Case 8:25-cv-00462-TDC Document 106 Filed 04/25/25 Page 1 of 24
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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`Case No. 8:25-cv-00462-TDC
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`J. DOE 4 et al., individually and on behalf of
`all others similarly situated,
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`ELON MUSK et al.,
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`MOTION FOR EXPEDITED DISCOVERY &
`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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`Case 8:25-cv-00462-TDC Document 106 Filed 04/25/25 Page 2 of 24
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 1
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5
`A. The Court Enjoys Broad Discretion to Grant Expedited Discovery. ..................................... 5
`B. Plaintiffs Show Good Cause for Narrow, Closely Tailored Discovery. ................................ 6
`obtained more efficiently from any other source. .................................................................... 7
`Defendants. ............................................................................................................................ 10
`allowed discovery. ................................................................................................................. 15
`Overcomes Any Apex Doctrine Considerations. .................................................................. 16
`REQUESTED RELIEF ................................................................................................................. 20
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`i. Compelling reasons support Plaintiffs’ motion, and the information sought cannot be
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`ii. Plaintiffs request only narrow, tailored discovery that imposes a minimal burden on
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`iii. Defendants’ anticipated motion to dismiss is of little consequence as this Court has already
`considered the underlying merits, and a divided Fourth Circuit panel opined that either (1)
`Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, or (2) Plaintiffs might succeed on the merits if
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`C. Defendant Lewin’s and Defendant Marocco’s Personal Involvement in the Events at Issue
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`Case 8:25-cv-00462-TDC Document 106 Filed 04/25/25 Page 3 of 24
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`Plaintiffs respectfully move this Court for leave to conduct expedited discovery, and in
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`support show the following:
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiffs1 seek narrowly tailored, expedited discovery tied directly to the substance of
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`their constitutional claims—namely, that Defendant Elon Musk’s exercise of unprecedented
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`executive authority without Senate confirmation violates the Appointments Clause and that
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`Defendants’ collective attempt to dismantle the United States Agency for International
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`Development (“USAID”) violates Separations of Powers principles core to the constitutional
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`order. Limited discovery is necessary for Plaintiffs to supplement the record that they have
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`already assembled in support of their case, which has largely relied on public information.
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`Plaintiffs do not bring this request to the Court lightly. Good cause supports granting
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`limited, expedited discovery given Defendants’ rapid dismantling of USAID. Indeed, pursuant
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`to Defendant Jeremy Lewin’s own words, USAID’s “final mission” will be executed between
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`July 1 and September 1 of this year, during which time the agency will be wound-down beyond
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`repair. Thus, as a practical matter, at some point this summer, Plaintiffs will lose the ability to
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`meaningfully achieve the injunctive relief they seek and thus will no longer be able to vindicate
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`their constitutional rights. Upon conclusion of the proposed twenty-eight day discovery period,
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`Plaintiffs can promptly move for summary judgment.
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiffs originally filed this case on February 13, 2025 against Defendant Elon Musk
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`1 Plaintiffs, J. Doe 4, J. Doe 7, J. Doe 22, J. Doe 27, J. Doe 28, and J. Doe 29, bring this putative
`class action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. See generally ECF No. 93
`(“Amend. Compl.”).
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`1
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`and Defendant DOGE2 on behalf of twenty-six current and recently-made former USAID
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`personnel. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction (the “PI”) promptly thereafter. See ECF No.
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`15 (setting case management conference); ECF No. 18 (granting leave to file PI); ECF No. 17
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`(Plaintiffs’ PI motion). Following a hearing on February 28, 2025, and multiple rounds of post-
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`hearing supplemental factual submissions by the Parties, this Court substantially granted
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`Plaintiffs’ motion on March 18, 2025 (the “PI Order”). See ECF Nos. 74, 75. The PI Order
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`directed Defendants Musk and DOGE to reinstate email and systems access to Plaintiffs and
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`similarly situated USAID personnel and to take steps to secure the future availability of USAID’s
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`former headquarters if Plaintiffs ultimately prevailed. ECF No. 75. It further enjoined
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`Defendants from taking “any action” or engaging in “any work [] relating to the shutdown of
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`USAID,” including any workforce reductions, contract terminations, grant recissions, and
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`building closures, and enjoined any disclosure of personal or employment information outside
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`of USAID. ECF No. 75.
