IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`PLAINTIFFS,
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`Case No. 6:20-cv-02055-KEM
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
`MOTION TO REMAND
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`
`HUS HARI BULJIC INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
`ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF SEDIKA
`BULJIC, HONARIO GARCIA INDIVIDUALLY AND
`AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
`REBERIANO LENO GARCIA, AND ARTURO DE
`JESUS HERNANDEZ AND MIGUEL ANGEL
`HERNANDEZ AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
`ESTATE OF JOSE AYALA,
`
`
`
` V.
`
`TYSON FOODS, INC., TYSON FRESH MEATS,
`INC., JOHN H. TYSON, NOEL W. WHITE, DEAN
`BANKS, STEPHEN R. STOUFFER, TOM BROWER,
`MARY A. OLEKSIUK, ELIZABETH CROSTON,
`TOM HART, HAMDIJA BEGANOVIC, JAMES
`COOK, RAMIZ MUHELJIC, GUSTAVO CABAREA,
`PUM PISNG, ALEX BUFF, WALTER CIFUENTES,
`MUWI HLAWNCEU, CODY BRUSTKERN, MARK
`SMITH, AND JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10,
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`
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`
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`DEFENDANTS.
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`
`
`SUMMARY
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`Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc. and Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (collectively “Tyson”)
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`needlessly and knowingly exposed Sedika Buljic, Reberiano Garcia, and Jose Ayala to COVID-
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`19. As a result, Ms. Buljic stopped working on April 14, 2020, and died four days later.1 Mr.
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`Garcia stopped working on April 11 and died twelve days later.2 Mr. Ayala was hospitalized and
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`intubated on April 13, and died on May 25 after six weeks on life-support.3
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`1 Ex. A, Buljic Affidavit.
`2 Ex. B, Garcia Affidavit.
`3 Ex. C, Hernandez Affidavit.
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`Tyson asserts that this case is removable on the basis of a Presidential Executive Order
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`issued on April 28, 2020. According to Tyson, removal is proper because: (1) Plaintiffs’
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`“challenge actions taken by Tyson at the direction” of the April 28 Executive Order, and (2)
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`Plaintiffs’ “Petition raises substantial and disputed issues of federal law under the Defense
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`Production Act,” which was enacted under the April 28 Order.4 Both assertions rest on the same
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`flawed premise: that a Presidential Executive Order issued on April 28, 2020 has any relation to
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`or bearing on claims that accrued before the Order was issued. Because Ms. Buljic, Mr. Garcia,
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`and Mr. Ayala all contracted the virus, stopped working, and were dead or dying weeks before the
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`executive order was issued, Tyson has not and cannot demonstrate any of the decedents were
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`sickened or died as a result of the Executive Order. Accordingly, removal was improper. It
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`necessarily follows that this matter must be remanded.
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`Tyson’s Tortious Conduct
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`BACKGROUND
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`Ms. Buljic, Mr. Garcia, and Mr. Ayala are dead because of Tyson’s incorrigible, willful
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`and wanton disregard for workplace safety. Instead of educating employees about the dangers of
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`COVID-19, Tyson warned them not to discuss the virus at work.5 Instead of encouraging sick
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`employees to stay home, Tyson offered $500 bonuses for perfect attendance.6 Instead of pausing
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`or slowing production, Tyson redirected hogs from a neighboring plant to the Waterloo Facility.7
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`And instead of providing personal protective equipment or implementing safety measures to
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`protect employees, Tyson aggressively lobbied President Trump and Vice President Pence for
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`liability protections.8
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`4 Doc. 1, Notice of Removal at 1-2.
`5 Petition at ¶ 78.
`6 Id. at ¶ 77.
`7 Id. at ¶ 62.
