Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 1 of 25
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
`
`v.
`
`DAVID J. BOSHEA,
` Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`COMPASS MARKETING, INC.,
` Defendant.
`
`Civil No. ELH-21-309
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`
`
`
`
`
`This case arises from a dispute between plaintiff David Boshea and his former employer,
`
`defendant Compass Marketing, Inc. (“Compass”), with respect to an alleged severance agreement.
`
`Boshea filed suit in 2021 as the plaintiff, contending that Compass breached a severance
`
`agreement. In January 2025, while awaiting a retrial, Boshea died unexpectedly, at the age of 62.
`
`It is anticipated that an Administrator of the Estate will be substituted as plaintiff. For now,
`
`however, I shall continue to refer to Boshea as the plaintiff.
`
`In particular, Boshea claims that Compass breached both a written and an oral severance
`
`agreement, by failing to pay him severance of $540,000 when he was terminated without cause in
`
`March 2020, after thirteen years of employment. On this basis, Boshea also asserts a claim under
`
`the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL” or “Wage Act”), §§ 3-501 et seq.
`
`of the Labor and Employment Article (“L.E.”) of the Maryland Code (2016 Repl. Vol., 2024
`
`Supp.). Compass and its CEO, John White, dispute the validity of both the written and oral
`
`agreement, as well as the Wage Act claim. And, with regard to the written agreement, Compass
`
`contends that White’s signature on the severance agreement was forged.
`
`As the record reflects, the Court previously conducted a jury trial in this case in February
`
`2024. ECF 230, ECF 231, ECF 233, ECF 235, ECF 238, ECF 241, ECF 246, ECF 299, ECF 300,
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 2 of 25
`
`ECF 301, ECF 302. The jury found in favor of plaintiff with respect to a belatedly added claim of
`
`breach of oral contract. ECF 246. The jury also determined that defendant breached the Wage
`
`Act. The jury did not find breach of a written agreement, however.
`
`For the reasons set forth in my Memorandum Opinion and Order of August 8, 2024 (ECF
`
`275, ECF 276), I granted defendant’s motion, in the alternative, for a new trial. See ECF 255.
`
`And, by Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 8, 2024 (ECF 288, ECF 289), I denied
`
`Compass’s motion for reconsideration. See ECF 279. Trial is presently scheduled for April 21,
`
`2025. ECF 296.1
`
`By Memorandum Opinion and Order of February 20, 2025, I granted two motions in limine
`
`filed by Boshea. ECF 304, ECF 305. The deadline for motions in limine has expired. ECF 277.
`
`However, on March 19, 2025, defendant moved for leave to file a motion in limine, due to the
`
`death of Boshea. ECF 323. The motion in limine is attached as an exhibit. ECF 323-1 (the
`
`“Motion”). In the Motion, Compass seeks to preclude at the second trial the use of Boshea’s
`
`testimony from the first trial, to the extent that the testimony related to an alleged oral agreement.
`
`Appended to the Motion is an exhibit excerpting the trial transcript with highlighted testimony
`
`from Boshea that Compass seeks to exclude. See ECF 323-3.
`
`Plaintiff’s response is not yet due. But, I need not await plaintiff’s opposition.2
`
`No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. I shall grant leave
`
`to file the Motion. But, for the reasons that follow, I shall deny the Motion.
`
`
`1 Trial had been reset for February 24, 2025. ECF 277. But, at the request of defense
`counsel, it was rescheduled to April 21, 2025. ECF 296.
`
`2 The Court has prioritized the ruling on the Motion because the pretrial conference is
`scheduled for April 4, 2025. See ECF 325.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 3 of 25
`
`I.
`
`Factual and Procedural Background3
`
`Compass is a sales and marketing company that works with manufacturers of consumer
`
`products to assist with product marketing. ECF 298 (Trial Transcript, 2/21/24), at 45–46; ECF
`
`301 (Trial Transcript, 2/26/24), at 63. 4 John White is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
`
`of Compass. ECF 301 at 64. Boshea was an employee of Compass from May or June of 2007
`
`until his termination, without cause, in March 2020. ECF 298 at 55 (Boshea); ECF 301 at 81, 82
`
`(White).
`
`Boshea filed suit against Compass in February 2021, alleging that Compass owed him
`
`severance pay equal to three years of his salary, in the sum of $540,000, pursuant to a written
`
`employment agreement. ECF 1. The suit was amended twice before the trial commenced. ECF
`
`27 (the “First Amended Complaint”); ECF 48 (the “Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”).
