UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`WASHINGTON, D.C.
`
`Before the Honorable Monica Bhattacharyya
`Administrative Law Judge
`
`In the Matter of
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`CERTAIN DISPOSABLE VAPORIZER
`DEVICES
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`Inv. No. 337-TA-1410
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`RESPONDENTS’ REPLY POST-HEARING BRIEF
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`II.
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`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
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`JURISDICTION AND IMPORTATION ............................................................................3
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`A.
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`Importation ...............................................................................................................3
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`1.
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`2.
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`Pastel Cartel and Affiliated Imports ............................................................3
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`Shenzhen Han ..............................................................................................4
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`III.
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`Non-Infringement ................................................................................................................5
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`Claim 1—RJR Failed to Prove that Certain Accused Products Meet the
`“Smoking Article” or “Electrical Power Source Arranged Within the Outer
`Housing” Limitations ...............................................................................................5
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`1.
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`2.
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`“Smoking Article” .......................................................................................5
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`The Separate Battery Products Do Not Have an Electrical Power
`Source Arranged Within the Claimed Outer Housing .................................9
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`Claim 4: RJR Has Not Shown That the Aerosol “Passes At Least Partially
`Through the Storage Compartment” ........................................................................9
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`Claim 11: RJR Has Not Shown That “at Least a Portion of the Electrical
`Resistance Heater Extends Into the Storage Compartment” ..................................10
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`D.
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`Claims 12 and 15 ...................................................................................................11
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`IV.
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`INVALIDITY ....................................................................................................................11
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`The USPTO Did Not “Consider” the Asserted Art ...............................................11
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`Dr. Dean’s Testimony was Solidly Grounded in Facts and Science .....................12
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`Dr. Dean’s Testimony was Offered from the Appropriate Perspective .................14
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`Takeuchi Anticipates and/or Renders Obvious the Asserted Infringement
`Claims ....................................................................................................................16
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`Independent Claim 1 – “ends” limitations .................................................16
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`Dependent Claim 4 – aerosol passes at least partially through the
`storage compartment ..................................................................................18
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`Dependent Claim 12 ..................................................................................24
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`Dependent Claim 15 ..................................................................................27
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`4.
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`E.
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`Kim in view of Pienemann Renders Obvious the Asserted Infringement Claims
`................................................................................................................................28
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`A POSITA would have been motivated to combine Kim and
`Pienemann. .................................................................................................28
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`There would have been a reasonable expectation of success combining
`Kim and Pienemann. ..................................................................................33
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`The combination of Kim and Pienemann discloses every limitation of
`the challenged claims. ................................................................................36
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`V.
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`DOMESTIC INDUSTRY ..................................................................................................41
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`A.
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`B.
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`RJR Failed to Establish the Economic Prong ........................................................41
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`RJR Failed to Establish the Technical Prong for Certain Products .......................44
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`VI.
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`PUBLIC INTEREST STATUTORY FACTORS (19 U.S.C. §1377(e)(1)) ......................45
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`VII. REQUESTED EXCLUSIONARY ORDERS ...................................................................47
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`RJR Is Not Entitled to a GEO ................................................................................47
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`Any LEO/CDO Must Be Narrowly Tailored. ........................................................48
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`CDOs Are Not Appropriate. ..................................................................................48
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`VIII. NO BOND .........................................................................................................................49
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`IX.
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`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................50
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
`
`Amgen Inc. v. Coherus BioSciences Inc.,
`931 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................7
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB,
`892 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1989)..........................................................................................33, 39
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`Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc.,
`707 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................13
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`Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors And Components Thereof And Prods.
