Case: 4:20-cv-01070 Doc. #: 1 Filed: 08/13/20 Page: 1 of 28 PageID #: 1
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`Plaintiff,
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`MONSANTO COMPANY ,
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`v.
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`DR. WARREN KRUGER,
`Serve: 1133 Nooningtree Drive
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`Chesterfield, MO 63017
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`Defendant.
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`INJUNCTIVE RELIEF REQUESTED
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`Cause No.
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`COMES NOW Plaintiff Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”) and for its causes of action
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`VERIFIED COMPLAINT
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`against Defendant Dr. Warren Kruger, alleges and states as follows:
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`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
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`1.
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`In this Verified Complaint, Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, temporary, preliminary, and
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`permanent injunctive relief to protect Plaintiff’s trade secrets from disclosure, and enforce
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`promises made by Defendant Dr. Warren Kruger in an Employment Agreement (the “Monsanto
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`Employment Agreement”) executed by Defendant. In the Monsanto Employment Agreement,
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`Dr. Kruger acknowledged that he would, through his employment with Plaintiff, learn significant
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`confidential information regarding its advanced agricultural business. He agreed to keep such
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`trade secret information confidential. Dr. Kruger further agreed that, if Plaintiff elected to
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`continue to pay him after he left its employment, he would not, for a period of one year, engage
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`in or contribute his knowledge to any work or activity involving any product competitive with or
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`similar to a product that he worked on with Plaintiff or concerning which he had access to
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`confidential information during his last five years of employment. Dr. Kruger recently notified
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`Plaintiff that he was resigning from his employment as Monsanto’s Head of Precision Genomics
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`to accept employment as the Head North American Field Crops Seeds Development for one of
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`Plaintiff’s largest competitors, Syngenta, Inc. (“Syngenta”), a company wholly owned by an
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`entity owned by the Chinese government. Notably, on June 26, 2020, Dr. Kruger had specifically
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`denied to Monsanto that he was considering leaving its employment to go to Syngenta. But on
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`July 27, 2020, after having just completed a two-plus week vacation, Dr. Kruger notified
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`Monsanto that he was resigning effective that same date to join Syngenta. Monsanto
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`concurrently learned that the Syngenta employment was scheduled to start just a week later, on
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`August 3, 2020. Plaintiff subsequently notified Dr. Kruger that his employment with Syngenta
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`would place him in direct violation of the promises made in the Monsanto Employment
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`Agreement, thereby causing it irreparable harm. As shown below, Plaintiff is entitled to specific
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`performance of Dr. Kruger’s promises in the Monsanto Employment Agreement as well as the
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`other relief specified herein. As noted, Plaintiff is so concerned about the irreparable harm that
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`Dr. Kruger would cause by breaching his promises to it that it will continue to pay him during the
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`one-year non-competition period, as specified in the Monsanto Employment Agreement.
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`PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
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`2.
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`Monsanto is a corporation duly formed and existing under the laws of the State of
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`Delaware with its principal place of business in St. Louis County, State of Missouri, within this
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`judicial district.
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`3.
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`Defendant Dr. Warren Kruger is a citizen of the State of Missouri and resides in
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`Chesterfield, Missouri. Until recently, Defendant was employed by Plaintiff as Monsanto’s Head
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`of Precision Genomics in Chesterfield, Missouri.
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`4.
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`This Court has original jurisdiction over this action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
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`as this cause of action arises under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, et seq. The
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`District Courts of the United States have original jurisdiction over civil actions brought under the
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`Defend Trade Secrets Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c).
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`5.
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`This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law
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`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), as the claims at issue are so closely related that they form part
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`of the same case or controversy.
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`6.
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`Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court by virtue of, among
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`other things, being a citizen and resident of Missouri, doing business in Missouri, and working
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`for Monsanto in Missouri during the time period in which he learned the trade secrets at issue in
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`this litigation.
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`7.
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`Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) as Defendant resides
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`in Chesterfield, Missouri, in this District, and the acts and omissions giving rise to this litigation
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`occurred in St. Louis County, Missouri.
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`FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
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`Plaintiff’s Business
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`8.
