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`Case 1:16-cv-01142-DDD-JPM Document 117 Filed 02/28/19 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 4430
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`R E C E l V E D
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FEB 2 8 2019
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`WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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`TONY R. MOORE, CLERK N
`WESTL’ES‘fiAfi‘flSSé‘fNE‘“
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`ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
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`LOUISIANA DIVISION SONS of
`CONFEDERATE VETERANS
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`VERSUS
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-1142
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`CITY OF NATCHITOCHES, ET AL.
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`MAG. JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES
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`JUDGE DEE D. DRELL
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`RULING
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`Before the court are two motions for summary judgment: one filed by the Historic District
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`Business Association, Inc. (“HDBA”) (Doc. 96) and the second filed by the City Of Natchitoches,
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`Mayor Lee Posey, Police Chief Micky Dove, and Samantha Bonnette (Doc. 102). For the reasons
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`set forth herein, we find the motions should and will be GRANTED.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`This lawsuit arises out of the denial of an application submitted by the Louisiana Division
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`Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) to march in the Christmas Festival of Lights Parade
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`(Christmas Parade) in Natchitoches, Louisiana in December 2015. The Christmas Parade is one
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`Of many events held during the Christmas Festival Of Lights (Christmas Festival), an annual event
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`held in Natchitoches along the bank of the Cane River to celebrate the Christmas season. The
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`Christmas Festival, which has been held for nearly a century has evolved over time and seen
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`various organizers. The most recent organization to host the Christmas Festival and Christmas
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`Parade is the HDBA; a not for profit organization whose mission is to generate tourism and
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`commerce for the businesses in Natchitoches historical district. The HDBA volunteered in 2014
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`to take over the coordination and presentation of the Christmas Festival and all its events to further
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`to further this mission.
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`To ensure that the Christmas Festival ran smoothly, the City of Natchitoches passed
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`Ordinance No. 035 of 2014, which created a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement that documented
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`the division of responsibilities between the City and the HDBA with respect to the Christmas
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`Festival. The City agreed to provide for the general welfare by affording police and fire protection,
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`and electrical and sanitation services, as well as to erect barricades and ticket booths and provide
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`music equipment. The HDBA coordinated all details of the Christmas Festival and its events,
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`including the Christmas Parade.
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`In 2015, SCV applied to march in the 89th Christmas Festival of Lights Parade. SCV
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`participated in the Christmas Parade in years prior and anticipated it would continue to do so.
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`However, in a letter dated November 4, 2015, Fred Terasa, the Director of the HDBA Christmas
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`Parade Committee, notified Paul Grambling that SCV’s application was denied. Though no
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`explanation for the decision was set forth in the letter, SCV was told by HDBA Christmas Festival
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`Director Lee Waskom that the decision was based upon Mayor Posey’s November 2, 2015, letter
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`to the HDBA Christmas Festival Committee.1
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`The November 2, 2015, letter provided, in relevant part:
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`In the past several months there has been considerable discussion regarding the
`Confederate Flag and what it represents. For many, the flag represents a symbol of
`patriotism, faith, and family. However, public comments have shown that many
`members of the general public find the Confederate Flag to be offensive, and the
`City believes these comments to be reasonable. The City has determined that a
`significant portion of the public associate the Confederate Flag with organizations
`advocating expressions of hate, racism, and intolerance directed toward people or
`groups that is demanding to those people or groups. The City is also concerned that
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`1 Several references are made in the motions for summary judgment that the application was also denied because
`the SCV failed to acknowledge that it would adhere to the HDBA’s Parade Standards of Excellence. The Court finds
`this reasoning to be an afterthought and not the actual basis for the denial. Accordingly, it will not be addressed in
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`the display of the Confederate Flag in the Natchitoches Christmas Festival Parade
`could be taken by the public as an endorsement of a symbol that is viewed as
`racially inflammatory.
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`The City believes that a Visible display of the Confederate Flag could cause
`substantial disruption or interference with the parade. Therefore, we respectfully
`request that your committee not allow the Confederate Flag and all its variations to
`be displayed in the Christmas Festival Parade.
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`(Doc. 110-8).