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`On March 20, 2025, the Court declined to modify the scope of the PI, denying Defendants’
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`request to exempt Defendant Jeremy Lewin from the PI Order. The Court reasoned that
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`Defendant Lewin was a DOGE affiliate explicitly subject to the PI; indeed, Defendant Lewin
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`submitted a declaration in which he self-identified as the “DOGE Team Lead at USAID for a
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`period of time.” ECF No. 77-2 ¶ 9. Defendants appealed and sought a stay of the PI. On March
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`28, 2025, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the PI. ECF No. 88
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`(“Stay Order”). The majority decision opined there were likely two deficiencies in Plaintiffs’
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`2 “DOGE” includes the United States DOGE Service; the Department of Government Efficiency;
`and their officers, agents, servants and employees. The term also includes all individuals who at
`any time from January 20, 2025 through the present have been designated as, or have served in the
`role as, a DOGE Team Lead or DOGE Team Member, regardless of the formal personnel status
`of that individual.
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`2
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`case on the merits. First, it considered the evidentiary record lacking as to the Appointments
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`Clause claim. Specifically, according to the panel, the record contained only “social media posts
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`and news reports” that, alone, were insufficient to establish that Defendant Musk directed the
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`allegedly unlawful acts and that he did so without the approval or ratification of properly
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`appointed USAID officials. Id. at 7. Second, the majority said Plaintiffs “failed, in part, to name
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`the unconstitutional actors as defendants,” given that neither “the Executive nor USAID” were
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`sued, and that this omission undermined Plaintiffs’ ability to seek relief for Separation of Powers
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`violations. Id. at 9; see also id. at 13-14.
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`Judge Roger Gregory concurred only in the result, based solely on his conclusion that
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`“Plaintiffs failed to include the proper Defendants.” Id. at 16. He explained, however, that “the
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`merits of Plaintiffs’ separation of power claim are clear,” given the uncontroverted evidence that
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`persons within the Executive Branch are dismantling USAID without any consultation with or
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`involvement by Congress. Id. at 17, see also id. at 25-26 (noting Secretary Rubio sent a letter to
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`Congress announcing the start of a reorganization process on February 3, 2025, after Defendants
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`had already announced USAID’s closure), id. at 28 (“Defendants have de facto shut down
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`USAID such that it cannot carry out its congressionally delegated functions.”), id. at 29 (“Musk’s
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`actions initiated the end of USAID, leading to what will be the end of the United States’
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`humanitarian aid to foreign countries.”). Judge Gregory went on to explain that, from his view,
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`the record makes plain that Defendant Musk has been unconstitutionally acting as an officer of
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`the United States, including in light of “the district court’s factual finding that Musk and DOGE
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`directed the effective closure of USAID, impacting the lives of thousands of employees and their
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`families,” id. at 32, and that Defendant Musk exercised his authority with “considerable
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`discretion” and final decision-making power. Id. at 33.
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`Since the stay was issued, Defendants and senior USAID leadership have taken swift and
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`dramatic steps to actualize the agency’s dismantling, despite the constitutional concerns this
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`Court recognized. Most notably, the same day the Stay Order was released, on March 28, 2025,
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`Defendant Lewin sent an email to USAID personnel entitled “Final Mission.” Ex. 1, J.R. 1. The
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`email stated: “[s]ubstantially all non-statutory positions at USAID will be eliminated. As a result,
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`USAID personnel globally will be subject to a consolidated Reduction-in-Force (“RIF”) action.
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`Within the next few minutes, USAID personnel will begin receiving RIF notices via email. These
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`notices will specify one of two separation dates: July 1, 2025 or September 2, 2025.” Id. at J.R.