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`Plaintiff is in the business of researching, developing, testing, registering,
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`manufacturing, marketing, and selling advanced agricultural products worldwide. Monsanto
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`develops and sells, for example, conventional and genetically modified hybrids and varieties of
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`corn, soybeans, cotton, canola, oilseed rape, wheat, and vegetable seeds, as well as crop
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`protection (chemicals) and biologic (substances containing or derived from natural materials
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`farmers can use to protect crops and/or increase yield) products. These seeds and other seed-
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`related products provide additional yield and yield protection and are designed to grow in
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`specific soil and environmental conditions, often with specific useful traits that improve yield
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`and assist the crop to be resistant to herbicides, insects, diseases, droughts, and other conditions.
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`9.
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`Plaintiff is constantly researching and developing new and improved products in
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`all of these areas. Plaintiff is recognized as the industry leader in the development and sale of
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`advanced agricultural products. However, the industry is highly competitive.
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`10. Monsanto has developed a competitive advantage in this industry by devoting
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`millions of dollars towards research and development efforts and analyzing data from millions of
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`prior tests and actual grower data collected over a period of more than 20 years. Plaintiff has
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`proprietary scientifically-derived algorithms that allow it to successfully predict which potential
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`products are most likely to be successful, as well as biotechnology-driven processes that allow it
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`to develop better products than its competitors more quickly and at a lower cost.
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`11.
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`One of Plaintiff’s largest competitors is Syngenta. Like Plaintiff, Syngenta
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`develops, produces, registers, manufactures, markets, and sells advanced seeds, crop protection,
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`biologic, and digital agricultural products on six continents.
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`12.
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`Plaintiff competes globally with Syngenta not only to have superior products,
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`intellectual property, and trade secrets, but also in a “first to market” manner, attempting to
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`develop, test, and obtain necessary approvals for new products in the fastest, most responsible
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`manner. Whichever company is first in the market can gain a tremendous competitive advantage.
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`Even a matter of a few months can be critical to the success or failure of a product. Knowing a
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`competitor’s undisclosed strengths, weaknesses, priorities, or proposed initiatives and where it
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`stands in the race to bring new products and services to market around the globe would be
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`invaluable.
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`Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets
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`13.
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`In connection with its business, Plaintiff has developed numerous Trade Secrets,
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`including but not limited to detailed scientific and business information relating to seed breeding,
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`genetic modifications of seeds, integration of genetic modifications into elite germplasm, seed
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`testing strategies and data, technical information, the performance of certain current and future
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`products, strategies for obtaining regulatory approvals, seed production, and digital agricultural
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`models (collectively, the “Trade Secrets”). Plaintiff has specifically developed Trade Secrets for
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`all six continents on which its products and services are sold.
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`14.
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`The Trade Secrets give Plaintiff a significant competitive advantage not enjoyed
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`by other companies, such as Syngenta, that are not in possession of said Trade Secrets, and
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`enable Plaintiff to more quickly develop and sell products that perform better than those of its
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`competitors.
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`15.
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`Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets are not generally known to, or readily ascertainable
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`through proper means, by individuals outside of Plaintiff.
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`16.
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`Plaintiff has invested considerable time, effort, and expense in developing the
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`Trade Secrets. Plaintiff spends an average of over $3 million per day on such developments.
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`17.
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`Plaintiff has used, and continues to use, reasonable and diligent efforts to maintain
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`and protect its Trade Secrets, including requiring all persons with access to Trade Secrets to
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`execute agreements with non-disclosure and other restrictive covenants as a condition of
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`employment, requiring employees to wear visible badges while at work, requiring employees to
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`complete annual training on the confidentiality of business information, maintaining video
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`security cameras outside and inside work facilities, utilizing security guards to monitor those
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`cameras and perform other security work 24 hours a day, limiting access to proprietary
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`information to those with a need to know, employing strict information technology security
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`regimens, and restricting access to their premises to employees and visitors who show
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`photographic identification and are escorted by employees.
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`Defendant’s Monsanto Employment Agreement
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`18.
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`On April 29, 2004, Defendant signed his Monsanto Employment Agreement,
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`which constitutes a valid, enforceable contract. The Monsanto Employment Agreement is
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`attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference as if fully set out herein.
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`19.
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`In the Monsanto Employment Agreement, Defendant agreed that he would be
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`given access to Plaintiff’s confidential Trade Secrets and proprietary information (the
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`“Confidential Information”), and that, in consideration for being given such access, he would not
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`directly or indirectly use or disclose the Confidential Information. Exhibit A, at 1.
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`20.
