`DAVIS Sgt.,
`HORN Sgt.,
`COBB Sgt.,
`R. BROWN Warden,
`C. NICHOLSON Lieutenant,
`DUNN Correctional Officer,
`JERRY SNYDER Unit Team Manager,
`ROGERS Correctional Officer,
`BOATMAN Correctional Officer,
`
`
`v.
`
`Defendants.
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`
`
`
`
`No. 2:19-cv-00096-JMS-MJD
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`Case 2:19-cv-00096-JMS-MJD Document 165 Filed 03/25/21 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 3655
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
`
`
`CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Order Granting Defendants' Motion
`for Partial Summary Judgment
`
`Christopher L. Scruggs, an Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) inmate incarcerated
`
`at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on February 22,
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`2019, against nine IDOC employees and a medical provider. Dkt. 2. The suit flows from incidents
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`on August 9, 2018, to be described in brief detail below. On December 28, 2020, the Court granted
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`the motion for summary judgment of defendant Hanna Boyd, R.N. Dkt. 138. Remaining are the
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`nine IDOC defendants who have also moved for partial summary judgment. The motion is fully
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`briefed and ready for a decision. For the reasons explained below, the motion, dkt. [95], is granted.
`
`I. Summary Judgment Standard
`
`A motion for summary judgment asks the court to find that a trial is unnecessary because
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`there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment
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`as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On summary judgment, a party must show the court
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`what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Gekas
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`v. Vasilades, 814 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment
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`if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570
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`F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
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`must set forth specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex
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`Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court views the record in the light most favorable
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`to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Illinois
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`Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
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`determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v.
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`Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The court need only consider the cited materials,
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the
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`district courts that they are not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is
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`potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them. Grant v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 870
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`F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017). The non-moving party bears the burden of specifically
`
`identifying the relevant evidence of record. D.Z. v. Buell, 796 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2015). This
`
`is in part because summary judgment is the "put up or shut up" moment in a lawsuit. Grant, 870
`
`F.3d at 568.
`
`II. Material Facts
`
`Consistent with the legal standards set out above, the following facts are undisputed except
`
`where noted. Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty., 772 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014). That is, these
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`statements of fact are not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment standard
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`requires, the undisputed facts and any disputed evidence are presented in the light most favorable
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`2
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`to the non-moving party. Whitaker v. Wisc. Dep't of Health Serv's, 849 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir.
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`2017).
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`The task of determining which facts are undisputed is complicated by Mr. Scruggs taking
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`issue with obscure and irrelevant differences between his deposition testimony, interrogatory
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`responses, and documentary evidence. See, e.g., dkt. 129 at 3-4 (Scruggs' response taking issue
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`with the definition or degree of what constitutes "the water wasn't working.") Any disagreement
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`from Mr. Scruggs as to the precise wording of these material facts is a disagreement that does not
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`materially impact to the issues.
`
`Mr. Scruggs was, at the relevant time, incarcerated at the Wabash Valley Correctional
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`Facility. Dkt. 91-5 at 10 (Scruggs' deposition).1 On August 9, 2018, Mr. Scruggs was on the thirty-
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`third day of a hunger strike. Id. at 10, 14. On that day he was moved to cell B-612, which is in the
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`"SCU/WVS" of the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Dkt. 95-1 at 12; dkt. 95-3 at 1-2. Mr.
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`Scruggs soon noticed that the water in the sink was not working properly. Dkt. 91-5 at 24. The hot
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`water was not working at all, and the cold water "would just run on the faucet like water on a
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`window pane or something." Id. at 24-25. Mr. Scruggs said there were no other sources of water
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`in his cell than the toilet, which was working properly, but he was "not drinking from no toilet . .
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`. ." Id. at 25.
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`Later the same day, Sgt. Horn came to Mr. Scruggs' cell after being told by Officer Dunn
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`that Mr. Scruggs was "unresponsive on the floor." Dkt. 95-4 at 1. Mr. Scruggs was taken to the
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`medical area, and once there and while waiting for the nurse, he asked for and received two six-
`
`
`1 Mr. Scruggs' deposition was taken February 4, 2020, by counsel for all defendants. A
`copy was filed in support of Defendant Boyd's motion for summary judgment and is cited by the
`IDOC defendants. Page citations to every filed document, including exhibits such as Mr. Scruggs'
`deposition, are to the CM/ECF assigned page numbers.
