Case 2:19-cv-00494-JMS-MG Document 66 Filed 08/10/22 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 406
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
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`JUAN SERRANO,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`No. 2:19-cv-00494-JMS-MG
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`RICHARD BROWN, et al.,
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`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`Plaintiff Juan Serrano, an inmate at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash
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`Valley") filed this civil rights suit alleging that his right to due process was violated when he was
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`placed in administrative restrictive status housing ("ARSH") from February to July 2018 without
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`meaningful review. Defendants Richard Brown, Kevin Gilmore, Jerry Snyder, Randall Purcell,
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`Andrean Stroup,1 and Breanna Trimble have filed a motion for summary judgment. For the
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`foregoing reasons, that motion, dkt. [40], is granted.
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`I.
`Standard of Review
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`Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a way of resolving a
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`case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
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`genuine dispute as to any of the material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
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`matter of law. Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Comm. Sch., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A
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`"genuine dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving
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`party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Material facts" are those that
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`might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
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`1 Named in the complaint as Andrea Mason.
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`1
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`When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws
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`all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v.
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`Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or
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`make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the
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`factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is only required to
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`consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it is not required to
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`"scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant. Grant v. Tr. of Ind.
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`Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).
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`"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
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`the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings,
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`depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
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`any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex
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`Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party may be
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`discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of
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`evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
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`II.
`Motion to Strike
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`As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the defendants' motion to strike
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`Mr. Serrano's surreply. Dkt. 60. Under Southern District Local Rule 56-1(d), "A party opposing a
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`summary judgment motion may file a surreply brief only if the movant cites new evidence in the
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`reply or objects to the admissibility of the evidence cited in the response. The surreply must be
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`filed within 7 days after the movant serves the reply and must be limited to the new evidence and
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`objections."
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`2
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`The defendants filed their reply brief on February 3, 2022. Dkt. 57. On March 4, 2022—
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`over three weeks after the deadline—Mr. Serrano filedd his surreply and a supporting affidavit.
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`Dkts. 58, 59. Mr. Serrano did not file a motion for extension of time or acknowledge the
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`belatedness of his surreply when he filed it. For this reason, the motion to strike, dkt. [60], is
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`granted. The clerk is directed to strike Mr. Serrano's surreply and affidavit, dkts. [58] and [59],
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`from the record.
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`III.
`Factual Background
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`Because the defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court
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`views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s]
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`all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.
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`2009) (citation omitted).
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`A. The Parties
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`Mr. Serrano has been in the custody of the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC")
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`since 2001. Dkt. 40-1 at 82:01-25. The defendants, all employees of Wabash Valley, were
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`members of a classification committee responsible for conducting reviews and informing
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`inmates regarding decisions, such as continued placement on ARSH. Id. at 34:03−15.
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`B. Prior Placement in ARSH at Wabash Valley and the STAND Unit
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`In 2011, an incident occurred resulting in a death of an inmate at an IDOC facility. Dkt. 12
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`at 4. An investigation ensued, and Mr. Serrano was placed on ARSH at Wabash Valley from
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`July 2011 to December 2016.2 Id.
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`In December 2016, Mr. Serrano was transferred to New Castle Correctional Facility
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`("New Castle"), where he was placed in the Striving Towards a New Direction ("STAND")
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`2 Mr. Serrano's claims related to his confinement in ARSH during this timeframe were dismissed at
`screening as being barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Dkt. 7 at 3−4.
`3
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`Case 2:19-cv-00494-JMS-MG Document 66 Filed 08/10/22 Page 4 of 9 PageID #: 409
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`Program. Dkt. 40-1 at 15:05-17:13. The STAND Program is intended to help inmates like Mr.
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`Serrano transition from long-term restrictive status housing into general population and consists
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`of five phases, lasting a total of 12 to 15 months. Id. at 20:18−19, 92−93.
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`Mr. Serrano advanced in the STAND Program until he was involved in a multi-inmate
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`altercation in July 2017. Id. at 23:6−10; 25:5−7. Mr. Serrano was found guilty of disorderly
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`conduct because when the fight broke out he did not return straight to his cell or get on the
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`floor. Id. at 24:16−20. As a result of the write-up, he was demoted back to Phase 1 of the
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`STAND Program. Id. at 19:20-21; dkt. 40-2 at 6.
