`WILLIAM DIXSON,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`RICHARD BROWN,
`JERRY SNYDER,
`CHARLES DUGAN,
`RANDALL PURCELL,
`JERRICHA MEEKS,
`JOSHUA COLLINS,
`SHERIFF ROBERT CARTER,
`JACK HENDRIX,
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`
`No. 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 36 Filed 02/23/23 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 544
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
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`Defendants.
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`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
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`William Dixson is an Indiana inmate currently housed at Wabash Valley
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`Correctional Facility. He brought this prisoner civil rights action alleging that
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`various Wabash Valley officials violated his due process rights by failing to
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`provide him periodic and meaningful reviews while he was housed in solitary
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`confinement from 2015 to 2020. Defendants now move for summary judgment
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`on their affirmative defense that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
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`remedies. Dkt. [31]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted.
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`I.
`Standard of Review
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`Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a way
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`of resolving a case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment
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`is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any of the material facts,
`1
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 36 Filed 02/23/23 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 545
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`and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pack v.
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`Middlebury Cmty. Sch., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A "genuine dispute"
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`exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving
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`party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Material facts"
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`are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
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`When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
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`record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
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`the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,
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`572-73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
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`determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-
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`finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is only
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`required to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3);
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`it is not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially
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`relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).
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`II.
`Factual Background
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`Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a),
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`the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to the
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`nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor."
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`Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
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`In April 2015, Mr. Dixson was placed in Department Wide Administrative
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`Restrictive Status Housing (DWARSH). Dkt. 18-6, Declaration of Matt Leohr ¶¶
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`10, 18. Restrictive status housing is a form of housing for offenders whose
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`2
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 36 Filed 02/23/23 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 546
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`continued presence in the general population would pose a serious threat to life,
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`property, self, staff, or other offenders, or to the security or orderly operation of
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`the facility. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Dixson remained in DWARSH for approximately five
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`years, until August 2020. Id. ¶ 10. While housed in DWARSH between April 2015
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`and August 2020, Mr. Dixson received more than sixty reviews of his
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`classification status.
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`Two types of classification and status reports were used to review his
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`placement, "Reports of Classification Hearing" ("ROCHs"), and thirty-day
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`restrictive status housing reviews ("ASRs").1 Id. ¶ 12. A ROCH has a section for
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`the case worker to recommend whether an inmate should remain in restricted
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`housing, and a section for the supervisor to review the recommendation and
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`either approve or deny it. See dkt. 18-7, Reports of Classification Hearing. Mr.
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`Dixson received at least twelve ROCHs while in restricted housing. Id. at 1, 6, 8,
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`9, 14, 15, 28, 37, 51, 68, 86, 90.
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`An ASR includes a section for the case worker to review the inmate's status
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`and explain whether continued placement in restricted housing is necessary. See
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`dkt. 18-7 at 20. These reports are required to be issued every thirty days. See
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`Ind. Code § 11-10-1-7(b). Mr. Dixson received at least fifty ASRs. Dkt. 18-7 at
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`20, 21, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, 42–50, 57–67, 73–85, 87–89, 94–97.
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`ROCHs and ASRs can be appealed by using the process outlined in IDOC
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`Policy No. 01-04-101, the "Adult Offender Classification" policy. Dkt. 18-6 ¶ 13;
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`1 This category of documents has various titles, including 30-Day reviews. They are
`substantially identical to one another regardless of title and the Court refers to each of
`these documents as an Administrative Segregation Review (ASR) for simplicity.
`3
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 36 Filed 02/23/23 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 547
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`Dkt. 18-12, Adult Offender Classification Policy Eff. 3/1/19.2 Under this policy,
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`if an inmate wants to appeal a classification decision, he can file a written appeal
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`using State Form 9260 within ten days from the date the inmate received the
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`decision. Id.; see dkt. 18-13, Reports of Classification Hearings with Notice of
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`Right to Appeal; see also Crouch v. Brown, 27 F.4th 1315, 1319 (7th Cir. 2022).
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`The right to appeal classification decisions is explained to offenders during
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`their orientation, and copies of all applicable policies of the IDOC are available
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`within the law library. Dkt. 18-6 ¶ 19. Even in restricted housing, the appeal
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`process is available to inmates. Id. ¶ 20. Additionally, beginning in February
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`2019, IDOC added language to each ASR explaining the appeal process. Compare
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`dkt. 18-7, Reports of Classification Hearing, with dkt. 18-13, Reports of
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`Classification Hearing with Notice of Right to Appeal. The following language was
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`added in February 2019:
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`Placement on Department-Wide Administrative Status Housing may
`be appealed by submitting a classification appeal (SF 9260) within
`ten working days of admission to a Department-Wide Restrictive
`Status Housing Unit or any subsequent Classification action (i.e. 30
`Day or 90 Day reviews).
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`See dkt. 18-13 at 13–17, ASRs from February 2019 to June 2019. The
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`Department changed the ASR form again in July 2019 but kept the language
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`regarding appeals. Id. at 1–12.
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`Mr. Dixson never appealed any ROCH or ASR. Id. ¶ 23.
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`2 The IDOC went through multiple different versions of its classification policy while Mr.
`Dixson was designated to restrictive housing. See dkts. 18-8, 18-9, 18-10, 18-11, 18-
`12. The differences among these versions of the policy are immaterial to Defendants'
`motion for summary judgment, and each version included a similar appeal process, so
`the Court cites the most recent version for simplicity.