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`The City’s belief that “substantial disruption or interference with the parade” was likely
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`resulted from the receipt of complaints regarding the Confederate Flag by Mayor Posey in mid to
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`late 2015. The first complaint received was from the Natchitoches Parish Voters and Civil League,
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`Inc. The League attended the Natchitoches City Council Meeting on August 10, 2015, and
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`presented the Mayor and members of the City Council with a Resolution the League adopted on
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`July 14, 2015. I The Resolution provided that they had been the “recipient of numerous contacts
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`regarding the offensive nature of the Civil War battle enactments and prominent display of the
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`Confederate Flag featured consistently for a number of consecutive years in the Annual Christmas
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`Festival Parade.” The League resolved to request that the “Natchitoches Christmas Festival
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`Committee ...delete the Civil War re—enactments and display of the Confederate Flag from the
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`Christmas Festival Parade from this time forward.” The second was received from a group of
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`African Americans in the community to voice their objection to the display of the Confederate
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`Flag in the Christmas Parade.
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`Mayor Posey and Chief Dove also heard rumblings that the Black Panthers might protest
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`the Christmas Parade and that sit—ins were likely. Sensing a real possibility of protests and
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`potential Violence, Mayor Posey held meetings on October 26 and 28, 2015, to discuss security
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`concerns. Chief Dove attended both meetings and the Director of the Christmas Festival of Lights,
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`Lee Waskom, attended the latter.
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`Armed with the verbal concerns expressed by the Mayor and his letter to the HDBA
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`Christmas Festival Committee dated November 2, 2015, Mr. Waskom advised members of the
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`committee that he planned to honor Mayor Posey’s request unless there was considerable
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`objection. No opposition was voiced, so the request was deemed accepted. Mr. Waskom issued
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`a letter to Mayor Posey dated November 3, 2015, acknowledging receipt of the letter and advising
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`the Festival Committee would comply and Mr. Terasa, issued his November 4, 2015,
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`letter
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`advising SCV that its application for participation was denied.
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`On August 4, 2016, SCV filed this lawsuit alleging the defendants, “CITY OF
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`NATCHITOCHES, LOUISIANA, LEE POSEY Mayor, City of Natchitoches, JOHN DOES ONE
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`THRU THREE, Members of the Christmas Festival Committee Who are Officially Affiliated With
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`the City of Natchitoches” (Doc. 1) infringed upon the organization’s rights under the First and
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`Fourth Amendments to free speech and due process, in Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil
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`Rights Act.
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`On April 13, 2017, SCV amended its complaint. Part of that amendment included a
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`paragraph referencing the HDBA but not adding it as a party. (Doc. 30). A few days later, a
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`“Second—Amended Complaint” (Doc. 32) was filed adding City Chief of Police Mickey Dove and
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`City employee, Samantha Bonnette, as defendants. It was not until September 29, 2017, that SCV
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`officially named HDBA as a defendant via SCV’s “Third—Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 73).
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
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`dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
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`Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 6(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable
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`jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
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`_S_e_e Anderson V. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
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`US. 242, 248 (1986). We consider “all evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting
`9
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`the motion.’
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`Seacor Holdings, Inc. V. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 680 (5th Cir.2011)
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`(internal citations omitted). It is important to note that the standard for summary judgment is two—
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`fold: (1) there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and (2) the movant is entitled to
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`judgment as a matter of law.
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`The movant has the burden of pointing to evidence proving there is no genuine dispute as
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`to any material fact, or the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case. Once
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`done, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with evidence which demonstrates
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`the essential elements of his claim. Anderson V. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. at 250. The
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`nonmoving party must establish the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact for trial by
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`showing the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, is sufficient to enable a
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`reasonable jury to render a verdict in his favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US. 317, 325 (1986);
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`Duffy V. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir.l995). A party whose claims are
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`challenged by a motion for summary judgment may not rest on the allegations of the complaint
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`and must articulate specific factual allegations which meet his burden of proof. Li. “Conclusory
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`allegations unsupported by concrete and particular facts will not prevent an award of summary
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`judgment.” My, 44 F.2d at 312, citing Anderson V Liberty Lobby, 477 US. at 247.
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`III.
