`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
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`Plaintiff,
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` v.
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`
`
` Cause No. 4:16-cv-43
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`HIGHER SOCIETY OF INDIANA, INC., )
` )
` )
` )
` )
` )
` )
` )
` )
`
`TIPPECANOE COUNTY, INDIANA,
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`Defendant.
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`OPINION & ORDER
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`The Higher Society of Indiana wants to hold a rally advocating the legalization of
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`marijuana on the steps of the Tippecanoe County Courthouse. It seems like a reasonable
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`place to get the message out since that is the very place where prosecutions for
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`marijuana possession and sale occur. But the County’s policy requires events on the
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`courthouse grounds to be “sponsored and prepared by a department or office of county
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`government” and scheduled through the Board of Commissioners. And despite a
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`request, the County has refused to sponsor an event by the Higher Society. The group
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`filed this case and has moved for a preliminary injunction on grounds that the County
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`has used its events policy to discriminate against speakers on the basis of viewpoint in
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`violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
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`A hearing was held on the motion for preliminary injunction. Although no
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`evidence was offered at the hearing other than the documentary evidence already
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`attached to the briefing, oral argument was held. During its argument, the County
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`candidly admitted that the reason it did not sponsor the Higher Society’s rally was
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 2 of 17
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`because it didn’t agree with the group’s message. The County argues that it may engage
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`in viewpoint discrimination because activities and speeches that take place on the
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`courthouse steps are “government speech” that is not entitled to constitutional
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`protection. As a result, the County’s position is that it can pick and choose what
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`messages are conveyed from the grounds of the courthouse. For the reasons outlined
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`below, I think that the County’s argument stretches the concept of “government
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`speech” to its breaking point, and so the motion for a preliminary injunction will be
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`granted.
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`Background
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`The Tippecanoe County Courthouse occupies one square city block in downtown
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`Lafayette, Indiana and houses the county’s state courts and county offices. (DE 15 at 2,
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`9; DE 18 at 1–2.) To fully understand this case, one needs to understand the physical
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`layout of the courthouse and the surrounding grounds which are landscaped and
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`include plush greenery, paved paths, several monuments, a fountain, and benches, and
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`all of which are open to and used by the public. (DE 15 at 2–3; DE 18 at 1–2.) The
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`northern entrance is on Main Street and is permanently closed. The southern entrance to
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`the Courthouse is on Columbia Street and is the only entrance for visitors. The eastern
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`entrance is on Fourth Street and is reserved for the transport of prisoners by the Sheriff.
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`The western entrance is on Third Street and is reserved for county employees. The Main
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`Street and Third Street entrances are separated from the sidewalk by a short flight of
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`stairs and are flanked by two larger staircases that rise to balconies overlooking the
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`2
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 3 of 17
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`street. (See DE 15 at 2–3, 16; see also DE 18-1 at 13 (showing Third Street entrance).) The
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`Columbia Street entrance is separated from the public sidewalk by three stairs and is
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`similarly flanked by two staircases that rise to a balcony and colonnade. (See DE 18-1 at
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`18; DE 15 at 2–3, 16.)
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`In 1999, the Tippecanoe County Board of Commissioners voted to change the
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`County’s policy on displays and events on government property to ensure that private
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`activities did not disrupt official business and that County property was available for
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`County uses. (DE 15 at 3; DE 18 at 2–3.) Although there’s nothing in the record about
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`the extent to which the courthouse grounds were available to the public for protests,
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`rallies, and other events before the policy was changed, it’s clear that the County
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`intended the courthouse grounds to be a “nonpublic forum” moving forward, which is
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`to say an area where the government may impose restrictions on speech or even ban
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`expressive activities, so long as it doesn’t discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. (See DE
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`2-2.) Here’s what the revised policy, which remains in effect today, says:
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`POLICY ON DISPLAYS AND EVENTS ON
`GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
`(CLOSED FORUM)
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`Only displays and events sponsored and prepared by a
`department or office of county government will be allowed in
`the windows of the Tippecanoe County Office Building or on
`the grounds of the Tippecanoe County Courthouse. Said
`displays and events shall be scheduled through the Board of
`Commissioners of the County of Tippecanoe.
