Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 29 Filed 02/22/22 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 505
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
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`WILLIAM DIXSON,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`No. 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG
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`RICHARD BROWN,
`JERRY SNYDER,
`CHARLES DUGAN,
`RANDALL PURCELL,
`JERRICHA MEEKS,
`JOSHUA COLLINS,
`SHERIFF ROBERT CARTER,
`JACK HENDRIX,
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`Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
`on Affirmative Defense of Exhaustion
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`Plaintiff William Dixson was held in solitary confinement at Wabash Valley Correctional
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`Facility for more than five years. Mr. Dixon alleges that during that time he was subjected to
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`oppressive and inhumane conditions and that the decision to keep him in segregation was not
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`meaningfully reviewed as required by law. The defendants assert that they are entitled to summary
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`judgment because Mr. Dixson failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before he filed
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`this lawsuit. For the reasons discussed below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt.
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`[18], is granted in part and denied in part.
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`I. Standard of Review
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`Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
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`as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`56(a). A "material fact" is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit." Anderson v. Liberty
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`1
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 29 Filed 02/22/22 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 506
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`Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "The applicable substantive law will dictate which facts are
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`material." Nat'l Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc., v. Superior Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1996)
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`(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
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`non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Ault v. Speicher,
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`634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).
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`II. Undisputed Facts
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`Mr. Dixson transferred to Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("WVCF") from the
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`Pendleton Correctional Facility in April 2015. Dkt. 18-6, ¶ 8. Mr. Dixson was held in department-
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`wide administrative restrictive status housing at WVCF from April 2015 until August 2020, then
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`transferred to general population in August 2020. Id. at ¶ 10. Administrative restrictive status
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`housing is intended to separate an inmate who poses a threat to life, self, staff, other offenders,
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`property, or facility security. Id. at ¶ 11.
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`A. Classification Review
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`Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) policy 01-04-101, "Adult Offender
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`Classification," was in effect throughout Mr. Dixon's placement on restrictive status housing.
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`Under the Adult Offender Classification, an inmate may administratively appeal a classification
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`decision from the Supervisor of Classification by submitting a written appeal using State Form
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`9260, "Classification Appeal," within ten working days from the date of the decision. The initial
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`placement and continued placement on restrictive status housing are both classification decisions.
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`Dkt. 18-6 at ¶ 13. See also dkts. 18-8, 18-9, 18-10, 18-11, and 18-12 (Adult Offender Classification
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`policies).
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`The right to appeal classification and disciplinary sanctions is explained to inmates during
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`orientation upon an inmate's initial arrival at IDOC. Dkt. 18-6 at ¶ 19. Copies of the applicable
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`2
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`policies are available in the law libraries at IDOC adult correctional facilities. Id. These appeal
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`processes are available to inmates at all times, including when an inmate is in the infirmary or
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`restrictive status housing units. Id. ¶ 20.
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`Here, prison officials regularly reviewed Mr. Dixson’s placement in restrictive status
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`housing. Id. ¶ 12; Dkt. 18-7 (Report of Classification Hearing Documents, including numerous
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`Report(s) of Classification Hearing signed by Mr. Dixon concerning his placement in restrictive
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`status housing). Mr. Dixson was provided written notice of his right to administratively appeal his
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`placement in restrictive status housing on several occasions. Id. at ¶ 21; Dkt. 18-13 (Department
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`Wide Restrictive Housing Review Forms). Mr. Dixson never appealed his placement on restrictive
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`status housing. Dkt. 18-6 at ¶ 22.
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`B. Conditions of Confinement
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`WVCF had a grievance program in place that was intended to promote prompt and
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`effective resolution of a broad range of issues or inmate complaints. The WVCF grievance
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`program provides a detailed process and procedure by which an inmate may grieve his complaint.
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`Dkt. 18-1, ¶¶ 5–7, 11–19, 22–39, 43–60; Dkts. 18-2; 18-3; and 18-4 (Grievance Policies).
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`At all times between April 2015 and August 2020, Mr. Dixson was aware that the grievance
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`process was available to him. Dkt. 18-1, ¶¶ 20–21, 40–42, 61–63. The conditions of Mr. Dixson’s
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`confinement while in restrictive status housing, including cell temperature, shower water
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`temperature, and amount of recreation time, were considered grievable issues. Id. ¶¶ 19, 33, 54,
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`67. If Mr. Dixson believed that prison staff were not following policies and procedures, those
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`concerns could have been raised. Id. ¶¶ 19, 33, 54.
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`IDOC records reflect that Mr. Dixson did not file any informal or formal grievances or
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`appeals. Dkt. 18-1 at ¶¶ 65–66.
