`Washington, D.C.
`
`Before the Honorable Paul J. Luckern
`Administrative Law Judge
`
`In the Matter of
`
`CERTAIN AUTOMOTIVE PARTS
`
`Inv. No. 337-TA-557
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`RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO COMPLAINANT FORD GLOBAL
`TECHNOLOGIES, LLC’S MOTION TO AMEND THE PROTECTIVE ORDER
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Respondents Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc.,
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`Gordon Auto Body Parts Co., Ltd, Y.C.C. Parts Manufacturing Co., Ltd., TYC Brother I n d d a
`2 - 22
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`Co., Ltd., and Depo Auto Parts Ind. Co., Ltd (collectively “Respondents”) submit this
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`memorandum in opposition to Complainant Ford Global Technologies, LLC’s motion requERin4
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`that the protective order be modified to permit Complainant’s in-house counsel access to
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`Respondents’ confidential business information. Complainant’s motion is meritless.
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`Complainant has failed to cite any applicable precedent or to otherwise justify the sweeping
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`departure from standard Commission practice it currently seeks. Accordingly, the motion should
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`be denied.
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`11.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Complainant’s motion entirely ignores the wealth of well-established, controlling
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`precedent in the ITC that counsels against amendments to the standard Commission protective
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`orders. The Commission has made clear time and again that the burden of establishing a need to
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`amend or modify a protective order to include in-house counsel rests with the party that seeks the
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`amendment. See Akzo N.V. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
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`denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987); Certain Rotary Wheel Printers, Inv. No. 337-TA-145, 5 I.T.R.D.
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`1933, 1937 (Nov. 4, 1983); Certain Integrated Repeaters and Products Containing Same, Inv.
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`No. 337-TA-430, Order No. 6 (June 13,2000). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), in fact,
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`explained that precedent during the preliminary conference held on February 14,2006.
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`Nonetheless, Complainant persists in bringing a motion that borders on the frivolous.
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`The Commission has adopted (and the Federal Circuit has upheld) a three-part balancing
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`test which allows in-house counsel access to confidential information “only in extraordinary
`circumstances and under the close supervision of the [Administrative Law Judge] .” Certain
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`Rotary Wheel Printers, 5 I.T.R.D. at 1935. The three factors are:
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`the moving party’s need for the confidential information
`(1)
`sought in order to adequately prepare its case;
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`the harm such disclosure would cause the party submitting
`(2)
`the information; and
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`the ITC’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the
`(3)
`information sought.
`Akzo N. V., 808 F.2d at 1484; Certain Data Storage Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
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`337-TA-471, Order No. 9 at 3 (Oct. 31,2002); Integrated Repeaters, supra, Order No. 6 at 3-4 .
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`Complainant bears a heavy burden. In Section 337 investigations, it is “the exception
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`rather than the rule to release confidential information to in-house counsel.” Rotary Wheel
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`Printers, 5 I.T.R.D. at 1935. As a general rule, in-house counsel is provided access to
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`confidential information only where the parties agree to the disclosure or where in-house counsel
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`already has access to the same information. Id. Indeed, Complainant cites no case in which,
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`absent the agreement of all parties, the Commission, in a Section 337 investigation, has granted
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`such a motion to allow in-house counsel to gain access to the opposing parties’ confidential
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`business information.
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`2
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`Here, Complainant has not made the requisite extraordinary three-part showing (1) that it
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`would be unable to adequately present its case, (2) that there would be no harm to Respondents,
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`and (3) that a compelling justification exists for overriding the Commission’s paramount interest
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`in maintaining the confidentiality of the parties’ sensitive business information.
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`A.
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`Complainant Has Not Shown That It Cannot Adequately Present Its Case
`Without The Requested Amendment To The Protective Order
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`First and foremost, Complainant has not shown that it will be unable to adequately
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`prepare its case unless in-house counsel gains access to Respondents’ business information.
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`Ford merely states that its in-house counsel “routinely provides Ford’s outside counsel with
`specialized knowledge of the automotive industry . . . .” (Compl. Memorandum at p. 5.) Ford
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`fails to explain, however, why or how this assistance is required for Ford to adequately present
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`its case.
