Case 2:20-cv-00589-JPH-MJD Document 13 Filed 07/14/21 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 39
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
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`DAKOTA LINTZ,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`No. 2:20-cv-00589-JPH-MJD
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`ROBERT E. CARTER, JR., et al.
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`ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT
`AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
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`Plaintiff Dakota Lintz, an inmate at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, has filed an
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`amended complaint alleging the violation of his civil rights. Mr. Lintz's original complaint was
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`previously dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and he was
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`given an opportunity to file an amended complaint to avoid dismissal of the action. Because the
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`amended complaint also fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the action is now
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`DISMISSED.
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`I.
`SCREENING STANDARD
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`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the amended complaint, or any
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`portion of the amended complaint, if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or
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`seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether
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`the amended complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a
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`motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive dismissal,
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`[the amended] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
`state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility
`when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
`inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
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`1
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`Case 2:20-cv-00589-JPH-MJD Document 13 Filed 07/14/21 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 40
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).
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`Pro se complaints such as that filed by the plaintiff are construed liberally and held to "a less
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`stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720.
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`II.
`DISCUSSION
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`In his original complaint, Mr. Lintz alleged that the Indiana Department of Correction has
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`instituted Administrative Policy and Procedure 02-04-102, which provides that inmates held on
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`disciplinary restrictive status housing for periods exceeding 60 days must be provided with the
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`same program services and privileges as inmates in administrative restrictive status housing and
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`protective custody. These programs and services shall include, but are not limited to, educational
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`services, commissary services, independent studies, library services, self-help, social services,
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`counseling services, religious guidance, and recreational programs. Mr. Lintz alleges that officials
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`at his facility have violated this policy by denying inmates, like Mr. Lintz, access to commissary
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`services.
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`The Court dismissed the original complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief
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`may be granted. The Court noted that a prison's violation of its own policies and procedures does
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`not create a per se constitutional violation. See dkt. 11, p. 2 (citing Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett,
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`863 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2017)). The Court also ruled that the complaint did not create a
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`reasonable inference that the defendants' alleged policy violations deprived Mr. Lintz of "the
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`minimal measure of life's necessities" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. (citing Hudson v.
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`McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). Nor did it create a reasonable inference that this violation
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`deprived Mr. Lintz of his right to equal protection because it did not allege that he had been
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`subjected to disparate treatment due to his membership in a protected class. Id., p.3 (citing Brown
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`v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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`2
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`Case 2:20-cv-00589-JPH-MJD Document 13 Filed 07/14/21 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 41
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`In his amended complaint, Mr. Lintz states that he was placed in disciplinary restrictive
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`status housing after he received five or six disciplinary convictions. See dkt. 12, p. 4. However, he
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`did not receive a total or near-total loss of commissary privileges as a sanction for any of these
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`convictions. Id. While inmates placed in long-term disciplinary restrictive status housing are
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`supposed to receive a "reduced list" of available commissary items, Mr. Lintz has essentially lost
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`access to the commissary list altogether. Thus, Mr. Lintz alleges, his loss of commissary privileges
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`exceeds the sanctions issued in his disciplinary convictions and amounts to an atypical and
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`significant hardship in violation of his right to due process.
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`The Court does not agree. To be sure, prisoners are entitled to limited due process
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`protections when they are subjected to an atypical and significant hardship, even when the hardship
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`does not, in and of itself, violate the Constitution or the prisoner's sentence. See Hewitt v. Helms,
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`459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995); Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d
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`508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). Prison regulations may create an enforceable expectation regarding a
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`prisoner's conditions of confinement. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471. But courts focus on the nature of
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`the hardship itself, and not whether the prison regulation involves mandatory or discretionary
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`language, to determine whether a due process right is implicated. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483.
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`In Sandin, the Court specifically took issue with previous rulings from lower courts that
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`found due process implications in day-to-day prison operations, such as access to electrical outlets,
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`access to specific programming, and access to tray lunches as opposed to sack lunches or loaf diets.
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`Id. (collecting cases). The Court reasoned that these intrusions infringed on the ability of prison
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`officials to administer their facilities and squandered scarce judicial resources. Id. at 482. The
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`Seventh Circuit has interpreted Sandin as requiring limited due process protections when prisoners
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`are placed in long-term administrative segregation. See Isby, 856 F.3d at525 (collecting cases).
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`3
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`In this instance, Mr. Lintz does not take issue with his placement in long-term segregation.
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`Nor does he take issue with the full range of expectations created by Administrative Policy and
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`Procedure 02-04-102. His only complaint is that an already "reduced list" of items available for
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`purchase through the commissary is not available to him. This is not an "atypical and significant"
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`hardship implicating his right to due process. Instead, it is akin to the day-to-day prison operations
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`that Sandin admonished lower courts against intruding upon. The policy's mandatory language
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`does not transform this ordinary hardship into one demanding due process. Accordingly, the Court
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`finds that the amended complaint fails to state a due process claim. For the same reasons explained
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`in the order screening the original complaint, the amended complaint also fails to state an equal
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`protection claim or an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim.
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`III.
`CONCLUSION
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`The amended complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief
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`may be granted. Because Mr. Lintz was previously given an opportunity to amend his complaint,
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`the action is now DISMISSED. This dismissal counts as a "strike" for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1915(g). The clerk is directed to enter final judgment in accordance with this Order.
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`SO ORDERED.
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`4
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`Date: 7/14/2021
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`Case 2:20-cv-00589-JPH-MJD Document 13 Filed 07/14/21 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 43
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`Distribution:
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`DAKOTA LINTZ
`261904
`WABASH VALLEY - CF
`WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
`6908 S. Old US Hwy 41
`P.O. Box 1111
`CARLISLE, IN 47838
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`5
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