`8 Id. at ¶ 79.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 2 OF 14
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`The Executive Order
`On April 28, 2020, President Trump issued an Executive Order “Delegating Authority
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`Under the DPA with Respect to Food Supply Chain Resources During the National Emergency
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`Caused by the Outbreak of COVID-19.”9 Notwithstanding Tyson’s assertion to the contrary,
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`President Trump neither mandated nor forgave Tyson’s reprehensible conduct. Rather than
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`compel any action, the order merely: (1) declared that meat and poultry in the food supply chain
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`fall under Section 101(b) of the Defense Production Act; and (2) delegated the president’s Defense
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`Production Act authority over the food supply chain to Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue.10
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`The order further instructed Secretary Perdue to take all appropriate actions “to ensure America’s
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`meat and poultry processors continue operations” consistent with guidance from the CDC and
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`OSHA.11 Subsequently, on May 5, 2020, Secretary Perdue issued a letter to meat processing
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`companies declaring that meat processing plants “closed since Friday May 1, and without a clear
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`timetable for near term resumption of operations, should submit written documentation of their
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`operations and health and safety protocol” to the Department of Agriculture.12 Neither President
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`Trump nor Secretary Purdue mandated Tyson to keep the Waterloo Facility open.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A.
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`The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.
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`“A defendant may remove a state law claim to federal court only if the action originally
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`could have been filed there.” In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 619 (8th Cir. 2010).
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`“The party seeking removal to federal court bears the burden of demonstrating that removal was
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`proper, even under the Federal Officer Removal Statute.” Graves v. 3M Co., No. CV 19-3094
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`9 See White House Presidential Actions, Executive Orders (April 28, 2020), available at
`https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-delegating-authority-dpa-
`respect-food-supply-chain-resources-national-emergency-caused-outbreak-covid-19/.
`10 Id.
`11 Id.
`12 USDA Letter to Stakeholders (May 5, 2020), available at
`https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/stakeholder-letters-covid.pdf.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 3 OF 14
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`(JRT/KMM), 2020 WL 1333135, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2020) (citing Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v.
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`Heller, 572 F.2d 174, 181 n.13 (8th Cir. 1978)). “This burden is met by a substantial factual
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`showing that supports candid, specific and positive allegations.” Bd. of Cty. Commissioners of
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`Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 965 F.3d 792, 819 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal
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`quotations and citations omitted). “[A]ll doubts about federal jurisdiction must be resolved in
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`favor of remand.” Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
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`Inc., 561 F.3d 904, 912 (8th Cir. 2009).
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`ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
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`A.
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`
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`Federal officer removal is improper because Tyson failed to identify any federal
`directive that existed at the time decedents were working for Tyson, failed to establish
`causation between a directive and the company’s tortious conduct, and failed to raise
`a colorable federal defense.
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`A defendant corporation seeking federal officer removal must demonstrate that: (1) it was
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`“acting under” the direction of a federal officer when it engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct;
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`(2) there is a causal connection between the official authority and the defendant’s actions; and
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`(3) it has a “colorable” federal defense to state-law liability. Jacks v. Meridian Res. Co., 701 F.3d
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`1224, 1230 (8th Cir. 2012).
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`1.
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`Tyson was not “acting under” the direction of a federal officer when it engaged
`in tortious conduct giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims.
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`The Federal Officer Removal Statute “permits removal only if [the defendant], in carrying
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`out the ‘act[s]’ that are the subject of the petitioners’ complaint, was ‘acting under’ any ‘agency’
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`or ‘officer’ of ‘the United States.’” Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 147
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`(2007) (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). Tyson argues that it “acted under”
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`the direction of a federal officer under the following theory: President Trump’s April 28 Executive
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`Order “instructed that Tyson and other meat and poultry processing companies to [sic] stay open
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 4 OF 14
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`and continue operations, subject to the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture.”13 In other
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`words, Tyson would have this Court believe that it had no choice but to maintain uninterrupted
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`operations at the Waterloo Facility—even in the face of an uncontrolled COVID-19 outbreak at
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`the plant—because the company was federally mandated to do so. This argument fails for a litany
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`of reasons.
