State of Illinois and this judicial district.
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`45.
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`Venue is also proper in this judicial district because Plaintiffs are citizens
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`of the State of Illinois and they seek to vindicate their rights as provided by Illinois law.
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`46.
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`Further, venue is proper in this judicial district because Defendant’s
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`conduct has harmed Plaintiffs and putative class members who are all citizens of the
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`State of Illinois and Plaintiffs live within the confines of the Northern District of Illinois.
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`II. Defined Terms, Statutory Prohibitions and Allowable Damages
`
`47. BIPA defines “Biometric identifier” as follows:
`
`"Biometric identifier" means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint,
`voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry. Biometric identifiers do
`not include writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human
`biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening,
`demographic data, tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such
`as height, weight, hair color, or eye color. Biometric identifiers do not
`include donated organs, tissues, or parts as defined in the Illinois
`Anatomical Gift Act or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or
`potential recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or
`stored by a federally designated organ procurement agency. Biometric
`identifiers do not include biological materials regulated under the
`Genetic Information Privacy Act. Biometric identifiers do not include
`information captured from a patient in a health care setting or
`information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment,
`payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance Portability
`and Accountability Act of 1996. Biometric identifiers do not include an
`X-ray, roentgen process, computed tomography, MRI, PET scan,
`mammography, or other image or film of the human anatomy used to
`diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or other medical condition or to
`further validate scientific testing or screening.
`
`
`740 ILCS 14/10.
`
`48. BIPA defines “Biometric information” and “Confidential and sensitive
`
`information” as follows:
`
`"Biometric information" means any information, regardless of how it is
`captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual's
`biometric
`identifier used to
`identify an
`individual. Biometric
`information does not include information derived from items or
`procedures excluded under the definition of biometric identifiers.
`
` "Confidential and sensitive information" means personal information
`that can be used to uniquely identify an individual or an individual's
`account or property. Examples of confidential and sensitive
`
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`information include, but are not limited to, a genetic marker, genetic
`testing information, a unique identifier number to locate an account or
`property, an account number, a PIN number, a pass code, a driver's
`license number, or a social security number.
`
`740 ILCS 14/10.
`
`49.
`
`Section 15(a) of BIPA requires private entities to develop written policies
`
`regarding the retention and destruction of “biometric identifiers” and “biometric
`
`information”:
`
`A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric
`information must develop a written policy, made available to the public,
`establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently
`destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information when the
`initial purpose
`for collecting or obtaining such
`identifiers or
`information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual's last
`interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first. Absent a
`valid warrant or subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction,
`a private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric
`information must comply with its established retention schedule and
`destruction guidelines.
`
`740 ILCS 14/15(a).
`
`50.
`
` “Section 15(a) expressly conditions lawful retention of biometric data on
`
`the continuation of the initial purpose for which the data was collected. The BIPA
`
`requirement to implement data retention and destruction protocols protects a person's
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`biometric privacy just as concretely as the statute's informed-consent regime.” Fox, 980
`
`F.3d at 1155.
`
`51.
`
`“It follows that an unlawful retention of a person's biometric data is as
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`concrete and particularized an injury as an unlawful collection of a person's biometric
`
`data.” Id.
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`52.
`
`As set forth below, Defendant has violated Section 15(a) of BIPA because
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`it appears that it has failed to develop and publish written policies regarding the
`
`retention and destruction of “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information”.
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`53.
`
`Section 15(b) of BIPA requires private entities to obtained informed written
`
`consent from persons before a private entity can obtain their biometric identifiers
`
`and/or biometric information.
`
`54.
`
`Section 15(b) of BIPA specifically states that “[n]o private entity may
`
`collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a
`
`customer's biometric identifier or biometric information, unless it first” takes the
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`following actions:
`
`(1) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative
`in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being
`collected or stored;
`
`(2) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative
`in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a
`biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored,
`and used; and
`
`(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric
`identifier or biometric information or the subject's legally authorized
`representative.
`
`55. BIPA defines “[w]ritten release” as “informed written consent”. 740 ILCS
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`14/10.
`
`56.
`
`Informed-consent is the "heart of BIPA." Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc.,
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`958 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2020).
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`57.
`
`Section 15(b) ensures that "consumers understand, before providing their
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`biometric data, how that information will be used, who will have access to it, and for
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`how long it will be retained." Id.
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`58.
`
`The failure to obtain informed consent before collecting an individual's
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`biometric data necessarily inflicts an Article III injury. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 619, 624,
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`626 (comparing a violation of section 15(b) to "an invasion of [an individual's] private
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`domain, much like an act of trespass").
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`59. Defendant has violated Section 15(b) of BIPA because it collected Plaintiffs’
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`biometric information without first obtaining informed written consent from Plaintiffs.
