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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
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`PAULA CALTRIDER,
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`v.
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`Plaintiff,
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`Case No.
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`Hon.
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`Defendant.
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`TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL
`INDUSTRIES LTD.,
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`Noah S. Hurwitz (P74063)
`HURWITZ LAW PLLC
`Attorney for Plaintiff
`340 Beakes St. STE 125
`Ann Arbor, MI 48104
`(844) 487-9489
`noah@hurwitzlaw.com
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`There is no other pending or resolved civil action arising out
`of this transaction or occurrence alleged in the Complaint.
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`COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
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`Plaintiff Paula Caltrider (“Plaintiff”), by and through her attorneys, HURWITZ LAW
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`PLLC, states the following for her Complaint against Defendant Teva Pharmaceutical Industries
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`Ltd. (“Defendant”):
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1.
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`There is no pandemic exception to the protections afforded by the Americans with
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`Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), or The
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`Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act of 1976 (the “ELCRA”), MCL 37.2101, et seq.
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`Defendant clearly did not understand this when it denied Ms. Caltrider religious and medical
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`exemptions to Respondent’s COVID-19 vaccine requirement. Instead of engaging with Ms.
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`Caltrider in the spirit of “bilateral cooperation,” Defendant violated the ADA, Title VII, and the
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`ELCRA by terminating Ms. Caltrider based on a purported “undue hardship” even though Ms.
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`Caltrider posed no health threat to her coworkers that could not be mitigated by all safety measures
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`that were put in place during the worst times of the pandemic.
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`PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
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`Plaintiff is an individual residing in Haslett, Michigan.
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`Defendant is an international organization with a principal place of business in the
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`2.
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`3.
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`United States located at Parsippany-Troy Hills, New Jersey.
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`4.
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`Plaintiff’s claims arise out of Defendant’s violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
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`Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 42 U.S.C. §
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`12102(1).
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`5.
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`6.
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`7.
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`This Court has general federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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`This matter is not subject to arbitration.
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`Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because this is the judicial district where
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`a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.
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`8.
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`Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Charge
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`of Discrimination alleging religious discrimination and retaliation on April 15, 2022.
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`9.
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`Plaintiff received her Right to Sue letter from the EEOC in the past 90 days.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`10.
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`Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Professional Sales Specialist for until her
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`termination effective February 7, 2022.
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`Defendant’s Mandatory Vaccine Policy
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`11.
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`Defendant announced a mandatory COVID-19 vaccine policy for its employees.
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`12.
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`Defendant failed to mention in its multiple memorandums regarding the mandate
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`that requesting religious or medical accommodations is a protected legal right for employees.
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`13.
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`Defendant required that all employees be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by
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`November 8, 2021.
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`Plaintiff’s Religious and Medical Accommodation Request
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`14.
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`Plaintiff seeks to make all decisions, especially those regarding vaccination and
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`other medical decisions, through prayer.
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`15.
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`After Plaintiff was hired and credentialed, her physician submitted a letter on her
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`behalf stating that she was unable to get the flu shot.
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`16.
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`The credentialing department accepted it into the system and Plaintiff was
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`accommodated immediately without Defendant or a third party contacting her physician.
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`17.
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`After the COVID-19 mandate was announced, on November 16, 2021, Plaintiff
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`submitted a religious exemption request for the COVID-19 vaccine, as she believes that her
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`sincerely held religious beliefs would be violated if she received the vaccine.
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`18.
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`Plaintiff also submitted a medical accommodation request as her disability
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`constrains her from receiving the COVID-19 vaccine.
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`19.
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`Plaintiff submitted a letter from her physician to inform Defendant that she was
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`medically advised not to receive the vaccine.
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`20.
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`Rather than taking the word of Plaintiff’s doctor, Defendant had an individual call
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`Plaintiff to evaluate her medical accommodation request.
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`21.
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`22.
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`This individual represented a third party, WorkForce, on Defendant’s behalf.
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`This individual failed to listen to Plaintiff about her disability and need for an
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`accommodation. Instead, she told Plaintiff that everyone should receive a vaccination and that
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`people die without it.
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`23.
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`Plaintiff promptly sent an email to her human resources representative, Bill Corbett,
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`and filed an incident report to the hotline.