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`As was apparent at the February 14,2006 discovery conference, this Investigation
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`concerns design patents that Ford alleges covers various fragments of the overall design of
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`Complainant’s F-150 truck. The overarching focus of this Investigation will be on whether
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`Complainant can circumvent the time-honored exhaustion doctrine and rely on its design patents
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`to defeat consumers’ right of repair. Additional key issues will include whether each of
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`Complainants’ 14 patents cover subject matter that is non-functional, novel, and non-obvious.
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`Complainant fails to explain how any of these issues implicate Respondents’ confidential
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`information, and further fails to show why in-house counsel’s access to Respondents’
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`confidential information is needed to allow Complainant to effectively present its case on these
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`or any other issues in this Investigation. Indeed, Ford fails even to explain why in-house counsel
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`needs Respondents’ confidential information to perform the stated function of providing outside
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`counsel with “specialized knowledge of the automotive industry.”
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`3
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`To the extent automotive expertise is needed to understand, interpret, or apply any
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`confidential information produced by Respondents, Complainant Ford can rely on outside
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`experts, who are eligible to receive confidential business information provided all requirements
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`of Paragraph 4 of the Protective Order are met. Again, Ford fails to establish why outside
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`counsel, assisted by independent experts, cannot adequately prepare and present its case in this
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`Investigation. See Data Storage Systems, supra, Order No. 9 at 4 (“Complainant has not
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`explained how this cadre of highly trained individuals [outside counsel and independent experts]
`is inadequate to prepare and present its case in this Investigation without . . . [in-house counsel
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`having] access to respondents’ confidential business information.”).
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`In short, Complainant fails to show a need for access by in-house counsel to
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`Respondents’ confidential business information. It’s motion should be denied on this basis
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`alone. See Rotary Wheel Printers, 5 I.T.R.D. at 1937 (“Until and unless the requisite need is
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`shown, there exists no jurisdiction for granting access to confidential information, no matter how
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`minimal the impact of disclosure would be.”); see also Certain Monolithic Microwave Integrated
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`Circuit Downconverters and Products Containing the Same, Including Low Noise Block
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`Downconverters, Inv. No. 337-TA-384, Order No. 8 at 12-15 (May 15, 1996) (“The issue of
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`need is the starting point for any assessment of whether to grant [in-house counsel] access to
`confidential business information . . . .”).
`B.
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`Complainant Has Not Shown That The Respondents Will Not Suffer Harm If
`Their Information Is Disclosed To In-House Counsel
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`Second, Ford has not met its burden of showing why Respondents’ confidential business
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`information in this Investigation should be treated differently, and denied the protection routinely
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`afforded Respondents’ in all other Section 337 investigations. “When confidential information is
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`disclosed to the employee of a competitor, the risk of the competitor obtaining an unfair business
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`4
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`advantage may be substantially increased.” Data Storage Systems, supra, Order No. 9 at 5
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`(citing Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1483). Ford alleges that Respondents and Complainant are competitors
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`in the market for automotive replacement parts. Respondents have produced sensitive propriety
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`information, including the identity of Respondents’ customers, sales data, and design and
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`development materials.
`Complainant seeks to place this sensitive information in the hands of an employee (Mr.
`Daniel Stock). Complainant asserts that Mr. Stock is not involved in “competitive
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`decisionmaking,” and therefore insists he is not positioned to misuse or exploit Respondents’
`confidential business information. Complainant, however, concedes that Mr. Stock’s “primary
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`responsibilities for Ford include selecting, supervising, and assisting Ford’s outside counsel in
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`litigation relating to intellectual property matters, including patent litigation.” (Compl.
`Memorandum at 5 (emphasis added).) Complainant further indicates that Mr. Stock “is also the
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`person at Ford that would initiate settlement discussions in patent litigation such as the present
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`proceeding.” (Compl. Memorandum at 6.)