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`ANALYSIS
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`The Civil Rights Act of 1871 creates a private right of action to redress the violation of
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`constitutional rights or federal law by those acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. §l983. To
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`prevail on a §1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove a person acting under color of state law deprived
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`him/her of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
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`In Monell v. City of
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`New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 US. 658 (1978),
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`the Supreme Court held
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`municipalities and other local governmental bodies can be “persons” within the meaning of Section
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`1983. Li. at 689, quoting Flagg Bros, Inc. V. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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`A. Claims against Mayor Posey, Chief Dove, and Ms. Bonnette in their official
`capacities
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`SCV asserts claims against Mayor Posey, Chief Dove, and Ms. Bonnette in their official
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`capacities. Claims against officials in their official capacity are treated as claims against the City
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`of Natchitoches. Kentucky V. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). Because the City of Natchitoches is
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`named as a party in this suit, the claims against Mayor Posey, Chief Dove, and Ms. Bonnette in
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`their official capacities are redundant and will be dismissed. See Flores V. Cameron County,
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`Texas, 92 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.1996).
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`B. Claims against the City of Natchitoches
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`A municipality cannot be held “vicariously liable under §l983 for the constitutional torts
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`of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.”
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`Collins V. City ofHarker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992). See also Monell, 436 U.S. at
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`694. The scope of liability of a municipality is limited to those instances where the deprivation
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`resulted from that municipality’s custom, policy or practice.
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`l_d_. Thus, municipal liability under
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`§1983 lies only where there is proof of: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a
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`policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional
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`violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom. Harris V. Jackson Cty., Mississippi, 684
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`Fed.Apr. 459, 463 (5th Cir.2017).
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`Existence of a policy can be shown in two primary ways: (1) the existence of an
`officially adopted policy, regulation, or decision promulgated by individuals with
`policymaking authority; or (2) a persistent, widespread practice of City officials or
`employees, which although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated
`policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents
`municipal policy. A single decision by a policy maker may also, under certain
`circumstances, constitute a policy for which a municipality may be liable.
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`However, this single incident exception is extremely narrow and gives rise to
`municipal liability only if the municipal actor is a final policymaker.
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`19L. (Internal quotations and citations omitted).
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`i.
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`Mayor Posey
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`SCV contends Mayor Posey established a policy when he issued the November 2, 2015,
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`letter to the HDBA, an organization it worked closely with to host the Christmas Festival, as set
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`forth in the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement. Though SCV is correct that the City and HDBA
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`entered into the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement pursuant to City of Natchitoches Ordinance No.
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`035 of 2014, neither the Ordinance nor the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement provided any
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`authority for the mayor to establish policies on behalf of the City.
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`The City Ordinance allows the City and the HDBA to enter into the Cooperative Endeavor
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`Agreement which establishes a division of labor for the Christmas Festival. The HDBA is
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`responsible for “arranging and coordinating” the Christmas Festival and all of its events, while the
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`City is tasked with providing services which “promote, protect, and preserve the general welfare,
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`safety, health, peace, and good order of the City.” The agreement to provide services, most of
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`which are provided any time an organization hosts an event on the riverbank or on Front Street,
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`ends with the provision of those services. The City has no input as to how the Christmas Festival
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`is organized. It provides the services pursuant to information it receives from the HDBA regarding
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`its needs.
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`Because the City of Natchitoches is governed by a Home Rule Charter with a mayor and a
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`five—person council comprising the executive and legislative branches respectively, an official
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`policy would require the consent of the city council. There are no allegations nor any evidence
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`that the mayor and city council worked together to ban SCV from marching in the Christmas
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`Parade. Likewise, the record is devoid of facts which establish any policy or widespread practice
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`establishing a custom. Failing to establish either an official policy or custom, the only other
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`possible way a policy exists is if Mayor Posey is a final policymaker.
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`While Mayor Posey is a policymaker for the City of Natchitoches, he must be a final
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`policymaker for the “single decision” policy to apply. “[W]hether a particular official has final
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`policymaking authority is a question of state law.”
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`ett V. Dallas Indep. School Dist, 491 US.
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`707, 737 (1989) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in the original). The Home Rule Charter
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`establishes the legislative branch of the city is the five-person council, not the mayor. Accordingly,
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`Mayor Posey cannot establish policy for the City on his own.