`3
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`

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`Case 2:19-cv-00096-JMS-MJD Document 165 Filed 03/25/21 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: 3658
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`ounce cups of water. Dkt. 91-5 at 40-41. At approximately 6:45 p.m., Mr. Scruggs was seen by
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`Nurse Hanna Boyd and then returned to cell B-612. Dkt. 91-2; dkt. 91-5 at 97. Mr. Scruggs was
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`placed on suicide watch at approximately 7:05 p.m. Dkt. 91-3.
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`Shortly after returning to B-612, Mr. Scruggs was temporarily moved to a holding cell that
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`was being used as a room for offenders on suicide watch. Dkt. 91-5 at 61-62. Mr. Scruggs had
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`spent approximately a total of six to seven hours in cell B-612. Dkt. 2 at 4. The water worked
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`properly in the holding cell. Dkt. 91-5 at 83.
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`When Mr. Scruggs was no longer on suicide watch, he was returned to cell B-612.
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`Dkt. 91-5 at 83. The water still did not work properly in B-612, but correctional officers brought
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`him water when he asked. Id.
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`III. Claims in This Lawsuit
`
`
`
`After screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and summary judgment for Nurse Boyd,
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`Mr. Scruggs has three claims remaining in this action:
`
`1.
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`First Amendment Retaliation Claim
`
`Mr. Scruggs asserts his move to cell B-612 was ordered or caused by
`
`Warden Richard Brown, Lt. Christopher Nicholson, and/or Unit Team Manager
`Jerry Snyder in retaliation for his having filed another lawsuit (Scruggs v. Wilson,
`No. 2:19-cv-00228 (S.D. Ind. 2019).
`
`2.
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`Eighth Amendment Condition of Confinement Claim
`
`Mr. Scruggs asserts that the six to seven hours he spent in cell B-612 without
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`drinkable running water violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel
`and unusual punishment. He brings this claim against all nine of the remaining
`defendants – Correctional Officer Stephen Boatman, Sgt. Jodi Davis, Sgt. Tim
`Horn, Sgt. Tracy Cobb, Warden Richard Brown, Lt. Christopher Nicholson,
`Correctional Officer Jeanne Dunn, Unit Team Manager Jerry Snyder, and
`Correctional Officer Blayze Rodgers. (this list includes the three defendants from
`the first claim), alleging they all knew cell B-612 did not have drinkable water and
`did nothing about it.
`
`4
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`3.
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`Eighth Amendment Excessive Force and Deliberate Indifference Claim
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`Mr. Scruggs asserts that Sergeant Jodi Davis sprayed his genitals with two
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`large cans of pepper spray, and that she and Sergeant Tim Horn then took him to a
`decontamination shower in handcuffs and would not help him turn on the water.
`These two defendants are not seeking summary judgment on this claim.
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`IV. Officer Boatman
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`Officer Boatman moves for summary judgment because Mr. Scruggs has made no
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`allegation against him. Mr. Scruggs indeed testified during his deposition that he erroneously sued
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`Officer Boatman, mistaking him for someone else. Dkt. 91-5 at 36. In his response, Mr. Scruggs
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`agrees and states that Officer Boatman is entitled to summary judgment. Dkt. 129 at 5.
`
`Accordingly, Officer Boatman's motion for summary judgment is granted. All claims against him
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`are dismissed with prejudice.
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`V. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
`
`The threshold, and dispositive, issue for this claim concerns the defendants' personal
`
`
`
`
`responsibility. Mr. Scruggs pled a claim against Warden Brown, Lt. Nicholson, and Manager
`
`Snyder for retaliation that survived screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See dkt. 6. Now at the
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`summary judgment stage, after discovery has concluded, Mr. Scruggs must adduce evidence that
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`these defendants were responsible for his move to cell B-612 and that they knew the drinking water
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`in the cell was not working properly. He has not done so.