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`First, Plaintiffs did not sue Tyson for actions taken subsequent to President Trump’s April
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`28 Executive Order. Plaintiffs sued Tyson for needlessly and knowingly infecting Ms. Buljic, Mr.
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`Garcia, and Mr. Ayala with COVID-19 during the first half of April (all three were infected and
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`stopped working on or before April 14). Accordingly, Tyson must establish that it was “acting
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`under” a federal officer during the period of time the decedents were still working at the Waterloo
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`Facility. Id. Whether or not Tyson was acting under a federal officer as of April 28 is wholly
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`irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claims.14
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`Second, Plaintiffs did not sue Tyson (or any other Defendant) for failing to shut down the
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`Waterloo Facility. Plaintiffs sued Tyson for fraudulent misrepresentation and seek to hold the
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`company vicariously liable for its executives and managers’ gross negligence. Plaintiffs
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`specifically contend that Tyson’s executives and managers violated their duty through twenty-nine
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`acts and omissions, none of which include failing to shut down the facility.15 The Petition only
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`references Tyson’s “prolonged refusal to temporarily close down” the facility as “evidence of
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`Tyson’s incorrigible, willful and wanton disregard for workplace safety and culpable state of
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`
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`13 Doc. 1 at 3.
`14 Moreover, to the extent Tyson implies that it was acting under the direction of President
`Trump’s March 16 “Coronavirus Guidelines” to employees (Doc. 1 at 4), this too is an insufficient
`basis for federal officer removal. It is well settled that “a private firm’s compliance (or
`noncompliance) with federal laws, rules, and regulations does not by itself fall within the scope of
`the statutory phrase ‘acting under’ a federal ‘official.’” Watson, 551 U.S. at 143.
`15 Petition at ¶¶ 119 (a)-(cc),135 (a)-(cc)
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 5 OF 14
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`mind.”16 Hence, the only action that Tyson claims to have taken at the direction of a federal officer
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`(keeping the facility open) does not serve as a basis for Plaintiffs’ claims.
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`Third, Tyson indefinitely suspended operations at the Waterloo Facility on April 22 and
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`the plant remained closed until May 7.17 Tyson’s assertion, that it did not pause production
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`because it was acting under President Trump’s April 28 Executive Order, is blatantly false.
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`Fourth, a federal officer did not order Tyson to make fraudulent representations to its
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`employees, prevent the company from providing employees with personal protective equipment,
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`prohibit the company from implementing and enforcing social distancing measures, or forbid the
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`company from implementing basic safety measures to protect its employees. Accordingly, federal
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`officer removal is improper because Tyson was not “acting under” a federal officer when it
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`exposed Ms. Buljic, Mr. Garcia, and Mr. Ayala to COVID-19. See id. (federal officer removal is
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`allowed only if the defendant was “acting under” a federal officer when it committed the acts “that
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`are the subject of the petitioners’ complaint”).
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`2.
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`Tyson failed to demonstrate that the acts for which they were sued occurred
`because of what they were asked to do by the Government.
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`Even if Tyson could establish it was “acting under” President Trump’s direct and detailed
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`control, it must also prove a causal nexus between the President’s April 28 Executive Order and
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`the actions for which it is being sued. To establish causation, Tyson “must demonstrate that the
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`acts for which they are being sued”—here, needlessly and knowingly exposing decedents to
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`COVID-19—“occurred because of what they were asked to do by the Government.” Isaacson v.
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`Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 137 (2d. Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (citing Willingham v.
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`Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969)). In other words, “this element requires that the ‘gravamen
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`
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`16 Id. at ¶ 110.
`17 Id. at ¶¶ 84, 85, 90. Moreover, Tyson indefinitely suspended operation at its nearby Columbus
`Junction facility on April 6, 2020. Id. at ¶ 62.
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`of the claim against [the defendant] occur while it acted under color of federal authority.’”