`
`In the Second Amended Complaint, Boshea lodged claims for breach of a written contract
`
`(Count I) and violation of the MWPCL (Count II).5 In the alternative to Count II, Count III
`
`asserted a claim under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
`
`115/1 et seq. Notably, the SAC did not allege breach of an oral contract. By Memorandum
`
`
`3 The Court has written numerous opinions in this case. See ECF 110; ECF 117; ECF 160;
`ECF 205; ECF 275; ECF 288; ECF 304. One was issued as recently as February 20, 2025. See
`ECF 304. I incorporate here the factual and procedural summaries in the opinions, to the extent
`relevant. For convenience, I will generally restate the facts set forth in my Memorandum Opinion
`of February 20, 2025, as well as the legal principles that apply to a motion in limine. See ECF
`304.
`
`4 Throughout the Memorandum Opinion, the Court cites to the electronic pagination.
`However, the electronic pagination does not necessarily correspond to the page number imprinted
`on a particular submission.
`
`5 The caption of Count II refers to the “Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Act.” ECF
`48 at 5 (emphasis added). However, the parties otherwise refer to the Maryland Wage Payment
`and Collection Law, or MWPCL. See L.E. § 3-509.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 4 of 25
`
`Opinion and Order of July 22, 2022 (ECF 110, ECF 111), I determined that the Maryland Wage
`
`Act, rather than the Illinois statute, applies here.
`
`At the time of the first trial in February 2024, the SAC (ECF 48) was the operative
`
`complaint. The case proceeded to trial as to the claims asserted in Counts I and II. ECF 230.
`
`Boshea testified that as of 2007, he had known John White for thirty years. ECF 298 at
`
`16. According to Boshea, in March 2007, White visited him twice in Chicago, where Boshea
`
`lived, in an effort to persuade Boshea to work for Compass. Id. at 17. Boshea made clear that a
`
`severance commitment was important to him, because he wanted “a security net” to “protect [his]
`
`family.” Id. at 20, 24.
`
`Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 2 is an email from White to Boshea dated April 1, 2007. The
`
`authenticity of the email was not disputed by Compass. See ECF 301 at 67–72, 80. In the email,
`
`White stated, in part: “Dave, I know you very very well, and have been waiting a long time to be
`
`able to work beside you again . . . . I can’t wait to do this . . . . Also, you and I need to make sure
`
`we discuss an exit plan for you, even separate from me selling Compass . . . . I’ll be real careful to
`
`both protect our friendship, and your family.”
`
`Boshea testified that he received an email from White on May 16, 2007, which contained
`
`terms of a proposed employment contract, including a severance provision. ECF 298 at 29–34.
`
`The email was introduced into evidence at trial as Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 4 (“Offer Letter”). See
`
`ECF 298 at 29; see also ECF 242 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit List).
`
`The Offer Letter provided for an annual salary for Boshea of $180,000 and included various
`
`employee benefits. See ECF 298 at 34. For example, the Offer Letter stated that “100 percent of
`
`[Boshea’s] business related membership fees at White Eagle Golf Course [would] be
`
`reimbursed. . . .” The benefits also included a car allowance, a “401k,” health insurance, and paid
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 5 of 25
`
`vacation. In addition, the Offer Letter provided for an “‘involuntary exit package’ of 3 times
`
`[Boshea’s] salary (1 year will be immediately vested, with the additional 2 years accrued over the
`
`next three years).” Id. Further, the Offer Letter stated, id.: “Upon acceptance of this letter of
`
`intent, I will send you a full employment agreement . . . .”
`
`Boshea testified that after he received this email, he contacted White and accepted the offer.
`
`ECF 298 at 34. Thereafter, White returned to Chicago, where Boshea resided. Id. at 161–62.
`
`Boshea recounted that he and White then had a celebration dinner in Chicago, joined by Julie
`
`Boshea, plaintiff’s wife at the time;6 Rebecca Obarski, the Bosheas’ friend, who is an attorney;
`
`and Ms. Obarski’s husband. Id. at 160–61.
`
`Boshea subsequently received a written agreement from White, via email. Id. at 36.
`
`Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 8 is titled “Compass Marketing, Inc. Agreement Relating to Employment
`
`And Post-Employment Competition” (the “Agreement”). See also ECF 287-1; ECF 278-2.
