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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
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`JUAN FLAGG,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`No. 2:20-cv-00095-JRS-MJD
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`ROBERT E. CARTER, et al.
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`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`Plaintiff Juan Flagg, an inmate at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash Valley")
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`brought this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
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`Amendments during his placement in administrative segregation. The defendants have moved for
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`summary judgment arguing that Mr. Flagg failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies
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`as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") before he filed this lawsuit. For the
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`following reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [22], is DENIED.
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`I.
`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that there is no genuine dispute as
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`to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 56(a). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party
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`must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions,
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`documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing
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`that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the
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`adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
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`Case 2:20-cv-00095-JRS-MJD Document 29 Filed 02/08/21 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 140
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`The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return
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`a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court
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`views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable
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`inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018).
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`II.
`DISCUSSION
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`The defendants seek summary judgment arguing that Mr. Flagg failed to exhaust his
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`available administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. The PLRA requires that a prisoner
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`exhaust his available administrative remedies before bringing suit concerning prison conditions.
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`42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). "[T]he PLRA's
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`exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
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`circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
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`wrong." Id. at 532 (citation omitted). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's
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`deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function
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`effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Woodford
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`v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804,
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`809 (7th Cir. 2006) ("'To exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the
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`place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules require.'") (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry,
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`286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). Thus, "to exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must
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`take all steps prescribed by the prison's grievance system." Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 397
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`(7th Cir. 2004). It is the defendants' burden to establish that the administrative process was
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`available. See Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Because exhaustion is an
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`affirmative defense, the defendants must establish that an administrative remedy was available and
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`that [the plaintiff] failed to pursue it.").
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`Case 2:20-cv-00095-JRS-MJD Document 29 Filed 02/08/21 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 141
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`Throughout their brief in support of summary judgment, the defendants argue only that Mr.
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`Flagg failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because his grievance log does not show that
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`he filed any grievance pertaining to his placement in administrative segregation. See dkt. 24 at 7.
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`In response, Mr. Flagg points out that he did not use the offender grievance process to challenge
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`his placement in administrative segregation because, under the defendants' policy, classification
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`decisions are a non-grievable issue. Rather, the policy delineates a separate classification appeals
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`process, which Mr. Flagg argues he exhausted. See dkts. 26, 27. The defendants filed no reply
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`addressing Mr. Flagg's arguments.
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`The Court's review of the policy provided by the defendants reveals that Mr. Flagg has
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`correctly characterized the policy in his response arguments. See dkt. 23-2 at 3 ("Section B. Matters
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`Inappropriate to the Offender Grievance Process"). Specifically, the policy lists classification
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`actions as a "non-grievable issue[]" and states that "a separate disciplinary classification appeals
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`process is in place for this purpose." Id. Therefore, because the undisputed evidence shows that
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`the defendants' initial arguments in support of exhaustion are meritless, and the defendants have
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`filed no reply brief to address Mr. Flagg's response argument that he satisfied the classification
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`appeals process, the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [22], is DENIED.
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`IV.
`CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons explained above, the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [22],
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`is DENIED. Further proceedings will be directed by separate order.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Date: 2/8/2021
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`Case 2:20-cv-00095-JRS-MJD Document 29 Filed 02/08/21 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 142
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`Distribution:
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`JUAN FLAGG
`121969
`WABASH VALLEY - CF
`WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
`6908 S. Old US Hwy 41
`P.O. Box 1111
`CARLISLE, IN 47838
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`Mollie Ann Slinker
`INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
`mollie.slinker@atg.in.gov
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`Samantha May Sumcad
`INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
`samantha.sumcad@atg.in.gov
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