`Containing Same,
`Inv. No. 337- TA-650, Comm’n Op. (April 14, 2010) ............................................................49
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`Certain Movable Barrier Operator Systems,
`Inv. No. 337-TA-1118, Comm’n Op. (Jan. 12, 2021) .......................................................43, 44
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`Certain Network Devices, Related Software & Components Thereof
`(II), Inv. No. 337-TA-945 ........................................................................................................19
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`Certain Oil Vaporizing Devices, Components Thereof, and Products Containing
`the Same,
`Inv. No. 337-TA-1392, Initial Determination (Mar. 6, 2025) .................................................41
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`Certain Smart Wearable Devices, Systems, and Components Thereof,
`Inv. No. 337-TA-1398, Initial Determination (Apr. 25, 2025) ................................................41
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`Certain Video Game Sys. & Controllers,
`Inv. No. 337-TA-743, Comm’n Op., 2011 WL 1523774 (Apr. 14, 2011) ..............................41
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`Certain Wearable Elec. Devices with ECG Functionality & Components Thereof,
`Inv. No. 337-TA-1266, Comm’n Op. (Jan. 20, 2023) .............................................................48
`
`In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig.,
`301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..........................................................................................15, 22
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`Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc.,
`140 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................8
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`Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.,
`126 U.S. 1 (1888) .....................................................................................................................36
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`Duramed Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Lab’ys, Inc.,
`413 F. App’x 289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................................14
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`DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.,
`464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................29
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`Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................8
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`EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
`268 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..........................................................................................22, 26
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`In re Etter,
`756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985)......................................................................................32, 33, 41
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`FastShip, LLC v. United States,
`968 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................14
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`In re Fulton,
`391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................33
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`Gaus v. Conair Corp.,
`363 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................6
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`Hyosung TNS Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`926 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................41
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ...........................................................................................................28, 30
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`L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Products, Inc.,
`499 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..............................................................................................7, 8
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`Lashify, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
`130 F.4th 948, 953-54 (Fed. Cir. 2025 ....................................................................................41
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`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship,
`564 U.S. 91 (2011) ...................................................................................................................11
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`Monsanto Tech. LLC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
`878 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................21
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`In re Mouttet,
`686 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................31
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`OSRAM Sylvania, Inc. v. Am. Induction Techs., Inc.,
`701 F.3d 698 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................12
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`Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
`504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................7
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`Persion Pharms. LLC v. Alvogen Malta Operations Ltd.,
`945 F.3d 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................15
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................10
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`PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................12
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`R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V., Paper 2,
`IPR2018-00627 (P.T.A.B. March 1, 2018) ..............................................................................12
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`Rembrandt Pat. Innovations, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`716 Fed. Appx. 965 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .........................................................................................8
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`Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms.,
`339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003)....................................................................................21, 22, 25
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`Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd.,
`684 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................11
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`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..............................................................................................7, 8
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`Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc.,
`935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991)..........................................................................................33, 39
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`Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`944 F.3d 901 (Fed. Cir. 2019)....................................................................................................7
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`Telemac Cellular Corp v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,
`247 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................21
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`Toro Co. v. Deere & Co.,
`355 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................15
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`In re Urbanski,
`809 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................32
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`Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc.,
`141 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................8
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`In re Yamamoto,
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984)................................................................................................32
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`Statutes
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`19 U.S.C. §1337(a)(2) ....................................................................................................................41
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`19 U.S.C. §1337(a)(3)(C) ..............................................................................................................41
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`19 U.S.C. §1337(e)(1) ..............................................................................................................45, 49
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`Tariff Act of 1930 § 337 ................................................................................................3, 41, 42, 50
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`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
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`Document / Exhibit
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`United States Patent 11,925,202; JX-001;
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,155,268; RX-0010
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`U.S. Pat. App. Pub. No. 2006/0016453; RX-
`0013
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`WIPO Pat. App. Pub. No. 00/28843; RX-0014
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`Transcript of the Hearing before ALJ
`Bhattacharyya from April 7-11, 2025
`Order No. 34: Construing Certain Terms of the
`Asserted Claims of the Patent at Issue (EDIS
`Doc. ID 845915) (March 14, 2025)
`Complainants’ Pre-Hearing Brief (Permanent
`Relief Phase) (EDIS Doc. ID 846802) (March
`25, 2025)
`Complainants’ Post-Hearing Brief
`Respondents’ Post-Hearing Brief
`OUII Staff’s Post-Hearing Brief
`RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. (“RAI”), R.J.
`Reynolds Vapor Company (“RJRV”), R.J.
`Reynolds Tobacco Company (“RJRT”), and
`RAI Services Company (“RAISC”),
`collectively
`Breeze Smoke LLC (“Breeze Smoke”) and
`Dongguan (Shenzhen) Shikai Technology Co.,
`Ltd. (“Shikai Technology”), collectively
`Guangdong Qisitech Co., Ltd. (“Guangdong
`Qisitech”), Guangdong Fewo Intelligent
`Manufacturing Limited (“Fewo Intelligent”),
`Guangdong Cellular Workshop Electronics
`Technology Co., Ltd. (“Guangdong Cellular”),
`and Zhuhai Qisitech Co., Ltd. (“Zhuhai
`Qisitech”), collectively
`Shenzhen IVPS Technology Co., Ltd.