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`Mr. Serrano completed Phase 1 of the STAND Program again, but the STAND Unit
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`Review Committee determined that he should remain in Phase 1, and Mr. Serrano requested to
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`then be removed from the STAND Program and be transferred. Dkt. 40-1 at 19:16, 20:23-21:04,
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`25:09-15, 26:15-28:10; dkt. 40-2 at 8. As such, Mr. Serrano was considered a STAND Program
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`failure and was notified that he was placed on a transfer list approved for any Level 3 (medium
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`security level) IDOC facility. Dkt. 40-1 at 28:15-29:09, 30:01-17, 31:01-24, 94; dkt. 40-2 at 8.
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`C. Return to ARSH at Wabash Valley
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`The day before his transfer, Wabash Valley staff decided to place Mr. Serrano in ARSH
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`based upon his STAND Program failure until they could talk to him to see what his goals and
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`objectives were and then make a further decision. Dkt. 40-2 at 9.
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`On February 2, 2018, Mr. Serrano was transferred to Wabash Valley and placed in ARSH,
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`where he met with Randall Purcell who provided him a packet of information and informed him
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`that he was in ARSH at the direction of Warden Richard Brown. Dkt. 40-1 at 51:10-52:06;
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`dkt. 40-2 at 9-10.
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`4
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`On February 23, defendant Jerry Snyder and non-defendant Frank Littlejohn met with
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`Mr. Serrano in an office to discuss the July 2017 altercation at New Castle. Dkt. 40-2 at 11;
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`dkt. 40-1 at 65:25-69:06. At the meeting, Mr. Serrano asked them why he was being housed in
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`ARSH, and they told him it was because of the incident. Id. They had reviewed a video of the
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`incident which Mr. Snyder described as follows: "Video showed a confrontation, Serrano leaves
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`the area and returns with something in his hand, then passes it to someone else. A knife was
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`found later and Frank and I believe that it [was] what he held in his hand." Dkt. 40-2 at 11.
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`Mr. Serrano told them he was not involved in the fight. Dkt. 40-1 at 68:12−13. Mr. Snyder and
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`Mr. Littlejohn concluded that Mr. Serrano was being deceitful, so they decided he would remain
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`in ARSH and they would "review when he is clear of that incident for a year (7/19/18)." Dkt. 40-
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`2 at 11.
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`Mr. Purcell prepared notes indicating he met with Mr. Serrano on February 7, February
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`14, February 21, February 28, and March 14, to discuss his continued placement in ARSH. Id.
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`at 9−11. Mr. Serrano testified that they did not meet on these dates, but rather Mr. Purcell sent
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`him paperwork through the prison mail system telling him about his continued placement.
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`Dkt. 40-1 at 64:24−25−65:1−8. In the following weeks and months, Mr. Serrano periodically
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`received classification paperwork regarding his continued placement in ARSH from some of
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`the named defendants. Id. at 52:07-57:15. The reviews consisted of the same standardized
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`language: "Your status has been reviewed and there are no changes recommended to the
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`Warden at this time." Dkt. 12-1 at 12−15.
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`Other than disagreeing with their decision to keep him in ARSH, Mr. Serrano had no issues
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`with the Wabash Valley staff. Dkt. 40-1 at 85:02-11. On July 10, 2018, Mr. Serrano was moved
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`5
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`Case 2:19-cv-00494-JMS-MG Document 66 Filed 08/10/22 Page 6 of 9 PageID #: 411
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`to general population. Dkt. 40-2 at 13. In total, Mr. Serrano spent 158 days, or five months and 8
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`days, in ARSH.
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`D. Conditions of ARSH
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`While Mr. Serrano was confined in ARSH, he was in a cell with no windows for 23 hours
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`a day. Dkt. 40-1 at 38:18−19. There were two lights in his cell; the smaller of the two stayed on
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`24 hours a day. Id. at 39:19−22. There were ants and small insects in the cell, but no other pests.
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`Id. at 41:11−17. He was ineligible for a prison job while in ARSH. Id. at 49:24−25.
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`Whenever Mr. Serrano left his cell, he was handcuffed and escorted to recreation by an
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`officer who held a "dog leash" that was connected to the handcuffs. Id. at 38:19−22. Mr. Serrano
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`was provided an hour of recreation outdoors each day in a cage that was large enough to walk
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`around and stretch his legs. Id. at 43:10−17. Mr. Serrano could not recall a day in which he was
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`not taken outside. Id. at 44:17−20. He was provided three showers a week, for which he had
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`warm water and soap. Id. at 38:23, 39:4−10.