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`2. It went on to say that,
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`[b]y July 1, 2025, the State Department will have assumed responsibility for
`USAID’s remaining programming, and many of our colleagues will depart for State
`or other opportunities. The remaining USAID personnel will then supervise the
`responsible decommissioning of USAID assets and the wind-down of the Agency’s
`independent operations. By September 2, 2025, the Agency’s operations will have
`been substantially transferred to State or otherwise wound down.
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`Id. In other words, Defendants plan to eliminate USAID as an independent agency by
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`September 2, 2025, at the latest.
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`Plaintiffs filed the Amended Class Action Complaint on April 17, 2025. ECF No.
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`93 (the “Amended Complaint”). The Amended Complaint:
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`● Names additional Executive Branch defendants, including the key decision-makers
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`at the agency: USAID; the United States Department of State (“State Department”);
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`President Donald J. Trump; Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also serves as the
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`Acting Administrator of USAID; Peter Marocco, who performed the duties of
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`Deputy Administrator of USAID; Jeremy Lewin, the Deputy Administrator for
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`Policy and Programming and the Chief Operating Officer for USAID; Kenneth
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`Jackson, the Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources at USAID; and
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`Amy Gleason, the Acting Administrator of Defendant US DOGE Service.
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`● Asserts constitutional claims on behalf of a putative class, making broad injunctive
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`relief appropriate; and
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`● Provides supplemental allegations regarding factual developments since the initial
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`filing, marshalling information from the public record in support of Plaintiffs’
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`claims.
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`This Court held a case management conference on April 22, 2025. ECF No. 100. In
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`addition to setting briefing schedules for Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs’ motion
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`for class certification, the Court granted leave for the Plaintiffs to seek expedited discovery. ECF
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`No. 105. Plaintiffs now move the Court for narrowly tailored discovery to develop a record to
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`support final judgment before Defendants consummate their unconstitutional deletion of a
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`congressionally created and appointed-for independent agency.
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`ARGUMENT
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`A. The Court Enjoys Broad Discretion to Grant Expedited Discovery.
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`The Court has “wide latitude in controlling discovery,” and rulings on the course and
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`scope of discovery “will not be overturned absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Ardrey
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`v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986); accord Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin.,
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`Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2003). Indeed, in the Fourth Circuit, “[d]istrict courts enjoy
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`nearly unfettered discretion to control the timing and scope of discovery.” Hinkle v. City of
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`Clarksburg, W.Va., 81 F.3d 416, 426 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure and the Local Rules authorize courts to enter scheduling orders expediting discovery.
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`See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(4); Local Rule 104.4; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2), 33(a), 33(b)(2)
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`& 34(b) (giving courts the power to adjust the discovery timing requirements imposed under
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`Rule 26(d) and, if warranted, to expedite).
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`In reviewing expedited discovery requests, courts in the District of Maryland apply “a
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`standard based upon reasonableness or good cause, taking into account the totality of the
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`circumstances.” Courthouse News Serv. v. Harris, No. CV ELH-22-548, 2022 WL 3577255, at
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`*4 (D. Md. Aug. 18, 2022) (quoting in part L’Occitane, Inc. v. Trans Source Logistics, Inc., No.
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`CIVA WMN-09-CV-2499, 2009 WL 3746690, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 2, 2009)); accord ClearOne
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`Advantage, LLC v. Kersen, No. CV JKB-23-03446, 2024 WL 278917, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 25,
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`2024). In making this determination, courts in this district have considered some or all of the
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`following “non-exhaustive” factors:
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`(1) whether a preliminary injunction motion is pending; (2) the breadth of the
`requested expedited discovery; (3) the proffered reasons for the expedited
`discovery; (4) the burden on the opponent to comply with the request for expedited
`discovery; (5) whether the evidence sought could be obtained more efficiently from
`some other source; (6) the extent to which the discovery process would be
`expedited; and (7) whether a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
`pending.
