Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 1 of 22 Page ID #6112
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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`No. 3:20-cv-00421-NJR
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`
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`Plaintiffs,
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`Defendant.
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`JANE DOE et al.,
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`v.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 2 of 22 Page ID #6113
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1
`I. Common questions predominate (Rule 23(b)(3)) ............................................................. 1
`A. The elements of Plaintiffs’ BIPA claims raise only common questions ................... 1
`B. Extraterritoriality does not defeat predominance ...................................................... 6
`C. Affirmative defenses do not defeat predominance .................................................... 7
`D. Individual damages do not defeat predominance ...................................................... 9
`II. Plaintiffs satisfy commonality, typicality, and adequacy (Rule 23(a)(2)–(4)) ............... 10
`III. A class action is superior to individual actions (Rule 23(b)(3)) ..................................... 14
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 15
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`ii
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 3 of 22 Page ID #6114
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`2460-68 Clark, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Chopo Chicken, Ltd. Liab. Co.,
`2022 IL App (1st) 210119 (2022) ............................................................................................... 9
`A Custom Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Kabbage, Inc.,
`No. 16 C 2513, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8975 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018) ................................. 7, 9
`Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
` 725 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................... 11
`Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,
`521 U.S. 591 (1997) .................................................................................................................. 10
`Castelaz v. Estée Lauder Co., Inc.,
`No. 22-5713, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7321 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2024) ......................................... 4
`Costello v. BeavEx, Inc.,
`810 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................... 1
`Cruson v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
`954 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................................... 8
`Cruz v. Lawson Software, Inc.,
`No. 08-5900 (MJD/JSM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33437 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2010) ................... 7
`Daichendt v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
`No. 22-3318, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217484 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2022) ...................................... 4
`Dancel v. Groupon, Inc.,
`949 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................................... 1
`Eggleston v. Chi. Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130,
`657 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................... 12
`Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
`657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................... 10
`Fosnight v. LVNV Funding, Inc.,
`310 F.R.D. 389 (S.D. Ind. 2015) ............................................................................................... 15
`Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Brigadoon Fitness, Inc.,
`29 F.4th 839 (7th Cir. 2022) ....................................................................................................... 8
`Hazlitt v. Apple Inc.,
`500 F. Supp. 3d 738 (S.D. Ill. 2020) ....................................................................................... 3, 4
`Hyderi v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA,
`235 F.R.D. 390 (N.D. Ill. 2006) .................................................................................................. 8
`In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig.,
`326 F.R.D. 535 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019) .................................... 1
`In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig.,
`No. 13-2430, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) ................................... 8
`
`iii
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 4 of 22 Page ID #6115
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`J. H. Cohn & Co. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc.,
`628 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1980) .................................................................................................... 10
`Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc.,
` 227 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ............................................................................................... 11
`Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan,
` 702 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................................... 7
`Johnson v. Rohr-Ville Motors, Inc.,
`189 F.R.D. 363 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ................................................................................................ 12
`Just Film, Inc. v. Buono,
`847 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................. 15
`Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.,
`769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................... 9
`Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc.,
`716 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................... 15
`Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp.,
`109 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................... 15
`Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC,
`795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................... 2, 7, 10, 14
`Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp.,
`434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................... 15
`Neil v. Zell,
` 275 F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ............................................................................................... 11
`New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC v. Bower,
`806 N.E.2d 1156 (2004) ............................................................................................................. 8
`Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp.,
`637 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................... 10
`Rivera v. Google Inc.,
`238 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2017) ........................................................................................ 7
`Robinson v. Lake Ventures LLC,
`No. 22-6541, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156296 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2023) ...................................... 4
`Ruppert v. Alliant Energy Cash Balance Pension Plan,
`726 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................... 11
`Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
`383 U.S. 363 (1966) .................................................................................................................. 12
`Tremitek, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Resilience Code, Ltd. Liab. Co.,
`535 P.3d 1005 (Colo. App. 2023) ............................................................................................... 9
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
`564 U.S. 338 (2011) .................................................................................................................... 1
`
`iv
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 5 of 22 Page ID #6116
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`Zellmer v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,
`104 F.4th 1117 (9th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................................... 4
`Statutes
`47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) ................................................................................................................ 8
`740 ILCS 14/10 ........................................................................................................................... 3, 8
`740 ILCS 14/20 ............................................................................................................................... 9
`765 ILCS 1075/5 ............................................................................................................................. 3
`Rules
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)................................................................................................................... 2
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`
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`v
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 6 of 22 Page ID #6117
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`I.