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`"Individual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal involvement in the alleged
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`constitutional deprivation." Colbert v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
`
`quotation omitted) (citing Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Section 1983
`
`creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual cannot
`
`be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional
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`5
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`deprivation. . . . . A causal connection, or an affirmative link, between the misconduct complained
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`of and the official sued is necessary."))
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`Mr. Scruggs' arguments that Warden Brown, Lt. Nicholson, and Manager Snyder were
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`responsible for the move to B-612 are mere speculation and conjecture. At his deposition, this
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`exchange occurred:
`
`Q.
`
`Do you know who decided for you to move?
`
`A. Well, Snyder is in charge of the caseworkers in each unit, so he handles movements.
`Brown, he's superintendent, so he has to approve the movements, and I know
`Nicholson has something to do with it too.
`
`Do you know what Nicholson had to do with it?
`
`. . . .
`
`Q.
`
`A.
`
`No. He's just the lieutenant over the SHU, so he handles movements, too. That's
`part of his job.
`
`
`Dkt. 91-5 at 17. Mr. Scruggs went on to testify that he never had communications with any of these
`
`three defendants about his move from "A end" to "B end." Id.
`
`
`
`The unrebutted interrogatory testimony of Warden Brown is that he is "not involved in the
`
`bed movement of offenders." Dkt. 95-2 at 1-2. Lt. Nicholson's unrebutted interrogatory testimony
`
`is that he did not make the decision to move Mr. Scruggs from the A-500 range to the B-600 range
`
`on August 9, 2018. Dkt. 95-1 at 1. Manager Snyder's unrebutted interrogatory testimony is that the
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`IDOC Central Office approved Mr. Scruggs' move back to SCU/WVS, and he does not admit or
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`deny being responsible for the move. Dkt. 95-3 at 1-2.
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`Mr. Scruggs also argues that several emails between officials are evidence that
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`Lt. Nicholson was involved in the decision to move him to B-612. See, e.g., dkt. 129 at 9, ¶ 5. He
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`does not point to nor quote any particular email. Id. The Court declines to hunt for emails among
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`those submitted by Mr. Scruggs that could support his allegations. "Judges are not like pigs,
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`6
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`hunting for truffles buried in" the record. Albrechtsen v. Bd. of Regents, 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th
`
`Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). However, the
`
`Court has conducted a brief review of the emails and does not find any discussion that even
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`remotely supports Mr. Scruggs' argument. Dkt. 125 at 4-54. To the contrary, the emails suggest a
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`concern for Mr. Scruggs' well-being during his hunger strike, reporting number of meals that were
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`missed, weight checks, and what efforts were made to convince him to stop his hunger strike. Id.
`
`
`
`The evidence most indicative of who may have directed Mr. Scruggs' move to cell B-612
`
`is the bed movement log, dkt. 95-1 at 12, showing that Sgt. Brock entered the bed move to B-612,
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`and it was approved by M. Woolsey. Neither are defendants to this action.
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`In the end, Mr. Scruggs has failed to produce admissible evidence to support his belief that
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`Warden Brown, Lt. Nicholson, or Manager Snyder directed or were responsible for his move to
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`B-612. Moreover, he has produced no evidence that any of the three knew that the cell's drinking
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`water was not sufficiently operating. Although the Court draws inferences in favor of Mr. Scruggs,
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`"our favor toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported
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`by only speculation or conjecture." Estate of Biegert by Biegert v. Molitor, 968 F.3d 693, 701 (7th
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`Cir. 2020) (internal quotation omitted); Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,
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`573 (7th Cir. 2021) ("[S]peculation is not sufficient to survive summary judgment; there must be
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`evidence.") (internal quotation omitted).
`
`As Mr. Scruggs has no evidence of their personal responsibility, Warden Brown,
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`Lt. Nicholson, and Manager Snyder's motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment
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`retaliation claim is granted.
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`7
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`VI. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement
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`With Officer Boatman's dismissal, the eight remaining defendants are accused by
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`Mr. Scruggs of violating his Eighth Amendment right to not be subjected to cruel and unusual
`
`punishment. He argues that being placed in cell B-612 for six to seven hours, in his weakened state
`
`due to his thirty-three-day hunger strike, without adequate drinkable water, was cruel and unusual.