`4
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 36 Filed 02/23/23 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 548
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`III.
`Discussion
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`
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`The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires inmates to exhaust their
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`available administrative remedies before suing in federal court. 42 U.S.C. §
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`1997e(a); Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 957 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir.
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`2020). This requirement is mandatory; a court cannot excuse an inmate's failure
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`to exhaust. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 1174, 1856 (2016). To satisfy the Act's
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`exhaustion requirement, an inmate must strictly comply with the prison's
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`administrative rules for filing grievances. Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th
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`Cir. 2020). If an inmate fails to comply with the prison's administrative rules,
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`their suit must be dismissed for failure to exhaust. Crouch v. Brown, 27 F.4th
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`1315, 1321 (7th Cir. 2022) ("[A] prisoner must exhaust his or her administrative
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`remedies before filing a federal claim about prison conditions.").
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`Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because
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`Mr. Dixson did not appeal any classification review and, therefore, failed to
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`exhaust administrative remedies. Dkt. 32. Mr. Dixson admits that he did not
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`appeal any classification review but argues that he wasn't obligated to because
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`of the number of reviews he received relative to the length of time he spent in
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`DWARSH. Dkt. 33; dkt. 34. Both parties cite Crouch v. Brown, 27 F.4th 1315
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`(7th Cir. 2022), in support of their respective positions. There, Mr. Crouch spent
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`nearly four years in solitary confinement at Wabash Valley. Id. at 1318. During
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`that time, he received dozens of classification and status reports reviewing his
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`housing status but did not appeal any of these decisions. Id.
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`5
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 36 Filed 02/23/23 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 549
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`Like Mr. Dixson, Mr. Crouch nonetheless filed a lawsuit alleging that
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`Defendants had violated his due process rights by failing to give him meaningful
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`periodic reviews of his placement in DWARSH. Id. at 1319. Defendants moved
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`for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Crouch had not exhausted his
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`administrative remedies under the PLRA, and the district court granted
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`summary judgment in Defendants' favor. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed,
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`finding that Mr. Crouch had not appealed any of the 56 classification review
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`decisions he received while in DWARSH. Id. at 1322. Because Mr. Crouch was
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`aware of the appeals process and it was available to him, the court found that
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`he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id.
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`Like Mr. Crouch, Mr. Dixson was in restricted housing at Wabash Valley
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`for several years, dkt. 18-6, ¶ 10, and during that time received dozens of reviews
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`of his placement. Dkts. 18-7, 18-13. Also like Mr. Crouch, Mr. Dixson was
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`provided notice of the appeals process on at least some of his reviews, but he did
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`not appeal any of his classification reports, dkt. 18-6 at ¶ 23; Crouch, 27 F.4th
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`at 1319 ("Crouch did not appeal any of these reviews, either before or after the
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`addition of the new language.") Therefore, Mr. Dixson failed to exhaust his
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`administrative remedies before filing suit. Crouch, 27 F.4th at 1322.
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`Mr. Dixson argues that his case is distinguishable from Crouch because
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`he received fewer reviews than Mr. Crouch received despite being housed in
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`restricted housing for a longer amount of time. Dkt. 34 at 3. But for exhaustion
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`purposes, that distinction is immaterial. The record reflects that Mr. Dixson was
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`provided dozens of reviews, dkts. 18-7, 18-13; was provided written notice of his
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`6
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 36 Filed 02/23/23 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 550
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`right to administratively appeal his placement in restrictive housing on several
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`occasions, dkt. 18-6 ¶ 21; and he did not appeal any decision regarding his
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`continued placement in DWARSH. Id. ¶ 21. Further, Mr. Dixson does not argue
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`the process was unavailable or that he attempted to appeal but was not provided
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`a response.3 Cf. Wallace v. Baldwin, 55 F.4th 535, 544 (7th Cir. 2022) (reversing
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`district court's grant of summary judgment to consider the question of
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`availability of remedies where the Plaintiff argued the grievance process was
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`unavailable). He only argues the numbers were different here than in Crouch,
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`but for reasons just explained, that distinction does not meaningfully distinguish
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`Crouch. As such, Mr. Dixson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
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`Crouch, 27 F.4th at 1322. His claims must be dismissed without prejudice. Ford
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`v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004) ("We therefore hold that all
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`dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.")
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`IV.
`Conclusion
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`Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [31], is therefore granted.
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`Final judgment shall enter accordingly.
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`SO ORDERED.
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`3 To this point, Mr. Dixson has not argued the appeal process was unavailable because
`the appeal process was not explicitly included on the ASRs prior to February 2019. Nor
`has he argued the change in language on the ASRs in February 2019 and in July 2019
`somehow rendered the process unavailable. These changes are therefore immaterial, at
`least on this record.
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`7
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`Date: 2/23/2023
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`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00169-JPH-MG Document 36 Filed 02/23/23 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 551
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`Distribution:
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`Brandyn Lee Arnold
`INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
`brandyn.arnold@atg.in.gov
`
`Jeffrey R. Cardella
`LAW OFFICE OF JEFF CARDELLA LLC
`jeffcardella@cardellalawoffice.com
`
`Kyle L. Christie
`CHRISTIE FARRELL LEE & BELL, P.C.
`kyle@cflblaw.com
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`8
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