`
`Exhibit 8 contains some handwritten notations.
`
`The Agreement is six pages in length, and the text is typed and single spaced. Boshea is
`
`identified in the text as “Employee” and referred to as “a senior executive.” ECF 287-1 at 1.
`
`Notably, the Agreement largely contains provisions for the benefit of Compass, with the exception
`
`of the severance provision, reviewed infra. In other words, it does not include the employee
`
`benefits contained in the Offer Letter. Nevertheless, the evidence indicated that, for the most part,
`
`Boshea received the benefits outlined in the Offer Letter. ECF 298 at 34.
`
`The Agreement appears to contain the signatures of John White and plaintiff. ECF 287-1
`
`at 5. Boshea testified that White signed it. ECF 298 at 42. He also denied that he forged White’s
`
`
`6 Julie and David Boshea had divorced by the time of trial.
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 6 of 25
`
`signature. Id. at 240. In contrast, White disputes the authenticity of his signature. ECF 301 at
`
`102. However, Compass never claimed at trial that the entire document was a fabrication.
`
`A review of the Agreement suggests that its main purpose was to benefit Compass by
`
`placing restrictions on Boshea’s conduct if he were to separate from Compass. Other than the
`
`provisions concerning severance, the document includes nearly four pages of concessions that
`
`Boshea was required to make to Compass.7
`
`The “Recitals” Section of the Agreement states, in part, ECF 287-1 at 1 (emphasis added):
`
`“NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of Employee’s employment with COMPASS, the
`
`severance benefit and for other good and valuable consideration . . . Employee agrees to enter into
`
`this Agreement . . . pursuant to which COMPASS will limit Employee’s rights . . . .”
`
`Article 6 of the Agreement is titled “Severance.” Id. at 3. Article 6(A) states, id. at 4:
`
`If Employee's employment is terminated by COMPASS for any reason other than
`Cause, Employee shall receive severance payments totaling $180,000 (one hundred
`and eighty thousand U.S. dollars) which will be divided up into twenty-four
`payments and will commence with the Employee's effective date of termination and
`shall be made in accordance with COMPASS's normal payroll cycle. The period
`during which Employee receives severance payments shall be referred to as the
`“Severance Pay Period.” Severance will increase one month for every month
`employed to a maximum severance of $540,000.[8]
`
`Article 7, titled “Term of Employment,” is also relevant. Id. at 5. It states, in part:
`
`“Employee acknowledges that COMPASS has the right to terminate Employee’s employment at
`
`any time for any reason whatsoever, provided, however, that any termination by COMPASS for
`
`
`7 The Agreement’s one-sided appearance lends support to Boshea’s contention that
`Compass entered the Agreement with Boshea.
`
`8 “Cause” is defined in Article 6(C) of the Agreement. But, it is undisputed that Boshea
`was not terminated for cause.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 7 of 25
`
`reasons other than Cause shall result in the severance described in Article 6 above, to become due
`
`in accordance with the terms of this Agreement . . . .”
`
`Boshea claimed that in May 2007, after receipt of the Agreement, he traveled to Compass’s
`
`office in Annapolis, Maryland. ECF 298 at 40–41. He was met by Michael White, the brother of
`
`John White. Id. at 41.9 Boshea claimed that he had questions and suggestions for White about the
`
`Agreement. However, White stated that he could not change the terms. Id. at 165, 169. According
`
`to Boshea, White pulled out the Agreement, signed it, and made a copy of it for Boshea. Id. at 42.
`
`Boshea also claimed that White kept the “ink one” and gave a copy to Boshea. Id. Plaintiff
`
`recounted that White “needed [him] to get started” with work. Id.
`
`As mentioned, Boshea joined Compass as an employee in May or June of 2007. On March
`
`3, 2020, after thirteen years of employment, Boshea was terminated, without cause, by letter dated
`
`March 3, 2020. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13 (termination letter). The termination letter stated that
`
`Boshea’s position was “selected to be eliminated due to a necessary reduction in force.” Id. Both
`
`a “Severance Agreement” and a “Non-Solicitation Agreement” were appended to the termination
`
`letter. In sum, in exchange for a mere “80 hours of Severance Pay,” see Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13,
`
`Severance Agreement, ¶ 1, Compass required a non-compete agreement for two years, id. ¶ 11; a
`
`waiver by Boshea of any suit, id. ¶ 3; and the execution by Boshea of a Non-Solicitation
`
`Agreement, among other terms.