`
`The defendants, Sgt. Jodi Davis, Sgt. Tim Horn, Sgt. Tracy Cobb, Warden Richard Brown,
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`Lt. Christopher Nicholson, Correctional Officer Jeanne Dunn, Unit Team Manager Jerry Snyder,
`
`and Correctional Officer Blayze Rodgers seek summary judgment, arguing that (1) being in a cell
`
`without running water for six to seven hours is not a sufficiently serious harm to implicate the
`
`Eighth Amendment protections, (b) there is no evidence that any of the defendants acted with the
`
`subjective intent required to prove an Eighth Amendment violation because none knew that Mr.
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`Scruggs faced a substantial risk of serious harm and were deliberately indifferent to it, and (c) they
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`are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law that either requires
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`running water in a prison cell or that being denied access to running water for six to seven hours
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`violates the Constitution. Dkt. 96 at 9-15. The Court will address only the qualified immunity
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`defense because it is dispositive.
`
`Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages unless
`
`their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
`
`person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also Burritt v.
`
`Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015). In other words, a defendant is entitled to "qualified
`
`immunity and is not liable . . . unless he has violated a 'clearly established' right, such that 'it would
`
`[have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful . . . ." Kingsley v.
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`Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
`
`
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`8
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`Analysis of the qualified immunity defense requires a consideration of: (1) whether the plaintiff's
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`constitutional rights were violated and (2) whether the rights were clearly established at the time.
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`Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02.
`
`Mr. Scruggs bears the burden of demonstrating the violation of a clearly established right.
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`Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 473 (7th Cir. 2011); Forman v. Richmond
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`Police Dep't., 104 F.3d 950, 957–958 (7th Cir. 1997). A violation is only "clearly established
`
`where: (1) a closely analogous case establishes that the conduct is unconstitutional; or (2) the
`
`violation is so obvious that a reasonable state actor would know that his actions violated the
`
`Constitution." Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2001). In Plumhoff v. Rickard,
`
`the Supreme Court held that "a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right
`
`unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's
`
`shoes would have understood that he was violating it." 572 U.S. 765, 778-779 (2014). As to the
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`latter prong of Mr. Scruggs' burden, it is not necessary for him to rely on a case directly on point,
`
`but "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate."
`
`Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013) (per curiam).
`
`"'Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
`
`mistaken judgments,' and protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
`
`the law.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (in turn quoting Malley v.
`
`Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
`
`Mr. Scruggs has not responded with authority to meet his burden. He cites to Babcock v.
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`White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996), but this case deals with qualified immunity on a retaliation
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`claim, not water in a prison cell. 102 F.3d at 276. He also cites to Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d
`
`839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999), which reiterates that jail and prison officials have a duty to provide
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`
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`9
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`humane conditions of confinement. Dkt. 129 at 21. There is no dispute that Mr. Scruggs is entitled
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`to humane conditions of confinement, but Henderson does not address whether a poorly working
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`water faucet that is impractical to drink from for six to seven hours violates the Constitution.
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`Lastly, Mr. Scruggs appears to argue that the defendants' conduct of leaving him in cell B-612
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`without an adequate drinking water supply is clearly unlawful because all humans need water to
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`live. Id.
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`There is no question that water is a necessity and its deprivation could constitute an Eighth
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`Amendment violation. But Mr. Scruggs cites to no authorities holding that a prison cell without
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`sufficient running water for drinking, for six to seven hours, is such a violation. The defendants
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`argue that Mr. Scruggs would have been given drinking water if he had asked, and while in cell
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`B-612 he did not. Dkt. 96 at 14. He asked for water while waiting to see the nurse and was provided
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`two cups of water then. Mr. Scruggs has not argued that he asked for water but was refused, either
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`in cell B-612 or any other place.
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`The authorities in this Circuit, as well as other circuits, assess the deprivation of water in
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`terms of days and in combination with other factors, such as unflushed toilets, human waste on the
`
`floor or walls, and denial of cleaning supplies. See Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821 (7th
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`Cir. 2019) (addressing the deprivation of water for three days in a pretrial detainee facility and
`
`collecting cases). In Hardeman, the court noted that the question in deprivation of water cases was
`
`"whether the severity and duration of the conditions . . . were so significant that . . . they violated
`
`the Constitution." Id. at 824 (emphasis added).