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`Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 8:25-CV-00951-PX, 2025 WL 1113440, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 15,
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`2025) (citing Courthouse News Serv., 2022 WL 3577255, at *4).
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`B. Plaintiffs Show Good Cause for Narrow, Closely Tailored Discovery.
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`Here, the above-listed factors and the totality of the circumstances favor finding good
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`cause for the proposed discovery and granting Plaintiffs’ Motion. First, Defendants have
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`manufactured the urgent timeline driving this Motion by seeking to wholly dismantle USAID on
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`a timeline that is faster than the normal pace of federal civil litigation—despite this Court’s
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`previous finding that Defendants’ actions are likely unconstitutional. See ECF No. 73. It is hardly
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`fair for Defendants to now object to Plaintiffs seeking to develop the factual record on the only
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`timeline that keeps pace with their unconstitutional actions. Second, Plaintiffs cabin the request
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`to narrowly-tailored discovery that minimally burdens Defendants and is largely focused on
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`authenticating the core events giving rise to the claim. Third, the course of litigation to date gives
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`little reason to believe that Defendants can defeat Plaintiffs’ claims solely on the pleadings.
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`i. Compelling reasons support Plaintiffs’ motion, and the information sought cannot be
`obtained more efficiently from any other source.
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` a. Plaintiffs have consistently pursued urgent, injunctive relief in this case, and intend
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`to use discovery to address time-sensitive claims of harm.
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`Plaintiffs have sought expedited injunctive relief in this lawsuit since its inception, and
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`have repeatedly emphasized the urgency of the matter at hand, including by previously moving
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`for their PI. “[E]xpedited discovery in the instant case accords with that preliminary relief,”
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`which—while currently not enforceable—has also not been reversed, but is still pending on
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`appeal. See Abrego Garcia, 2025 WL 1113440, at *3. Here, even though the proposed discovery
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`is not intended to be used to prepare for a preliminary injunction motion, the combined factors
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`of (a) Plaintiffs’ pending PI motion on appeal, and (b) Plaintiffs’ intent to use this discovery to
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`seek urgent injunctive relief, weigh in favor of granting this Motion. See, e.g., Does 1-9 v. Dep’t
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`of Just., No. 25-CV-325 (JMC), 2025 WL 894120, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2025) (noting that
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`“Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is pending before the court, which weighs in
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`Plaintiffs’ favor” (internal citation omitted)); Evapco, Inc. v. Mech. Prods. Sw., LLC, No. CV
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`SAG-22-3375, 2023 WL 361131, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 23, 2023) (directing the parties to “conduct
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`expedited discovery in the interim” after denying a TRO and staying consideration of “whether
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`to grant a preliminary injunction” until a later hearing date).
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` Moreover, “courts have routinely granted expedited discovery in cases involving
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`challenges to constitutionality of government action.” Ellsworth Assocs., Inc. v. United States,
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`917 F. Supp. 841, 844 (D.D.C. 1996) (“Expedited discovery is particularly appropriate when a
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`plaintiff seeks injunctive relief because of the expedited nature of injunctive proceeding.”)
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`(citing Optic–Electronic Corp. v. United States, 683 F. Supp. 269, 271 (D.D.C. 1987); Saco
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`Defense Sys. Div. Maremont Corp. v. Weinberger, 606 F.Supp. 446, 449 (D. Me. 1985)). Again,
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`here, Defendants created
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`the exigent circumstances by seeking
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`to effectuate
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`their
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`unconstitutional dismantling of USAID swiftly, including on a timeline that is faster than the
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`schedule on which the Fourth Circuit normally hears an appeal. “Courts have found that
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`immediate discovery ‘should be granted when some unusual circumstances or conditions exist
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`that would likely prejudice the party if he were required to wait the normal time,’” as is the
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`situation here. ForceX, Inc. v. Tech. Fusion, LLC, No. 4:11CV88, 2011 WL 2560110, at *3 (E.D.