`
`
`9 Michael White and Daniel White are the brothers of John White. When I use the name
`“White,” I am referring to John White.
`
`There is considerable acrimony between the White brothers. See, e.g., Compass
`Marketing, Inc. v. Flywheel Digital LLC, et al., GLR-22-379 (D. Md.); Compass Marketing, Inc.
`v. Flywheel Digital LLC, 2024 WL 3292676 (4th Cir. July 3, 2024) (per curiam); Michael White,
`et al. v. John White, et al., Case No. 013CL21004012-00 (Cir. Ct. Va., Arlington) (seeking the
`dissolution of Compass).
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 8 of 25
`
`Plaintiff recalled that upon termination of his employment with Compass, he made repeated
`
`requests to White and Compass for his severance payment under the Agreement. Id. at 62, 67–68,
`
`72. He estimated that he called White around forty times, id. at 59, but White ignored him. Id. at
`
`61. Indeed, Compass never paid any severance to Boshea. Id. at 71.
`
`According to Boshea, during the course of his employment, he traveled to Maryland for
`
`work approximately 50 times. Id. at 80. He estimated that in his thirteen years of employment
`
`with Compass, he spent somewhere between 97 to 150 days in Maryland. Id. at 111.
`
`Julie Boshea, who was married to Boshea at the relevant time, also testified at trial. She
`
`recalled that Boshea and White had been good friends before Boshea joined Compass. ECF 299
`
`(Trial Transcript, 2/22/24), at 61. Indeed, the Boshea children referred to White as “Uncle
`
`Whitey.” Id. at 64. Ms. Boshea testified that White visited them in Chicago multiple times,
`
`including in March 2007, to meet with Boshea about possible employment. Id. at 61. She “heard
`
`everything that was going on” when White and her husband were talking. Id. at 62. In particular,
`
`White said he would protect Boshea’s family in case Compass was sold or in case anything
`
`happened with their friendship, and it would be by way of a severance payment. Id. at 63.
`
`Further, Ms. Boshea recalled that she went to a celebratory dinner with plaintiff, White,
`
`and others following plaintiff’s acceptance of the job offer that had been emailed by White to
`
`plaintiff in May 2007. Id. at 97. Ms. Boshea was “excited” when her husband decided to accept
`
`the employment offer. Id. In addition, Ms. Boshea testified that her husband also showed her the
`
`Agreement. Id. at 71. Specifically, she claimed that she saw a copy of it when Boshea returned
`
`from Maryland around June 2007, and it was signed. Id. at 71–72.
`
`At the close of plaintiff’s case, defendant moved for judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
`
`ECF 300 (Trial Transcript, 2/23/24), at 80. I denied the motion. Id. at 91.
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 9 of 25
`
`Compass claims that White “rebutted Boshea’s testimony to demonstrate that any contract
`
`Boshea alleged to exist merely reflected contract negotiations that took place during the months
`
`before Compass Marketing hired Boshea and, therefore, there was no actual contract with definite
`
`terms.” ECF 255 (defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, alternatively,
`
`for a new trial), at 2.
`
`White testified that he and Boshea met in 1990, when they were co-workers in Maryland.
`
`ECF 301 at 65. Through the years, they remained “in contact.” Id. at 66. White acknowledged
`
`that in 2007 he had discussions with Boshea about joining Compass. Id.
`
`According to White, during discussions with Boshea in March 2007, Boshea “asked for
`
`three times his annual salary as a severance.” Id. at 78; see id. at 79. But, White claimed that he
`
`rejected the request. Id. at 79. Then, plaintiff asked for six months of severance. Id. Again, White
`
`claimed that he refused. Id. at 79, 82.
`
`White was asked if he emailed the Offer Letter of May 16, 2007, to Boshea. Id. at 91. He
`
`responded, id.: “Absolutely not.” He also testified that he never sent a copy of the Agreement to
`
`Boshea. Id. at 102. And, he disputed that the Agreement contains his signature. Id. Yet, White
`
`testified that he and his brother, Daniel White, met with Boshea in Chicago in April 2007 to discuss
`
`Boshea joining Compass. Id. at 80.
`
`On cross-examination, Boshea’s counsel sought to undermine White’s veracity. Plaintiff’s
`
`counsel established, for example, that at White’s deposition, about two years prior to trial, White
`
`had no recollection about the parties’ negotiations as to Boshea’s compensation. Yet, at trial, he
`
`was able to recall the discussions. Id. at 110, 113–122; see also ECF 261 at 10; ECF 242.
