Case: 5:20-cv-00334-DCR Doc #: 9 Filed: 08/14/20 Page: 1 of 5 - Page ID#: 128
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
`CENTRAL DIVISION
`(at Lexington)
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`WORLD HERITAGE ANIMAL
`GENOMIC RESOURCES, et al.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`ALTON H. STULL, SR., et al.,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 5: 20-334-DCR
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`MEMORANDUM ORDER
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`*** *** *** ***
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`This action involves the potential eviction of Plaintiff World Heritage Animal Genomic
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`Resources (“WHAGR”) from property leased from Defendants Alton H. Stull, Sr., and Brenda
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`Stull (collectively, “the Stulls”). WHAGR and its president, Lucinda Christian, seek entry of
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`a restraining order or temporary injunction to prohibit the eviction. However, because the only
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`purported federal claim does not “arise under” federal law, this Court lacks jurisdiction over
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`the matter and it will be dismissed.
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`WHAGR is a non-profit organization “whose mission entails the collection and
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`preservation of rare and endangered animals.” [Record No. 1, p. 4] In 2018, it established an
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`educational research facility in Mt. Sterling, Kentucky, on property owned by the Stulls.1 [Id.]
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`In late 2019, the plaintiffs claim that WHAGR’s animals “began dying unexpectedly and at an
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`A number of WHAGR’s claims turn on the parties’ obligations under the land purchase
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`agreement and the circumstances attendant to its formation. Because the plaintiffs have not
`properly alleged a federal cause of action, the Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction
`over the state law claims.
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`Case: 5:20-cv-00334-DCR Doc #: 9 Filed: 08/14/20 Page: 2 of 5 - Page ID#: 129
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`unusually fast rate.” [Id. at p. 6] The animals were diagnosed with salmonella typhimurium
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`(“salmonella”). [Record No. 6-9] Around the same time, WHAGR discovered the remains of
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`two long-deceased cows on the property, both lying in “riparian corridor[s]” near water
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`sources. [Record No. 1, p. 6] It believes that either latent conditions on the property or the
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`Stulls’ improper disposal of the cows caused its own animals’ current infections. [Record No.
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`1, pp. 6-7]
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`WHAGR reported the salmonella contamination to state and federal authorities.
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`[Record No. 6-1, p. 3] At some point thereafter, the parties’ relationship deterriorated.2 The
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`Stulls now claim that WHAGR breached their agreement by failing to pay rent and have
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`threatened eviction. [Record No. 6-10] However, WHAGR argues that it is current on its rent
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`payments. [Record No. 6-11] It asks this Court to enjoin the Stulls’ threatened eviction, while
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`acknowledging that its claims are based predominantly under state law.3 Nevertheless, it
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`asserts that the Court has jurisdiction because its claim for injunctive relief is “created by
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`federal law.” 4 [Record No. 8, p. 2]
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`The Animal Health Protection Act (“Act”), in relevant part, is concerned with the
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`interstate movement of animals that pose a danger to public health. See 7 U.S.C. § 8305.
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`For example, WHAGR asserts that it has been locked out of portions of the property,
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`that one of the Stulls allowed a known dangerous dog to maim one of WHAGR’s animals, and
`that the Stulls threatened it by shooting firearms on the property in the middle of the night.
`[Record No. 1, pp. 5, 7]
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`WHAGR delineates all of its claims as “State Law Causes of Action” except for Count
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`I for “Temporary and Permanent Injunctive Relief.” [Record No. 1]
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`WHAGR asserts the same right to relief under Kentucky Revised Statutes § 257.040.
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`[Record No. 6, p. 6 n.6]
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`Case: 5:20-cv-00334-DCR Doc #: 9 Filed: 08/14/20 Page: 3 of 5 - Page ID#: 130
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`Regulations promulgated under the Act prohibit the movement of diseased animals without a
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`health certificate. 9 C.F.R. § 71.3.
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`The Complaint indicates that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter
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`under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
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`all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” [Record
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`No. 1] “A case ‘arises under federal law if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that
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`the plaintiff's cause of action is a creature of federal law, or that a federal law is an essential
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`component of the plaintiff's state law claim.” Bullitt Cty. Fiscal Court v. Newsome, 60 F.3d
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`828, 828 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152
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`(1908)) (emphasis added).
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`Federal courts “narrowly apply[] the principles of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the well-
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`pleaded complaint rule to possessory land actions brought in federal court.” Oneida Indian
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`Nation of N. Y. State v. Oneida Cty., New York, 414 U.S. 661, 683 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
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`concurring) (refusing to find subject-matter jurisdiction even where the right to possession
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`derived from a federal land grant). In such a context, the “threshold allegation required of such
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`a well-pleaded complaint” is “the right to possession . . . based on federal law.” Id. at 666
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`(majority opinion) (emphasis added). The federal law issue must “not arise solely in
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`anticipation of a defense.” Id.
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`WHAGR mischaracterizes the nature of its action. Although it asserts that its claim for
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`injunctive relief “is created by federal law,” that simply is not the case. [Record No. 8, p. 1]
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`Any claim WHAGR has to injunctive relief depends first on whether it has a right to possess
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`the property in question. The Court turns to state law to answer this question. See Curry v.
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`McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 363 (1939). Only if that inquiry were determined in the negative
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`Case: 5:20-cv-00334-DCR Doc #: 9 Filed: 08/14/20 Page: 4 of 5 - Page ID#: 131
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`would the Act be implicated at all in this matter. It is true that any attempt by WHAGR to
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`“transport its animals across state lines . . . would likely be prevented by the language of 9
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`CFR § 71.3.” [Record No. 8, p. 3] But such movement would only occur in if WHAGR were
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`evicted, which means the Act would only be implicated if state law did not entitle WHAGR to
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`relief.5 In other words, WHAGR asserts that the Court has jurisdiction because a federal
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`question is raised by one possible answer to a state law question.6 See Gully v. First Nat. Bank,
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`299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936) (finding no jurisdiction where the plaintiff had “to prove that the
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`state law ha[d] been obeyed before the question will be reached whether anything . . . [was]
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`inconsistent with the federal rule”). Nothing on the face of WHAGR’s Complaint or in its
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`subsequent effort to the Court’s Show Cause Order indicates that federal law provides it with
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`a right to relief. Accordingly, it is hereby
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`ORDERED as follows:
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`1.
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`The plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order [Record No. 6] is
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`DENIED as moot.
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`2.
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`The hearing previously scheduled for August 18, 2020, [Record No. 7] is
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`CANCELED.
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`Also, WHAGR’s fear of violating the Act may be misplaced. It has not alleged that it
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`has any plans to move the animals across state lines. The Act only regulates interstate
`movement. Intrastate movement would implicate only Kentucky law and would raise no
`federal question.
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`For this reason, the Court finds it unnecessary to take up WHAGR’s arguments that
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`“[f]ederal regulations have been the basis of subject matter jurisdiction and have been
`interpreted to satisfy the federal element.” [Record No. 8, p. 2] Accepting WHAGR’s
`argument would not answer whether their claims arise under federal law, for the reasons stated
`above.
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`Case: 5:20-cv-00334-DCR Doc #: 9 Filed: 08/14/20 Page: 5 of 5 - Page ID#: 132
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`3.
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`The plaintiff’s Complaint [Record No. 1] is DISMISSED, without prejudice,
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`for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This matter is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the
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`docket.
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`Dated: August 14, 2020.
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