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Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 1 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 1 of 13
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
`
`Criminal No. (QOC Y i 00:;- i
`
`YANQING YE,
`
`Defendant
`
`vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv
`
`Violations:
`
`Count One: Visa Fraud
`
`(18 U.S.C.§ 1546)
`
`Count Two: Making False Statements
`(18 U.S.C.§ 1001(a)(2))
`
`Count Three: Acting as an Agent of a
`Foreign Government
`(18 U.S.C. § 951)
`
`Count Four: Conspiracy
`(18 U.S.C. § 371)
`
`IN DICTMENT
`
`At all times relevant to this indictment:
`
`General Allegations
`
`A.
`
`The People’s Republic of China and its Military
`
`1.
`
`The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) is a “foreign government" as that tenn
`
`is defined under 28 CPR. § 73.1(b). The People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”) is the military aim
`
`of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) and the armed forces of the PRC. The PLA is
`
`composed of six services and support forces: the PLA Army; PLA Navy; PLA Air Force; PLA
`
`Rocket Force; PLA Strategic Support Force; and the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force. The
`
`Central Military Commission (“CMC”) controls the PLA. The PLA uses three schools (the
`
`Academy of Military Science, National Defense University, and National University of Defense
`
`Technology) to formulate military strategy, research and advance its military capabilities and
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 2 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 2 of 13
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`weapons systems, and train its armed forces. Professors at these schools also serve as military
`
`officers and leaders of the PLA.
`
`2.
`
`National University of Defense Technology (“NUDT”) is a top military academy
`
`directed by China’s CMC. It was founded in 1953 by the Harbin’s Military Engineering
`
`Institute PLA. NUDT is involved in national defense research for the PLA and responsible for
`
`modernizing the PRC’s armed forces and designing advanced weapons. NUDT is also
`
`responsible for training advanced scientific and engineering personnel, commanding personnel,
`
`and senior leadership in the PLA.
`
`B.
`
`The Defendant and Her Conspirators
`
`3.
`
`YANQ ING YE (“YE”) is a Chinese national, a female member of the PLA, and
`
`member of the CCP. At all times relevant to the Indictment, YE was a Lieutenant in the PLA
`
`and was being directed by senior leaders of the PLA while conducting research at Boston
`
`University pursuant to a J-l non-immigrant visa.
`
`4.
`
`Co-conspirator A was, at all relevant times, YE’s supervisor as well as a Colonel
`
`in the PLA and full professor at NUDT.
`
`5.
`
`Co-conspirator B was, at all relevant times, an Assistant Professor in Management
`
`Science and Engineering at NUDT and a member of the PLA who according to YE had the rank
`
`“of less than Colonel.” YE was aware that Co-conspirator B had worked on military research
`
`projects regarding rocket launchers.
`
`6.
`
`Co—conspirator C was, at all relevant times, an Assistant Professor in NUDT’s
`
`College of Information Systems and Management.
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 3 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 3 of 13
`
`C.
`
`YE Fraudulently Gained Entgg into the United States
`
`7.
`
`YE applied for, and obtained a, J-1 non-immigrant visa to conduct research in the
`
`Department of Physics, Chemistry, and Biomedical Engineering, Center of Polymer Studies, at
`
`Boston University. YE’s research and studies in the United States at Boston University were
`
`funded by the Chinese Scholarship Council (“CSC”). The CSC was established in 1996 as a
`
`non-profit institution affiliated with the PRC’s Ministry of Education. The CSC is responsible for
`
`the enrollment and administration of Chinese Government Scholarship programs and provides
`
`funding for both undergraduate and graduate students, as well as post-doctoral visiting scholars,
`
`to Chinese citizens wishing to study abroad and to foreign citizens Wishing to study in China.
`
`CSC is financed mainly by the state’s special appropriations or scholarship programs.
`
`8.
`
`On or about August 4, 2017, YE electronically signed her visa application and
`
`certified that all of her answers on the form were true and correct when, in fact, she
`
`misrepresented her foreign military service to gain entry to the United States. In her visa
`
`application, YE described her foreign military service as follows:
`
`Name of Country/Region: CHINA
`Branch of Service: CIVIL SERVICE
`
`Rank/Position: STUDENT
`
`Military Specialty: NUDT [National University of Defense Technology]
`Date of Service
`
`From: 01 September 2009
`Date of Service
`
`To: 31 July 2017
`
`This description was false as YE’s foreign military service did not end on July 31, 2017, as she
`
`represented to the US. Government. Nor was her rank only that of a “student” in NUDT. To
`
`the contrary, YE was in fact a Lieutenant in the PLA and continued to work as a Lieutenant in
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 4 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 4 of 13
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`the PLA while studying and conducting research in the United States from in or about October
`
`2017 to in or about April 2019. As described below, YE was tasked with numerous assignments
`
`from PLA officers while she was in the United States such as conducting research, assessing
`
`US. military websites, and sending U.S. documents and information to China, which YE
`
`completed by masking her affiliation to the PLA. YE also lied on her visa application when she
`
`answered “No” to the question: “Do you seek to engage in espionage, sabotage, export control
`
`violations, or any other illegal activity while in the United States?” Based upon YE’s false
`
`representations, on or about September 5, 2017, the US. Department of State approved YE’s
`
`DS-16O application. On or about October 14, 2017, YE gained entry into the United States using
`
`her visa that she knew had been procured through fraud and making false statements, in violation
`
`of 18 U.S.C. § 1546.