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`24. Mr. Corbett forwarded the email Plaintiff wrote in confidence to the individuals
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`who comprised the panel that made accommodation decisions.
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`25.
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`On or about November 19, 2021, Defendant’s director of North America human
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`resources, Linda Misialek, called Plaintiff and instructed her not to respond to or sign the HIPPA
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`consent form that was provided to her, and that she was looking for a solution for Plaintiff when
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`she returned to work.
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`26.
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`Plaintiff requested that Defendant name the physician that she spoke to so she could
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`report the physician to the state’s medical board for harassment. This request was ignored.
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`27.
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`Additionally, Ms. Misialek informed Plaintiff that Defendant was not going to
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`accept any religious exemptions that were submitted.
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`28.
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`On December1, 2021, Plaintiff returned to work from medical leave.
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`29. Ms. Misialek never followed up with Plaintiff.
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`30.
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`Plaintiff then reported this interaction to Defendant’s hotline. She did not receive a
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`substantive response.
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`31.
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`On January 31, 2022, Plaintiff received a letter from Mr. Corbett, stating “Based
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`on the fact you did not sign and return your HIPPA form as requested on would not be affected,
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`[she] would be open to take the vaccine.”
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`32.
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`Plaintiff’s doctor would not sign the HIPPA as she believed her letter was
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`sufficient.
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`33. Mr. Corbett sent Plaintiff an email on February 1, 2022 to inform Plaintiff that if
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`she did not receive the vaccine, her last day of employment would be February 4, 2022.
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`34.
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`Defendant failed to continuously engage in the interactive process with Plaintiff
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`regarding her medical accommodation request.
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`35.
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`Plaintiff, maintaining both her sincerely held religious beliefs and following her
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`physician’s medical advice, did not receive the vaccine, and was subsequently terminated on
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`February 7, 2022.
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`36.
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`Defendant refused to provide Plaintiff’s any specific reason for its denial of her
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`religious and medical accommodation requests and failed to answer any of her questions regarding
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`their determination. Defendant simply stated the sincerely held religious beliefs were accepted,
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`but it would not accommodate Plaintiff.
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`37.
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`The religious accommodation process mandates “bilateral cooperation” between
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`employer and employee. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philabrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
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`38.
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`No such “bilateral cooperation” occurred during Defendant’s interrogation of its
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`employees or otherwise during the process.
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`39.
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`The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission tells employers
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`that a prototypical example of reasonable accommodation to the vaccine is being “given the
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`opportunity to telework.” U.S. EQUAL EMPL. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, What You Should Know
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`About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws (May 28, 2021). “If
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`the employer denies the employee’s proposed accommodation, the employer should explain to the
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`employee why the preferred accommodation is not being granted.” Id. (Mar. 1, 2022).
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`40.
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`41.
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`Plaintiff was an excellent performer of her job duties.
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`Title VII’s statutory definition of “religion” includes “all aspects of religious
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`observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
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`42.
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`The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) advises
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`employers to “ordinarily assume that an employee’s request for religious accommodation is based
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`on sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.” U.S. EQUAL EMPL. OPPORTUNITY
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`COMM’N, What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and
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`Other EEO Laws (May 28, 2021).
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`43.
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`An individual’s testimony about his or her belief “must be given great weight” and
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`is enough to demonstrate a sincerity. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184 (1965).
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`44.
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`Plaintiff’s religious conviction is highlighted by the fact she remained unvaccinated
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`in the face of termination, losing her livelihood in the process.
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`Defendant Did Not Base Its Decision on Undue Hardship,
`Nor Could It Establish Undue Hardship
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`Pursuant to Title VII, the prohibition against religious discrimination imposes an
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`45.
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`affirmative duty on employers to reasonably accommodate the religious observances and practices
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`of its employees, unless the employer can demonstrate that such an accommodation would cause
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`undue hardship to the conduct of its business. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
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`63, 74 (1977).
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`46.
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`“The obligation to provide religious accommodations absent undue hardship is a
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`continuing obligation that allows for changing circumstances.” Guidance at L.6.
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`47.