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`Brokaw v. Boeing Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1096 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (emphasis added) (quoting
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`Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 2012)). Because Tyson unnecessarily and
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`recklessly exposed Ms. Buljic, Mr. Garcia, and Mr. Ayala to COVID-19 weeks before April 28,
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`there is no causal connection between Tyson’s reprehensible conduct and the President’s
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`Executive Order. Tyson’s actions subsequent to April 28 are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claims.
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`Therefore, federal officer removal is inappropriate.
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`Furthermore, to establish a sufficient nexus a defendant “must by direct averment exclude
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`the possibility that [the state lawsuit] was based on acts or conduct of his not justified by his federal
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`duty.” Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 132 (1989). Not only has Tyson failed “by direct
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`averment” to “exclude the possibility that” Plaintiffs’ lawsuit “was based on acts or conduct” not
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`justified by a federal duty, Tyson does not even acknowledge the fact that Plaintiffs’ claims are
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`based on alleged tortious acts committed in the first half of April. Id.
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`Tyson has unequivocally failed to demonstrate that the acts for which they were sued
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`occurred because of what they were asked to do by the Government.
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`
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`3.
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`Tyson failed to articulate a colorable federal defense.
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`Federal officer removal “must be predicated on the allegation of a colorable federal
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`defense.” Id. at 129. A colorable federal defense “constitutes the federal law under which the
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`action against the federal officer arises for Art. III purposes.” Id. at 136. This is required because
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`the statute itself does not create a federal question, but “merely serves to overcome the ‘well-
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`pleaded complaint’ rule which would otherwise preclude removal even if a federal defense were
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`alleged.” Id.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 7 OF 14
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`Tyson asserts two federal defenses: express preemption under the Federal Meat Inspection
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`Act (FMIA); and ordinary preemption under President Trump’s April 28 Executive Order and the
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`Defense Production Act.18 Neither constitutes a colorable federal defense.
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`First, Plaintiffs’ claims did not arise under the FMIA, which “regulates a broad range of
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`activities at slaughterhouses to ensure the safety of meat and the humane handling of animals.”
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`Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 455 (2012). Ms. Buljic, Mr. Garcia, and Mr. Ayala were
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`people—not animals. Consequently, the FMIA does not constitute a colorable federal defense.
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`See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 129 (explaining that a colorable federal defense “constitutes the federal law
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`under which the action against the federal officer arises.”).
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`Moreover, the FMIA preempts states from regulating “the inspection, handling, and
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`slaughter of livestock for human consumption.” Nat'l Meat Ass'n, 565 U.S. at 455. It does not
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`preempt wrongful death claims arising under state law. See id. at 467, n.10 (explaining that the
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`FMIA does not preempt “state laws of general application [such as] workplace safety regulations,
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`building codes, etc.”). Finally, there is no private right of action under the FMIA, Pacific Trading
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`Company v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 547 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1976), and “complete preemption can only
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`exist where…the federal statute provides a private right of action.” Rogers v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
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`308 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2002). The FMIA does not constitute a colorable federal defense.
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`Second, neither the Defense Production Act nor the President’s April 28 Executive Order
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`preempt Plaintiffs’ claims. As previously stated, President Trump issued his Order invoking the
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`DPA weeks after the decedents contracted COVID-19 and stopped working. Consequently,
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`Plaintiffs’ claims did not arise under the executive order or the DPA and both are wholly irrelevant
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`18 Doc. 1 at 8.
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`
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`to Plaintiffs’ claims. Tyson cannot assert a colorable federal defense based on the President’s
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`Executive Order or the DPA because such a defense pertains to claims that simply do not exist.
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`
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`In short, Tyson has not raised a colorable federal defense. Federal officer removal is
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`improper and Tyson’s assertion to the contrary is objectively unreasonable.
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`B.
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`Removal is not warranted on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
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`Federal “jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
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`plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
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`“[T]he question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed
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`and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally
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`approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc.
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`v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).