`Maduro Distributors Inc. d/b/a The Loon
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`vii
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`Abbreviation / Citation
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`’202 Patent
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`Takeuchi
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`Kim
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`Pienemann
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`Tr.
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`Markman Order
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`CPHB
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`CPoHB
`RPoHB
`SPoHB
`RJR or Complainants
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`Breeze Respondents
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`Qisitech Respondents
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`Shenzhen IVPS
`Maduro
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`Abbreviation / Citation
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`Document / Exhibit
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`Shenzhen Yangyang or Hyppe Respondents
`Pastel Respondents
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`Kangvape
`Shenzhen Pingray or Posh Respondent
`SV3
`Price Point
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`Element Vape
`Shenzhen Han
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`Shenzhen Yanyang Technology Co., Ltd.
`Pastel Cartel, LLC (“Pastel Cartel”), American
`Vape Company, LLC (“American Vape” or
`“AVC”), and Affiliated Imports, LLC
`(“Affiliated Imports”), collectively
`Shenzhen Kangvape Technology Co., Ltd.
`Shenzhen Pingray Technology
`SV3 LLC d/b/a Mi-One Brands
`Price Point Distributors Inc. d/b/a Price Point
`NY
`Thesy, LLC d/b/a Element Vape
`Shenzhen Han Technology Co., Ltd.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`RJR’s claims of “widespread intellectual-property theft” bear no connection to the facts of
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`this case. The asserted ’202 patent is barely a year old—RJR drafted it after Respondents’ products
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`were already long on the market. In trying to capture a mature market with a new patent, RJR
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`resorted to expanding and contorting a decades-old patent family, directed to “tobacco-containing
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`smoking articles,” to cover Respondents’ vaping products. In drafting new claims untethered from
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`the specification, RJR jettisoned any potentially novel elements. The asserted claims are invalid.
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`Still failing to offer any invention story, RJR concedes that most limitations in the asserted
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`claims of the ’202 patent are disclosed in the prior art. The inventors’ proposed point of novelty in
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`the ’202 patent family was the inclusion of tobacco components beyond pure nicotine—a
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`requirement which RJR removed from the claims of the ’202 patent, per the ALJ’s claim
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`construction. Even for the contested limitations, RJR rarely offers any affirmative interpretation
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`of the prior art, instead trying to narrow its disclosures in implausible ways while suggesting that
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`Dr. Dean’s explanations of the prior art are somehow too expert to be credited. But Dr. Dean
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`properly and thoroughly explained numerous scientific principles, especially ones related to fluid
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`dynamics, that confirm that the prior art matches the claims. As RJR concedes, Dr. Dean possesses
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`“unique, extraordinary expertise gleaned from three decades of working with nicotine
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`aerosolization and aerosol delivery devices.” CPoHB 36 (emphasis in original; quote omitted). His
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`testimony regarding invalidity was credible and well-founded.
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`In contrast, RJR’s expert Dr. Alarcon “simply provided contrary and conclusory opinions
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`not backed by science” in an attempt to manufacture uncertainty about the prior art. SPoHB 33.
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`Many of those opinions were facially implausible—for instance, that there was no way to know
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`whether Takeuchi’s device had a top or a bottom, and that a POSITA would never consider
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`combining devices shaped, respectively, like a cigarette (Kim) or a cigar (Pienemann) even though
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`both are similarly shaped and are the two most prominent tobacco smoking products. RJR’s
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`complaint regarding “conclusory, unsupported ipse dixit from [an] expert” (CPoHB at 1) applies
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`to the entirety of Dr. Alarcon’s invalidity opinions, none of which should be given weight, which
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`stands in contrast to Dr. Dean who consistently backed up his affirmative understanding of the
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`prior art with indisputable scientific principles.