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`(DE 15 at 3; DE 18-1 at 19.)
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`3
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 4 of 17
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`Under this policy, any group that wishes to hold an event on the courthouse
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`grounds must solicit the support of a commissioner, who then must request
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`sponsorship by the full County board. (See DE 18 at 4; DE 15 at 8.) The County’s
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`professed aim is to restrict the use of courthouse property to “private groups that are in
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`essence echoing the views of the government agency that is sponsoring them.” (See DE
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`18 at 4 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).) This is a rather curious claim
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`in light of the fact that the County does not inquire into the content of the messages the
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`group would convey before deciding whether to sponsor an event, and there’s nothing
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`to suggest that the County in any way controls what a group says once an event is
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`sponsored.
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`County-Sponsored Events
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`Since the policy change, the County has continued to allow ostensibly private
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`events to take place on courthouse grounds. For example, soon after changing the
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`policy, the County passed a resolution permitting the Round the Fountain Art Fair to be
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`held annually on the courthouse grounds. (DE 15-1 at 6; DE 15 at 5.) Although the fair’s
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`name suggests it is confined to an area surrounding a fountain in the northeast corner of
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`the block, it actually takes place across the courthouse grounds and on the surrounding
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`sidewalks and streets. (See DE 15 at 5.) Consistent with the County’s sponsorship of the
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`fair, County commissioners and maintenance department help with preparations and
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`handle logistics for the fair. (Id.; DE 15-1 at 6.)
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`The County also has sponsored other events by private groups on the courthouse
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`4
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 5 of 17
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`grounds. For example, in 2015, the County board authorized the League of Women
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`Voters to hold a rally celebrating its 95th anniversary on one staircase, the balcony, and
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`the plaza outside the Fourth Street entrance. (DE 18 at 3; DE 18-1 at 42–45.) That rally,
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`which attracted approximately 100 people, was held on a weekday, just after the close
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`of business. (Id.) Similarly, the County sponsored a rally by the Fraternal Order of Police
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`in 2014. (DE 18-1 at 46–48.) The FOP rally took place at lunchtime on a weekday on the
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`Main Street entrance stairs. (See id.) Neither the League of Women Voters nor the FOP’s
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`sponsorship agreement with the County board included any specifics about the
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`messages that would be conveyed at those events. (See generally DE 18-1 at 42–48.)
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`Private Events Held Without Permission
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`In addition to County-sponsored events, other private groups have held events
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`on the courthouse steps without County permission. For example, in 2015, a group
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`called Eyes on Lafayette requested authorization to hold a candlelight vigil against
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`bullying on the courthouse steps. (DE 15-2 at 14–15.) A County employee responded
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`that, while it was too late to get County sponsorship and approval, the event could be
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`held on the sidewalk surrounding the courthouse without permission. (Id. at 14.) The
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`vigil was held a few days later in the evening, and the group made use of the
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`courthouse steps in addition to the sidewalk. (DE 15-4 at 2–5 (reproducing pictures from
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`D. Peers McCoy, Lafayette Crowd Remembers Bullying Victims, Lafayette J. & Courier,
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`June 5, 2015, www.jconline.com/story/news/education/2015/06/04/lafayette-crowd-
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`remembers-bullying-victims/28517089/).) It was reported that more than 50 people
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`5
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 6 of 17
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`attended that event. Id.
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`In other cases, the group holding the event decided that its easier to beg for
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`forgiveness than ask for permission. They simply held their event without soliciting
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`County permission, and the County became aware that the event was held on the
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`courthouse grounds only after the fact. (See DE 18 at 5.) That was the case on Monday,
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`September 28, 2015, when Planned Parenthood held a daytime rally, which was
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`attended by approximately 60 people, on the stairs and adjacent sidewalk outside the
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`visitors’ entrance on Columbia Street. (See DE 15 at 6; see also Dozens Rally in Pink to
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`Stand with Planned Parenthood, WLFI News, Sept. 29, 2015, http://wlfi.com/2015/09/29
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`/dozens-rally-in-pink-to-stand-with-planned- parenthood/. Similarly, approximately
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`70 people attended a daytime march in support of Syrian refugees and against
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`Governor Pence’s attempted ban on the resettlement of refugees in Indiana on a
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`weekday in 2015, and that event spilled over onto the courthouse steps from the
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`sidewalk. (See DE 15 at 6; see also PHOTOS: Protestors Rally Against Syrian Refugee Ban,
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`Lafayette Journal & Courier, Dec. 4, 2015, http://www.jconline.com/picture-gallery/
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`news/2015/12/04/photos-protesters-rally-against-syrian-refugee-ban/76801556/.)