`
`Curiously, White claimed that his memory was better at the time of trial in 2024 than it was when
`
`he was deposed almost two years earlier. ECF 301 at 115.
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 10 of 25
`
`During trial, Compass sought to introduce an exhibit that had been included on Boshea’s
`
`exhibit list as Exhibit 3, but was never introduced by Boshea. ECF 298 at 124–27. It was identified
`
`as “David Boshea April 2007 Memo to John White,” but is titled “Re: Joining Compass
`
`Marketing.” See ECF 255-5 (“2007 Memo”). It was marked for identification by Compass as
`
`Defendant’s Exhibit 62. ECF 298 at 124; ECF 301 at 77.
`
`The 2007 Memo is an undated, typed, one-page memo from Boshea to White, with some
`
`handwritten notations. As noted, it is titled “Re: Joining Compass Marketing.” The 2007 Memo
`
`contains typed lists under three separate typed headings: “Expectations”, “Concerns”, and
`
`“Compensation.” The typed words “severance/buy out agreement” are listed under Compensation,
`
`but they are lined out by hand. However, the typed line continues: “3X Total annual
`
`compensation.” Next to it, in handwriting, it says, “Sale of Compass.” At the bottom of the page,
`
`in handwriting, it states: “*6 month severance.” Id. Below those words, it says: “1 yr.” Id.
`
`I pause to note that the parties had filed a proposed Joint Pretrial Order (“PTO”) on June
`
`6, 2023. ECF 173. It contained the parties’ exhibit lists, including the exhibit of plaintiff titled
`
`“David Boshea April 2007 Memo to John White.” Id. at 16–17, 18–21. On October 18, 2023,
`
`after the trial date of July 31, 2023, had been rescheduled (ECF 145, ECF 178), the parties
`
`submitted an Amended PTO. ECF 195. Plaintiff again listed the 2007 Memo as an exhibit. Id. at
`
`15. For its part, Compass did not include that document as a defense exhibit. Compass offered
`
`the curious explanation that it did not do so because “Boshea included the exhibit in his exhibit
`
`list . . . .” ECF 255 at 21; see id. at 2–3.
`
`Four days before trial, on February 16, 2024, Compass emailed an exhibit list to plaintiff
`
`and to the courtroom deputy, which included the 2007 Memo. ECF 255-1. Compass’s email
`
`contained one sentence, which stated, id. at 2: “Attached is Defendant Compass Marketing, Inc.’s
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 11 of 25
`
`exhibit list in both Word and PDF format.” Notably, the revised exhibit list added the 2007 Memo
`
`as a defense exhibit. It is troubling that Compass never alerted plaintiff or the Court to the
`
`substantive change to its exhibit list, i.e., the addition of the 2007 Memo as a defense exhibit. Id.
`
`As indicated, Boshea never introduced the 2007 Memo as an exhibit at trial. Consequently,
`
`Compass sought to do so. But, the Court ruled that Compass could not introduce an exhibit that it
`
`had not included in the Amended PTO. ECF 298 at 134. However, and of import, at the time of
`
`that ruling there was no claim by Boshea of an oral agreement, to which the 2007 Memo is arguably
`
`pertinent. Rather, the case was proceeding only on a claim of a written Agreement. In any event,
`
`the Court allowed White to testify as to the content of the 2007 Memo. ECF 301 at 78–82.
`
`The centerpiece of the defense concerned the challenge to the authenticity of White’s
`
`signature on the Agreement. The defense presented expert testimony to the effect that the signature
`
`was forged. In contrast, plaintiff’s expert was unable to reach a conclusion as to whether or not
`
`White’s signature was genuine.
`
`At the close of evidence, Compass again moved for judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`50. ECF 301 at 140; see also ECF 238; ECF 255 at 3. At that time, Boshea’s counsel moved to
`
`amend the SAC to include a claim for breach of oral contract. ECF 301 at 147. As the record
`
`reflects, the Court expressed its dismay with regard to Boshea’s motion, because the case had been
`
`pending for about three years, and the claim clearly was one of which plaintiff had knowledge.