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`Common questions predominate (Rule 23(b)(3))
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`ARGUMENT
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` A.
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`The elements of Plaintiffs’ BIPA claims raise only common questions
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`Plaintiffs showed that each element of their BIPA claims can be established with common
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`proof regarding the operation of Defendant’s software in automatically collecting class members’
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`biometric information and Defendant’s failure to comply with BIPA’s notice and consent
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`requirements. Doc. 177-1, Mot. Certify Class at 8–12 (“Mot.”). Defendant does not seriously
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`dispute that the questions of whether it made the disclosures and obtained the written consent
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`required by BIPA section 15(a) and (b) are common to all class members and can be resolved with
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`common proof. Those questions alone establish both commonality and predominance. See Wal-
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`Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“[F]or purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) ‘[e]ven a
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`single [common] question’ will do.”); Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 1060 (7th Cir.
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`2016) (finding predominance satisfied where a single element that was a “significant aspect” of
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`the case was subject to common proof); In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 326 F.R.D.
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`535, 545 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019) (“no doubt” that similar BIPA
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`claims presented predominantly common issues).
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`Defendant nevertheless attempts to identify various individualized questions. See Opp. 7. The
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`predominance inquiry is limited to “the substantive elements of plaintiffs’ cause of action” and the
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`evidence needed to make out a prima facie case. Dancel v. Groupon, Inc., 949 F.3d 999, 1008 (7th
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`Cir. 2019); Costello, 810 F.3d at 1060. The first four questions in Defendant’s list—whether each
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`member used the devices and software at issue to take and store picures during the class period—
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`pertain to the criteria used to define class membership, rather than the substantive elements of the
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`class’s BIPA claims. Any person for whom the answer to any of those questions is “no” is not a
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`“class member,” and therefore is not among the persons for whom the Court must assess
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`1
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 7 of 22 Page ID #6118
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`predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (“the questions of law or fact
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`common to class members” must predominate) (emphasis added). The first four questions cited by
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`Defendant merely concern the threshold criteria used to limit the class to persons harmed “during
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`a particular time frame, in a particular location, in a particular way.” Mullins v. Direct Digital,
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`LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2015). In Mullins, the definition required proof that each
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`member (1) purchased the relevant product (2) during the limitations period (3) in a particular state
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`(4) for personal use. Id. at 658. The potential for individual proceedings during the claims process
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`to determine class membership did not negate the common question of whether defendant’s
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`representations about its product were false or misleading. Id. at 669–74.
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`Here, the questions of whether Defendant’s conduct involves “collection” or “possession” of
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`“biometric identifiers” or “biometric information” within the meaning of BIPA, and whether it
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`made the disclosures and obtained the written consent required by the statute, are common to all
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`class members. The answers to those questions do not vary based on any individual class member’s
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`personal circumstances. Determining whether a particular individual was aggrieved by
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`Defendant’s BIPA violations is a matter for a later stage of the proceedings and irrelevant to the
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`predominance inquiry. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 671 (noting that defendant would be “given the
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`opportunity to challenge each class member’s claim to recovery during the damages phase”).
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`The remaining three questions cited by Defendant, involving the manner in which each class
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`member labeled People albums, rest on a flawed interpretation of BIPA. See Opp. at 7. Defendant
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`asserts that no biometric “identifier” exists unless a device user labels the People album containing
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`the user’s photos with an accurate first and last name, so as to enable Apple to use the faceprint in
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`its possession to “identify” the device user by name. Opp. at 1, 6–7 & n.9 (arguing that a BIPA
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`violation turns on whether each device user labeled People albums with “personally identifiable
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`2
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 8 of 22 Page ID #6119
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`information” like “first and last name” or “their full name”).