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`Higher Society’s Rallies
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`The rally the Higher Society wants to hold would be its second on the
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`Tippecanoe County Courthouse grounds. The first was held on Wednesday, May 11,
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`2016, during business hours just outside and above the employee entrance on Third
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`Street. (See DE 15 at 7; DE 8-1 at 1–2.) Although a County employee told the group that
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`6
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 7 of 17
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`they could hold the rally, she mistakenly believed that the event had been approved by
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`the County board. (DE 8-1 at 2.) At the event, speakers at a podium on the balcony
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`above the door to the courthouse addressed a crowd of up to 40 people that had
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`gathered below. (DE 9 at 3; see also DE 15 at 7.) Banners and signs hung from the
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`balcony, and the speeches and music were amplified, until a commissioner asked the
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`group to turn the amplifier off. (DE 9 at 3.)
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`After that first rally, the Higher Society asked the County for permission to hold
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`a second rally on the courthouse steps, this time without an amplification system, but
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`the County denied the request, on grounds that “[n]one of the Commissioners has
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`indicated an intent to recommend sponsoring the event to the full Board” and
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`seemingly because of the County board’s 1999 decision to designate the courthouse
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`grounds a “closed forum.”(DE 2-2; see also DE 2-1 at 1.)
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`The County’s refusal sparked the current controversy in which Higher Society
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`seeks a preliminary injunction. The County’s response brief argued both that speech on
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`the courthouse steps is government speech that the County can constitutionally control
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`and that the courthouse grounds are a “nonpublic forum” that can be regulated, so long
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`as there is no viewpoint discrimination. (DE 15 at 9, 13–16.) But as I mentioned above,
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`the County conceded at oral argument that its denial of the Higher Society’s request
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`was “not viewpoint neutral”—which means that, if the courthouse grounds are a
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`nonpublic forum, the County acted unconstitutionally. Based on that concession, it is
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`unnecessary to address the County’s first argument, and so I will focus my attention on
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`7
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 8 of 17
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`the County’s sole remaining argument: that the County’s viewpoint discrimination was
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`not unconstitutional because speech on the courthouse steps is government speech that
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`is not protected by the First Amendment.
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`Discussion
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`The Higher Society wants a preliminary injunction so that it can hold another
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`rally before this case is fully resolved. Let’s start with the basics. “A preliminary
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`injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res.
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`Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must make
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`a threshold showing that it (1) is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) will suffer
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`irreparable harm will result if the injunction is denied; and (3) has no adequate remedy
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`at law. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011).
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`There is no question that the second and third requirements for a preliminary
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`injunction are satisfied here because “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms is
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`presumed to constitute an irreparable injury for which money damages are not
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`adequate[.]” Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2006); accord
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`MacDonald v. Chicago Park Dist., 132 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Elrod v. Burns,
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`427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). The only real question at this threshold stage, then, is whether
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`the Higher Society is likely to prevail on the merits of its claim that the County violated
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`its First Amendment rights by denying the request for a second rally.
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`Because the County admits to viewpoint discrimination that would violate the
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`First Amendment even in the most restrictive of the government-created forums for
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`8
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 9 of 17
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`speech, there is no need to do a traditional forum analysis here. See generally Anderson v.
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`Milwaukee Cnty., 433 F.3d 975, 979–80 (7th Cir. 2006); Ill. Dunesland Preser. Soc’y v. Ill.