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`60.
`
`Section 15(c) of BIPA provides that "[n]o private entity in possession of a
`
`biometric identifier or biometric information may sell, lease, trade, or otherwise profit
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`from a person's or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric information." 740 ILCS
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`14/15(c).
`
`61.
`
`Section 15(c) "flatly prohibits" certain for-profit transactions involving
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`biometric data. Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 2021).
`
`62.
`
`Section 15(c) does not allow an entity to avoid liability merely by obtaining
`
`the informed consent of the individual whose biometric data it profits from.
`
`63.
`
`Section 15(c)'s prohibition on for-profit transactions involving biometric
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`data is "the same kind of general regulation as the duty to create and publish a retention
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`and destruction schedule found in section 15(a)." Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1247.
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`64. Defendant has violated Section 15(c) of BIPA because it has sold, leases,
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`traded, and/or otherwise profited from its use of Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers and/or
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`their biometric information.
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`65.
`
`Section 15(d) of BIPA prohibits private entities
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`from disclosing,
`
`redisclosing, or otherwise disseminating a person's biometric identifier or biometric
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`information with first obtaining informed written consent of the subject.
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`66. Defendant has violated Section 15(d) of BIPA because it has disclosed,
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`redisclosed, and/or otherwise disseminated Plaintiffs’ biometric identifier and/or
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`biometric information without their informed written consent.
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`67.
`
`In enacting BIPA, the Illinois legislature determined that violations of BIPA
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`should result in awards of liquidated damages.
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`68.
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`Section 20 of BIPA provides that “[a] prevailing party may recover for each
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`violation: ... (1) against a private entity negligently violates a provision of this Act,
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`liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater” and that “[a]
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`prevailing party may recover for each violation: ... (a) against a private entity that
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`intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $5,000
`
`or actual damages, whichever is greater”. 740 ILCS 14/20(1)-(2).
`
`69.
`
`Additionally, in enacting BIPA, the Illinois legislature determined that “[a]
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`prevailing party” in a BIPA action “may recover ... (3) reasonable attorneys' fees and
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`costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses” and injunctive relief.
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`740 ILCS 14/20(3)-(4).
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`III. Defendant’s Violations of BIPA
`
`70.
`
`This putative Class Action Complaint, brought on behalf of citizens of the
`
`State of Illinois, alleges that Defendant has violated Sections 15(a), 15(b), 15(c) and 15(d)
`
`of BIPA.
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`71. Defendant has violated BIPA because its technology works by imaging a
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`user’s face to capture and utilize a user’s biometric identifiers and/or biometric
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`information without a user’s informed written consent.
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`72. Defendant has acquired Looksery, Inc., a company that developed an app.
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`(Looksery) which used facial recognition technology for the purpose of capturing and
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`modifying a person’s facial features in real-time.
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`73. Defendant modified the Looksery app. and the Looksery app. became
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`known as a Snapchat feature referred to as “Lenses”.
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`74.
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`Additionally, Defendant has applied for at least one patent, where the
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`patent application describes the use of “[a] facial recognition technique”. See, Patent No.
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`US9396354B1, found at https://patents.google.com/patent/US9396354 (last visited
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`5/3/2022).
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`75. Defendant requires users of Snapchat to provide Defendant with access to
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`their smartphones’ cameras.
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`76.
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`According to Defendant, “[m]any of our services require us to collect
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`images and other information from your device’s camera and photos.”
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`77. Defendant has also users and potential users “won’t be able to send Snaps
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`or upload photos from your camera roll unless we can access your camera or photos.”
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`78.
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`As alleged herein, Defendant has failed to properly disclose to Plaintiffs
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`that its Snapchat app would collect and monetize the "biometric identifiers" and/or
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`"Biometric information" (hereafter "Biometric(s)") of Plaintiffs without their informed
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`written consent.
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`79.
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`As alleged herein, Defendant has failed to properly disclose to putative
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`class members that its Snapchat app would collect and monetize the "biometric
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`identifiers" and/or "Biometric information" (hereafter "Biometrics") of putative class
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`members without their informed written consent.
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`80. Defendant has collected the Biometrics of Plaintiffs and putative class
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`members in violation of the prohibitions set forth by BIPA.
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`81.
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`For example, when Plaintiffs and putative class members have utilized the
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`Snapchat app., they have utilized a feature called “Lenses” (hereafter “Lenses Feature”,
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`where Lenses Feature allowed them to modify their facial features with special effects.
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`82.
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`Snatpchat’s Lenses Feature worked by having users (a) open up the
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`Camera screen in the Shapchat app., on their smartphone, (b) “press” and aim their
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`smartphone at a user’s face press, (c) “swipe” left to “select” a particular Lenses, (d)
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`follow any prompts (such as “Raise Your Eyebrows” and (e) “tap” the “capture button”
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`to take a Snap or press and hold the “capture button” to take a Snap video.
