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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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`Case No. 17-cv-347-SMY
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`GUSTAVO NAVARRETE,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`MADISON COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
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`Defendant.
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`ORDER
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`On April 5, 2017, Plaintiff Gustavo Navarrete filed the instant lawsuit against Madison
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`County Sheriff’s Office. He filed an Amended Complaint on October 17, 2017, naming Madison
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`County, Illinois as the defendant and alleging discrimination and retaliatory termination of his
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`employment based upon his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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`1964. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.1 On June 30, 2021, a jury returned a verdict in favor of
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`Navarrete and awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages.
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`Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Equitable Relief (Doc. 122) and
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`Petition for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 129). Defendant opposes both motions. The Court held an
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`evidentiary hearing regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Equitable Relief on August 6, 2021, and
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`admitted various exhibits. The Court also took judicial notice of several exhibits.
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`Back Pay
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`Prevailing Title VII plaintiffs are “presumptively entitled to full relief.” Hutchinson v.
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`Amateur Elec.Supply, 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1994) citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
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`422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Once the jury has found that there has been employment discrimination,
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`there is then a presumption that the employee is entitled to back pay. David v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
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`1 Madison County Sheriff’s Department was terminated as a Defendant with the October 17, 2017 filing of the
`Amended Complaint against Madison County, Illinois.
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`Case 3:17-cv-00347-SMY Document 135 Filed 03/27/25 Page 2 of 9 Page ID
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`324 F.3d 851, 865 (7th Cir. 2003). Back pay is “the difference between actual earnings for the
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`period and those which she would have earned absent discrimination by defendant.” Horn v. Duke
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`Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599 ,6060 (7th Cir. 1985). Back pay covers
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`the period from the time of firing to the date of judgment. See David, 324 F.3d at 865. Back pay
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`is then reduced by interim earnings, “wages (or the like) earned by a discriminated upon employee
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`in the period after his discharge but before judgment that, but for the discrimination, would not
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`have been earned.” Chesser v. State of Ill., 895 F.2d 330, 337 (7th Cir. 1990). Defendant has the
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`burden to show that a plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages or that damages are in fact less
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`than what the plaintiff asserts. Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supp., Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th
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`Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff seeks back pay of $227,820.00 for 2016 through June 11, 2021.
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`Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s back pay award should be reduced because he failed to mitigate
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`his damages.
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`The evidence shows that Plaintiff earned $63,316.98 in 2015, which was the last full year
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`of pay that he received; Defendant ceased paying Plaintiff on January 22, 2016. The evidence
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`further shows that at the time of his termination, Plaintiff was subject to a Collective Bargaining
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`Agreement (“CBA”) that was in effect from December 1, 2014 until November 30, 2017. Under
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`the CBA, as a jail officer with 5 to 10 years of experience, Plaintiff was scheduled to have a base
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`salary of $63,059 in 2016 and $64,484 in 2017. Under a CBA Agreement in effect from December
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`1, 2017 until November 20, 2020, Plaintiff was scheduled to earn a base salary of $67,953 in 2018,
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`$71,013 in 2019, and 72,608 in 2020. Because no new CBA went in effect between 2020 and
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`judgment in this case.
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`Regarding interim earnings, the evidence shows that Plaintiff found employment with the
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`National Archives and earned $8,143.67 in 2016. He earned $2,087.00 in 2016 as a self-employed
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`translator. Then, in 2017, Plaintiff earned $19,730.35 working for the National Archives until he
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`Case 3:17-cv-00347-SMY Document 135 Filed 03/27/25 Page 3 of 9 Page ID
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`found a higher paying job with the Veteran’s Administration, where he earned $5,031.99 in 2017.
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`Plaintiff’s earned wages from the VA from 2018 until June 11, 2021 were as follows: $24,885.11
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`(2018); $29,115.34 (2019); $32,552.00 (2020); and $19,515.84 (2021).
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`A discharged employee must mitigate damages by using reasonable diligence in finding
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`other suitable employment. Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1202 (7th Cir.