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`Dep’t of Natural Res., 584 F.3d 719, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2009). Instead, the question is
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`whether speech on the Tippecanoe County Courthouse stairs has been confined to
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`speech by the County government itself, albeit through private speakers. If it has, then
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`the County “is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position,”
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`and in doing so, may decide which speakers to sponsor and which to turn away on the
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`basis of viewpoint without violating the First Amendment. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of
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`Confed. Vets., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015) (citing Pleasant Grove City, Utah v.
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`Summun, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009)).
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`Summun is the leading case on government speech. 555 U.S. 460. There, a
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`religious organization sued a town for denying its request to erect a permanent
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`monument in a park where the city had permitted other groups to erect religious
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`monuments. (Id. at 464.) The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that
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`monuments erected in a public park are like “speeches and other transitory expressive
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`acts” for First Amendment purposes because, while “public parks can accommodate
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`only a limited number of permanent monuments,” other government-owned property
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`is “capable of accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating the
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`essential function of the land[.]” (Id. at 464, 478–79.) Rather, the Court concluded that
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`the monuments were government speech that could be regulated (or banned) based on
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`content and viewpoint. (Id. at 467–68 (internal citations omitted).)
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`9
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 10 of 17
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`The U.S. Supreme Court further delineated what kinds of expressive activities
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`constitute government speech in Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239. There, the Texas Department of
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`Motor Vehicles had a program whereby private citizens and groups could propose
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`alternative license plate designs. Id. at 2244–45. The Sons of Confederate Veterans
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`applied for a specialty license plate featuring a Confederate flag, but the DMV denied
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`the request, which led the group to sue on First Amendment grounds. Id. The Walker
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`court applied Summun and concluded that Texas’s license plates were not a public
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`forum entitled to Free Speech protections, but instead government speech. Id. at 2248. In
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`doing so, the Court clarified the following markers of government speech made by or
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`with the help of a private speaker: (1) there is a history of the government using the
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`forum to speak to the public; (2) observers of speech in that forum “routinely—and
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`reasonably— interpret [it] as conveying some message” on behalf of the government
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`because the forum is not usually opened up to messages with which the government
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`disagrees; and (3) the government maintains control over the message to be conveyed.
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`Id at 2247–49 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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`Applying those factors here leads to the conclusion that the rallies, protests, and
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`other events that have happened on the Tippecanoe County Courthouse steps are not
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`government speech. First, the County pointed to no evidence indicating that the
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`courthouse stairs are a forum that the government has historically used to convey its
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`own messages. To the contrary, prior to 1999, the courthouse stairs appear to have been
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`used by groups for expressive activity, and, even after the policy change, private groups
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`10
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 11 of 17
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`continue to use the stairs, whether they have the County’s permission (e.g., the
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`Fraternal Order of Police) or not (e.g., Planned Parenthood).
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`Second, passersby who see protests, speakers, rallies, and the like on the
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`Tippecanoe Courthouse steps are unlikely to interpret them as conveying a message on
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`behalf of Tippecanoe County. That’s both because private groups historically have held
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`events on the courthouse grounds and continue to have them—with or without County
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`approval—and because rallies and protests outside the courthouse are not a usual
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`mechanism for speech by the government. And more generally, no one who happens
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`upon a protest on public property would think that the government necessarily
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`supports the message being conveyed. Rather, reasonable observers know that people
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`who want to protest will find symbolic public property to do it on, and that, in many
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`cases, the First Amendment guarantees them the right to march peacefully and make
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`speeches there, even if the government doesn’t like what they are saying. In other
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`words, reasonable people instinctively know the difference between the government
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`allowing people to speak on its property, on the one hand, and supporting the message
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`being conveyed, on the other.
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`More permanent forms of speech like monuments and license plates are a horse
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`of a different color. As the Supreme Court recognized in Summun, speeches and protests
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`are fleeting; monuments and license plates, by contrast, are more permanent. 555 U.S. at
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`479. Observers of these permanent types of speech would be reasonable to conclude
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`that the government supports the monument’s message because, otherwise, it would
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`11
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 12 of 17
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`not have permitted the monument to be placed permanently on its land. Not so with a
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`speaker. It is this distinction that explains cases like Walker and Summun.