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`Va. June 27, 2011) (cleaned up); NAPCO, Inc. v. Landmark Tech. A, LLC, 555 F. Supp. 3d 189,
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`225 (M.D.N.C. 2021) (quoting ForceX); Williams v. Ests., LLC, No. 1:19CV1076, 2019 WL
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`13148707, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2019) (same).
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`b. Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are necessary to support the merit of their claim while
`there is still an agency left to salvage.
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`In issuing its PI Order, this Court recognized that the undisputed central facts supporting
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`this lawsuit’s constitutional claims are established by the public record. See, e.g., ECF No. 73
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`(“Mem. Op.”) at 3 (finding that “President Trump has identified Musk as the leader of DOGE”
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`based on the President’s numerous public statements), 4 (“Musk’s public statements and posts on
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`the social media platform X . . . suggest that he has the ability to cause DOGE to act.”), 6 (“DOGE
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`has taken numerous actions without any apparent advanced approval by agency leadership,”
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`based largely on press reporting), 37 (“The record demonstrates that Defendants, as well as other
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`government officials, have acted swiftly to shut down, dismantle, and effectively eliminate
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`USAID as an independent agency.”). While the established facts supporting the underlying record
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`for this Court’s order remain, Plaintiffs also recognize the need for limited discovery prior to
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`moving for summary judgement, for the reasons set forth below.
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`First, as the Fourth Circuit’s Stay Order recognized, there are factual disputes between
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`the Parties as to the Appointments Clause claim. Contrary to Defendants’ arguments that the
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`Appointments Clause hinges entirely on whether Defendant Musk has been given a formal title,
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`courts uniformly agree that an Appointments Clause violation instead turns on the actual exercise
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`of significant authority, see Mem. Op. at 30-31 (collecting authorities), and the stay-panel
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`majority did not suggest that Plaintiffs’ Appointments Clause claim failed as a matter of law due
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`to Musk’s particular title or lack thereof.
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`Defendants have repeatedly claimed that Defendant Musk does not, in fact, lead DOGE
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`or exercise significant decision-making authority, despite repeated assertions by both President
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`Trump and by Defendant Musk to the contrary. See Stay Order at 3, 7-8; see also Mem. Op. at 5.
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`While Plaintiffs have these facts from Defendants’ public admissions and from press accounts,
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`the additional, admissible information sought in discovery will likely further prove the claim
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`and—upon information and belief—this new information is exclusively known to Defendants.
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`Second, the record regarding official decision makers and the specific course of events
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`taken to dismantle USAID between January 20, 2025 and February 3, 2025, including, in
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`particular, the critical time period between January 30 and February 2, 2025, needs further factual
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`development. Notably, according to multiple statements by Defendant Marocco and Secretary
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`Rubio, on January 30, 2025, Jason Gray was removed from his position as USAID Acting
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`Administrator. That same day, President Trump purportedly directed Secretary Rubio to perform
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`the duties of USAID Administrator. However, on information and belief, Defendants have never
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`publicly produced an official instrument documenting the date of this transition, and there was
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`no public reporting of Secretary Rubio’s new role until February 3, 2025. Moreover, despite
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`Defendant Marocco’s previous sworn statement to the contrary, a subsequent official delegation
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`of duties document indicates that Defendant Marocco was not delegated the Deputy
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`Administrator authority until February 2, 2025 at the earliest. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 72-73. Plaintiffs
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`thus believe that there was no person acting with the authority of USAID Deputy Administrator
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`during that weekend when Defendant Musk has claimed he and DOGE were “feeding USAID
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`into the wood chipper.” Id. ¶ 87; see generally id. ¶¶ 59-90. Plaintiffs further believe that the
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`remaining
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`information on
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`these matters
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`is only known
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`to Defendants
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`themselves.
