CASE 0:21-cv-01751-DSD-ECW Doc. 1 Filed 08/02/21 Page 1 of 105
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
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`COMPLAINT
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., AND
`BI-LO HOLDING, LLC,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`CARGILL, INC., CARGILL MEAT
`SOLUTIONS CORPORATION (A/K/A
`CARGILL PROTEIN), JBS S.A., JBS USA
`FOOD COMPANY HOLDINGS,
`JBS PACKERLAND, INC., NATIONAL
`BEEF PACKING COMPANY, TYSON
`FOODS, INC. AND TYSON FRESH
`MEATS, INC.,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. NATURE OF THIS ACTION ............................................................................................ 1
`II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ........................................................................................ 10
`III. PARTIES ............................................................................................................................ 12
`A. Plaintiffs ........................................................................................................................... 12
`B. Defendants ....................................................................................................................... 13
`1. The Cargill Defendants .............................................................................................. 13
`2. The JBS Defendants .................................................................................................... 14
`3. The Tyson Defendants ................................................................................................ 15
`4. National Beef Packing Company ............................................................................... 17
`C. Defendants and Their Subsidiaries and Affiliates ....................................................... 17
`D. Defendants’ Co-Conspirators ........................................................................................ 17
`E. Reciprocal Agency of Defendants and Co-Conspirators ............................................ 18
`F. Defendant Parent and Subsidiary Companies Share A Unity of Interest ................ 18
`1. The Cargill Defendants ............................................................................................. 19
`2. The JBS Defendants .................................................................................................... 21
`3. The Tyson Defendants ................................................................................................ 23
`IV. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 26
`V. OPERATING DEFENDANTS’ ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS ..................................... 29
`A. Direct Evidence of Defendants’ Conspiracy ................................................................ 30
`1. Mr. Hooker Was Well Positioned to Know About Operating Defendants’
`Agreement .................................................................................................................... 32
`2. Witness 1 Learns of an Agreement Among Defendants.......................................... 35
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`B. The Available Data Corroborates Witness 1’s Account ............................................. 36
`C. Operating Defendants Slash Production in 2015 ......................................................... 44
`D. After Historic Cuts, Operating Defendants Continued to Keep Supply Restrained,
`Resulting in Higher Beef Prices and Unprecedented Margins Into 2017 and 2018 49
`E. After Historic Cuts, Operating Defendants Continued to Keep Supply
`Restrained, Resulting in Higher Beef Prices and 2017 and 2018…………………...50
`F. Operating Defendants’ 2019 and 2020 Bring Continued Parallel Slaughter, Reaction
`Against Independent Self-Interest ............................................................................... 52
`G. Defendants Idled and Closed Plants, Refrained from Expanding Processing Capacity
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`H. Operating Defendants Signaled Their Conspiracy and Encouraged Each Other to
`Maintain it ...................................................................................................................... 58
`I. Parallel Reductions in Cash Cattle Purchases and Anticompetitive Queuing
`Conventions .................................................................................................................... 59
`VI. EFFECTS OF DEFENDANTS’ ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS .................................... 62
`A. Defendants’ Conspiracy Increased the Spread Between Cattle and Beef Prices….64
`B. Tyson Foods and, Jointly, JBS S.A. and JBS USA Falsely Claimed Their Record
`Profits Were Due to Market Prescience, Not Supply Constraints……………….…64
`VII. ADDITIONAL PLUS FACTORS ENCOURAGING THE REASONABLE
` INFERENCE OF DEFENDANTS’ CONSPIRACY ..................................................... 65
`A. The Beef Market Is Highly Concentrated .................................................................... 66
`B. The Beef Market Has High Barriers To Entry ............................................................ 67
`C. Beef Is A Commodity Product ....................................................................................... 68
`D. The Demand for Beef Is Inelastic .................................................................................. 68
`E. Defendants Took Advantage of Multiple Opportunities To Collude ........................ 69
`F. Defendants Exacerbated Their Supply Restraints By Continuing to Reduce Their
`Imports ............................................................................................................................ 75
`G. Defendants’ Market Share Stability is Indicative of a Conspiracy ........................... 76
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`VIII. THE BEEF INDUSTRY FACES GOVERNMENTAL INQUIRIES AND
`INVESTIGATIONS........................................................................................................... 80
`IX. ANTITRUST INJURY ...................................................................................................... 82
`X. DEFENDANTS FRAUDULENTLY CONCEALED THEIR CONSPIRACY ............ 85
`A. Defendants’ Concealment of Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action ............................................ 85
`1. The Cargill Defendants .............................................................................................. 87
`2. The JBS Defendants .................................................................................................... 88
`3. National Beef ............................................................................................................... 89