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`Third, activities held on the Tippecanoe Courthouse steps by private groups are
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`not government speech because Tippecanoe County exercises very little (if any) control
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`over the messages conveyed there. The County’s stock sponsorship agreement doesn’t
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`even require information about the subject matter of the event. (See, e.g., DE 23-2 at
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`9–11.) While the message is likely obvious in certain cases (as it is with the Higher
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`Society), in others the County has no idea what the group intends to say. Take the
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`Round the Fountain Art Fair, as an example. That event, which features the artwork of
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`many different artists, has been sponsored by the County on a permanent basis, but
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`there’s no evidence suggesting that the County has ever reviewed or approved the
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`artwork that will be displayed at the fair. A participating artist could use her work to
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`rail against an official County policy, speech that would be clearly inconsistent with the
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`County’s viewpoint, and the County wouldn’t learn of it until it’s said and done. I don’t
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`see how that speech—speech that is“sponsored” by the County in name but the content
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`of which is never reviewed or approved by the County—can be reasonably
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`characterized as “government speech.”
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`Nor does Tippecanoe exercise control over the messages professed by the groups
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`that receive ad hoc sponsorship. The League of Women Voters applied for and was
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`granted County sponsorship for an event in 2015, yet its sponsorship agreement with
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`the County was silent about content and instead vaguely stated that the group “would
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`12
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 13 of 17
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`like to conduct a “[r]ally on the courthouse steps with short speeches, proclamations,
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`[and] singing to celebrate the 95th Anniversary of the League of Women Voters.” (See
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`DE 18-1 at 42.) The agreement did not disclose—and nothing suggests the County ever
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`separately asked—whether the group would express any of its more controversial
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`views during the event, such as positions on voter restrictions and abortion access. See
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`id.; see also, e.g., League of Women Voters, Status of Women in the States: 2015,
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`Reproductive Rights, http://leaguelafayette. org/files/status_of_
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`women_reproductive-rights_2015. pdf. The sponsorship agreement also did not reserve
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`the County’s right to review or approve the language that would be used at the event.
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`(See generally DE 18-1 at 42–45.)
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`Similarly, the Fraternal Order of the Police applied and was granted sponsorship
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`for a memorial service on the courthouse steps in 2015 (DE 18-1 at 46–48), but the group
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`never said and seemingly was never asked whether the event would involve conveying
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`the message that “Blue lives matter,” a political viewpoint that the FOP has espoused
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`elsewhere. See id.; see also, e.g., C. Canterbury, Letter to U.S. Rep. K. Buck, Mar. 18, 2016,
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`https://fop.net/CmsDocument/Doc/ltr _2016-0318.pdf (expressing “strong support”
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`for legislation that has come to be known as the Blue Lives Matter Act of 2016). As with
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`the other sponsored events, the sponsorship agreement did not reserve the County’s
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`right to review or approve the group’s message. (See generally DE 18-1 at 46–48.)
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`What’s more, the County has exercised even less control over events that do not
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`go through the County board before they are held on the courthouse steps. For
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 14 of 17
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`example, the County knew about but didn’t have time to sponsor an anti-bullying event
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`held by Eyes on Lafayette in June 2015. (DE 15-2 at 15.) In that case, the vigil was held in
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`the evening, and, while it may have begun on the sidewalk, the group ultimately made
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`use of the courthouse steps. (DE 15-4 at 2–5.) Similarly, both Planned Parenthood and a
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`group protesting against Indiana Governor Pence’s attempt to ban Syrian refugees from
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`resettling in Indiana held events that made partial use of the courthouse steps, and they
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`did so without advance permission from the County. (DE 15 at 6.) Although the County
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`claims that the use of the courthouse grounds in those cases was incidental and
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`unauthorized, news reporting of those events shows that attendees made significant use
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`of courthouse property. See, e.g., Peers McCoy, Lafayette Crowd Remembers Bullying
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`Victims, Lafayette J. & Courier, June 5, 2015, www.jconline.com/story/news/
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`education/2015/06/04/lafayette-crowd-remembers-bullying-victims/ 28517089/
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`(showing 30 or more people on the courthouse stairs during the event); Dozens Rally in
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`Pink to Stand with Planned Parenthood, WLFI News, Sept. 29, 2015, http://wlfi.com/
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`2015/09/29/dozens-rally-in-pink-to-stand-with-planned-parenthood/ (video showing
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`more than 20 people on the courthouse stairs during the event).
