`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`
`KRISTEN PELL,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No.
`
`Hon.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`Noah S. Hurwitz (P74063)
`HURWITZ LAW PLLC
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`340 Beakes Street, Suite 125
`Ann Arbor, MI 48103
`(844) 487-9489
`noah@hurwitzlaw.com
`
`
`
`ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
`
`NOW COME Plaintiff Kristen Pell (“Plaintiff”), by and through the
`
`undersigned attorneys, and state the following:
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Kristen Pell was terminated by Defendant after requesting a religious
`
`1.
`
`accommodation to be exempt from Defendant’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate. Ms.
`
`Pell timely submitted a request for deferral for the COVID-19 vaccine because she
`
`was trying to conceive, which was accepted through June 30, 2022. However, on
`
`February 8, 2022, Defendant informed Ms. Pell that instead of by June 30, 2022, she
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.2 Filed 05/23/23 Page 2 of 14
`
`would need to receive both doses of the vaccine by March 18, 2022 and submit
`
`documentation by April 1, 2022. She was also informed that Defendant “made the
`
`decision whereby additional exemption, including religious exemption requests will
`
`NOT be an option.” Ms. Pell decided to submit a religious accommodation request,
`
`as her sincerely held religious beliefs constrain her from receiving the vaccine.
`
`Defendant denied this request, and Ms. Pell was then forced either abandon her
`
`religious accommodation beliefs and receive the vaccine or be terminated. Despite
`
`the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) telling employers to
`
`“ordinarily assume that an employee’s request for religious accommodation is based
`
`on sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance,” Defendant did the
`
`opposite. Defendant terminated Ms. Pell based on Defendant’s subjective standard
`
`of religiosity.
`
`PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
`
`Kristen Pell resides in Jackson, Michigan.
`
`Defendant Trinity Health Corporation is a domestic for-profit
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`corporation incorporated in Michigan.
`
`4.
`
`The Eastern District of Michigan has jurisdiction over the Title VII of
`
`the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
`
`supplemental jurisdiction over the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”)
`
`claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.3 Filed 05/23/23 Page 3 of 14
`
`5.
`
`Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to 28
`
`U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because it is the judicial district in which Defendant is
`
`incorporated and where the incidents described in this Complaint took place.
`
`6.
`
`Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the U.S. Equal
`
`Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on March 1, 2023.
`
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`
`Defendant’s Mandatory Vaccine Policy
`
`7.
`
`Defendant announced its COVID-19 vaccination mandate on July 8,
`
`2021.
`
`8.
`
`The deadline for employees to receive the first dose of the vaccine was
`
`September 21, 2021.
`
`9.
`
`The employees were to submit exemption requests or proof of
`
`vaccination by August 20, 2021.
`
`Plaintiff’s Religious Accommodation Requests
`
`10. After Defendant announced its mandate, Plaintiff promptly submitted
`
`and was approved for a deferral of the COVID-19 vaccination because she was
`
`trying to conceive.
`
`11. On October 19, 2021, when Plaintiff’s deferral was approved, she was
`
`given the new deadline of June 30, 2022.
`
`12. However, on February 8, 2022, Defendant sent Plaintiff further
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.4 Filed 05/23/23 Page 4 of 14
`
`communication informing her that her deadline was now March 18, 2022, and that
`
`she needed to submit proof of vaccination by April 1, 2022.
`
`13. Additionally, Defendant asserted that it “made the decision whereby
`
`additional exemption, including religious exemption requests will NOT be an
`
`option.”
`
`14. Despite Defendant’s unlawful stipulation, Plaintiff submitted a
`
`religious accommodation request as her sincerely held religious beliefs constrain her
`
`from receiving the COVID-19 vaccine.
`
`15. Plaintiff’s religious objections to the vaccine were straightforward and
`
`similar to those accepted by Defendant.
`
`16. On June 27, 2022, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s request for religious
`
`accommodation.
`
`17. Defendant did not describe the “specific criteria” for Plaintiff’s
`
`sincerely held religious beliefs were evaluated on.
`
`18. Plaintiff was terminated from employment on July 8, 2022.
`
`19. Under the law, religious practices “include moral or ethical beliefs as
`
`to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional
`
`religious views.” 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.
`
`20. Defendant assumed insincerity when the opposite should have been
`
`true – see Guidance, supra (“[T]he employer should ordinarily assume that an
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.5 Filed 05/23/23 Page 5 of 14
`
`employee’s request for religious accommodation is based on sincerely held religious
`
`belief, practice, or observance.”)
`
`21. The fact that an employee submits to some vaccines but not others in
`
`no way negates the sincerity of his or her beliefs. See id. (“[E]mployees need not
`
`be scrupulous in their observance.”); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec.
`
`Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (holding that religious beliefs “need not be
`
`acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others” to merit protection).
`
`22.
`
`“If the employer denies the employee’s proposed accommodation, the
`
`employer should explain to the employee why the preferred accommodation is not
`
`being granted.” Id.
`
`23. Defendant did not explain why it could not accommodate Plaintiff.