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`For all of the foregoing reasons, the Mayor’s November 2, 2015, letter does not constitute
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`an official policy of the City of Natchitoches, and without an official policy, these claims warrant
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`dismissal.
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`ii.
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`Chief Dove
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`The SCV also attempts to classify Chief Dove as a policymaker for the City. However, the
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`only policy articulated by SCV is Mayor Posey’s letter. There are no facts nor any allegations
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`connecting Chief Dove to that letter. The only involvement Chief Dove had with respect to the
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`Christmas Parade was granting HDBA a permit. No other action and no input were provided by
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`Chief Dove.2
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`iii.
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`Ms. Bonnette
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`Attempts by SCV to establish liability for actions undertaken by Ms. Bonnette also fail as
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`she was not a policymaker for the City. Ms. Bonnette was an employee of the City, but she had
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`no policymaking authority and did not have any role in drafting the Mayor’s November 2, 2015,
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`2 SCV also argues that Chief Dove is liable in some way because he might have harassed, threatened, arrested or
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`letter. SCV argues she acted as an agent for the City to in ensure HDBA enforced the terms of
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`letter, but SCV failed to present any evidence that Ms. Bonnette requested or ordered HDBA
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`members to withhold their objections to banning the Confederate Flag.
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`Allegations that Ms. Bonnette’s role as liaison between the HDBA Christmas Festival
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`Parade Committee and the City allowed her to influence the decision to ban SCV from marching
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`lacks merit for the same reasons. The evidence presented establishes her role as a liaison and
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`nothing more. She had no vote on the parade committee as to whose applications were granted or
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`denied, and when she asked for information regarding the applications that were denied, she was
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`prohibited from accessing it.
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`SCV’s failure to establish an official policy renders its §l983 claims meritless. All of its
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`its claims under §1983 will be dismissed.
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`C. Claims against the HDBA
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`i.
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`Statute of Limitations
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`HDBA argues that the third amended complaint, which named it as a defendant to this
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`action, was filed beyond the one—year statute of limitations and cannot relate back to the original
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`filing because the purpose of relation back under F.R.C.P. 15(0) (to address a mistake as to the
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`proper party) is not present in this case. Rather, it is an instance where SCV identified a new
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`defendant.
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`In support, HBDA cites the seminal case in the Fifth Circuit regarding relation back,
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`Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315 (5th Cir.1998), which noted that adding a newly discovered
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`defendant was not the type of situation contemplated under Rule 15(0). SCV argues in response,
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`though vaguely, that the statute of limitations was tolled under Louisiana law as the two defendants
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`are joint tortfeasors.
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`Federal courts look to Louisiana law for its tolling provisions, Burge V. Parish of St.
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`Tammany, 996 F.2d. 786, 788 (5‘h Cir.l983), and Louisiana law provides that “[i]nterruption of
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`prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors.” La. Civ. Code
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`art. 2324(C).
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`In SCV’s second amended complaint, it asserts at paragraph 6 that the City and
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`HDBA were partners who were responsible for planning, organizing, and supervising the Festival
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`Parade.”
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`(Doc. 32, p.3). However, SCV fails to allege that HDBA was liable for the acts
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`complained of. Rather, it states in the second amended complaint:
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`“Defendant City is directly liable for acts complained of herein due to the policies,
`practices, procedures and customs of its Office of the Mayor and its employees.
`Defendant City is further directly liable for acts complained of herein due to its
`enactment of the policy stated in a letter (dated November 2, 205) from the Office
`of the Mayor that violates Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under
`the US. Constitution to march with Confederate Battle flags (to include its
`corporate logo) in the Defendant City’s 89th Annual Natchitoches Christmas
`“Festival of Lights” Parade held on or about December 5, 2015.
`In any of his
`complaints, much less the third amended complaint, that HDBA is a joint tortfeasor.
`Not a single complaint asserts the defendants are jointly liable for the damages
`plaintiff allegedly sustained. Additionally, there was no mistake as to the identity
`of HDBA as a defendant.
`Plaintiff named John Does as individuals who
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`participated on the parade committee but at no time sought to name an entity such
`as the HDBA. As such, relation back under Rule 15(c) is inapplicable.