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`1989). To support a failure to mitigate theory, an employer “must prove both that the claimants
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`were not reasonably diligent in seeking other employment, and that with the exercise of reasonable
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`diligence there was a reasonable chance that the claimants might have found comparable
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`employment.” E.E.O.C. v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1990). Defendant argues
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`that Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by failing to exercise reasonable diligence in finding
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`other suitable employment. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to search for
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`comparable employment, other than applying for one law enforcement position with Scott Air
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`Force Base.
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` Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff could have found other comparable positions or other
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`positions wherein he would have made more income is not unsupported by the evidence. The
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`Defendant failed to meet its burden and provide the Court with evidence that comparable law
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`enforcement jobs that Plaintiff was qualified to hold were available during the relevant period. To
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`the contrary, the evidence shows: Plaintiff intended on working for the Sheriff’s office until his
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`retirement at twenty years of service (December 1, 2027); Plaintiff has been unable to find a
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`comparable job; Plaintiff applied for numerous jobs; Plaintiff was not hired for the security job at
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`Scott Air Force Base; Plaintiff could not find any other jobs in the field; Plaintiff did find
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`alternative employment in another field of work; Plaintiff started working within one week of
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`being terminated by Defendant; Plaintiff transitioned between new jobs for better pay; and, while
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`Plaintiff’s current job does not provide him with the same pay, duties, field of interest or career
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`Case 3:17-cv-00347-SMY Document 135 Filed 03/27/25 Page 4 of 9 Page ID
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`advancement as what he had with Defendant, he is actively receiving wages and working. On this
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`evidence, the Court will not reduce Plaintiff’s claim for lost wages for failure to mitigate.
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`Accordingly, the Court AWARDS Plaintiff back pay in the amount of $227,820.00.
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`Prejudgment Interest
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`Prejudgment interest on back pay is awarded to compensate plaintiffs for the loss of the
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`use of money. Partington v. Broyhill Furniture Industries, Inc., 999 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1993).
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`There is no statutory rate for prejudgment interest. Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co. v. City of
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`Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998). Instead, the rate is to be determined by the Court
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`with a starting point at market rate (or the average of the prime rate for the years in question). Id.
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`The prejudgment interest accrues from the date of the loss or that the claim accrued. Am. Nat. Fire
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`Ins. Co. ex rel. Tabacalera Contreras Cigar Co. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 325 F.3d 924, 935
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`(7th Cir. 2003).2
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`The evidence presented shows that Plaintiff’s date of loss or the date on which his claim
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`accrued was January 23, 2016. The Court also finds from the that the monthly Bank Prime Loan
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`Rate published by the Federal Reserve from 2016 is reasonable. Accordingly, the Court
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`AWARDS prejudgment interest on the back pay award in the amount of $57,252.00.
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`Lost Benefits
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`An award of back pay should also include an award for lost benefits. Pollard v. E.I. du
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`Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 847-848 (2001) (holding that back pay includes lost
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`benefits). Lost benefits include sick leave, health insurance, and pension loss. See Graefenhain,
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`870 F.3d at 1212 (pension loss is a compensable item in order to make plaintiff whole); see Mister
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`v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 790 F. Supp. 1411, 1418 (S.D. Ill. 1992) (part of the calculation of
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`back pay includes the value of work related benefits, like health insurance).
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`2 Defendant does not contest or object to Plaintiff’s calculations for prejudgment interest.
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`Case 3:17-cv-00347-SMY Document 135 Filed 03/27/25 Page 5 of 9 Page ID
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`Sick Leave
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`The evidence establishes that Plaintiff had accumulated 363 hours of sick leave at the time
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`of his wrongful termination. According to Exhibit 41, Plaintiff’s rate of pay was $29.88 per hour.
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`Therefore, at the time of his termination, Plaintiff had accrued $10,846.44 for sick leave.
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`Plaintiff’s arguments for additional sick leave time assumes facts not in evidence, and are therefore
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`speculative. Therefore, the Court AWARDS $10,846.44 in sick leave benefits.