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`As support for the premise that it cannot “identify” a person unless the People album is labeled
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`with an accurate first and last name, Defendant relies heavily on Dancel, which involved an
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`entirely different statute, the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA). IRPA “prohibits the use of a
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`person’s identity . . . for commercial purposes without consent.” Id. at 1002 (citing 765 ILCS
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`1075/5, 30). The statutory definition of identity includes a person’s “name,” meaning “the actual
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`name or other name by which an individual is known that is intended to identify that individual.” Id.
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`at 1008 (citing 765 ILCS 1075/5) (emphasis added). Based on several of the Instagram “usernames
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`belonging to class members—e.g., eawhalen, artistbarbie, isa.tdg, loparse, johanneus,” it was
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`“simply impossible to make any type of across-the-board determination as to whether these names
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`‘identify’ a particular person, as that term is defined by the IRPA.” Id. at 1003. Determining
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`whether a particular username serves to identify a particular individual would require an
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`individualized analysis of the content of each username. Id. at 1009.
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`In relying on Dancel, Defendant ignores important differences between IRPA and BIPA.
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`Dancel turned on IRPA’s statutory definition of identity and requirement that the plaintiff show
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`that the appropriated information “serves to identify” a particular person. Id. (citing 765 ILCS
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`1075/5) (emphasis added). BIPA contains no similar requirement. BIPA defines “biometric
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`identifier” to include a “scan of hand or face geometry.” 740 ILCS 14/10. BIPA does not require
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`names to be attached to a faceprint for it to count as a biometric identifier. Id. Indeed, the Court
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`previously rejected Defendant’s assertion that the at-issue faceprints “do not qualify as biometric
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`identifiers as defined by BIPA because they are anonymous and do not actually identify any
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`individual.” Hazlitt v. Apple Inc., 500 F. Supp. 3d 738, 748 (S.D. Ill. 2020). Thus, in contrast to
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`Dancel, where an individualized analysis would be required to determine whether each username
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`3
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 9 of 22 Page ID #6120
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`identified a particular individual, the question of whether the faceprints generated by Defendant’s
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`software qualify as a “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” can be determined
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`categorically for all class members across the board. Because evidence of People album labels are
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`unnecessary to prove a BIPA violation, Defendant’s label-based questions are false issues that do
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`not pertain to any element of Plaintiff’s BIPA claims.
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`Defendant’s district court cases do not support its position. Daichendt rejected the argument
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`“that plaintiffs must specifically allege that defendant, in fact, ‘used’ their biometric data to
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`determine their identities,” finding allegations that the data was “capable of determining their
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`identities” to be sufficient. Daichendt v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 22-3318, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`217484, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2022); see also Robinson v. Lake Ventures LLC, No. 22-6541,
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`2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156296, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2023) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is whether
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`the data that is alleged to have been collected was itself capable of identifying Plaintiffs, not
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`whether the software actually identified plaintiffs or how it used the data.”) (emphasis added).
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`Castelaz also held that the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant “is capable of determining
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`Plaintiffs and members of the Illinois class members’ identities by using the collected facial scans,
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`whether alone or in conjunction with other methods or sources of information available to [it]
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`(e.g., the user’s account information such as their name, email, physical address, etc.).” Castelaz
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`v. Estée Lauder Co., Inc., No. 22-5713, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7321, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10,
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`2024) (emphasis added). In addition to Defendant’s cases, the Ninth Circuit has endorsed this
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`Court’s conclusion that “‘biometric identifiers’ under BIPA must be able to identify,” and that the
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`allegation “that the Photos app applies an algorithm to identify the device user,” if proven, would
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`establish BIPA liability. Zellmer v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 104 F.4th 1117 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing
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`Hazlitt v. Apple, 500 F. Supp. 3d 738 (S.D. Ill. 2020)).
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`4
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 10 of 22 Page ID #6121
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`102, 107, 111–112. Although Defendant contends whether the at-issue data is “capable of being
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` Doc. 177-4, Hashmi Rep. ¶¶ 96,
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`used to identify someone . . . cannot be determined on a classwide basis,” Opp. at 6,
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` Doc. 182-3, Subramaniam Dep. 88:15–89:8; Doc. 182-12, Sharma Dep.