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`In addition to their substantive flaws, RJR’s arguments for the ’202 patent’s validity
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`regularly violate procedural rules. For instance, RJR’s supposed uncertainty about the disclosures
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`of Takeuchi required it to adopt a new interpretation of the art disclosed nowhere in its prehearing
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`brief and, worse, to ignore the ALJ’s claim construction of the term “ends”—its only argument
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`against anticipation of claim 1. Similarly, in a last-minute attempt to improve its invalidity
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`positions, RJR’s post-hearing brief now argues for a new interpretation of the “aerosol” referenced
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`in claim 4—a claim construction position absent from RJR’s prehearing brief, as well as
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`inconsistent with the understanding of a POSITA (as Dr. Dean explained). RJR’s late arguments
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`underscore the goal-post-moving nature of RJR’s case. They are also wrong: Takeuchi
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`undoubtedly has ends and, as Dr. Dean explained, one cannot gasify a tobacco-extract-containing
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`e-liquid (which Takeuchi teaches) without creating an aerosol.
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`RJR also failed to carry its burden on infringement. Mr. Wensley conceded that many
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`Accused Products do not literally infringe because they lack tobacco-derived nicotine, and
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`infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents (“DOE”) is unavailable as a matter of law in light
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`of the disclaimer in the specification noted by the ALJ in the claim construction order. Even if
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`DOE is deemed to be available, RJR failed to present the particularized analysis of infringement
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`under DOE required by the Federal Circuit. Mr. Wensley’s and Mr. Murelle’s general testimony
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`regarding alleged similarities between synthetic nicotine and tobacco-derived nicotine from a
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`user’s perspective or the FDA’s perspective are irrelevant to the question of equivalence under the
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`patent laws. No testing or function-way-result analysis was performed to assess the substantiality
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`of the differences between the claimed smoking article and the accused products. And on top of
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`this, Mr. Wensley merely presumed—without any supporting evidence—the nature of the nicotine
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`in many accused products.
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`RJR’s post-hearing brief does no better at bolstering its arguments regarding domestic
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`industry, public interest, remedy, and bond, and similarly fails to improve the flaws identified in
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`Respondents’ Brief.
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`Accordingly, Respondents respectfully request a finding that no Respondent has violated
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`section 337 and that no remedy should issue.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND IMPORTATION
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`Respondents do not contest subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or in rem
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`jurisdiction over the Accused Products, but certain Respondents contest importation as discussed
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`below. See RPoHB §§IV.A-C.
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`A.
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`Importation
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`1.
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`Pastel Cartel and Affiliated Imports
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`All parties agree and stipulate that Pastel Cartel and Affiliated Imports have not imported,
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`sold for importation, or sold after importation any Accused Products since well before the patent
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`issued. JX-0071C, ¶3. Moreover, it is undisputed that these Respondents
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` CX-1839C (Lee Dep.) 58:3-5, 86:5-10, 137:12-138:4. RJR, however, incorrectly
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`claims that such cessation of importation was “voluntary” and, according to its interpretation of
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`the ID in Certain CGFIs, Pastel Cartel and Affiliated Imports “could” be subject to the
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`Investigation—but this claim is not supported by the facts or the law. Pastel Cartel and Affiliated
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`Imports have not imported the Accused Products due to
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`before the issuance of the Asserted Patent;
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` Moreover, Certain CGFIs is
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`inapplicable because the respondent there, unlike here, waived the importation requirement and
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`had voluntarily ceased importation. See Certain CGFIs, ID at 22. Accordingly, the importation
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`requirement cannot be satisfied by Pastel Cartel and Affiliated Imports.
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`2.
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`Shenzhen Han
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`RJR does not dispute that Shenzhen Han does not import any accused products or sell them
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`after importation. Shenzhen Han has no involvement whatsoever in the importation of the accused
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`products into the U.S.;
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`. RPoHB §IV.D.2. This does not constitute a
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`sale for importation under the statute.
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`Nothing in RJR’s post-hearing brief suggests otherwise. The fact that Shenzhen Han
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`testified,
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` CX-1848C.31 at 115:2-116:11. As Mr. Wang
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`for importation (it is not),
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` Id. at 116:3-8. Even if this were sufficient to show a sale
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` RJR has failed to meet its burden
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`of showing importation by Shenzhen Han.
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`III. NON-INFRINGEMENT
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`A.
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`Claim 1—RJR Failed to Prove that Certain Accused Products Meet the
`“Smoking Article” or “Electrical Power Source Arranged Within the Outer
`Housing” Limitations
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`1.
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`“Smoking Article”
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`a.