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`Far from justifying Ford’s request to depart from time-honored Commission practice,
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`these assertions in fact provide further grounds for denying Ford’s motion. In the Data Storage
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`Systems investigation, the ALJ held that in-house counsel, like Ford’s in-house counsel, who
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`directed litigation should not receive the opponent’s confidential business information, even
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`though he was not involved in competitive decisionmaking: “Given the broad scope of the
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`duties of [in-house counsel] the Administrative Law Judge finds that it is reasonable to assume
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`that confidential information obtained in this investigation may at least inadvertently be used to
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`benefit complainant’s competitive position in the future.” Data Storage Systems, supra, Order
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`No. 9 at 5-6 (citing Motorola Znc. v. Znterdigital Tech Corp., 1994 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 20714 at 15
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`5
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`(D. Nev. 1998)). That decision applies with equal force here. Whether or not Mr. Stock
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`participates in forming business strategies, his role as litigation counsel may require him, for
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`example, to consider future legal action against Respondents relating to their development,
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`manufacture, or sale of replacement products not at issue in this Investigation. At a minimum,
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`the potential thus would exist for Respondents’ confidential information to be unfairly used in
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`such circumstances.
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`Ford also asserts that its in-house counsel is an “upstanding member of the bar” who
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`takes “ethics and professional responsibility very seriously.” (Compl. Motion at 5-6.)
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`Respondents do not question Ford’s in-house counsel’s ethics and background. What is at issue
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`here is the risk that a competitor will obtain an unfair business advantage-a risk that is
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`substantially increased where confidential information is released to an employee of a
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`competitor. See Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1483; Data Storage Systems, supra, Order No. 9 at 5 . Even
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`where the competitor’s employee is a member of the bar, and therefore is fully aware of the need
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`to respect the provisions of a protective order, there is no guarantee that the employee will be
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`able to “compartmentalize the information he learns in the course of his investigation and
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`unfailingly dismiss it from his mind when discharging his other duties.” Certain Process,
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`Apparatus, and Components ThereoJ for the Production of Spunbond Nonwoven Fabric, and
`Fabric Made Therefrom, Inv. No. 337-TA-237, 1990 ITC LEXIS 237 at * 7, Order No. 6 (June
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`27, 1990).
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`C.
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`Complainant Has Not Shown That Its Need For Access Overrides The
`Commission’s Interest In Preserving Confidentiality
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`Finally, Complainant fails to provide any justification for the Commission ignoring the
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`paramount interest in “maintaining the confidentiality of information under a protective order.”
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`Indeed, the Commission’s policy of maintaining the confidentiality of information submitted by
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`6
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`respondents and third parties is “critical to the operation of Section 337 Investigations.” Data
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`Storage Systems, supra, Order No. 9 at 6 (citing Zntegrated Repeaters, Order No. 6 at 3 ); see
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`also Certain Transport Vehicle Tires, Inv. No. 337-TA-390, Order No. 12 at 3 (December 24,
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`1996). As has often been stated, and as the Federal Circuit has recognized, the Commission
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`heavily depends on the voluntary submission of information in order to discharge its statutory
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`responsibilities in a timely manner:
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`Disclosure of sensitive materials to an adversary would
`undoubtedly have a chilling effect of the parties’ willingness to
`provide the confidential information essential to the Commission’s
`fact finding processes.
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`Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1483. In addition, such disclosure would have a chilling effect on third-
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`parties’ willingness to provide information, which in turn would undermine the Commission’s
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`ability to make a fair determination on a complete record, potentially resulting in broader harm to
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`parties not before the Commission, as well as to the public at large. See Data Storage Systems,
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`supra, Order No. 9 at 5-6.
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`In its Motion, Complainant ignores the controlling precedents discussed above. Instead,
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`Complainant relies on Matsushita Elec. Zndus. Co. v. U.S., 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1991), U.S.