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`(Id.) We do not find that SCV asserted in the original or first two amended complaints that HDBA
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`was a supposed joint tortfeasor nor that it did anything wrong.
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`It was only once it was named a
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`defendant in amendment number three, that SCV alleged HDBA engaged in wrongdoing.
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`Even if the joint tortfeasor argument could be said to have legs, it would not work here.
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`For interruption of prescription to have taken place as to HDBA, there would have to be in
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`existence viable claims against the City and/or its employees. Prescription is not interrupted as to
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`a joint tortfeasor if the claims against the primary defendant are dismissed. Renfroe v. State ex
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`rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 809 So.2d 947 (La. 2002); Spott v. Otis Elevator Co., 601
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`So.2d 1355 (La. 1992).
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`Accordingly, we find that the claims against HDBA prescribed prior to it being named as
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`a defendant in the third amended complaint. Even if the claims were not barred by the statute of
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`limitations, the claims should be dismissed for reasons set forth infra.
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`ii.
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`State Action
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`Plaintiff’s cause of action is filed its pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, SCV must
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`establish it was denied a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and the
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`alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.
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`42 U.S.C. §1983; Lugar v.
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`Edmondson Oil Co.
`Inc., 475 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Like the state action requirement of the
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`Fourteenth Amendment, the “under color of state law” element of Section 1983 excludes from its
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`reach “merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrong.” Blum v. Yartesky, 457
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`U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). For state action to
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`exist, the plaintiff must establish the alleged constitutional deprivation was “caused by the exercise
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`of some right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a
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`person for whom the state is responsible,” and “the party charged with the deprivation must be a
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`person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” anr, 457 U.S. at 937.
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`SCV contends HDBA acted with the knowledge of and pursuant to the mayor’s letter
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`requesting the Confederate Flag not be displayed during the parade. SCV further contends the
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`denial of its application to march in the parade was conduct “fairly attributable” to the state. To
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`find that such state action occurred, the plaintiff must establish “a sufficiently close nexus between
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`the state and the challenged action of the [defendants] so that the action of the latter may be fairly
`
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`treated as that of the state itself.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
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`Co., 419 U.S. 345, 390 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). A close nexus exists only when
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`the state “has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
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`overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Blum, 457 US. at
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`1004. (quoting Flagg Bros, 436 US. at 164-165. Thus, the issue is whether HDBA’s decision to
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`deny SVC’s application for participation in the December 5, 2015, parade is conduct “fairly
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`attributable” to the state.
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`To determine whether otherwise private conduct is “fairly attributable” to the state, and
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`thus considered state action, the courts employ three tests. Under the public function test, state
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`action exists if the private defendant performs a public function that is traditionally the exclusive
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`province of the state, state action exists. The state coercion test examines whether a state exercised
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`coercive power of overt or covert encouragement to determine if state action exists.
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`If a
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`government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private
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`defendant] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise,” state action exists under the nexus/joint
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`action test. Bass v. Parkwood Hosp, 180 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir.l999).
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`a. Public function
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`Under the public function test, a “private entity may be deemed a state actor when that
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`entity performs a function which is traditionally the exclusive province of the state. While many
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`functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been “exclusively
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`reserved to the state.” I_d., 180 F.3d at 241—42 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
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`mere fact the public benefits from a private action is insufficient to establish state action. United
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`Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals Inc., 43 F.3d 902, 906-907 (4th Cir.l995).
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`As the Fifth Circuit has not examined nor addressed whether the operation of a parade or
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`festival is a governmental function, much less one exclusively reserved to the states, we look to
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`other circuit courts for instruction. In the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court found “[t]he
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`government has not traditionally been the sole provider of community entertainment... Fairs and
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`festivals. .
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`. have traditionally been administered primarily by private organizations, like churches,
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`civil groups, or local business consortiums.” E at 908. In Lansing V. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d
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`821, 828-89 (6th Cir.2000) and Villegas V. Gilroy Garlic Festival Association, 541 F.3d 950, 956
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`(9th Cir.2008) (en banc), both Circuit Courts failed to find the operation of a festival to be a
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`governmental function reserved to the state.
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`The HDBA is the entity responsible for the Christmas Festival and the Christmas Parade.