`
`D.
`
`YE Makes False Statements to US. Law Enforcement
`
`9.
`
`On or about April 20, 2019, officers of Customs and Border Protection along with
`
`a Special Agent of the FBI conducted an interview of YE at Boston Logan International Airport.
`
`During this interview, YE stated, among other things, that Co-conspirator A was her Chinese
`
`adviser and a “full professor” at NUDT and he held the military rank of “Colonel.” YE falsely
`
`claimed that she had minimal contact with Co-conspirator A, and that Co-conspirator A did not
`
`provide much oversight of her research projects. She further falsely denied participating in any
`
`of Co—conspirator A’s military projects. Yet, based upon records found on YE’s electronic
`
`devices pursuant to a border search, at the instruction of Co-conspirator A, YE had accessed US.
`
`military websites, researched US. military projects, and compiled information for the PLA on
`
`two US. persons with expertise in robotics and computer science.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 5 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 5 of 13
`
`10.
`
`During the April 20, 2019 interview, YE also denied having any involvement in
`
`Co-conspirator B’s research. YE described Co-conspirator B as an Assistant Professor of NUDT
`
`who held a military rank of “less than colonel.” She also claimed that she had no recent
`
`communications with him when, in fact, she had numerous WeChat conversations with Co-
`
`conspirator B in 2018 and 2019. Indeed, according to a January 2019 WeChat conversation
`
`between YE and Co-conspirator B, they were collaborating on a research paper that was focused
`
`on a risk assessment model designed to assist the PLA in deciphering data for military
`
`applications. On or about April 11, 2019, Co-conspirator B sent YE a message in Chinese that
`
`has been translated into English that states: “See if [we can] find projects in risk analysis and
`
`policy sponsored by the US military by searching risk + US military directly.” YE also provided
`
`Co-conspirator B her Boston University VPN login, including her usemame and password so
`
`Co-conspirator B could log into YE’s account.
`
`11.
`
`Lastly, during this interview, YE stated that she held the rank of Lieutenant in the
`
`PLA and admitted she was a member of the CCP. She planned to return to the PRC and
`
`complete her PhD at NUDT under the advisement of Co-conspirator A. YE indicated that part of
`
`her undergraduate studies at NUDT included classification training and students at NUDT
`
`worked on classified projects.
`
`E.
`
`YE Acted as an Agent of the PRC without Notification to the Attorney General
`
`12.
`
`In direct violation of the terms of her J-l visa, while in the United States, YE had
`
`extensive communications with several senior PLA officers and she continued to work as a PLA
`
`Lieutenant. YE was tasked by senior PLA officers, completed those taskings, conducted
`
`research on the US. military for the PLA, collaborated with Co-conspirator B on research
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 6 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 6 of 13
`
`projects that had potential military applications, and lied about her engagement with PLA
`
`officers when directly questioned about them. YE acted as an agent for the Chinese government,
`
`yet she never notified the Attorney General as required for agents working fora foreign
`
`government.
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 7 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 7 of 13
`
`COUNT ONE
`
`Visa Fraud
`
`(18 U.S.C. § 1546(a))
`
`The Grand Jury charges:
`
`13.
`
`The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-12 are hereby re-alleged and
`
`incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
`
`14.
`
`The conduct alleged in this Count occurred outside the jurisdiction of any
`
`particular State or district and within the venue of the United States District Court for the District
`
`of Massachusetts, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3238.
`
`15.
`
`On or about August 4, 2017, in the People’s Republic of China, the defendant
`
`YANQING YE,
`
`did knowingly subscribe as true, under penalty of perjury (28 U.S.C. § 1746), a false statement
`
`with respect to a material fact in an application, to wit, in response to the question: “Have you
`
`ever served in the military?” on the Form DS—160, Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
`
`Registration, YE responded that she only had attained the rank of “student” at NUDT and her
`
`period of service to Chinese military ended on July 31, 2017, which statement the defendant then
`
`and there knew was false.
`
`All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a).
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 8 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 8 of 13
`
`COUNT TWO
`
`False Statements
`
`(18 U.S.C. § 1001)
`
`The Grand Jury further charges:
`
`16.
`
`The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-12 are hereby re-alleged and
`
`incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
`
`17.
`
`On or about April 20, 2019, in the District of Massachusetts, the defendant
`
`YANQING YE,
`
`in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the Government of the United
`
`States, did knowingly and willfully make a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement
`
`and representation, which YE then knew to be false during an interview conducted by CBP
`
`officers and a FBI Special Agent.
`
`All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001(a)(2).
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 9 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 9 of 13
`
`COUNT THREE
`
`Acting in the United States as an Illegal Agent of a Foreign Government
`(18 U.S.C. § 951)
`
`The Grand Jury further charges:
`
`18.