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`While in ARSH, Mr. Serrano suffered no physical injuries and was not assaulted by any
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`other inmates or Wabash Valley staff. Id. at 38:05−12. However, he suffered from headaches,
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`cognition issues, and social skill deficits from his time in ARSH. Id. at 78:2−5 ("I get headaches
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`now, stuff like that. Conversations – I go blank in the middle of a conversation. . . .And I never
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`had that problem until I was in the SHU."), 79:2−6 ("[M]y social skills are not the same no
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`more. I just – I'm not the same person, and I know it, you know. My family knows it, and
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`everybody that knows me from before knows it."). Although these psychological and cognitive
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`issues arose during his first time in ARSH from 2011 to 2016, they reemerged in the months he
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`spent there in 2018. Id. at 78:6−22.
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`6
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`IV.
`Discussion
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`The constitutional right at issue in this case is the due process clause. The due process
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`clause "applies only to deprivations of life, liberty, and property." Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508,
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`524 (7th Cir. 2017). When presented with a procedural due process challenge, the Court must
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`engage in a two-step analysis. Id. It must first determine "'whether the plaintiff was deprived of a
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`protected interest; if so, [it] determine[s] what process was due under the circumstances.'" Id.
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`(quoting Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2016)).
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`"Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to remain in the general population." Id.
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`(citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995)). Rather, a protected liberty interest "is
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`triggered only when the confinement imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
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`relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 721 (7th Cir.
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`2019) (cleaned up). The Seventh Circuit has not established a bright-line rule for the length of
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`time an inmate must spend in segregation before his liberty interest is triggered, Kervin v.
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`Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836−37 (7th Cir. 2015), though it has concluded that "six months of
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`segregation is not such an extreme term and, standing alone, would not trigger due process
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`rights." Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009). Instead, when
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`deciding whether placement in segregation imposes atypical and significant hardship, the Court
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`"look[s] to both the duration of the segregation and the conditions endured." Lisle, 933 F.3d at
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`721.
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`No rational jury could conclude that Mr. Serrano suffered from "atypical and significant
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`hardship" given the conditions he encountered in ARSH and the relatively short duration of his
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`time in segregation. Id. Mr. Serrano was in ARSH for about five months. He received an hour of
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`outdoor recreation daily and showers three times a week. See Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d
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`7
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`740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (no liberty interest implicated where inmate spent six months in
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`segregation with a violent cellmate and "was permitted to use the shower and prison yard once
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`every week") (emphasis added). He introduced no evidence that the cell was unsanitary, and he
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`was not subjected to a pest infestation in his cell. Lisle, 933 F.3d at 721 (finding inmate
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`introduced no evidence that rust on bars of cell and "corroded feces" in the toilet were unique to
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`cells in segregation or caused the plaintiff hardship); see also Stallings v. Best, 2018 WL
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`4300488, *6 (N. D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2018) (collecting cases that hold that a six-month placement in
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`segregation with pest infestations and unsanitary conditions does not implicate a liberty interest).
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`Mr. Serrano was not able to have a job while in ARSH, but he introduced no evidence that
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`inmates in general population tend to have jobs, or that the lack of job affected him in any way.
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`In short, examining both the duration of segregation and the conditions endured, Mr. Serrano did
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`not demonstrate that the conditions of his five-month segregation were so atypical as to implicate
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`a due process liberty interest.
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`Because Mr. Serrano was not deprived of a liberty interest, the Court need not evaluate
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`whether
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`the procedures used
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`to determine his continued placement
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`in ARSH were
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`constitutionally deficient. Lisle, 933 F.3d at 720.
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`The Court recognizes that, in total, Mr. Serrano spent nearly six years in segregation and
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`has received psychological scars as a result. Mr. Serrano could not pursue his claim for the
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`2011−2016 period of segregation because it was barred by the statute of limitations, and his five-
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`month stay in 2018 did not trigger due process protections. Thus, applying the controlling
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`precedent of this Court, "this is one of those cases in which federal law leaves no one to blame
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`legally." Jump v. Vill. of Shorewood, No. 21-2255, 2022 WL 3040894, at *8 (7th Cir. Aug. 2,
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`2022). The defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
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`V.
`Conclusion
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`The defendants' motion to strike, dkt. [60], is granted. The clerk is directed to strike
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`Mr. Serrano's surreply and affidavit, dkts. [58] and [59], from the record.
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`The defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [40], is granted. Final judgment will
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`issue in a separate entry.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Distribution:
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`JUAN SERRANO
`112300
`WABASH VALLEY - CF
`WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
`6908 S. Old US Hwy 41
`P.O. Box 1111
`CARLISLE, IN 47838
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`All Electronically Registered Counsel
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`9
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`Date: 8/10/2022
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