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`Defendant bears the burden to show “that it is unable to reasonably accommodate
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`the employee’s religious beliefs without incurring undue hardship.” McDaniel v. Essex Intern.,
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`Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 341 (6th Cir.1978); see also Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir.1986);
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`Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 (7th Cir.1978); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d
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`1504, 1512 (9th Cir.1989).
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`48.
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`In the instant case, Defendant cannot show undue hardship. To date, Defendant has
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`not stated why granting Plaintiff an accommodation poses an undue hardship.
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`49.
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`Defendant has not explained its criteria for determining whether an accommodation
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`poses an undue hardship.
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`50.
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`An employer does not satisfy its burden “merely by showing that an
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`accommodation would be bothersome to administer.” Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry
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`Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.1975).
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`51. Without a proffered explanation as to why Defendant would endure undue hardship
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`to accommodate Plaintiff individually, Defendant relies on hypothetical hardships by default.
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`52.
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`“A claim of undue hardship cannot be supported by merely conceivable or
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`hypothetical hardships; instead, it must be supported by proof of actual imposition on co-workers
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`or disruption of the work routine.” Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d at 615 (9th Cir. 1988).
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`53.
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`“An employer cannot rely on speculative or hypothetical hardship when faced with
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`an employee’s religious objection but, rather, should rely on objective information.” Guidance at
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`L.3.
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`54.
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`Defendant’s actions demonstrate a motive
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`to avoid granting religious
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`accommodations. “[A]n employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may
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`violate Title VII even if [it] has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation
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`would be needed.” Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033,
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`192 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2015).
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`COUNT I
`Violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
`Religious discrimination – Failure to accommodate
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`Plaintiff restates the foregoing paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
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`55.
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`56.
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`At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was an employee and Defendant was her
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`employer for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
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`57.
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`Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., makes it
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`unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs and
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`practices of an employee or prospective employee.
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`58.
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`Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because
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`of such individual’s... religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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`59.
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`This “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
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`unless an employer demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s...
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`religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
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`business.” Id. § 2000e(j).
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`60.
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`After receiving an accommodation request, “the employer is obligated by law to
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`engage in interactive process – a meaningful dialogue with the employee[.]” Chevron Phillips
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`Chem. Co., 570 F.3d at 621 (5th Cir. 2009).
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`61.
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`The employer must act in “good faith,” Id., and the employee must “make a good
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`faith attempt to satisfy his needs through means offered by the employer,” Brener v. Diagnostic
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`Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982).
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`62.
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`Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who
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`engaged in protected activity.
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`63.
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`Plaintiff holds sincere bona fide religious beliefs that preclude her from receiving
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`a COVID-19 vaccine.
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`64.
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`Plaintiff
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`informed Defendant of
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`those beliefs and
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`requested
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`religious
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`accommodation from the vaccine mandate.
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`65.
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`Defendant refused to engage in the interactive process with Plaintiff regarding her
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`religious accommodation requests.
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`66.
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`Under Title VII, Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of religious
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`discrimination based on a failure to accommodate by showing: (1) she has a bona fide religious
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`belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) about which she informed the
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`[Defendant]; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action for failing to comply with the
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`conflicting employment requirement. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
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`67. Multiple accommodations could have been offered to Plaintiff. They include mask
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`wearing and periodic testing for COVID-19—the very same accommodations being offered to
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`virtually every public and private employee in the State of Michigan.
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`68.
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`A “[r]easonable accommodation is by its terms most logically construed as that
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`which presently, or in the immediate future, enables the employee to perform the essential
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`functions of the job in question.” Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995).
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`69.
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`Defendant would not suffer undue hardship by granting Plaintiff an
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`accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
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`70.
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`The issue became moot when Defendant failed to engage each employee in “a
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`meaningful dialogue” about the accommodation request and learn whether an acceptable
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`accommodation would impose undue hardship. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d at 621 (5th
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`Cir. 2009).
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`71.
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`Instead, Defendant announced a one-size-fits all approach to accommodation that
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`deprived Plaintiff of the conversation necessary to discover what accommodations were
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`possible. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996) (“courts
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`should look for signs of failure to participate in good faith or failure by one of the parties to help
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`the other party determine what specific accommodations are necessary” and “[a] party that fails to
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`communicate... may also be acting in bad faith”).
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`72.