`
`The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-12 are hereby re-alleged and
`
`incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
`
`19.
`
`Beginning on a date unknown to the Grand Jury, but no later than in or about
`
`October 2017, and continuing until in or about April 2019, in the District of Massachusetts and
`
`elsewhere,
`
`YANQING YE,
`
`defendant herein, did knowingly act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government, to
`
`wit: the People’s Republic of China, without prior notification to the Attorney General of the
`
`United States as required by law.
`
`All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 951(a).
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 10 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 10 of 13
`
`COUNT FOUR
`
`Conspiracy
`(18 U.S.C. § 371)
`
`The Grand Jury further charges:
`
`20.
`
`The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-12 are hereby re-alleged and
`
`incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
`
`21.
`
`Beginning on a date unknown to the Grand Jury, but no later than in or about
`
`October 2017, and continuing until in or about April 2019, in the District of Massachusetts and
`
`elsewhere, the defendant
`
`YANQING YE,
`
`did knowingly and willfully conspire with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury to
`
`commit an offense against the United States, to wit, 18 U.S.C. § 951, that is, to knowingly act in
`
`the United States as an agent of a foreign government, the PRC, without prior notification to the
`
`Attorney General as required by law, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 371.
`
`OVERT ACTS
`
`21.
`
`In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its objects, the defendant and her
`
`co-conspirators committed overt acts, including but not limited to, the following:
`
`a.
`
`On or about August 4, 2017, YE lied on the Form DS-160, Application for
`
`Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration, about her military rank in the PLA, position in the PLA,
`
`and the end date of her service. She made these statements to fraudulently obtain a J-l visa so as
`
`to gain entry into the United States and operate Within the United States under the direction and
`
`control of her senior leaders in the PLA.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 11 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 11 of 13
`
`b.
`
`On or about March 15, 2018, YE sent instructions to Co-conspirator B in Chinese
`
`via WeChat on how to access Boston University’s document database using her Boston
`
`University VPN login information (usemame and password) thereby giving Co-Conspirator B
`
`the ability to log into Boston University posing as YE.
`
`c.
`
`Beginning in or about January 2019, Co-conspirator B and YE collaborated on a
`
`research paper that was focused on a risk assessment model designed to assist in deciphering
`
`data for military applications. As part of this research project, among other things, on or about
`
`April 11, 2019, Co-conspirator B advised YE via WeChat: “See if [we can] find projects in risk
`
`analysis and policy research sponsored by the US military by searching risk + US military
`
`directly.” In response, later on April 11, 2019, YE responded via WeChat that she would
`
`conduct this research.
`
`(1.
`
`On or about April 6, 2019, Co—conspirator A instmcted YE via WeChat to
`
`research a US. professor at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California whose work
`
`focused on computer security, digital forensics, and computer and software engineering and
`
`prepare a summary of his biography for him. Co-conspirator A advised Ye: “Compile the
`
`information into a file, then send it to me please.” YE responded: “Sure Teacher [Co-conspirator
`
`A]. Please go to bed now.
`
`I will start to work on it immediately.” Approximately, six hours
`
`later, YE sent Co-conspirator A three documents: (1) a Word document that she prepared
`
`summarizing the professor’s biography; (2) the professor’s curriculum vitae from the school’s
`
`website; and (3) a list of his published articles.
`
`e.
`
`On or about April 11, 2019, Co-conspirator C requested YE via WeChat to
`
`download a pdf file from a US. navy website —
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 12 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 12 of 13
`
`www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/Surface_Forces_Strategy.pdf. YE did as she was
`
`instructed and sent Co—Conspirator C this document via WeChat. In response, Co-conspirator C
`
`stated: “Now a days, we can’t connect to a link with mil top level domain from China... This is
`
`probably American taking precautions against us.” YE agreed with these statements and
`
`revealed that when she has been searching for information recently, “sometimes I have to use the
`
`IP of the university to enter certain websites.”
`
`f.
`
`On or about April 15, 2019, Co-conspirator A sent YE requests via WeChat to
`
`access the U.S. navy website — www.0nr.navy.mil and “check if it has a list of projects.” Later
`
`that same day, Co-conspirator A also requested YE to access the U.S. army website —
`
`www.arl.army.mil and review the contents of that website for him.
`
`g.
`
`On or about April 16, 2019, Co-conspirator A instructed YE via WeChat to
`
`conduct research and compile information on a Professor of Electrical and Computer
`
`Engineering at University of Texas at San Antonio. This professor’s research focused on system
`
`of systems technology and intelligent robotics. As instructed, YE compiled the information Co-
`
`conspirator A requested and sent it to Co-conspirator A via WeChat on or about April 16, 2019.
`
`All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 13 of 13
`Case 1:20-cr-10021-PBS Document 1 Filed 01/28/20 Page 13 of 13
`
`A TRUE BILL
`
`
`
`FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY
`
`
`
`. TEPHANIE SIEGMANN
`
`Assistant United States Attorney
`
`DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, Boston, MA
`
`January 28, 2020
`
`'ae Grand Jurors and filed.
`
` .
`
`13
`
`

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