`
`Again, Mr. Scruggs cites to no authorities to demonstrate that the deprivation of running
`
`water for six to seven hours is a clearly established violation of the Eighth Amendment or that it
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`is so egregious that the officers knew their actions violated the Constitution. The authorities noted
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`10
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`in Hardeman strongly suggest otherwise. Id. at 821 (citing Woods v. Thieret, 903 F.3d 1080, 1082
`
`(7th Cir. 1990) (three days without food and water stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson
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`v. Pelker, 891 F.3d 126, 139 (7th Cir. 1989) (three days without running water, feces on walls, and
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`denial of cleaning supplies stated Eighth Amendment claim); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257
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`F.3d 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (one bottle of water and one pint of milk per day for three days stated
`
`an Eighth Amendment claim); and Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (inadequate
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`drinking water, along with other deprivations, for four days stated an Eighth Amendment claim).
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`In light of these established authorities, and the absence of cases holding that the
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`deprivation of running water for six to seven hours could state an Eighth Amendment claim, this
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`Court finds that there is no clearly established law providing notice to the defendants that their
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`conduct could violate the Constitution. The Court also finds that the deprivation of running water
`
`for this short time period was not so egregious that any officer involved in this conduct would
`
`understand that she is violating the Constitution.
`
`For these reasons, the remaining eight defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See
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`Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (district court may bypass question of whether a constitutional violation
`
`occurred and address the "clearly established" prong first). Their motion for summary judgment is
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`granted and Mr. Scruggs' Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims concerning the
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`conditions of cell B-612 are dismissed with prejudice.
`
`VII. Surviving Claims Against Sgt. Davis and Sgt. Horn
`
`
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`In his complaint, Mr. Scruggs alleged that near the end of his time in B-612, Sgt. Davis
`
`sprayed him on his genitals with "two big cans of pepper spray." He was then taken to the shower
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`for decontamination. His hands were handcuffed behind his back and he could not turn on the
`
`shower water. Sgt. Davis and Sgt. Horn told him to "figure it out" by himself. Dkt. 2 at 7. These
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`11
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`defendants did not seek summary judgment on these claims and they will therefore be resolved by
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`settlement or trial.
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`VIII. Conclusion
`
`For the reasons explained above, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment,
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`dkt. [95], is granted. All claims are dismissed with prejudice against defendant Correctional
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`Officer Stephen Boatman. The clerk is directed to terminate Officer Boatman from the docket.
`
`The First Amendment retaliation claims against Warden Richard Brown, Lt. Christopher
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`Nicholson, and Unit Team Manager Jerry Snyder are dismissed with prejudice. The Eighth
`
`Amendment conditions of confinement claims concerning the water in cell B-612 are dismissed
`
`with prejudice against Sgt. Jodi Davis, Sgt. Tim Horn, Sgt. Tracy Cobb, Warden Richard Brown,
`
`Lt. Christopher Nicholson, Correctional Officer Jeanne Dunn, Unit Team Manager Jerry Snyder,
`
`Correctional Officer Blayze Rodgers as barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The clerk is
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`directed to terminate Sgt. Tracy Cobb, Warden Richard Brown, Lt. Christopher Nicholson,
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`Correctional Officer Jeanne Dunn, Unit Team Manager Jerry Snyder, and Correctional Officer
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`Blayze Rodgers from the docket.
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`Mr. Scruggs' Eighth Amendment excessive force claim remains against defendants
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`Sgt. Jodi Davis and Sgt. Tim Horn. A trial date will be set by separate order.
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`No partial final judgment is necessary at this time.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`12
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`Date: 3/25/2021
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`

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`Case 2:19-cv-00096-JMS-MJD Document 165 Filed 03/25/21 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: 3667
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`Distribution:
`
`Christopher L. Scruggs
`957096
`Wabash Valley Correctional Facility - Inmate Mail/Parcels
`Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
`
`Archer Riddick Randall Rose
`Indiana Attorney General
`archer.rose@atg.in.gov
`
`
`
`
`
`13
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`