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`Irrespective of the interactive process, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with
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`reasonable accommodations for her religious beliefs.
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`73.
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`74.
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`Defendant thereby discriminated against Plaintiff because of her religious beliefs.
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`Defendant’s failure to provide religious accommodations has harmed and will
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`continue to harm Plaintiff.
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`75.
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`As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of Title VII Plaintiff has
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`suffered emotional and physical distress, mental and physical anguish, loss of reputation,
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`humiliation and embarrassment, and the physical effects associated therewith, and will so suffer
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`in the future.
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`76.
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`As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of Title VII,
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`Plaintiff has been denied employment and placed in financial distress and have suffered a loss of
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`earnings and benefits, and a loss of and impairment of her earning capacity and ability to work and
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`will so suffer in the future; she has been required to employ the services of an attorney to bring
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`this lawsuit and will suffer additional damages in the future.
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`77.
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`By failing to engage in the interactive process or offer any reasonable
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`accommodation, Defendant’s discriminatory actions were intentional and/or reckless and in
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`violation of Title VII.
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`COUNT II
`VIOLATION OF TITLE VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
`DISPARATE TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION
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`Plaintiff restates the foregoing paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
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`“To assert a successful claim of religious discrimination . . . a plaintiff must either
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`78.
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`79.
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`present direct evidence of discrimination, or, in the absence of direct evidence, present a prima
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`facie case of indirect discrimination by showing (1) they were a member of a protected class, (2)
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`they experienced an adverse employment action (3) they were qualified for the position, and (4)
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`they were replaced by a person outside of the protected class or were treated differently than
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`similarly situated employees.” Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 515 (6th Cir. 2007).
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`80.
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`81.
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`Plaintiff espoused religious beliefs and is therefore a member of a protected class.
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`Defendant directly discriminated against Plaintiff by terminating them after they
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`stated their sincerely held religious beliefs that conflicted with Defendant’s subjected standard of
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`religiosity.
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`82.
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`Defendant allowed other unvaccinated employees without Plaintiff’s same
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`religious beliefs to be exempted from Defendant’s vaccine mandate policy.
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`83.
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`84.
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`It is undisputed that Plaintiff was qualified for the position.
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`Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated employees with different
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`religious beliefs who were allowed to continue working despite not being vaccinated.
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`85.
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`86.
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`Plaintiff was terminated and replaced with a person of different religious beliefs.
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`Plaintiff has suffered emotional and physical distress, mental and physical anguish,
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`loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, and the physical effects associated therewith
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`because of the denial of her requests, and will so suffer in the future.
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`COUNT III
`VIOLATION OF ELCRA, MCL 37.2101, et seq.
`DISPARATE TREATMENT AND INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
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`Plaintiff restates the foregoing paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
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`87.
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`88.
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`Plaintiff holds sincere religious beliefs that conflict with Defendant’s COVID-19
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`vaccine mandate.
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`89.
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`Plaintiff informed Defendant how these sincerely held religious beliefs conflicted
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`with Defendant’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate.
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`90.
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`“To assert a successful claim of religious discrimination . . . a plaintiff must either
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`present direct evidence of discrimination, or, in the absence of direct evidence, present a prima
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`facie case of indirect discrimination by showing that the employee (1) was a member of a protected
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`class; (2) experienced an adverse employment action; (3) was qualified for the position; and (4)
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`was replaced by a person outside of the protected class or that the employee was treated differently
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`than similarly situated employees.” Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 515 (6th Cir. 2007).
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`91.
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`Defendant directly discriminated against Plaintiff based on termination after the
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`employee espoused sincerely held religious beliefs that conflicted with Defendant’s policy.
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`92.
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`Defendant allowed other unvaccinated employees without Plaintiff’s same
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`religious beliefs to be exempted from Defendant’s vaccine mandate policy.
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`93.
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`Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs qualify the employee as a member of a
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`protected class.
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`94.
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`Defendant placed Plaintiff on unpaid suspension before ultimately terminating
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`Plaintiff.
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`95.
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`96.
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`Plaintiff was qualified for the position.
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`Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated employees with different
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`religious beliefs who were allowed to continue working despite being unvaccinated.
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`97.
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`98.