`4. The Tyson Defendants ................................................................................................ 91
`B. Plaintiffs Were Unable to Discover the Existence of Operating Defendants’
`Conspiracy ...................................................................................................................... 92
`C. Plaintiffs Exercised Due Diligence in Attempting to Discover Their Claim ............. 94
`XI. DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN CONTINUING ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS ......... 95
`A. Defendants Renewed their Conspiracy with New and Independent Acts ................. 95
`B. Defendants Inflicted New and Accumulating Injury on Plaintiffs ............................ 96
`XII. VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1 .............. 98
`XIII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................ 100
`XIV. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ........................................................................................ 101
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`Plaintiffs, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., and Bi-Lo Holding, LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”),
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`by and through their attorneys, bring this action against Defendants Cargill, Inc., Cargill Meat
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`Solutions Corporations (a/k/a Cargill Protein) (“CMS”), JBS S.A., JBS USA Food Company
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`Holdings (“JBS USA”), Swift Beef Company (“Swift”), JBS Packerland, Inc. (“Packerland”),
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`National Beef Packing Company (“National Beef”), Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson Foods”), Tyson
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`Fresh Meats, Inc. (“Tyson Fresh”) (collectively “Defendants”), and unnamed co-conspirators,
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`and for their Complaint against Defendants, Plaintiffs allege as follows:
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`I.
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`NATURE OF THIS ACTION
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`1.
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`Defendants are the world’s largest meat processing and packing companies,
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`known in the industry as meatpackers or packers. In 2018, the operating company Defendants
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`(Tyson Fresh, CMS, Swift/Packerland, and National Beef) (collectively “Operating
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`Defendants”) — sold approximately 80 percent of the more than 25 billion pounds of fresh and
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`frozen beef supplied to the U.S. market. Collectively, they controlled approximately 81–85
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`percent of the domestic cattle processed (or slaughtered) in the market throughout the
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`Conspiracy Period. The next largest meatpacker had only a 2–3 percent market share.
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`2.
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`Since at least January 1, 2015 until the present (the “Conspiracy Period”),
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`Defendants have exploited their market power in this highly concentrated market by conspiring
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`to limit the supply, and fix the prices, of beef 1 sold to Plaintiffs in the U.S. wholesale market.
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`1 In this Complaint, “beef” means boxed and case-ready meat that has been processed from fed
`cattle by Defendants and other smaller, nondefendant producers. It excludes ground beef made
`from culled dairy cows, but includes ground beef made from Cattle. “Cattle” means fed cattle
`before they are processed into beef and excludes culled dairy cows. “Fed” cattle means steers
`and heifers raised in feedlots on a concentrated diet for the production and sale of beef.
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`The principal, but not exclusive, means Defendants have used to effectuate their conspiracy is a
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`scheme to artificially constrain the supply of beef entering the domestic supply chain.
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`Defendants’ collusive restriction of the beef supply has had the intended effect of artificially
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`inflating beef prices. As a result, Plaintiffs paid higher prices than they would have paid in a
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`competitive market.
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`3.
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`Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and U.S. Department of
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`Agriculture (“USDA”) launched investigations into whether Defendants fixed beef prices in the
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`United States. On June 4, 2020, news sources reported, and Plaintiffs confirmed, that DOJ’s
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`Antitrust Division sent civil investigative demands to Defendants Tyson Foods, JBS SA, and
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`Cargill, Inc., and to National Beef Inc. (a company related to Defendant National Beef) seeking
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`information about their pricing practices dating back to January 2015.
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`4.
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`In March 12, 2020, testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Agriculture,
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`Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies, Secretary of
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`Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the USDA had begun an investigation into
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`suspiciously high beef prices. Secretary Perdue expressed serious concern that meatpackers were
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`paying lower prices for live cattle without passing the cost savings on to Plaintiffs and other
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`beef purchasers. As he explained, the difference between prices for live cattle and prices for
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`wholesale beef was “historically high.”
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`5.