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`Finally, while the Defendants’ unconstitutional acts to dismantle USAID are largely
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`publicly known, and while Plaintiffs have been able to establish additional facts through
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`documents provided from other witnesses, Plaintiffs plan to utilize requests for production to
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`authenticate government documents obtained from other sources. Though there may be
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`evidentiary exceptions that ultimately allow the Court to consider statements and documents from
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`indirect sources, Plaintiffs and this Court would be best served by having fully authenticated
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`versions of key documents that evidence the acts at the core of both the Appointments Clause and
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`Separation of Powers claims. Indeed, the stakes at issue are great given that “the Constitution’s
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`core, government-structuring provisions are no less critical to preserving liberty than are the later
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`adopted provisions of the Bill of Rights.” N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 570 (2014)
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`(Scalia, J., concurring).
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`ii. Plaintiffs request only narrow, tailored discovery that imposes a minimal burden on
`Defendants.
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`Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are relevant, minimally burdensome, and proportional to the
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`needs of the case. “Discovery is relevant if there is any possibility that the information sought
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`may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Dean v. Integrace, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-
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`1221-GLR, 2025 WL 833922, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2025) (internal citations and quotation
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`marks omitted). Relevancy in the discovery context “has been construed broadly to encompass
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`any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any
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`issue that is or may be in the case.” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Union Cap. Mkts. Corp.,
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`189 F.R.D. 158, 161 (D. Md. 1999) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
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`351 (1978)). Proportionality is determined by taking into account “the importance of the issues
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`at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant
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`information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
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`whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 26.
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`Plaintiffs seek a limited number of discovery requests: ten interrogatories; six depositions;
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`and fourteen requests for document production. This is fewer than envisioned by the Federal
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`Rules of Civil Procedure or the District of Maryland Local Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`30(a)(2)(A)(i) (allowing up to ten depositions without leave); Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (allowing
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`up to twenty-five interrogatories without leave); L. Rule 104.1 (allowing up to thirty requests for
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`production and up to thirty requests for admission). As described below, each request seeks
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`legally relevant information not otherwise available to Plaintiffs and is crafted to minimize any
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`burden on Defendants. Responding to the requests would impose de minimis costs, and the
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`United States has sufficient resources to do so. Cf. ECF No. 66 (ordering government defendants
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`to produce relevant documents similar to those requested below). Further, Plaintiffs will provide
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`Defendants reciprocal discovery on the same timeline proposed herein.
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`1. Proposed Interrogatories & Requests for Production (attached as App. A)3
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`Plaintiffs’ interrogatories are limited to: (1) identifying which individuals from Defendant
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`3 Plaintiffs identify seven of ten proposed interrogatories and eleven of fourteen proposed requests
`for production. Plaintiffs wish to reserve up to three additional interrogatories and up to three
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`DOGE have gained what level of access to USAID operating systems; (2) identifying the formal
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`instruments by which certain authorities were purportedly delegated to certain individuals, as
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`alluded to in Defendants’ previous submissions in this case; and (3) identifying discrete actual
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`and anticipated personnel levels on particular key dates. These requests are minimally
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`burdensome, asking only for information that is readily available to Defendants, but is also
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`currently only possessed by Defendants.
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`Plaintiffs’ requests for production are limited to requests for: (1) authenticated copies of
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`known, non-privileged documents that are central to this case, most of which are publicly
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`available in unauthenticated versions or have been described to Plaintiffs; and/or (2) metadata for
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`and unredacted copies of documents that were previously produced in this case. The
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`authenticated, readily admissible, and complete form of this evidence is available only to
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`Defendants. These requests impose de minimis, if any, costs on Defendants. To the extent there
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`is personally identifiable information in the previously produced redacted versions of the
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`requested documents, Plaintiffs are willing to enter into a protective order with Defendants to
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`keep such information confidential.
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`2. Proposed Depositions4
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`John Vorhees: served as USAID Director of Security until being placed on administrative
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`leave on or around February 1, 2025. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 77, 81. Mr. Vorhees was present at and
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`would have personal knowledge of the events taking place at the Ronald Reagan headquarters on
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`additional requests for production should discovery reveal the need for further discoverable
`information. Defendants would be able to raise any objections to those requests at the appropriate
`time should Plaintiffs issue them.