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`RJR Provides No Evidence That the Category 2 and 4
`Products With Unknown Source of Nicotine Satisfy the
`Smoking Article Limitation
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`RJR provides no evidence that the Category 2 products with an unknown source of nicotine
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`satisfy the “smoking article” limitation. CPoHB 20-21. As the ALJ instructed the parties at the
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`Pretrial Conference, “[i]t is important . . . that for issues where a party bears the burden of proof,
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`that I receive some evidence on a limitation, even if it is not disputed.” 4/4/2025 Pretrial
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`Conference Tr. 10:17-21. And Mr. Wensley explicitly admitted that he was “not offering any
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`evidence that [the Category 2 Accused Products] contain nicotine derived from tobacco.” Tr.
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`(Wensley) 311:6-9, 312:12-15.
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`RJR instead argues that it should be excused from providing such evidence because
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`“Respondents failed to disclose during discovery the source of nicotine in their products”—a
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`purported deficiency that RJR never raised during fact discovery, and which would not justify its
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`“presumption” in any case. CPoHB 16, 21; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257
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`(1986) (affirmative evidence required “even where the evidence is likely to be within the
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`possession of the defendant”). Furthermore, Mr. Wensley’s review of Respondents’ documents was
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`clearly cursory-at-best; for example, he admittedly never asked to see documents that he knew
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`could indicate the nicotine’s source. See RPoHB 23-24 (citing Tr. (Wensley) 314:3-315:11, 315:24-
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`316:4). Mr. Wensley similarly failed to investigate nicotine source for RJR’s DI products. Tr.
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`(Wensley) 344:19-349:22; CX-1971C.1-2.
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`Now, RJR argues for the first time that its “presumption” is based on Mr. Wensley’s
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`“understanding of the regulatory requirement that it be tobacco-derived nicotine up until recently.”
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`CPoHB 21. That argument is contradicted by the current widespread use of synthetic nicotine,
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`including undisputedly in “at least 17 Accused Products.” CPoHB 16.
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`For the Category 4 products (listed at RPoHB 24), RJR not only provides no evidence of
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`tobacco-derived nicotine, but also does not even allege that those products satisfy the “smoking
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`article” limitation. See CPoHB 20-21 & App.A, 1-3. Thus, RJR has waived any argument that
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`those products satisfy this limitation. See G.R. 13.1.
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`b.
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`RJR Failed to Prove That the Loon Air+ and Geek Bar Pulse
`Contain Tobacco-Derived Nicotine
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`RJR argues that the Loon Air+ uses tobacco-derived nicotine (CPoHB 16 n.1) despite
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`RJR’s own expert testifying that it uses synthetic nicotine as shown on its packaging. Tr. (Wensley)
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`306:7-308:19. In so arguing, RJR misrepresents the testimony of a Maduro witness, who testified
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`only regarding the Loon Air and Loon Maxx, not the Loon Air+. CX-1834C (113:22-114:2, 111:6-
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`8); see also CDX-0016.72.
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`RJR also cites no evidence that the Geek Bar Pulse uses tobacco-derived nicotine. See
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`CPoHB 15 & App.A. Instead, RJR erroneously argues that Respondents’ expert conceded that the
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`Geek Bar Pulse and Loon Air+ use tobacco-derived nicotine—but he clearly did not. CPoHB 15
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`(citing Tr. (McAlexander) 1064:15-19). Thus, RJR has failed to prove that those two products
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`literally satisfy the “smoking article” limitation.
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`c.
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`RJR’s Attempted Recapture Using DOE is Precluded
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`RJR provides no support for its argument that it can use DOE to recapture the “now
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`unchallenged” disclaimer of “‘smoking articles’ that do not include tobacco or tobacco-derived
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`components.” Order No. 34 (“Markman Order”) at 32 n. 26; see RPoHB 25-26; see also Gaus v.
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`Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1288 n. 2, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding no literal infringement
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`based on a clear disclaimer and holding that “having disavowed coverage of [those] devices…, the
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`patentee cannot reclaim that surrendered claim coverage by invoking [DOE].”); Amgen Inc. v.
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`Coherus BioSciences Inc., 931 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that patentee could not
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`“us[e] [DOE] to recapture subject matter surrendered from the literal scope of a claim”) (internal
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`quotation marks omitted).