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`Regardless of whether a group asked for advance permission or not, Tippecanoe
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`County did not review the messages that would be conveyed during the events to weed
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`out those that were overtly partisan or were not shared by the powers that be in the
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`County. The League of Women Voters or Planned Parenthood could have used the
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`courthouse stairs to shout “Voter restrictions are racist!”; the FOP could chant their now
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`14
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 15 of 17
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`oft-repeated mantra that “Blue lives matter!”; and protestors could have used the stairs
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`to scream “Out with Governor Pence! In with the Syrian refugees!” And for all the
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`County knows, they did.
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`This is in direct contrast to the control of message one sees in the line of
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`government speech cases relied upon by the County. In Walker, Texas reviewed and
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`formally approved the final design of each specialty license plate. 135 S. Ct. at 2247. In
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`Summun, Pleasant Grove City “effectively controlled” the messages on permanent
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`monuments by exercising “final approval authority” over their selection. 555 U.S. at 473
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`(quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mrktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2004)). And, in Illinois
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`Dunesland Preservation Society, a state employee selected brochures that would attract
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`tourists to a state park for showcasing in display racks at the park. 584 F.3d at 724.
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`In short, the speech that takes place on the Tippecanoe County Courthouse stairs
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`doesn’t have the features of government speech. Rather, the County has opened the
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`courthouse grounds up to speech by some groups—the ones it likes—and, having done
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`so, it may not now prohibit others from speaking on the basis of what they intend to
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`say. Accordingly, the Higher Society has shown that it has a significant likelihood of
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`success on the merits, and it has made a threshold showing that it is entitled to a
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`preliminary injunction.
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`Balances of Harms & Public Interest
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`The next stage in the preliminary injunction analysis is to balance the relative
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`harms that could be caused to either party if an injunction is granted or denied and to
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`15
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 16 of 17
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`weigh the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. The balancing of harms is done on a
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`sliding sale, which is to say that “the more likely it is the plaintiff will succeed on the
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`merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms need weigh towards its side[.]” Planned
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`Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal
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`quotation marks and citations omitted).
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`Here, the Higher Society has shown a strong likelihood of success and so it
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`doesn’t have to show that the balance of harms tips heavily in its favor. Nevertheless, it
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`is clear that the balance of harms weighs strongly in favor of the Higher Society because
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`“the loss of the First Amendment right to speak and associate, even for a short period of
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`time, will necessarily give rise to an irreparable injury.” See MacDonald, 132 F.3d at 358;
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`see also DE 15 at 17. The only possible harm on the other side of the scale is a loss of
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`“order and decorum at the Tippecanoe County Courthouse.” (See DE 15 at 17.) Frankly,
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`that seems unlikely to happen, given that the Higher Society’s last rally was not
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`disruptive and that the County would be able to continue regulating events so that they
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`don’t interfere with courthouse business and in order to ration the use of a limited
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`amount of space. See generally Women’s Health Link, 2016 WL 3435633; see also MacDonald
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`v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1032 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that time, place, and
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`manner restrictions are constitutional so long as they are viewpoint neutral, narrowly
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`tailored, and leave open sufficient alternative mans of communication).
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`When you add to this calculation the fact that an injunction protecting First
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`Amendment rights is always in the public interest, see Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at
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`16
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`USDC IN/ND case 4:16-cv-00043-PPS-JEM document 31 filed 12/19/16 page 17 of 17
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`859, what you end up with is the conclusion that the Higher Society is entitled to a
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`preliminary injunction.
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`Conclusion
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`Accordingly, the motion to for preliminary injunction (DE 8) is GRANTED, and
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`Tippecanoe County, Indiana is ENJOINED from enforcing its Policy on Displays and
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`Events on Government Property to prevent the Higher Society from holding future
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`rallies on the courthouse steps.
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`SO ORDERED.
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`ENTERED: December 19, 2016.
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`s/ Philip P. Simon
`CHIEF JUDGE
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`17
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