`
`However, upon review of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, and because the underlying evidence for the claim of
`
`breach of an oral contract is very similar to the evidence for the claim of breach of the written
`
`contract, I permitted the belated amendment. Id. at 172–73. I also denied defendant’s motion for
`
`judgment. Id. at 213; see also ECF 238.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 12 of 25
`
`The jury returned its verdict on February 27, 2024. ECF 246. It found that Compass
`
`breached an oral contract for severance. Id. at 1.10 The jury awarded Boshea $193,000 for breach
`
`of oral contract, and also found that Boshea is entitled to prejudgment interest on that amount,
`
`calculated at the rate of 6% per year from the date of his termination. Id. at 2. Further, the jury
`
`found that Compass violated the MWPCL by failing to pay severance due and owing to Boshea.
`
`Id. And, the jury found that Compass’s failure to pay the severance was not the result of a bona
`
`fide dispute. Id. The jury also determined that, under the MWPCL, Boshea is entitled to a
`
`severance payment of $540,000, which equated to the maximum severance under the alleged
`
`agreements. Id. However, the jury did not award plaintiff additional statutory damages, i.e., a
`
`sum up to three times the amount of unpaid wages. Id. at 3.11
`
`The Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on March 8, 2024, for a total of $540,000
`
`in compensatory damages; prejudgment interest at the rate of 6%, dating from March 3, 2020, as
`
`to the sum of $193,000; and post-judgment interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the sum of
`
`$540,000. ECF 254. The Court stated that, as to compensatory damages, Boshea “is not entitled
`
`to duplicate recovery.” Id. ¶ 3. Therefore, I did not enter judgment for plaintiff for $193,000 for
`
`breach of the oral contract.
`
`
`10 The Offer Letter, on which the alleged oral agreement is founded, included employee
`benefits that are not included in the written Agreement. According to Boshea, the benefits were
`provided by Compass. ECF 298 at 33.
`
`The verdict form suggested to the jury that the jury could find either a written agreement,
`an oral agreement, or neither one, but not both. Plaintiff’s counsel did not argue that the facts and
`the law could support both an oral and a written agreement, or that the alleged contracts are not
`mutually exclusive.
`
`11 The matter of a prevailing plaintiff’s recovery of attorneys’ fees under the MWPCL is
`decided by the Court. See L.E. § 3-507.2.
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 13 of 25
`
`On April 5, 2024, Compass filed a “Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or,
`
`In the Alternative, Motion for a New Trial.” ECF 255. By Memorandum Opinion (ECF 275) and
`
`Order of August 7, 2024 (ECF 276), the Court denied Compass’s motion for judgment as a matter
`
`of law but granted Compass’s motion for a new trial. In sum, I noted that, in the midst of the trial,
`
`the Court had only a brief time to consider Boshea’s belated motion to amend the suit to add a new
`
`claim based on an oral contract. ECF 275 at 22. Despite significant factual similarities in regard
`
`to plaintiff’s evidence concerning both an oral and a written contract, I noted some distinctions in
`
`the elements. And, in my view, the defense was deprived of the opportunity to challenge any
`
`“shortcomings in the proof of an oral contract,” because “Boshea engaged in trial by ambush.” Id.
`
`at 23. Moreover, the alleged oral contract implicated the Statute of Frauds, but the Court did not
`
`have an adequate opportunity to consider it. Id. at 33. However, I granted plaintiff leave to amend
`
`the suit to add a claim based on an oral agreement. Id. at 41.
`
`On September 5, 2024, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration. ECF 279. By
`
`Memorandum Opinion (ECF 288) and Order (ECF 289) of November 8, 2024, I denied that
`
`motion. Of relevance, I pointed out that “many of the facts that support the written contract claim
`
`also support the claim for an oral contract, and these facts were well known to both sides before
`
`trial.” ECF 288 at 32. And, I also said, id. at 28, that “the facts for the oral and written contract
`
`claims are largely the same and have been known to the defense since the inception of the case.”
`
`The Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) followed on August 23, 2024 (ECF 278), along
`
`with exhibits. The TAC adds a claim for breach of oral contract.12 Compass has answered. ECF
`
`280.
`
`
`12 Confusingly, plaintiff labels the new claim for breach of oral contract as Count I. As a
`result, what had been Count I (breach of written contract) is now Count II. And, the TAC
`mistakenly contains two counts that are labeled as Count II.
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 14 of 25
`
`Trial is scheduled for April 21, 2025. ECF 296. In anticipation of the second trial, plaintiff
`
`submitted two motions in limine. ECF 287; ECF 293. By Memorandum Opinion (ECF 304) and
`
`Order (ECF 305) of February 20, 2025, I granted both motions.