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`Plaintiff was terminated and replaced with a person of different religious beliefs.
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`Defendant also terminated Plaintiff based on Defendant’s own subjective standard
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`of religiosity, thus directly discriminating against Plaintiff’s unique sincerely held spiritual beliefs.
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`99.
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`EEOC Guidance states that (“[t]he definition of ‘religion’ under Title VII protects
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`both traditional and nontraditional religious beliefs . . . including those that may be unfamiliar to
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`employers.”)
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`100. The law on religious discrimination states that religious beliefs need not be
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`“acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others” and the law “leaves little room for a
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`party to challenge the religious nature of an employee’s professed beliefs.”). E.E.O.C. v. Union
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`Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56
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`(1st Cir. 2002).
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`101. Defendant defied the law when it determined that some religious beliefs of its
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`employees were valid and while others were bogus.
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`102.
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`In discovery, Plaintiff will be able to investigate which types of religious beliefs
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`Defendant found were acceptable and which types of religious beliefs Defendant discriminated
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`against, thereby establishing evidence probative of discriminatory intent.
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`103. Plaintiff has suffered emotional and physical distress, mental and physical anguish,
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`loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, and the physical effects associated therewith
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`because of the termination and will so suffer in the future.
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`COUNT IV
`VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
`DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION–DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION
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`104. Plaintiff restates the foregoing paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
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`105. Plaintiff had a “disability” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
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`106. Plaintiff was regarded as having a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
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`107. Plaintiff submitted a letter from her physician to Defendant which stated that she
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`was medically advised not to receive the vaccine and that she needed a medical accommodation.
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`108. Defendant was legally required to engage Plaintiff in an interactive process before
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`terminating her.
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`109. Defendant failed to continually engage in an interactive process with Plaintiff
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`following the end of her short-term accommodation.
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`110. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on account of her “actual or perceived”
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`disability when she was terminated on June 20, 2022.
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`111. Defendant’s actions were knowing and willful.
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`112. Plaintiff has suffered feelings of depression, emotional and physical distress,
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`mental and physical anguish, loss of reputation, humiliation and embarrassment, and the physical
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`effects associated therewith, and will so suffer in the future, as a direct and proximate result.
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`113. Plaintiff has been placed in financial distress and has suffered a loss of earnings
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`and benefits, and a loss of and impairment of her earning capacity and will so suffer in the future;
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`she has been required to employ the services of an attorney to bring this lawsuit and will suffer
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`additional damages in the future, as a direct and proximate result of the violation.
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF
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`WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief:
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`a.
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`b.
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`c.
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`d.
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`e.
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`Compensatory damages for monetary and non-monetary loss;
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`Exemplary and punitive damages;
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`Prejudgment interest;
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`Attorneys’ fees and costs; and
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`Such other relief as in law or equity may pertain.
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`Respectfully Submitted,
`HURWITZ LAW PLLC
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`/s/ Noah S. Hurwitz
`Noah Hurwitz (P74063)
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`14
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`Case 1:23-cv-00536 ECF No. 1, PageID.15 Filed 05/23/23 Page 15 of 16
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`Dated: May 23, 2023
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`Attorney for Plaintiff
`340 Beakes St., Ste. 125
`Ann Arbor, MI 48104
`(844) 487-9489
`noah@hurwitzlaw.com
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`15
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`Case 1:23-cv-00536 ECF No. 1, PageID.16 Filed 05/23/23 Page 16 of 16
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
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`PAULA CALTRIDER,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Case No.
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`Hon.
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`Defendant.
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`TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL
`INDUSTRIES LTD.,
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`Noah S. Hurwitz
`HURWITZ LAW PLLC
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`340 Beakes St., Ste. 125
`Ann Arbor, MI 48104
`(844) 487-9489
`noah@hurwitzlaw.com
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`DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
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`Plaintiff, Paula Caltrider, by and through her attorneys, Hurwitz Law PLLC, hereby
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`demands a trial by jury in the above-captioned matter for all issues triable.
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`Dated: May 23, 2023
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`Respectfully Submitted,
`HURWITZ LAW PLLC
`/s/ Noah S. Hurwitz
`Noah S. Hurwitz (P74063)
`Attorney for Plaintiff
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`16
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