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`A confidential witness previously employed by Swift at its Cactus, TX slaughter
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`plant has confirmed the existence of a conspiracy among the Operating Defendants. The witness
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`has confirmed that all the Defendants agreed to reduce their cattle purchases and slaughter
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`volumes for the purpose and effect of increasing their margins (i.e., the spread between what
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`Defendants pay cattle ranchers for fed cattle and the price they charge Plaintiffs). Defendants’
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`transactional data and slaughter volume records, information published by the USDA, and
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`Defendants’ public calls for industry-wide slaughter and capacity reductions corroborate
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`Witness 1’s account.
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`6.
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`In addition to the high concentration in the wholesale beef industry, other
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`structural characteristics of the domestic beef market facilitate Defendants’ conspiracy.
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`Operating Defendants sit atop the supply and distribution chain that ultimately delivers beef to
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`the market. Their vital role is to purchase cattle from the nation’s farmers and ranchers, slaughter
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`and pack cattle into beef, and sell beef to Plaintiffs. Operating Defendants’ gatekeeping role has
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`enabled them to collusively control upstream and downstream beef pricing throughout the
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`Conspiracy Period.
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`7.
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`Other market characteristics serve as plus factors and support the inference of
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`collusion among Defendants during the Conspiracy Period. These characteristics include
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`producer concentration, high barriers to entry, inelastic demand, the commodity nature of beef,
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`frequent opportunities to conspire, strong demand, market share stability, and decreased imports.
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`These economic factors encouraged and fomented the formation of Defendants’ conspiracy and
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`continue to foster its successful operation.
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`8.
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`Operating Defendants capitalized on the fundamental mechanism of supply and
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`demand operating in a beef market vulnerable to successful cartel formation and operation, and
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`illegally collaborated to restrain and manage production of beef in the United States.
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`9.
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`These practices created surpluses in the cattle market and shortages in the
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`wholesale beef market. These artificial conditions, in turn, drove down the prices Operating
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`Defendants paid for cattle and boosted the prices Operating Defendants commanded for beef.
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`The result intended and achieved by Operating Defendants has been higher profit margins (e.g.,
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`meat margins) than would have existed in a competitive market.
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`10. This growth of Operating Defendants’ margins was aided by the way supply and
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`demand operate in the beef industry. The supply of cattle is insensitive to short-term price
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`changes because of the long lifecycle of livestock, livestock’s perishable nature, and the lack of
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`any alternative use for livestock. Beef demand is also relatively insensitive to price fluctuations.
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`As a result, Operating Defendants’ margins are very responsive to changes in the aggregate
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`volume of slaughtered cattle.
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`11. Another form of interaction conducive to Defendants’ collusion was frequent
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`meetings between each other’s executives and key employees. Trade association conferences
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`and other industry events offered convenient opportunities to exchange information, plans and
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`strategies, and to build relationships. As described throughout this complaint, Operating
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`Defendants seized these opportunities to advance their collusive supply restrictions.
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`12. By the beginning of 2015, Defendants had begun exploiting favorable market
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`conditions to launch their conspiracy. At that time, they undertook a campaign of reducing and
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`restraining the beef supply, which campaign persists today. Publicly available industry data
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`demonstrates Operating Defendants’ abrupt transition from competition to collusion. Joint
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`management of their respective slaughter volumes during the Conspiracy Period is immediately
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`apparent from Figure 1 below, which tracks their quarterly slaughter volumes and shows them
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`moving in tandem.
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`Figure 1
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`13. The results of Defendants’ agreement to coordinate slaughter reductions and
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`volume are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 below. Figure 2 compares the average annual beef
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`cattle slaughter by Operating Defendant and the smaller, non-defendant beef producers in the
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`market before the Conspiracy Period (2007–2014) to the same average during the first five years
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`of the Conspiracy Period (2015–2019), the years for which data is available.
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`14.
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`Figure 3 also compares the Operating Defendants’ and the Independent Packers’
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`annual slaughter volumes during the Conspiracy Period and the pre-Conspiracy Period, but
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`breaks out the slaughter volume for each year of the Conspiracy Period for which data is
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`available. The graph confirms that Tyson Fresh, Swift/Packerland, CMS, and National Beef
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`each slaughtered less fed cattle in every year in the Conspiracy Period compared to their pre-
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`Conspiracy Period averages. It also shows that while Tyson Fresh, Swift/Packerland, CMS, and
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`National Beef each gradually increased their slaughter volume from 2016 after their dramatic
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`2015 reductions, as the supply of fed cattle increased, their rate of increase was vastly outpaced
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`by the slaughter volume increases of Independent Packers during the same period.2 Operating
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`Defendants thus used periodic slaughter reductions and underutilized plant capacity to ensure
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`their supply of beef never outstripped demand.