`
`24. Generally, the sincerity of an employee’s religious beliefs “is not open
`
`to question.” United States v Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). Title VII’s statutory
`
`definition of “religion” includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
`
`well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
`
`25. Defendant evaded any sort of “bilateral cooperation,” Ansonia Bd. of
`
`Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986). “Bilateral cooperation is appropriate in
`
`the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s religion
`
`and the exigencies of the employer’s business.” Id.
`
`26. Defendant’s accommodation process was arbitrary.
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.6 Filed 05/23/23 Page 6 of 14
`
`27. Defendant did not explore available reasonable alternatives to the
`
`vaccine.
`
`Defendant Did Not Base Its Decision on Undue Hardship,
`Nor Could It Establish Undue Hardship
`
`28. The prohibition against religious discrimination imposes a “duty” on
`
`employers to accommodate sincere religious beliefs, absent “undue hardship.”
`
`Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
`
`29. The employer, not the employee, bears the burden of showing “that it
`
`is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs without
`
`incurring undue hardship.” McDaniel v. Essex Intern., Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 341 (6th
`
`Cir. 1978).
`
`30. An employer does not satisfy its burden of proving undue hardship
`
`“merely by showing that an accommodation would be bothersome to administer or
`
`disruptive of the operating routine.” Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
`
`527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975). The operative word is “undue,” meaning that
`
`“something greater” than a mere hardship is required. Id.
`
`31. Defendant cannot satisfy its burden of proving undue hardship.
`
`32. Defendant’s allegations are based in religious animus rather than
`
`science.
`
`33. Plaintiff was more than willing to comply with all safety protocols,
`
`even though she had no proximity to her coworkers.
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.7 Filed 05/23/23 Page 7 of 14
`
`34. Any allegation of undue hardship lacks scientific backing and, in fact,
`
`directly contravene scientific evidence supporting the effectiveness of practices such
`
`as handwashing and wearing respirators in preventing infection and death. Stella
`
`Talic et al., Effectiveness of public health measures in reducing the incidence of
`
`covid-19, SARS-CoV-2 transmission, and covid-19 mortality: systematic review and
`
`meta-analysis, Brit. Med. J (2021).
`
`COUNT I
`Violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
`RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION–FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE
`
`35. Plaintiff restates the foregoing paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
`
`36. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an
`
`employee “because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
`
`2(a)(1). Title VII’s definition of “religion” includes “all aspects of religious
`
`observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
`
`37. Plaintiff can establish prima facie cases of discrimination by showing
`
`(1) she holds sincere religious beliefs that conflict with an employment requirement;
`
`(2) she informed her employer of same; and (3) she was disciplined for failing to
`
`comply with the employment requirement.” Yeager v. FirstEnergy Generation
`
`Corp, 777 F.3d 362, 363 (6th Cir. 2015).
`
`38. Plaintiff holds sincere religious beliefs that conflict with Defendant’s
`
`vaccine mandate.
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.8 Filed 05/23/23 Page 8 of 14
`
`39. Plaintiff informed Defendant of the same.
`
`40. Plaintiff was disciplined for failing to comply with the vaccine
`
`mandate.
`
`41. Defendant evaded any sort of “bilateral cooperation,” Ansonia Bd. of
`
`Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
`
`42. Defendant could have instituted multiple reasonable accommodations
`
`without undue hardship, including sanitizing, disinfecting, handwashing, respirator-
`
`wearing, and regular testing.
`
`43. Defendant never explained why Plaintiff could not be accommodated.
`
`44. Defendant never explained why no accommodations could have
`
`worked.
`
`45. Due to her termination, Plaintiff has suffered emotional and physical
`
`distress, mental and physical anguish,
`
`loss of
`
`reputation, humiliation,
`
`embarrassment, and the physical effects associated therewith; and Plaintiff will
`
`continue to suffer in the future.
`
`46. Plaintiff has been denied employment, placed in financial distress,
`
`suffered a loss of earnings and benefits, suffered a loss of health insurance coverage,
`
`and suffered a loss of and impairment of their earning capacity and ability to work.
`
`47. Defendant’s actions were intentional and/or reckless.
`
`COUNT II
`Violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.9 Filed 05/23/23 Page 9 of 14
`
`
`
`DISPARATE TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION
`
`48. Plaintiff restates the foregoing paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
`
`49.
`
`“To assert a successful claim of religious discrimination . . . a plaintiff
`
`must either present direct evidence of discrimination, or, in the absence of direct
`
`evidence, present a prima facie case of indirect discrimination by showing (1) they
`
`were a member of a protected class, (2) they experienced an adverse employment
`
`action (3) they were qualified for the position, and (4) they were replaced by a person
`
`outside of the protected class or were treated differently than similarly situated
`
`employees.” Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 515 (6th Cir. 2007).
`
`50. Plaintiff espoused religious beliefs and is therefore a member of a
`
`protected class.
`
`51. Defendant directly discriminated against Plaintiff by terminating them
`
`after they stated their sincerely held religious beliefs that conflicted with
`
`Defendant’s subjected standard of religiosity.