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`Health Insurance
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`Plaintiff received 100% of his health insurance premiums and 70% of his dependents’
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`health insurance premiums through his employment with Defendant. The evidence demonstrates
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`that had Plaintiff selected an individual health plan for himself, his premiums would have been
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`from $116.91 to $123.45 every two weeks for the period of October 1, 2017 to August 1, 2021.
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`Accordingly, the Court Plaintiff AWARDS $12,300.00 for past health insurance premiums.
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`As compensation for future health insurance premiums, Plaintiff seeks a biweekly rate of
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`$123.00 from August 1, 2021 through December 1, 2027. In support, Plaintiff presented
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`undisputed evidence that he intended on working through December 1, 2027 before retiring.
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`Accordingly, the Court AWARDS Plaintiff $21,525.00 for future health insurance
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`premiums.
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`Pension
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`The Court
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`takes
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`judicial notice of
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`the Life Table
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`identified as Exhibit 60
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`(https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr70/nvsr70-1-508.pdf). Plaintiff would have been 66
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`years of age at his intended retirement on December 1, 2027. According to the Life Table, his life
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`expectancy at retirement was 17.3 years. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to 17
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`years of pension benefits.
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`Case 3:17-cv-00347-SMY Document 135 Filed 03/27/25 Page 6 of 9 Page ID
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`The Court further takes judicial notice of the bases for calculation Plaintiff’s pension
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`benefits from the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF), VA pension, VA Thrift Savings
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`Plan, and IMRF Liquidation. As a result, the Court AWARDS Plaintiff $482,067.00 for his total
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`pension loss.
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`Front Pay
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`Front pay may be awarded under Title VII in cases where reinstatement is unavailable.
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`Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1998). Here, it is undisputed that
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`reinstatement is not an available option.
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`Front pay is the “discounted present value of the difference between the earnings an
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`employee would have received in his old employment and the earnings he can be expected to
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`receive in his present and future, and by hypothesis, inferior employment.” Williams, 137 F.3d at
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`953. Front pay is designed to extend for a reasonable period of time, until a date by which a
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`plaintiff, using reasonable diligence, should have found comparable employment. Id. quoting
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`Ward v. Tipton County Sheriff Dep’t, 937 F. Suppl. 791, 796 (S.D. Ind. 1996); see also Shick v.
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`Illinois Dept. of Hum. Servs., 307 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2002). If an employee obtains another
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`job, those earnings are deducted from front pay. Shick, 307 F.3d at 614.
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`Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to front pay because of his failure to mitigate
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`damages and find comparable employment. However, as previously found, Defendant’s argument
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`is unsupported by any evidence.
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`As previously noted, the evidence was uncontradicted that Plaintiff intended on working
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`for the Sheriff’s office through his retirement on December 1, 2027. Thus, the time period the
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`Court will consider for front pay is from June 2021 to December 2027. As the evidence supports,
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`Plaintiff would have earned $36,304 (1/2 of 2021); $72,608 (2022); $73,845 (2023); $74,464
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`(2024); $74,464 (2025); $74,464 (2026); and, $68,255 (through December 1, 2027). During that
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`Case 3:17-cv-00347-SMY Document 135 Filed 03/27/25 Page 7 of 9 Page ID
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`same period, the evidence shows that Plaintiff has now earned or will earn $17,343 (1/2 of 2021);
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`$36,163 (2022); $36,163 (2023); $37,293 (2024); $37,293 (2025); $38,423 (2026); and, $35,221
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`(through December 1, 2027). Those amounts shall be deducted from any front pay award.
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`Accordingly, the Court AWARDS Plaintiff front pay in the amount of $238,687.00.
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`Reduction of Sick Leave Loss, Health Insurance Loss, Pension Loss and Front Pay Award
`to Present Value
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`The application of the net discount rate applies to health insurance loss, pension loss, and
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`front pay awards. The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibit 62, the Consumer Price Index, and
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`Exhibit 63, the U.S. Department of Treasury Daily Treasury Long Term Rate Data. As the Court
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`finds no difference in the value of money from now to the future, it agrees with Plaintiff that 0%
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`is an appropriate discount rate based upon the gold standard for measuring inflation and current
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`yield on 20-year treasury notes.