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`39:10–12; Doc. 182-11, Thomson 2023 Dep. 30:7–32:13; Doc. 182-4, Circlaeys Dep. 56:2–12;
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`Ex. 1, APL-HAZLI_00004361; Ex. 2, APL-HAZLI_00004364; Ex. 3, APL-HAZLI_00016451 at
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`13.
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`.” Ex. 4, APL-HAZLI_00014440;
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`Doc. 182-10, Zuliani Dep. 173:7–10. Apple Photos uses
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` Ex. 4, APL-HAZLI_00014440.
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`d.
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` Doc. 177-4, Hashmi Rep. ¶¶ 96, 102, 107, 111–112.
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`Thus, regardless of whether any device user labeled a People album with their full name,
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`Defendant indisputably knows the identities of its device users, who provide a variety of real-
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`world identifying information such as names and email addresses during the process of setting up
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`5
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 11 of 22 Page ID #6122
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`the device and an Apple ID. Mot. at 18; Sinnreich Decl., at 5. Therefore, Defendant’s ability to
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`determine the identities of Plaintiffs and class members, whether based on the collected faceprints
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`alone or in conjunction with other methods or sources of available information that device users
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`have provided to Defendant, is subject to common proof.
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`B.
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`Extraterritoriality does not defeat predominance
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`Defendant further asserts that “extraterritoriality” questions impair a predominance finding
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`because “there is no common proof that can demonstrate where each putative class member was
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`located when each action necessary to establish class membership took place.” Opp. at 8–9. Again,
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`the threshold criteria used to establish class membership are irrelevant because anyone who is not
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`a “class member” is outside the scope of Rule 23(b)(3).
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`The Ninth Circuit rejected a similar argument in affirming certification of similar BIPA
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`claims. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1275–76 (9th Cir. 2019). The defendant asserted
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`that extraterritoriality defeated predominance due to the need for individualized proof “that the
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`member was in Illinois when the scanned photo was taken or uploaded, when a facial recognition
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`analysis was performed, when the photo was tagged or given a tag suggestion, or for similar
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`events.” Id. at 1275. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Given BIPA’s stated purpose, the court found it
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`“reasonable to infer that the General Assembly contemplated BIPA’s application to individuals
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`who are located in Illinois, even if some relevant activities occur outside the state.” Id. at 1276.
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`These threshold questions of BIPA’s applicability can be decided on a class-wide basis. If
`the violation of BIPA occurred when the plaintiffs used Facebook in Illinois, then the
`relevant events occurred “primarily and substantially” in Illinois, and there is no need to
`have mini-trials on this issue. If the violation of BIPA occurred when Facebook’s servers
`created a face template, the district court can determine whether Illinois's
`extraterritoriality doctrine precludes the application of BIPA. In either case,
`predominance is not defeated.
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`Id. This Court should reach the same conclusion.
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`Defendant misplaces its reliance on Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Ill.
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`6
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 12 of 22 Page ID #6123
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`2017), which involved a “dismissal motion,” not class certification. Id. at 1091. The court
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`concluded “that the Plaintiffs sufficiently allege facts that would deem the asserted violations as
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`having happened in Illinois,” while noting the lack of any “bright-line rule” for deciding
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`extraterritoriality. Id. at 1102. Nothing in the decision contradicts Patel’s conclusion that
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`extraterritoriality questions can be decided on a class-wide basis. Cruz is even farther afield; it did
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`involve claims under Illinois law, let alone BIPA. Cruz v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 08-5900
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`(MJD/JSM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33437, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2010) (claims under Minnesota
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`and federal labor laws).
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`Moreover, Defendant’s argument here is purely speculative. Defendant cites only the
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`“inherently transient activity of taking photos on mobile devices.” Opp. at 9. The proposed class
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`is limited to “Illinois citizens.” Defendant notes that Plaintiffs took photos in other states in
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`addition to Illinois, but fails to identify a single Illinois citizen who only took photos outside of the
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`state and never did so while located in Illinois. Defendant “either didn’t look for such a class
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`member, which would be inexcusable, or it looked but didn’t find one, which would probably
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`mean that there isn’t any such class member.” Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emple. Ret. Plan,
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`702 F.3d 364, 372 (7th Cir. 2012). In the highly unlikely event that such a person exists, Defendant
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`will have “the opportunity to challenge” that person’s “claim to recovery during the damages
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`phase.” Mullins, 795 F.3d at 671. But that speculative possibility does not defeat predominance.