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`83.
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`Snapchat’s Lenses Feature involved and/or involves the use of technology
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`to create a face scan or face template of a user where the Feature involved creating,
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`obtaining and storing of a user’s unique "biometric identifiers" and/or "Biometric
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`information".
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`84.
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`Snatpchat’s Lenses Feature involved and/or involves the collection, use,
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`modification, monetization and/or storage of a user’s "biometric identifiers" and/or
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`"Biometric information" in violation of Section 15(1) of BIPA.
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`85.
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`For example, each time Plaintiffs used the Lenses Feature, the Snapchat
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`app. scanned their faces and stored the resulting image.
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`86. Each time Plaintiffs used the Lenses Feature, the Snapchat app. scanned
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`their faces to create a detailed map or digital depiction of their facial features.
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`87. Each time Plaintiffs used the Lenses Feature was used by Plaintiffs, the
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`Snapchat app. scanned the faces of Plaintiffs, which resulted in Defendant obtaining
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`and/collecting Plaintiffs’ unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” as
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`these terms are defined by BIPA.
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`88. Each time a Defendant’s Lenses Feature scanned Plaintiffs’ faces and
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`obtained their unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric information”, the Lenses
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`Feature did so without Plaintiffs’ informed written consent.
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`89.
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`Further, when putative class members used the Lenses Feature, the
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`Snapchat app. scanned their faces to create a detailed map of their facial features.
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`90. Each time putative class members used the Lenses Feature, the Snapchat
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`app. scanned their faces to create a detailed map or digital depiction of their facial
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`features.
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`91. Each time putative class members used the Lenses Feature, the Snapchat
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`app. scanned their faces, which resulted in Defendant obtaining and/or collecting the
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`unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” of each putative class members
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`- as these terms are defined by BIPA.
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`92. Each time Defendant’s Lenses Feature obtained and/or collected the
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`unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” of putative class members, it did
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`so without their informed written consent.
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`93.
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`The Snapchat app. also utilizes so-called “Sponsored Lenses” that are
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`utilized by in conjunction with Defendant’s sponsors.
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`94. On information and belief, “Sponsored Lenses” have violated Section 15(b)
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`of BIPA by obtaining and/or collecting the unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric
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`information” of Plaintiffs and putative class members – without their informed written
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`consent.
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`95.
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`The Snapchat app. also scanned and modified the facial features of
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`Plaintiffs and putative class members with certain user enabled filters (hereafter
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`“Filters”).
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`96.
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`Snatpchat’s Filters
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`involve and/or
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`involved
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`the collection, use,
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`modification, monetization and/or storage of the "biometric identifiers" and/or
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`"Biometric information" of Plaintiffs and putative class members.
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`97. Each time Plaintiffs used a Filter, the Snapchat app. scanned their faces
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`and obtained their unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” as these
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`terms are defined by BIPA.
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`98. Each time Plaintiffs used a Snapchat app. Filter a scan of their faces, the
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`Snapchat app. collected and/or obtained their unique “biometric identifier” or
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`“biometric information” without their informed written consent.
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`99. Each time putative class members used a Filter, the Snapchat app.
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`scanned their faces and obtained their unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric
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`information” as these terms are defined by BIPA.
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`100. Each time putative class members used a Snapchat app. Filter a scan of
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`their faces, the Snapchat app. collected and/or obtained their unique “biometric
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`identifier” or “biometric information” without their informed written consent.
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`101. Defendant has failed to fully and properly disclose to Plaintiffs and
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`putative class members that its Filters collected, captured, or otherwise obtained their
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`unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” as these terms are defined by
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`BIPA.
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`102. Defendant has failed to disclose to Plaintiffs and putative class members
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`that its Filters collected, captured, or otherwise obtained their unique “biometric
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`identifier” or “biometric information” as these terms are defined by BIPA.
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`103. Defendant failed to obtain Plaintiffs’ informed written consent prior to
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`obtaining their unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” as these terms
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`are defined by BIPA.
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`104. Defendant failed to obtain putative class members informed written
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`consent prior to obtaining their unique “biometric identifier” or “biometric information”
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`as these terms are defined by BIPA.
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`105. Defendant has failed to disclose how it uses the “biometric identifier” and
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`“biometric information” they have obtained from Plaintiffs and putative class members.
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`106. Defendant has failed to disclose to Plaintiffs and putative class members
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`whether it has shared their “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” with third
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`parties.
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`107. Defendant has failed to disclose to Plaintiffs and putative class members
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`whether it will share their “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” with third
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`parties.
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`108. Defendant has failed to disclose to Plaintiffs and putative class members
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`whether it has sold their “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” to third parties.
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`109. Each of the proposed class definitions are limited to BIPA violati