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`Figure 3.
`Average Pre- & Post-Conspiracy Period Fed Cattle Slaughter- Operating Defendant vs.
`Others
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`15. These figures demonstrate that each Operating Defendant family curtailed its
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`annual slaughter volumes during the Conspiracy Period, while the smaller beef processors
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`collectively increased their slaughter volumes during the same period without making up the
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`shortfall of beef created by the conspiracy.
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`16. As an immediate consequence of Operating Defendants’ reduced supply, the beef
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`National Beef acquired Iowa Premium in June 2019, adding 300,000 head to its
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`annual fed cattle slaughter volume. Absent that acquisition, its year-on-year slaughter
`volume was flat against 2018, while Independent Packers collective slaughter volume rose
`by approximately 100,000 head (netting out National Beef's acquisition of Iowa Premium).
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`market experienced a dramatic change of price behavior. Before 2015, prices of cattle and beef
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`predictably moved in tandem. That correlation was the natural economic relationship in a
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`competitive market because beef is simply processed cattle.
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`17. But, at the start of the Conspiracy Period, when Operating Defendants began to
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`cut production, this fundamental economic relationship between cattle and beef prices abruptly
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`changed. The degree of correlation of cattle and beef prices diverged (to Operating Defendants’
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`benefit) without any credible, non-collusive explanation. The relevant supply and demand
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`factors in the industry no longer explained the prices charged to direct purchasers.
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`18.
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`Starting in 2015, wholesale beef prices began to show unusual trends. The per-
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`pound price of cattle had historically stayed within 20 to 40 cents of the per-pound average
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`wholesale price of beef. But in 2015, the spread between those prices increased dramatically as
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`Figure 4 and Figure 5 demonstrate.
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`19. According to USDA Economic Research Service data, the average spread between
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`the average farm value of cattle and wholesale value of beef was substantially higher from
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`January 2015 to present than during the preceding five years. From 2010 to 2014, the average
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`farm-to-wholesale spread was about $34. But from 2015 to 2018, the average spread was about
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`$54—a 59% increase. The spread continued to balloon, by 2020 reaching about $71, a 109%
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`increase from the pre-conspiracy period average.
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`20. Operating Defendants’ ability to cut beef production while maintaining inflated
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`beef prices during the Conspiracy Period provides compelling circumstantial evidence of their
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`conspiracy. In a beef market free from collusion, if a competitor reduces its purchase of cattle,
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`other competitors quickly pick up the slack to boost their sales and increase their market shares.
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`21.
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`In that environment, a competitor would not cut its purchases and suffer lost sales
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`thereby compromising any hope of increasing its profit margin. Only colluding meatpackers
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`would expect to benefit by reducing their purchases and slaughter of cattle – because they knew
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`their would-be competitors would not be increasing their purchasing volumes as one would
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`expect in a competitive market. By concertedly slashing their supply output, Operating
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`Defendants have been able to expand their profit margins, confident that none of them would
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`grab volume from another.
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`22. United by their conspiracy, Operating Defendants were confident that none of
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`them would break ranks and disproportionately expand their beef production to satisfy unmet
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`demand. Armed with this assurance, Operating Defendants improved their meat margins by
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`achieving and sustaining an unprecedented gap between cattle and beef prices.
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`23. Aided by their collective market power in the upstream (cattle) and downstream
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`(beef) markets, Operating Defendants’ conspiracy allowed them to steadily enlarge their
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`operating margins throughout the Conspiracy Period. By the end of 2020, the two largest
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`Defendants, Tyson Foods and JBS USA, were reporting record margins in their beef business.
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`Tyson Foods reported that its beef business’ operating margin was nearly 10.7% percent—
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`nearly triple its 2014 operating margin. JBS USA reported a higher beef business margin of
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`11.5% percent for the first three quarters of 2020.
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`24.
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`In summary, Defendants colluded during the Conspiracy Period to reduce supplies
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`of beef in tandem thereby raising and fixing beef prices at levels higher than prices that would
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`have prevailed had the beef market been competitive. As a direct result, Plaintiffs suffered
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`antitrust injury by paying illegally inflated prices for beef they purchased from Defendants.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`25.
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`Plaintiffs bring this action under Sections 4(a) and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15
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`U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 26, to secure damages and injunctive relief for Defendants’ violations of
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`Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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`26.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 and
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`Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 26.