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`Meriter, 702 F.3d at 372; A Custom Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Kabbage, Inc., No. 16-
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`2513, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8975, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018) (“[Defendant] cannot destroy
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`Plaintiff’s chances at class certification by summoning hypothetical consent issues while failing
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`to produce any specific evidence demonstrating the actual existence of those issues.”).
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`C.
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`Affirmative defenses do not defeat predominance
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`Defendant further contends that “affirmative defenses of waiver, consent, and failure to
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`7
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 13 of 22 Page ID #6124
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`mitigate” require individualized inquiries. Opp. at 10. But it fails to cite any authority recognizing
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`such defenses in the BIPA context. Defendant cites several cases recognizing such defenses under
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`other areas of the law, but fails to cite a single BIPA case. Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Brigadoon Fitness,
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`Inc., 29 F.4th 839, 840 (7th Cir. 2022) (“action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
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`(TCPA)”); Cruson v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 954 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2020) (common law
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`claims “for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation” against
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`an insurance company selling variable annuities); Hyderi v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 235 F.R.D. 390,
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`393 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (claim under Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); In re Google Inc. Gmail
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`Litig., No. 13-2430, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (state and
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`federal anti-wiretapping laws).
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`In Gorss, class member consent was a critical issue because the TCPA prohibits only “an
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`unsolicited advertisement,” and the record showed that many members of the class had solicited
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`or consented to receiving faxes by various means. Gorss Motels, 29 F.4th at 842 (citing 47 U.S.C.
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`§ 227(b)(1)(C)) (emphasis added).
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`In contrast, Defendant’s purported waiver and consent defenses are inconsistent with BIPA.
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`By explicitly requiring a “written release” and “informed written consent” to comply with BIPA,
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`the General Assembly necessarily rejected the sort of implied consent or waiver argument
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`Defendant makes here. See 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3), 740 ILCS 14/10.1 Indeed, given that BIPA
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`violations often arise in the employment context, Defendant’s position that implied consent
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`establishes a defense would mean that Illinois citizens must choose to either quit their jobs or
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`waive BIPA’s protections. And the concept of mitigation of damages is incompatible with
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`1 As of August 2, 2024, “electronic signature” is an approved form of consent. 740 ILCS 14/10, as
`amended by SB 2979, Public Act 103-0769. This substantive amendment applies only prospectively. See
`New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC v. Bower, 806 N.E.2d 1156, 1162 (2004).
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`8
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 14 of 22 Page ID #6125
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`statutory liquidated damages. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1291
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`(7th Cir. 1985) (applying Illinois law to find that an enforceable liquidated damages clause “should
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`be read to eliminate any duty of mitigation”); 2460-68 Clark, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Chopo Chicken,
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`Ltd. Liab. Co., 2022 IL App (1st) 210119, ¶ 33 (2022) (“[I]in
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`the case of an
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`enforceable liquidated damages provision, mitigation is irrelevant and should not be considered in
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`assessing damages.”); Tremitek, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Resilience Code, Ltd. Liab. Co., 535 P.3d 1005,
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`1011–12 (Colo. App. 2023) (“[L]iquidated damages and mitigation of damages are antithetic
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`doctrines.”).
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`In
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`short, Defendant
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`cannot defeat predominance
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`“by
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`summoning
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`hypothetical consent issues while failing to” cite any evidence or legal authority “demonstrating
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`the actual existence of those issues.” A Custom, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8975, at *11.
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`
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`D.