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`This fact is established by the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement which specifically states the
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`HDBA runs all aspects of the parade except for those limited services the City provides to ensure
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`the general welfare. This fact is further supported by the deposition testimony of various witnesses
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`including Mayor Posey, HDBA President Lee Waskom, and City Finance Advisor Patrick Jones
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`who all affirmed the HDBA organizes and runs the events.
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`b. State compulsion
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`The state compulsion test provides for state action by private parties when a state “has
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`exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert,
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`that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Bass, 180 F.3d at 242, citing Blum,
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`457 US. 991 (1982). This test is based on the degree of the state’s influence over the private actor;
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`thus, the test is broader in reach than the private function test. “Coercion” and “encouragement”
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`refer to the “kinds of facts that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private action as private
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`instead.” Brentwood Academy V. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 US.
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`288, 303 (2001). That is, did the private actor have a choice to refrain from engaging in the
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`conduct?
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`Mayor Posey’s letter was nothing more than a request to the HDBA to consider banning
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`the Confederate Flag from the Christmas Parade. Mayor Posey testified in his deposition that he
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`knew the decision to ban the Confederate Flag was that of the HDBA and that it could deny his
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`request. Mr. Waskom and Ms. Bonnette stated during their depositions that they understood the
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`letter was a request of the HDBA and that it could vote to deny it. Instead, the Christmas Festival
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`Parade Committee considered the request in light of the security concerns the City faced and
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`decided it would honor the request.
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`SCV fails to show that there was coercion by any state actor to ensure the Confederate Flag
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`was banned and there is certainly no evidence that the ban was intended to infringe upon the First
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`Amendment rights of the SCV. Without such a showing, SCV cannot meet the state compulsion
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`0. Nexus/joint action
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`Finally, under the nexus/joint action test, a private party is found to be a state actor where
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`the government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private
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`actor] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.” Li
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`SCV attempts to establish an
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`interdependence of the HDBA and the City by pointing to the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement,
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`the City’s membership in the HDBA, Ms. Bonnette’s role on the Christmas Festival Committee,
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`and fiscal arrangements between the HDBA and the City. However, none of these examples, alone
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`nor in combination, evidence the interdependence needed to satisfy the nexus/joint action test.
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`The Cooperative Endeavor Agreement was established to ensure the Christmas Festival
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`ran smoothly. The Agreement was desired by the City after it had a breakdown in communication
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`with the prior, private, entity responsible for the Christmas Festival. The Agreement did not alter
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`the fact a private entity (in this case the HDBA) organized and implemented plans for the
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`Christmas Festival and its events. The Agreement simply set forth the specific function the City
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`played.
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`SCV also argues the interdependence of the two entities is evidenced by the City’s
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`membership in the HDBA and Ms. Bonnette’s role as a member of both the Christmas Festival
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`and Christmas Parade committees. Though the City was a member of the HDBA, Mayor Posey
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`had little involvement with the organization. Of any purported state actor, the most involved was
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`Ms. Bonnette; yet, her role was limited. While she was a member of the HDBA and served on the
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`Christmas Festival Committee and Parade Committee, she had no vote in Parade Committee
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`matters. Her sole function on that committee was to act as a liaison to coordinate the provision of
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`public works by the City.
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`The argument
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`that
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`there are financial
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`ties between the two organizations,
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`further
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`substantiating interdependence, is equally unfounded. Deposition testimony consistently provided
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`the HDBA was fiscally responsible for the Christmas Festival and the City did not pay any money
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`from its budget to the HDBA for the event. HDBA raised funds throughout the year to host the
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`Christmas Festival. Per the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement, it paid the City a sum from the
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`profits which the City placed into its general fund to cover public works expenditures such as clean
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`up. Though the City provided services for opening weekend, those expenses were covered by a
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`grant obtained from the State of Louisiana to promote tourism.
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`There is simply no evidence before the court that HDBA was a state actor. Accordingly,
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`as it is a private entity which did not engage in state action, the claims against it lack merit and
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`must be dismissed.
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`D. Fourteenth Amendment
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`SCV argues its Due Process rights under the 14th Amendment were violated. While due
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`process claims are actionable against the state and state actors, the Due Process Clause of the
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`Fourteenth Amendment “offers no shield” against private conduct, “however discriminatory or
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`Cas