`
`52. Defendant allowed other unvaccinated employees without Plaintiff’s
`
`same religious beliefs to be exempted from Defendant’s vaccine mandate policy.
`
`53.
`
`It is undisputed that Plaintiff was qualified for the position.
`
`54. Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated employees with
`
`different religious beliefs who were allowed to continue working despite not being
`
`vaccinated.
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.10 Filed 05/23/23 Page 10 of 14
`
`55. Plaintiff was terminated and replaced with a person of different
`
`religious beliefs.
`
`56. Plaintiff has suffered emotional and physical distress, mental and
`
`physical anguish, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, and the physical
`
`effects associated therewith because of the denial of their requests and will so suffer
`
`in the future.
`
`COUNT III
`VIOLATION OF ELCRA, MCL 37.2101, et seq.
`DISPARATE TREATMENT AND INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
`57. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs by reference herein.
`
`
`
`58. Plaintiff holds sincere religious beliefs that conflict with Defendant’s
`
`COVID-19 vaccine mandate.
`
`59. Plaintiff informed Defendant how these sincerely held religious beliefs
`
`conflicted with Defendant’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate.
`
`60.
`
`“To assert a successful claim of religious discrimination . . . a plaintiff
`
`must either present direct evidence of discrimination, or, in the absence of direct
`
`evidence, present a prima facie case of indirect discrimination by showing that the
`
`employee (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) experienced an adverse
`
`employment action; (3) was qualified for the position; and (4) was replaced by a
`
`person outside of the protected class or that the employee was treated differently
`
`than similarly situated employees.” Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 515 (6th Cir.
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.11 Filed 05/23/23 Page 11 of 14
`
`2007).
`
`61. Defendant directly discriminated against Plaintiff based on termination
`
`after the employee espoused sincerely held religious beliefs that conflicted with
`
`Defendant’s policy.
`
`62. Defendant allowed other unvaccinated employees without Plaintiff’s
`
`same religious beliefs to be exempted from Defendant’s vaccine mandate policy.
`
`63. Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs qualify the employee as a
`
`member of a protected class.
`
`64. Plaintiff was qualified for the position.
`
`65. Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated employees with
`
`different religious beliefs who were allowed to continue working despite being
`
`unvaccinated.
`
`66. Plaintiff was terminated and replaced with a person of different
`
`religious beliefs.
`
`67. Defendant also terminated Plaintiff based on Defendant’s own
`
`subjective standard of religiosity, thus directly discriminating against Plaintiff’s
`
`unique sincerely held spiritual beliefs.
`
`68. EEOC Guidance states that (“[t]he definition of ‘religion’ under Title
`
`VII protects both traditional and nontraditional religious beliefs . . . including those
`
`that may be unfamiliar to employers.”)
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.12 Filed 05/23/23 Page 12 of 14
`
`69. The law on religious discrimination states that religious beliefs need not
`
`be “acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others” and the law “leaves
`
`little room for a party to challenge the religious nature of an employee’s professed
`
`beliefs.”). E.E.O.C. v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y
`
`Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002).
`
`70. Defendant defied the law when it determined that some religious beliefs
`
`of its employees were valid and while others were bogus.
`
`71.
`
`In discovery, Plaintiff will be able to investigate which types of
`
`religious beliefs Defendant found were acceptable and which types of religious
`
`beliefs Defendant discriminated against, thereby establishing evidence probative of
`
`discriminatory intent.
`
`72. Plaintiff has suffered emotional and physical distress, mental and
`
`physical anguish, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, and the physical
`
`effects associated therewith because of the termination and will so suffer in the
`
`future.
`
`PRAYER FOR RELIEF
`
`
`WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief:
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`Compensatory damages for monetary and non-monetary loss;
`
`Exemplary and punitive damages;
`
`Prejudgment interest;
`
`12
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.13 Filed 05/23/23 Page 13 of 14
`
`d.
`
`e.
`
`Reasonable attorney’s fees; and
`
`Such other relief as in law or equity may pertain.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: May 23, 2023
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`HURWITZ LAW, PLLC
`
`
`
`/s/ Noah S. Hurwitz
`Noah Hurwitz (P74063)
`Attorney for Plaintiff
`340 Beakes Street, Suite 125
`Ann Arbor, MI 48103
`(844) 487-9489
`noah@hurwitzlaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-11217-FKB-APP ECF No. 1, PageID.14 Filed 05/23/23 Page 14 of 14
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASETERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`
`KRISTEN PELL,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No.
`
`Hon.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`Noah S. Hurwitz (P74063)
`HURWITZ LAW PLLC
`Attorney for Plaintiff
`340 Beakes Street, Suite 125
`Ann Arbor, MI 48103
`(844) 487-9489
`noah@hurwitzlaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
`
`Plaintiff Kristen Pell (“Plaintiff”), by and through her attorneys Hurwitz Law,
`
`PLLC, hereby demand a trial by jury, for all issues so triable.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: May 23, 2023
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`HURWITZ LAW, PLLC
`
`/s/ Noah S. Hurwitz
`Noah Hurwitz (P74063)
`Attorney for Plaintiff
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`