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`Here, Plaintiffs’ causes of action are made entirely in terms of state law—specifically, for
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`Iowa common law negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, for federal question
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`jurisdiction to arise, resolution of Plaintiffs’ state law claims must depend necessarily on a
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`disputed and substantial question of federal law, which a federal forum may entertain without
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`disturbing the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. Grable & Sons Metal Prods.
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`545 U.S. at 313. Because Plaintiffs’ common law tort claims do not create a substantial question
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`of federal law, removal based on federal question jurisdiction is improper.
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`1.
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`Tyson’s attempt to transform this action into one arising under federal law
`violates the well-pleaded complaint rule.
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`The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded
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`complaint rule. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. Here, Plaintiffs’ Petition pleads only state law
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`claims, none of which depend necessarily on a disputed and substantial question of federal law.
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`While Tyson argues the “Petition raises substantial and disputed issues of federal law under the
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 9 OF 14
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`Defense Production Act” and “implicates federal imperatives of the highest and broadest
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`importance,” 19 removal is not appropriate under the well-pleaded complaint rule because these
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`federal issues are not raised or at issue in Plaintiffs’ claims. The “presence of a federal
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`question…in a defensive argument does not overcome the paramount policies embodied in the
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`well-pleaded complaint rule.” Id. at 399. Tyson cannot “merely by injecting a federal question
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`into” Plaintiffs’ state law claims, “transform the action into one arising under federal law.” Id.
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`2.
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`The DPA is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claims.
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`Because Ms. Buljic, Mr. Garcia, and Mr. Ayala contracted COVID-19 and stopped
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`working weeks before President Trump invoked the DPA, Plaintiffs’ claims do not depend, in any
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`way, on the interpretation or application of the DPA. It follows, therefore, that federal question
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`jurisdiction does not exist. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vactation Trust,
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`463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983) (It is not enough that “federal law becomes relevant only by way of a defense
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`to an obligation created entirely by state law.”). Tyson’s assertion that Plaintiffs’ state law claims
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`cannot be resolved without interpreting a federal statute that was invoked after Plaintiffs’ claims
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`accrued is objectively unreasonable.
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`3.
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`Plaintiffs’ reference to federal guidance and regulations does not confer
`federal question jurisdiction.
`
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`Tyson also appears to argue that federal question jurisdiction is appropriate because
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`Plaintiffs’ Petition references Defendants’ failure to comply with CDC guidance and OSHA
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`regulations.20 It is well settled, however, that the “mere presence of a federal issue in a state
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`cause of action does not confer federal question jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v.
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`Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986) (emphasis added). Indeed, Courts have uniformly ruled that
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`19 Id. at 2, 10.
`20 Id. at 10.
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`a plaintiff’s reference to federal regulations within the context of state law negligence claims is
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`insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bowler v. Alliedbarton Sec. Servs.,
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`LLC, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1158 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (“mere reference” to federal regulations in a
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`state-law claim “is not sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction”); Daniels v. Potomac Elec.
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`Power Co., 789 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. D.C. 2011) (“Because OSHA does not provide a federal
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`cause of action, and because alleged violations of OSHA were asserted by plaintiff simply to prove
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`elements of a state common law claim, the Court concludes that [plaintiff’s cause of action] does
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`not arise under federal law.”); I.S. v. Washington University, 2011 WL 2433585, *5 (E.D. Mo.
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`Jun. 14, 2011) (no federal question jurisdiction where state law claim for negligence per se referred
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`to HIPAA statute); Goforth v. Nevada Power Co., 101 F. Supp. 3d 975, 979 (D. Nev. 2015)
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`(finding no federal question jurisdiction “because proof of a violation of an OSHA regulation is
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`not an essential element of any of Plaintiffs’ claims”). Merely referencing federal regulations
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`within the context of state law negligence claims does not confer federal question jurisdiction.
