`SONNY DAVIS,
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`JERRY SNYDER, et al.
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00381-JRS-DLP Document 31 Filed 08/02/21 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 1018
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
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`No. 2:20-cv-00381-JRS-DLP
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`ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
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`Sonny Davis, an inmate at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, is proceeding against the
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`defendants on claims relating to his placement in disciplinary restrictive status housing. He is
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`proceeding on First Amendment retaliation claims and Eighth Amendment conditions of
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`confinement claims.
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`The defendants have moved for partial summary judgment. They argue that Mr. Davis
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`failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies on his retaliation claims before filing this
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`lawsuit.1 Mr. Davis has not filed a response, and the time to do so has passed. For the reasons
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`explained below, the motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED, and Mr. Davis' First
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`Amendment claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
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`I.
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
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`A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that the movant is entitled to
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`judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Fed.
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`1 The defendants also argue that Mr. Davis failed to exhaust Fourteenth Amendment due process claims alleging a
`lack of meaningful and periodic reviews of his placement in segregation. See dkt. 29, p. 14. Because Mr. Davis is not
`proceeding on a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the Court need not consider this argument. See dkt. 20
`(Order on plaintiff's motion to amend screening order).
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`Case 2:20-cv-00381-JRS-DLP Document 31 Filed 08/02/21 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 1019
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`R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party must support any asserted disputed or undisputed fact by citing to specific
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`portions of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
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`A party may also support a fact by showing that the materials cited by an adverse party do not
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`establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce
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`admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations
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`must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show
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`that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly
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`support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being
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`considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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`In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the only disputed facts that matter are material
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`ones—those that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Williams v. Brooks,
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`809 F.3d 936, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2016). "A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists 'if the
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`evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Daugherty
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`v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609−10 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court views the record in the light most
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`favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Skiba
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`v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make
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`credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder.
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`Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only consider the cited
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`materials and need not "scour the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary
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`judgment motion. Grant v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotation
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`marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
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`2
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`Case 2:20-cv-00381-JRS-DLP Document 31 Filed 08/02/21 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 1020
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`II.
`BACKGROUND
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`A. Mr. Davis' claims
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`Restrictive status housing is a form of disciplinary segregation. Dkt. 28-8, para. 8. It is for
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`prisoners who pose a security threat in general population. Id.
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`Mr. Davis has been in department-wide restrictive status housing since April 15, 2013. Id.
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`at para. 10. He has been ordered to remain there until October 1, 2035. Dkt. 28-8, p. 1. He is
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`proceeding in this lawsuit on the following claims: (1) Eighth Amendment claims alleging that his
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`prolonged isolation in restrictive status housing has caused significant harm to his physical,
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`emotional, and psychological well-being; (2) Eighth Amendment claims alleging that inmates in
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`restrictive status housing are denied adequate nutrition and hygiene products; and (3) First
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`Amendment retaliation claims alleging that he was placed in restrictive status housing for refusing
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`to dismiss lawsuits against prison officials. Dkt. 20, p. 2.
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`B. Offender grievance process
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`The Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) maintains an offender grievance process.
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`See generally dkt. 28-1 (Wellington affidavit). To successfully raise an issue through the grievance
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`process, prisoners must submit a formal written grievance, followed by a facility-level appeal,
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`followed by a department-level appeal. Dkt. 28-1, paras. 12, 23, 34, 47, 29.2
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`The offender grievance process is "the only administrative remedy officially recognized by
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`the Department for grievable issues." Dkt. 28-2, p. 4; dkt. 28-3, p. 3; dkt. 28-4, p. 3; dkt. 28-5,
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`pp. 2-3; dkt. 28-6, p. 3.
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`2 The grievance process has been revised several times during Mr. Davis' time in restrictive status housing, but each
`version of the grievance process has this same basic structure.
`3
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`Case 2:20-cv-00381-JRS-DLP Document 31 Filed 08/02/21 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 1021
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`The grievance process is unavailable for certain categories of prisoner complaints.
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`"Classification actions or decisions, which include loss of a job, change in security level, facility
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`transfers, and bed moves" may not be addressed through the grievance process. Dkt. 28-2, p. 6;
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`dkt. 28-3, p. 4; dkt. 28-4, p. 4; dkt. 28-5, p. 3; dkt. 28-6, p. 4. "[A] separate classification appeals
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`process is in place for this purpose." Id.
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`C. Classification appeals process
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`The classification appeals process allows prisoners to appeal classification decisions,
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`including decisions to place inmates in restrictive status housing. Dkt. 28-8, para. 14. Prisoners
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`may use the classification appeals process to appeal their classification in department-wide
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`restrictive status housing. Id. To do this, the prisoner must submit a written appeal to the IDOC
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`Director of Classification. Id.; dkt. 28-15, pp. 10-11; dkt. 28-16, pp. 10-11; dkt. 28-17, pp. 10-11;
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`dkt. 28-18, pp. 10-11. Appeals of interfacility transfers must also be submitted to the IDOC
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`Director of Classification. Id. 3
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`D. Mr. Davis did not raise retaliation through the offender grievance process
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`Mr. Davis submitted four grievances regarding his placement in restrictive status housing.