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`27. Venue is proper in this District under Sections 4, 12, and 16 of the Clayton Act,
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`15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22, and 26 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) and (d) because one or more Defendants
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`reside in, are found in, transacted business in, or have an agent who transacted business in this
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`District and because a substantial portion of the affected interstate commerce was carried out
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`here.
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`28.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over each of the Defendants because, among
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`other reasons, each Defendant (a) transacted business throughout the United States, including in
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`this District; (b) manufactured, sold, shipped, and delivered or directed the manufacture, sale,
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`shipment, and delivery of substantial quantities of beef throughout the United States, including
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`in this District; (c) had substantial contacts with the United States, including in this District; and
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`(d) engaged in an antitrust conspiracy that was directed at and had a direct, foreseeable, and
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`intended effect of causing injury to the business or property of persons residing in, located in,
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`or doing business throughout the United States, including in this District.
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`29. Defendants’ and co-conspirators’ activities were within the intended flow of
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`commerce within the United States and had direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
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`effects on foreign and interstate commerce.
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`III. PARTIES
`A.
`Plaintiffs
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`30.
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`Plaintiff Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (“Winn-Dixie”) is a corporation organized under
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`the laws of the State of Florida with its principal place of business at 8928 Prominence Parkway,
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`Suite 200, Jacksonville, Florida. Winn-Dixie directly purchased beef from one or more
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`Defendants or their co-conspirators during the Conspiracy Period. In addition, Winn-Dixie brings
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`this action on its own behalf and as the assignee of C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., a grocery
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`wholesaler that, during the relevant period, purchased directly from Defendants for resale to
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`Winn-Dixie and has specifically and expressly assigned its antitrust and other claims arising out
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`of those purchases to Winn-Dixie. During the time period relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, Winn-
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`Dixie and/or its assignor directly purchased beef from one or more Defendants and/or their co-
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`conspirators. Winn-Dixie suffered antitrust injury as a direct result of the antitrust violations
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`alleged in this Complaint.
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`31.
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`Plaintiff Bi-Lo Holding, LLC (“Bi-Lo”) is a limited liability company organized
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`under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business at 8928 Prominence
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`Parkway, Suite 200, Jacksonville, Florida. Bi-Lo directly purchased beef from one or more of the
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`Defendants, or their co-conspirators during the Conspiracy Period. In addition, Bi-Lo brings this
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`action on its own behalf and as the assignee of C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., a grocery
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`wholesaler that, during the relevant period, purchased directly from Defendants for resale to Bi-
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`Lo and has specifically and expressly assigned its antitrust and other claims arising out of those
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`purchases to Bi-Lo. During the time period relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, Bi-Lo and/or its
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`assignor directly purchased beef from one or more Defendants and/or their co-conspirators. Bi-
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`Lo suffered antitrust injury as a direct result of the antitrust violations alleged in this Complaint.
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`B.
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`Defendants
`1.
`The Cargill Defendants
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`32. Cargill, Inc. is a privately held Delaware corporation with its principal place of
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`business at 15407 McGinty Road, Wayzata, Minnesota 55391. During the Conspiracy Period,
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`Cargill, Inc. and/or its predecessors, wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold
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`beef in interstate commerce, directly or through Cargill, Inc.’s wholly owned or controlled
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`affiliates, to purchasers in the United States. Cargill, Inc. is the parent company.
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`33. Defendant Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation (a/k/a Cargill Protein) (“CMS”) is
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`a Cargill, Inc. subsidiary. CMS is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at
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`825 East Douglas Avenue, Wichita, Kansas 67202. CMS is the principal operating entity within
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`Cargill, Inc.’s U.S. cattle and beef business and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cargill, Inc. On
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`information and belief, CMS owns directly, or indirectly through its subsidiaries, Cargill, Inc.’s
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`U.S. fed cattle slaughter plants, and contracts for the purchase of cattle slaughtered there.
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`34.
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`Throughout the Conspiracy Period, Cargill, Inc. wholly owned, as a direct or
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`indirect subsidiary, CMS and sold, along with CMS, beef in interstate commerce, directly or
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`through this wholly owned or controlled affiliate, to purchasers in the United States.
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`35. During the Conspiracy Period, Cargill, Inc. and CMS shared a unity of corporate
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`interest and operated as part of a single enterprise in furtherance of the conspiracy that
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`purposefully directed conduct causing injury to and derived direct benefit from Plaintiffs in the
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`United States and this District.