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`Here, Plaintiffs referenced CDC guidance and OSHA regulations merely as standards upon
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`which to measure Defendants’ negligence. Plaintiffs do not claim relief under CDC guidance or
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`OSHA regulations, but solely under Iowa tort law. Consequently, evidence of Defendants’
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`compliance with these federal standards is merely one of many factors for a jury to consider in
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`assessing Defendants’ alleged breach of duty in this case. This is not enough to confer federal
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`question jurisdiction. “For federal courts to have jurisdiction, the state law claim must turn on an
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`‘actually disputed and substantial’ issue of federal law.” Bender v. Jordan, 623 F.3d 1128, 1130
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`(D.D.C. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 314). Because Plaintiffs’ state law
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`claims do not turn on interpretation of CDC guidance or OSHA regulations, removal is not
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`warranted on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
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`C.
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`Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.
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`Courts may award attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) where the removing party
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`lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Convent Corporation v. City of North
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`Little Rock Arkansas, 784 F.3d 479, 482–83 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Martin v. Franklin Capital
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`Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134 (2005)). Here, it was objectively unreasonable for Tyson to remove this
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`case on the basis of an executive order issued after Plaintiffs’ claims accrued. Accordingly,
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`Plaintiffs’ respectfully request judgment imposing the costs and attorneys’ fees associated with
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`this proceeding.21
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`Defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Under
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`CONCLUSION
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`these circumstances, there is no basis for finding jurisdiction under the Federal Officer Removal
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`Statute, no basis for finding federal question jurisdiction, and consequently—no basis for
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`removing this case from state to federal court. Plaintiffs respectfully urge the Court to grant
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`Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand and to issue an award of attorneys’ fees and costs associated with
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`this proceeding.
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`DATED this 26th day of August 2020.
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`_/s/ Thomas P. Frerichs_____________
`Thomas P. Frerichs (AT0002705)
`Frerichs Law Office, P.C.
`106 E. 4th Street, P.O. Box 328
`Waterloo, IA 50704-0328
`319.236.7204 / 319.236.7206 (fax)
`tfrerichs@frerichslaw.com
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`
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`21 Plaintiffs’ have incurred $662.07 in legal research expenses; and $10,875.00 in attorneys’ fees
`(43.5 hours at $250 per hour).
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 12 OF 14
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`John J. Rausch
`Rausch Law Firm, PLLC
`3909 University Ave., P.O. Box 905
`Waterloo, IA 50704-0905
`319.233.3557 / 319.233.3558 (fax)
`rauschlawfirm@dybb.com
`
`Mel C. Orchard, III
`G. Bryan Ulmer, III
`Gabriel Phillips
`The Spence Law Firm, LLC
`15 S. Jackson Street
`P.O. Box 548
`Jackson, WY 83001
`307.337.1283 / 307.337.3835 (fax)
`orchard@spencelawyers.com
`ulmer@spencelawyers.com
`phillips@spencelawyers.com
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`Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 13 OF 14
`Case 6:20-cv-02055-LRR-KEM Document 15-1 Filed 08/26/20 Page 13 of 14
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on this 26th day of August 2020, a true and correct copy of the above
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`and foregoing Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Motion to Remand was served via CM/ECF
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`Electronic Transmission on the following:
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`Kevin J. Driscoll
`Finley Law Firm, P.C.
`699 Walnut Street, Suite 1700
`Des Moines, Iowa50309
`Email: kdriscoll@finleylaw.com
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`Christopher S. Coleman
`Perkins Coie LLP
`2901 N. Central Avenue
`Suite 2000
`Phoenix, Arizona 85012
`Email: CColeman@perkinscoie.com
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`Mary Gaston
`Perkins Coie LLP
`1201 Third Avenue
` Suite 4900
`Seattle, Washington 98101-3099
`Email: MGaston@perkinscoie.com
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`Attorneys for Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc.
`and Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc.
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`_/s/ Thomas P. Frerichs_____________
`Thomas P. Frerichs
`Frerichs Law Office, P.C.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND — PAGE 14 OF 14
`Case 6:20-cv-02055-LRR-KEM Document 15-1 Filed 08/26/20 Page 14 of 14
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