`
`Boshea died unexpectedly on January 28, 2025. The Motion followed on March 19, 2025.
`
`ECF 323-1. As indicated, Compass seeks to preclude at the upcoming retrial the use of “Boshea’s
`
`prior trial testimony that may relate to the formation and existence of an alleged oral contract.”
`
`Id. at 2.
`
`II. Motions in Limine
`
`“A motion in limine is a request for guidance by the court regarding an evidentiary
`
`question.” United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
`
`The purpose of a motion in limine is “‘to aid the trial process by enabling the Court to rule in
`
`advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence.’” United States v. Slagle, SAG-
`
`15-392, 2015 WL 5897740, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2015) (quoting Banque Hypothecaire Du Canton
`
`De Geneve v. Union Mines, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1400, 1401 (D. Md. 1987)). In other words,
`
`“motions in limine are meant ‘to streamline the case for trial and to provide guidance to counsel
`
`[and the parties] regarding evidentiary issues.’” Osei v. Univ. of Maryland Univ. Coll., 202 F.
`
`Supp. 3d 471, 479 n.5 (D. Md. 2016) (quoting Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 554,
`
`558 (D. Md. 2001)), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 710 Fed. Appx. 593 (4th Cir. 2018).
`
`Generally, pretrial motions in limine seek “‘to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence
`
`before the evidence is actually offered.’” Changzhou Kaidi Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Okin Am., Inc., 102
`
`F. Supp. 3d 740, 745 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Luce, 469 U.S. at 40 n.2); see also Championship
`
`Tournaments, LLC v. United States Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc., SAG-18-02580, 2022 WL 1002137,
`
`at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2022); Dorman v. Anne Arundel Med. Ctr., MJG-15-1102, 2018 WL
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 15 of 25
`
`2431859, at *1 (D. Md. May 30, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Dorman v. Annapolis OB-GYN Assocs.,
`
`P.A., 781 F.App’x 136 (4th Cir. 2019). Such motions enable “‘a court to rule in advance on the
`
`admissibility of documentary or testimonial evidence and thus expedite and render efficient a
`
`subsequent trial.’” INSLAW, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 295, 303 (1996) (citation omitted) .
`
`Further, such motions allow the court to avoid “lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial.”
`
`Banque Hypothecaire Du Canton De Geneve, 652 F. Supp. at 1401; see United States v. Williams,
`
`81 F.3d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that motions in limine promote judicial efficiency
`
`by preserving issues for appeal without the need to renew objections, “so long as the movant has
`
`clearly identified the ruling sought and the trial court has ruled upon it"); Changzhou Kaidi Elec.
`
`Co., 102 F. Supp. 3d at 745 (stating that motions in limine “are ‘designed to narrow the evidentiary
`
`issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.’”) (internal quotation omitted).
`
`Notably, “‘[a] district court is accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility
`
`of evidence under the Federal Rules.’” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379,
`
`384 (2008) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984)); see Kauffman v. Park Place
`
`Hosp. Grp., 468 F. App’x 220, 222 (4th Cir. 2012). But, a court should grant a motion in limine
`
`“‘only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.’” Dorman, 2018 WL
`
`2431859, at *1 (quoting Emami v. Bolden, 241 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (E.D. Va. 2017)). Moreover,
`
`evidentiary rulings prior to trial are generally preliminary or tentative, made in the discretion of
`
`the court, for the purpose of assisting in preparation for trial. Luce, 713 F.2d at 1239–
`
`40; see Adams, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 558 (“A ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a
`
`preliminary or advisory opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court”).
`
`Therefore, when the evidence is actually offered at trial, the trial court may change its ruling. Luce,
`
`713 F.2d at 1239.
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00309-ELH Document 328 Filed 03/31/25 Page 16 of 25
`
`III. Discussion
`
`Compass argues that the Court should exclude “all of Boshea’s prior testimony related to
`
`the formation and existence of an oral contract at the second trial” because it is inadmissible,
`
`pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). ECF 323-1 at 2, 7.13 Compass identifies specific trial
`
`testimony of Boshea. See ECF 323-3. It maintains that it “did not have the motive to develop
`
`[Boshea’s] testimony . . . related to his belated oral contract claim during the first trial in this case.”
`
`Id. at 2. And, becaus