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`Tax Component Award
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`The tax component award is an additional offset in Title VII discrimination cases to make
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`a plaintiff whole and offset any increased tax burden incurred as a result of receiving a lump sum
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`award. E.E.O.C. v. N. Star Hospitality, Inc., 777 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2015). The Court takes
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`judicial notice of the Tax Tables submitted as Exhibit 68 and finds that the evidence presented
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`regarding the increase in Plaintiff’s tax bracket from 22% to 32% is reasonable and rational based
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`upon the lump sum of unpaid back wages that Plaintiff will receive totaling $227,820.00. Plaintiff
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`would not have exceeded the 22% tax bracket if he had received the wages in the appropriate years.
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`However, he will now have a one-time increased tax burden due to receiving the lump sum award.
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`The Court AWARDS Plaintiff the difference in tax liability; $22,782.00.
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`The Court AWARDS Plaintiff the total sum of $1,073,279.44 as equitable relief.
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`Case 3:17-cv-00347-SMY Document 135 Filed 03/27/25 Page 8 of 9 Page ID
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`Attorneys’ Fees
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`Finally, Plaintiff has petitioned for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
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`5(k), which allows the prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees including expert fees as part of
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`the costs. Defendant’s objections pertain only to (1) an alleged double-billed entry for September
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`4, 2018 and (2) unrecoverable expenses.
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`With respect to the alleged double-billed entries for September 4, 2018, the entries include:
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`“Deposition of Lakin” for 2.5 hours and “Prepared for and took Lakin Deposition” for 6.2 hours.
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`Defendant’s position that these two entries reflect a “double-billed” entry for that date is
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`speculative at best. The affidavit submitted by Attorney Paul T. Slocomb indicates that the time
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`reflected in the itemized billing reflects the time that he worked on the file. Further, for each
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`deposition taken in this matter, there are two entries on the itemized billing. Based on the
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`supporting affidavit and documentation, the Court finds the entry for September 4, 2018 reasonable
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`and appropriate.
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`Second, Plaintiff seeks to recover the following expenses: three hotel rooms for trial
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`($960.45), food during trial ($36.52), and mileage expenses for Paul Slocomb and Matt Hoffman
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`($105.28 and $264.32). Defendant objects and asserts that reimbursement for travel, lodging, and
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`subsistence are not reimbursable. However, the standards for fee awards under Title VII are the
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`same as those under the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act (42 U.S.C. §1988). Proctor v.
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`Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 795 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986). With respect
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`to attorney travel expenses, the Seventh Circuit has established that “expenses of litigation that are
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`distinct from either statutory costs or the costs of the lawyer’s time reflected in hourly billing rates
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`– expenses for such things as postage, long distance phone calls, xeroxing, travel, paralegals and
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`expert witnesses – are part of the reasonable attorney’s fees allowed by the Civil Rights Attorney
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`Fees Award Act.” Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1144 (7th Cir. 1994)
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`Case 3:17-cv-00347-SMY Document 135 Filed 03/27/25 Page 9 of 9 Page ID
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`citing Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984). Since attorney travel
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`expenses are normally billed separately from an attorney’s hourly fees, those expense are
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`separately recoverable. Id. However, attorney meals are generally not recoverable. See generally
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`42 U.S.C. §1988; see generally Fields v. City of Chicago, 2018 WL 253716, at *11 (N.D. Ill.
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`2018). Accordingly, the Court finds the costs of the hotel room339s for trial and mileage expenses
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`are reasonable and appropriate, but the costs for food during trial are not recoverable.
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`Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and
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`AWARDS attorneys’ fees in the amount $68,025.00 and reduced costs in the amount of
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`$4,039.45.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`DATE: March 27, 2025
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`STACI M. YANDLE
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`9
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