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`Dkt. 28-1, paras. 70-78; dkt. 28-7 (grievance records). None of these grievances mentioned
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`retaliation. Id.
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`His first grievance (No. 103486) argued that his long-term placement in segregation was
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`negatively impacting his physical, psychological, and emotional well-being—causing anxiety,
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`depression, and auditory hallucinations. Dkt. 28-7, pp. 5-15. His second grievance (No. 103487)
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`argued that inmates in restrictive status housing do not receive adequate nutrition. Id. at 26-27.
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`3 Like the grievance process, the classification appeals process is occasionally revised. Dkt. 28-8, para. 14. But the
`basic structure of the classification appeals process has been the same during Mr. Davis' time in restrictive status
`housing. Id.
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`4
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`Case 2:20-cv-00381-JRS-DLP Document 31 Filed 08/02/21 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 1022
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`His third grievance (No. 103489) argued that inmates in restrictive status housing do not receive
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`adequate hygiene products, specifically deodorant. Id. at 28. His fourth grievance (No. 103490)
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`requested a television to dampen the sounds of his auditory hallucinations. Id. at 29.
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`E. Mr. Davis did not raise retaliation through the classification appeals process
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`Mr. Davis successfully submitted two classification appeals regarding his placement in
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`restrictive status housing. Dkt. 28-8, pp. 64, 99 (classification records). Neither of these appeals
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`mentioned retaliation. Id.
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`His first classification appeal argued that he was erroneously placed in a short-term
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`segregation unit, thereby denying him certain privileges enjoyed by long-term segregation inmates.
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`Dkt. 28-14, p. 99. His second classification appeal argued that he should be removed from
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`restrictive status housing and reclassified in the ACT program. Id. at 64.
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`Mr. Davis submitted one other classification appeal, but that appeal was rejected without a
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`decision on the merits. Id. at 62-63. Among other things, Mr. Davis claimed that he was classified
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`to restrictive status housing in retaliation for filing lawsuits and that his transfer to another facility
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`was inappropriate. Id. This appeal was rejected without a decision on the merits because it was not
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`sent to the IDOC Director of Classification. Id. at 62-63; dkt. 28-16, pp. 10-11. The official who
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`rejected this appeal informed Mr. Davis that, "[t]his was a Central Office decision. You may appeal
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`to the Director of Classification at Central Office." Dkt. 28-14, p. 63. Mr. Davis did not file another
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`classification appeal on this issue. See generally 28-14.
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`III.
`DISCUSSION
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`A. Exhaustion Standard
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`The substantive law applicable to the motion for summary judgment is the Prison Litigation
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`Reform Act ("PLRA"), which provides, "No action shall be brought with respect to prison
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`5
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`Case 2:20-cv-00381-JRS-DLP Document 31 Filed 08/02/21 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 1023
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`conditions under section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are
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`exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e; see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). "[T]he PLRA's
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`exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
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`circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
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`wrong." Id. at 532 (citation omitted). The requirement to exhaust provides "that no one is entitled
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`to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has
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`been exhausted." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2006) (citation omitted).
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`Exhaustion of available administrative remedies "means using all steps that the agency
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`holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)." Id. at 90.
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`Proper use of the facility's grievance system requires a prisoner "to file complaints and appeals in
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`the place, and at the time [as] the prison's administrative rules require." Pozo v. McCaughtry,
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`286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).
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`Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that
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`the plaintiff failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing this suit. Kaba v.
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`Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 680-81 (7th Cir. 2006). Inmates do not need to raise claims with lawyerly
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`precision or name specific parties in their administrative grievances, but the grievance must inform
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`prison officials about the issue and give them a chance to take corrective action. Jones v. Bock,
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`549 U.S. 199, 218-19 (2007).
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`B. Mr. Davis did not exhaust his available administrative remedies
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`The defense argues that Mr. Davis failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies
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`on his retaliation claims because he did not allege retaliation through the grievance process.
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`Dkt. 29, p. 13. The Court agrees. There is no evidence that Mr. Davis alleged retaliation for filing
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`lawsuits through the offender grievance process. To the extent that the classification appeals
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`6
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`Case 2:20-cv-00381-JRS-DLP Document 31 Filed 08/02/21 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 1024
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`process may have provided another avenue to raise this issue, the Court notes that Mr. Davis failed
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`to successfully raise retaliation through the classification appeals process as well.
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`For these reasons, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED,
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`and Mr. Davis' retaliation claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
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`IV.
`CONCLUSION AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
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`The motion for partial summary judgment, dkt. [28], is GRANTED. Mr. Davis'
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`First Amendment retaliation claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court will issue a
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`pretrial schedule for the resolution of Mr. Davis' remaining Eighth Amendment claims in due
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`course.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Date: 8/2/2021
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`Distribution:
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`SONNY DAVIS
`128888
`WABASH VALLEY - CF
`WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
`Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
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`Michael J. Blinn
`INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
`michael.blinn@atg.in.gov
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`Thomas Joseph Flynn
`INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
`tom.flynn@atg.in.gov
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`Brandon Alan Skates
`INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
`brandon.skates@atg.in.gov
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`7
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