`4 Plaintiffs name five of the six proposed deponents here, reserving the sixth pending the
`information obtained in the first tranche of depositions. Plaintiffs wish to reserve the sixth
`deponent should discovery reveal the need for further discoverable information that can only be
`obtained from a particular source. Defendants would be able to raise any objections to those
`requests at the appropriate time should Plaintiffs issue them.
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`or around February 1, 2025, during which Plaintiffs have alleged that DOGE personnel coercively
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`gained access to the headquarters and used their systems administrator level access to give
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`themselves unauthorized physical access to secure locations within the headquarters. Id. ¶¶ 77-80.
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`Mr. Vorhees has information likely to be relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, speaking, as an individual
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`who resisted DOGE efforts, as to who took what actions and under what authority during this
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`critical weekend in which large parts of the agency were effectively dismantled.
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`Gavin Kliger: is a DOGE team member who demanded and received unrestricted access
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`to USAID’s financial, personnel, and administrative data systems. Amend. Compl. ¶ 64. As part
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`of the infiltration of digital assets, Mr. Kliger issued himself an agency email address and later
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`created a USAID HR email account. Id. ¶¶ 86, 112. On information and belief, he used and
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`continues to use his access to exert control over and directly execute agency personnel and
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`contracting actions. Mr. Kliger was also present on February 1, 2025, and witnessed DOGE team
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`members, including Steve Davis, a high ranking member of the DOGE apparatus, physically
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`demand and gain access to USAID offices in the Ronald Reagan building. Id. ¶ 76. Mr. Kliger has
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`information likely to be relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, speaking in unique ways about who has
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`taken what actions and under what authority in dismantling USAID, and the continued access and
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`control of agency systems by DOGE members.
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`Luke Farritor: is a DOGE member who has served in roles at several agencies, including
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`USAID. Amend. Compl. ¶ 51. As a DOGE member serving at USAID, Defendant Farritor was
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`provided the highest level of access to USAID systems on January 27, 2025. Id. ¶ 64. Using this
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`access, Defendant Farritor identified individuals at USAID who he claimed had taken actions
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`relating to releasing already obligated, congressionally appropriated funds. Id. ¶¶ 64, 67. These
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`individuals were targeted for leave and/or termination based on claims that they violated the
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`Case 8:25-cv-00462-TDC Document 106 Filed 04/25/25 Page 16 of 24
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`agency’s funding pause. Id. ¶¶ 67-69. On February 1, 2025, Mr. Farritor and other DOGE members
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`arrived at the Ronald Reagan building and demanded physical access to USAID offices, including
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`physical access to highly restricted areas despite lacking proper security clearances. Id. ¶ 76. Using
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`the complete administrative access to USAID systems that had already been provided to him,
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`Defendant Farritor manually removed building restrictions for himself and DOGE members. Id. ¶
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`80. On information and belief, Mr. Farritor has continued to play a role dismantling USAID by
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`restricting payment systems and helping prepare and disseminate termination and leave notices.
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`Mr. Farritor has information likely to be relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, speaking as to who has
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`directed DOGE members, under what authority, what actions those individuals were directed to
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`take, and in providing information on the extent of the dismantling of the agency, including its
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`payment and other operating systems.
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`Defendant Peter Marocco: either served as or performed the duties and functions of the
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`Acting USAID Deputy Administrator from at least February 2, 2025, to March 18, 2025. Amend.
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`Compl. ¶ 17. Defendant Marocco is likely to have unique relevant information about the process
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`of removing the Acting Administrator, Jason Gray, including whether or not information
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`documenting the date and timing of the transitions in leadership at USAID, prior to February 3,
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`2025, exists. Id. ¶ 72. There are apparent discrepancies between Defendant Marocco’s declaration
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`testimony and d