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`RJR erroneously argues that DOE remains available because the specification does not
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`“clearly exclude” synthetic nicotine—presumably because the phrase “synthetic nicotine” does not
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`appear in haec verba in the specification. CPoHB 19. But disavowal does not require explicit,
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`individualized discussion of each disavowed embodiment. See, e.g., Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Int’l
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`Trade Comm’n, 944 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[W]here the specification describes ‘the
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`present invention’ as having [a] feature,’ that representation may disavow contrary embodiments”);
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`Order No. 28 at 30 (citing Techtronic); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1309
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`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1346-47 for disavowal of category of embodiments);
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`L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Products, Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
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`(holding that DOE was foreclosed because of disclaimer of adhesives from the literal scope of the
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`claim term “weld,” even where specification did not individually disclaim “a continuous
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`attachment using adhesives”).
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`Additionally, the only case that RJR cites in support of its position is SciMed Life Sys., Inc.
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`v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., where the Federal Circuit specifically held that where “the
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`patent clearly excludes the asserted equivalent structure, either implicitly or explicitly” such that
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`“an explicit disclaimer [of literal claim scope] is present, … the patentee cannot be allowed to
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`recapture the excluded subject matter under [DOE] without undermining the notice function of the
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`patent.” 242 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Here, as the ALJ already found, the ’202 patent did
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`“clearly exclude,” disavow, and disparage devices lacking any tobacco-derived components. Order
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`No. 28 at 32.
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`There is no dispute that synthetic nicotine is neither tobacco nor a tobacco-derived
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`component. Devices with synthetic nicotine, but no tobacco or tobacco-derived components, thus
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`fall within the scope of the disclaimed and disparaged category of subject matter, even if that
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`specific embodiment is not individually discussed in the specification. Tr. (Wensley) 303:8-17.
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`Therefore, Reynolds “cannot use [DOE] to recapture the disclaimed scope.” Edwards Lifesciences
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`LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also L.B. Plastics, 499 F.3d at 1309-
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`10; Rembrandt Pat. Innovations, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 716 Fed. Appx. 965, 971-77 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
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`(nonprecedential) (holding that the patentee “cannot recapture under [DOE] what the specification
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`clearly gives up” after finding a clear disclaimer of literal claim scope).
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`d.
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`RJR Failed to Prove Equivalence
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`Even if RJR could properly assert DOE, it failed to prove equivalence in the context of the
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`’202 patent. On this point, RJR relies on Mr. Wensley’s testimony that tobacco-derived nicotine is
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`equivalent to synthetic nicotine because “[i]t’s used in the same way. It’s used to the same end, to
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`deliver nicotine to the human body.” CPoHB 17 (quoting Tr. (Wensley) 175:3-14). Such testimony
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`(i) is conclusory; (ii) ignores all context of the specification; and (iii) fails to compare the alleged
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`equivalent to the properly construed claim term “smoking article.” See RPoHB 27-29.
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`The Federal Circuit has rejected conclusory expert testimony on equivalence that is not
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`grounded in the context of the specification and the construed claim language. See, e.g., Vehicular
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`Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1090-92 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting
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`“litigation-induced pronouncements” of DOE witnesses where testimony “[wa]s not directed to”
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`a function that “the written description emphasize[d] repeatedly”); Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky
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`Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1016-17 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting expert DOE testimony ungrounded
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`in the context of the specification). Thus, even if RJR could properly pursue DOE, RJR failed to
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`meet its burden.
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`2.
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`The Separate Battery Products Do Not Have an Electrical Power
`Source Arranged Within the Claimed Outer Housing
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`RJR cites no evidence that the accused Kangvape ONEE Max Mag-Snap and Qisitech
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`TwinDock products (“the separate battery products”) have an electrical power source arranged
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`within the same outer housing that contains all of the other components required by claim 1. See
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`CPoHB at 24-25; RPoHB at 30-32. RJR cites only conclusory testimony from its expert about
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`products that he had never seen other than the images he displayed at the Hearing (at CDX-
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`0016C.106), and for which he provided no evidence that a single outer housing is allegedly formed
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`when the “two parts . . . are mated together.” CPoHB at 24; Tr. (Wensley) 337:15-25. Furthermore,
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`contrary to RJR’s argument that “these products were not accused,” CPoHB at 24, RJR has
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`stipulated that they are accused. See JX-0083C.2 (¶3, defining “Accuse