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`Steel Corp. v. U.S., 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and various district court decisions. None of
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`these cases involve Section 337 proceedings and jurisprudence, and none, including the
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`Matsushita and U.S. Steel Federal Circuit decisions, has any bearing or relevance to the present
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`motion. Matsushita and U.S. Steel involve an anti-dumping petition. In fact, the Federal Circuit
`in U.S. Steel explained that its decision in the antidumping context has no bearing on the
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`stringent safeguards for confidential business information the Commission provides in Section
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`337 proceedings. “Our decision here bears no relation to, and can have no effect on, ITC’s rule
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`establishing a per se ban on disclosure to in-house counsel in its administrative proceedings.”
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`U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468.
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`As the Federal Circuit explained in Akzo-a post-U.S. Steel decision actually addressing a
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`Section 337 protective order-“we have neither found nor been directed to any judicial decision
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`in this country mandating, in the circumstances present here, that business confidential
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`information must be made available to inside management.” Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1485 (emphasis
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`in original). Finally, it is insufficient to claim, as Ford does here, that in-house counsel may be
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`provided access to confidential information in other courts. See Integrated Repeaters, supra,
`Order No. 6 at 5 (holding that protective order in 0 337 investigation should not be modified to
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`give in-house counsel access to opponent’s confidential information, even where such access
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`was permitted under protective order in stayed parallel district court litigation). The district
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`court decisions on which Ford relies at pages 3-4 of its memorandum thus are irrelevant and in
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`no way support the unusual, unprecedented relief Complainant now seeks.
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`111. CONCLUSION
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`Ford’s motion flies in the face of long-standing Commission precedent. Not only has
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`Ford failed to adequately address that precedent, it has not even acknowledged its existence.
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`Contrary to that precedent, Ford has failed to make the requisite showing that its in-house
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`counsel must have access to Respondents’ confidential business information in order for
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`Complainant to adequately prepare its case, that Respondents’ confidential information is less
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`deserving of protection than that of other Section 337 litigants, or that the Commission should
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`disregard its strong interest in protecting confidential information voluntarily produced in
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`discovery by parties justifiably relying on the safeguards of a Section 337 protective order.
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`Indeed, permitting in-house counsel access to Respondents’ confidential information over the
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`Respondents’ objection could significantly hamper the Commission’s ability to ensure timely
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`8
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`compliance with discovery requests in this and future investigations. Accordingly, the
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`Complainant’s Motion to Amend the Protective Order should be denied.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`Basil J. Lewris
`Robert D. Litowitz
`Smith R. Brittingham IV
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
`Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`901 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20001-4413
`(202) 408-4000
`(202) 408-4400 fax
`
`John R. Alison
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
`Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`12D, 167 Tun Hwa North Road
`Taipei 105, Taiwan, R.O.C.
`01 1-886-22-712-7001
`01 1-886-22-712-7080 fax
`
`Attorneys for Respondents
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`9
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`Dated: March 6,2006
`
`
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`Certain Automotive Parts
`
`Inv. No. 337-TA-557
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I, Joanna Grauel, hereby certify that on March 6,2006, a copy of the forgoing document
`was filed and served as indicated:
`
`The Honorable Marilyn R. Abbott, Secretary
`U.S. International Trade Commission
`500 E Street, S.W., Room 112
`Washington, D.C. 20436
`(Original and 6 Copies)
`
`The Honorable Paul J. Luckern
`Administrative Law Judge
`U.S. International Trade Commission
`500 E Street, S.W., Room 317
`Washington, D.C. 20436
`(2 Copies)
`
`Juan Cockburn, Esq.
`Office of Unfair Import Investigations
`U.S. International Trade Commission
`500 E Street, S.W., Room 401
`Washington, D.C. 20436
`
`Counsel for Ford Global Technologies:
`
`Ernie L. Brooks
`Frank A. Angileri
`Sangeeta G. Shah
`Brooks Kushman P.C.
`1000 Town Center
`Twenty-Second Floor
`Southfield, Michigan 48075
`
`V. James Adduci I1
`Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg LLC
`1200 I
`Street N. W.
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`
`Via Hand Delivery
`
`0 Via First Class Mail
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`,
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`ERSON, FARABOW,
`& DUNNER, L.L.P.
`-TT
`901 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`(202) 408-4000
`
`~