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`Individual damages do not defeat predominance
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`Defendant further contends that because “damages are discretionary rather than mandatory
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`under [BIPA],” it has “unique defenses to each putative member’s claims.” Opp. at 12. But it fails
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`to explain how the discretionary nature of an award implicates a “unique” or individualized
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`inquiry. Defendant’s argument is baseless because BIPA’s damages regime focuses on the
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`defendant’s conduct, not the victim of the violation. 740 ILCS 14/20 (“A prevailing party may
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`recover for each violation” the greater of “$1,000 or actual damages” against “a private entity that
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`negligently violates” BIPA and “$5,000 or actual damages” against “a private entity that
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`intentionally or recklessly violates” BIPA). The determination of whether Defendant violated
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`BIPA negligently, intentionally, or recklessly would be based on common proof and apply to all
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`class members. The fact that the Court has discretion to award less than the full measure of
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`damages does not convert this common question into an individualized one. For instance, if the
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`Court were to exercise its discretion to reduce the aggregate damages award by 5%, that reduction
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`would apply to all class members. Defendant suggests no reason that any discretionary damages
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`9
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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 15 of 22 Page ID #6126
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`reduction would vary among individuals. Even if there were some basis for individual damages
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`inquries, “[i]t has long been recognized that the need for individual damages determinations at [a]
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`later stage of the litigation does not itself justify the denial of certification.” Mullins, 795 F.3d at
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`671 (collecting Seventh Circuit cases).
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`II.
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`Plaintiffs satisfy commonality, typicality, and adequacy (Rule 23(a)(2)–(4))
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`Because “Rule 23(a)(2)’s ‘commonality’ requirement is subsumed under, or superseded by,
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`the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3)” predominance requirement, Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521
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`U.S. 591, 609 (1997), Defendant’s commonality objection fails for the same reasons that its
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`predominance arguments fail. Defendant’s assertion that the answer to the question of whether it
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`collected or possessed a biometric identifier or information “depends entirely on whether each
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`person labeled their People albums with information capable of identifying them,” Opp. at 13, is
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`wrong for the reasons discussed. See supra, pp. 3–6. Defendant’s typicality argument also depends
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`on the same mistaken premise that only members who labeled People albums with their full names
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`have valid claims. Opp. at 14.
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`Defendant further contends that the named Plaintiffs are atypical and inadequate
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`representatives based on continued use of the Photos app, which Defendant characterizes as a
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`“unique” defense. Opp. at 14, 19. For a potential defense to undermine typicality or adequacy, it
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`must be one that applies to the named plaintiff alone but which “would not defeat unnamed class
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`members.” Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2011); J. H. Cohn & Co. v.
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`Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 628 F.2d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 1980) (defense must be “peculiar to the
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`named plaintiff or a small subset of the plaintiff class”). Defenses that are “typical of the defenses
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`which may be raised against other members of the proposed class” are not unique and do not render
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`the plaintiff inadquate. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 2011).
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`Defendant’s assertion that its “waiver, consent, and failure to mitigate defenses” are somehow
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`10
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`

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`Case 3:20-cv-00421-NJR Document 211 Filed 08/23/24 Page 16 of 22 Page ID #6127
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`“unique,” Opp. at 14, 19, is severely undermined by its Rule 23(b)(3) argument that it intends to
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`raise such defenses against “each putative class member,” id. at 10. As noted, Defendant fails to
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`cite any legal authority supporting these defenses. See supra, p. 8. But even assuming such
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`defenses were viable, Defendant makes no effort to show that only the named Plaintiffs or even a
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`small subset of the putative class members continued using the Photos app.
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`Defendant’s suggestion of an intra-class conflict also fails. See Opp. at 14 (asserting that
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`named Plaintiffs “are at odds with” various class members). A defendant cannot avoid class
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`certification merely by identifying a “hypothetical” conflict that may or may not “materialize as
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`the litigation progresses.” Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 725 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2013). To
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`defeat certification, the defendant must show that the representative’s interests are genuinely
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`“antagonistic to the class.” Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 284, 289 (N.D. Ill.
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`2005). An alleged conflict does not rise to that level unless it is “of the type that, if that plaintiff
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`succeeds, would result in identifiable harm to some member of the class.” Neil v. Zell, 275 F.R.D.
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`256, 265 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (emphasis added).
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`Defendant comes nowhere close to making that showing. There is no conflict with people
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`“who never used the app” because they are not even members of the proposed class. Cf. Opp. at
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`14. Nor is there any antagonism between class members who did and did not enable iCloud photos.
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`Members of the iCloud subclass are also members of the Local Device Class. All members of both
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`proposed classes have an alignment of interests and the same incentive to establish Defendant’s
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`liability.
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`Defendant’s final argument is that Plain