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`3
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`III. Discussion
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`Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Mr. Dixson did not
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`administratively grieve or appeal his complaints related to the claims that he brings in this case.
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`A. The Exhaustion Requirement
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`The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative remedies before
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`bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
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`524–25 (2002). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other
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`critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing
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`some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91
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`(2006) (footnote omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) ("In order
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`to properly exhaust, a prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals 'in the place, and at the
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`time, the prison's administrative rules require.'") (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,
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`1025 (7th Cir. 2002))). Strict compliance is required with respect to exhaustion, and a prisoner
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`must properly follow the prescribed administrative procedures in order to exhaust his remedies.
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`Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).
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`Inmates are only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are available to them.
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`"[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'available' is 'capable of use for the accomplishment of a
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`purpose,' and that which 'is accessible or may be obtained.'" Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858
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`(2016) (internal quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that remedies may be
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`deemed unavailable "when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a
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`grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." Ross, 136 S. Ct. at
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`1860 (2016). Thus, administrative remedies are primarily unavailable to inmates where
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`"affirmative misconduct" prevents prisoners from pursuing administrative remedies. Hernandez v.
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`4
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`Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2016). Such misconduct may include telling a prisoner that he
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`cannot file a grievance when he in fact can do so, Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847–48 (7th
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`Cir. 2015); denying a prisoner grievance forms, threatening him, and soliciting other inmates to
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`attack him for filing grievances, Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2006); and preventing
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`prisoner access to grievance forms, Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004).
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`"Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, so the defendants bear the burden of proof
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`and cannot shift it to require [Mr. Dixson] to show that administrative remedies were unavailable."
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`Gooch v. Young, 24 F.4th 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2022); Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir.
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`2015).
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`B. Availability of the Grievance Process
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`The undisputed evidence shows that there was a grievance program in place during Mr.
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`Dixson’s placement in restrictive status housing; Mr. Dixson was aware of the grievance process;
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`and the grievance process was available to him at all relevant times. Mr. "Dixson admits that he
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`did not file grievances and that his condition of confinement claims should be dismissed." Dkt. 26
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`at p. 1. Thus, Mr. Dixson’s conditions of confinement claims are dismissed without prejudice for
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`failure to exhaust administrative remedies.1
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`C. Availability of the Classification Appeals Process
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`The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Dixson's due
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`process claim because Mr. Dixson did not challenge his prolonged placement in solitary
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`1 All claims raised in the complaint were permitted to proceed at screening. The court understands the following legal
`claims stated in the complaint, dkt 1 at p. 33, to be resolved in this Order without objection from the plaintiff:
`• The Defendants engaged in Cruel and Unusual Punishment of Plaintiff in violation of the 8th Amendment
`and/or 14th Amendment and/or 4th Amendment.
`• The Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff and/or failed to intervene, or were deliberately indifferent, in
`violation of the 14th Amendment and/or 8th Amendment and/or 5th Amendment and/or 4th Amendment.
`• The Defendants unreasonably seized Plaintiff by placing him indefinitely in solitary confinement, in violation
`of the 4th Amendment.
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`5
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 29 Filed 02/22/22 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 510
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`confinement through the Adult Offender Classification Policy. In response, Mr. Dixson argues he
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`could not have utilized the Classification Appeals Process because that process was limited to
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`classification decisions and did not apply to 30-day reviews. Because the Adult Offender
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`Classification policy was not available to challenge 30-day reviews and there was no other process
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`for challenging 30-day reviews, Mr. Dixson had no administrative remedies available to exhaust.
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`Mr. Dixson argues that Indiana law required, but WVCF did not provide, a process to challenge
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`30-day reviews.
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`This specific legal argument has been raised by plaintiff's counsel in Crouch v. Brown, 21-
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`2422 (7th Cir. 2021), and oral arguments have concluded. Whether Mr. Dixson was entitled to a
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`process through which he could appeal a 30-day review is a question of law. The answer to that
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`question will dictate which facts are material in this dispute. Nat'l Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc., 98
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`F.3d 262, 265.
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`Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied without prejudice.
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`Plaintiff's counsel is directed to notify the court when the Seventh Circuit has issued an opinion in
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`Crouch, and both parties will then be given an opportunity to explain that ruling's impact on the
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`defendants' affirmative defense.
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`IV. Conclusion
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`Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkts. [18], is granted on the conditions of
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`confinement claims and denied without prejudice on the due process claims pending resolution
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`of the appeal in Crouch v. Brown, 21-2422 (7th Cir. 2021).
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`SO ORDERED.
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`6
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`Date: 2/22/2022
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`Distribution:
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`All Electronically Registered Counsel
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`7
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