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`2.
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`The JBS Defendants
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`36. Defendant JBS S.A. is a Brazilian corporation with its principal place of business
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`at Av. Marginal Direta do Tiete, 500 Bloco 3-30 andar, Vila Jaguara, Sao Paulo 05.118-100,
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`Brazil. During the Conspiracy Period, JBS S.A. and/or its predecessors, wholly owned or
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`controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold beef in interstate commerce, directly or through JBS
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`S.A.’s wholly owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the United States. JBS S.A. is the
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`parent company.
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`37.
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`JBS USA Food Company Holdings (“JBS USA”) is a Delaware corporation with
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`its principal place of business at 1770 Promontory Circle, Greeley, Colorado 80634. JBS USA is
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`the principal operating entity within JBS S.A.’s U.S. cattle and beef business and the contracting
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`entity for certain of JBS S.A.’s purchases of fed cattle in the United States.
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`38. Defendant Swift Beef Company (“Swift”) is a Delaware corporation with its
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`principal place of business at 1770 Promontory Circle, Greeley, Colorado 80634. Swift owns
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`directly, or indirectly through its subsidiaries, certain of JBS S.A.’s U.S. fed cattle slaughter
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`plants including the Cactus, Texas; Greeley, Colorado; Grand Island, Nebraska; and Hyrum, Utah
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`plants. On information and belief, Swift contracts for the majority of fed cattle to be slaughtered
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`at these plants.
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`39. Defendant JBS Packerland, Inc. (“Packerland”) is a Delaware corporation with its
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`principal place of business at 1770 Promontory Circle, Greeley, Colorado 80634.
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`40. On information and belief, Packerland owns directly, or indirectly through its
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`CASE 0:21-cv-01751-DSD-ECW Doc. 1 Filed 08/02/21 Page 19 of 105
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`subsidiaries, certain of JBS S.A.’s U.S. fed and dairy cattle slaughter plants, including the
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`Packerland packing plants in Green Bay, Wisconsin and Plainwell, Michigan, the Sun Land beef
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`plant in Tolleson, Arizona, and the Moyer Packing plant in Souderton, Pennsylvania. On
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`information and belief, Packerland contracts for the majority of fed cattle to be slaughtered at
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`these plants.
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`41. Various senior staff and executives responsible for the operation of JBS’s US fed
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`cattle and beef business during the Conspiracy Period were employed by each of JBS USA, Swift,
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`and Packerland.3
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`42.
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`Throughout the Conspiracy Period, JBS S.A. wholly owned as direct or indirect
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`subsidiaries, JBS USA, Swift, and Packerland and sold, along with JBS USA, Swift, and
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`Packerland, beef in interstate commerce, directly or through these wholly owned or controlled
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`affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.
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`43. During the Conspiracy Period, the JBS Defendants shared a unity of corporate
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`interest and operated as part of a single enterprise in furtherance of the conspiracy that
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`purposefully directed conduct causing injury to and derived direct benefit from Plaintiffs in the
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`United States and in this District.
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`3.
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`The Tyson Defendants
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`44.
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`Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson Foods”) is a publicly traded Delaware corporation
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`headquartered in Springdale, Arkansas. During the Conspiracy Period, Tyson Foods and/or its
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`See JBS USA’s, Swift’s, and Packerland’s September 25, 2020 Updated Disclosures
`3
`Pursuant to Attachment 1 of ECF No. 187 in Peterson, et al. v. JBS USA Food Company
`Holdings, et al., Case No. 19-cv-1129, at 3-7, 12-13.
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`predecessors, wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates sold beef in interstate
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`commerce, directly or through its wholly owned or controlled affiliates, to purchasers in the
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`United States.
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`45. Defendant Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (“Tyson Fresh”) is a wholly owned subsidiary
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`of Tyson Foods. Tyson Fresh is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at
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`800 Stevens Port Drive, Dakota Dunes, South Dakota 57049. Tyson Fresh is the principal
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`operating entity within Tyson Foods’ U.S. cattle and beef business.
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`46. On information and belief, Tyson Fresh owns directly, or indirectly through its
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`subsidiaries, Tyson Foods’ U.S. fed cattle slaughter plants and contracts for the purchase of cattle
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`slaughtered there.
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`47.
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`Throughout the Conspiracy Period, Tyson Foods wholly owned as a direct or
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`indirect subsidiary, Tyson Fresh and sold, along with Tyson Fresh, beef in interstate com