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`In exchange for being provided access to its Trade Secrets, Defendant agreed to
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`grant Plaintiff a “Non-Compete Option.” Under that option, if provided with written notice of a
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`decision to exercise the option, Defendant agreed that he would not, for a period of one year
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`following the ending of his employment (the “Non-Compete Period”), “engage in or contribute
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`[his] knowledge to any work or activity that involves a product, process, apparatus, service or
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`development which is then competitive with or similar to a product, process, apparatus, service
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`or development on which [he] worked or with respect to which [he] had access to Confidential
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`Information” in the final five years of his employment. Exhibit A, at 2.
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`21.
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`It was further agreed that, if the Non-Compete Option was invoked, Plaintiff
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`would “continue to pay [Defendant], during the Non-Compete Period, the same gross base salary
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`(subject to taxes) [he] had made during the last year of [his] employment with Monsanto, in
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`monthly installments.” Exhibit A, at 2.
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`22.
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`In 2018, Monsanto was acquired by Bayer. On October 21, 2018, Dr. Kruger was
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`offered to continue employment with the post-acquisition company and signed an offer letter that
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`expressly preserved the Monsanto Employment Agreement and stated that Bayer would accede to
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`all of Monsanto’s rights thereunder (the “Offer Letter”). A copy of the Offer Letter is attached as
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`Exhibit B.
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`23.
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`Since Bayer’s acquisition of Monsanto until his resignation of employment,
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`Defendant remained an employee of Monsanto.
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`Defendant’s Access to Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets
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`24.
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`Defendant has a Ph.D. in Plant Pathology.
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`25.
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`Defendant began his employment with Monsanto in 2004. He has worked in a
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`variety of functions, including Lead of Corn Doubled Haploid Optimization, Lead of North
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`American Soybean Breeding and Analytics, Lead of North American Varietal Crop Breeding,
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`and Head of Precision Genomics. During his long career with Plaintiff, each of his progressive
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`positions provided increasing access to the Trade Secrets.
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`26.
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`Over the last five years of his employment with Plaintiff, Dr. Kruger had access to
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`Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets that would be invaluable in his role at Syngenta. Significantly, the use
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`of the Trade Secret information he possesses would be to the detriment of Plaintiff on a
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`worldwide basis regardless of Defendant’s physical location, permitting Syngenta to compete
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`unfairly with Plaintiff on six continents.
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`27.
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`During the last five years of his employment with Plaintiff, Dr. Kruger worked in
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`Plaintiff’s breeding and biotechnology organizations. In his role as Head of Varietal Crop
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`Breeding for North America, Dr. Kruger had approximately 17 employees reporting to him,
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`directly or indirectly, and he controlled an annual budget of over $4.5 million. As Head of
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`Precision Genomics, over 120 employees reported to him, directly or indirectly, and he
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`controlled an annual budget of over $50 million. This job gave Dr. Kruger worldwide
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`responsibilities for all of Monsanto’s major seed lines (corn, soybeans, cotton, canola, oilseed
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`rape, and wheat). Moreover, as Head of Precision Genomics, Dr. Kruger’s job required him to
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`interface and work regularly with high-level members of Plaintiff’s breeding organization.
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`28.
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`Dr. Kruger’s base salary at the time he resigned was over $190,000 per year. In
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`addition, during his employment with Plaintiff he was eligible for annual incentive pay, stock
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`options, grants of restricted stock units, and retention incentives that had the potential to add to
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`his compensation considerably.
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`29.
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`Prior to his recent resignation, Dr. Kruger was a member of Plaintiff’s Plant
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`Biotechnology Leadership Team (“PBLT”), which consisted of approximately 8 high-ranking
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`persons in the Biotechnology organization who reported directly to the Head of Biotechnology.
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`In his job in Breeding, Dr. Kruger also was a member of the North American Breeding
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`Leadership Team (“NABLT”), the top persons in the organization whose jobs involved breeding
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`for North American seeds across all of Monsanto’s major crops. While Dr. Kruger’s job in the
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`breeding organization was focused on varietal crops (soybeans, cotton, and some wheat seeds),
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`his membership on the NABLT gave him considerable exposure to and knowledge of
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`Monsanto’s Trade Secrets regarding all of its major crops, including corn and vegetables.
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`Moreover, the soybean and corn breeding programs run in parallel and many of the learnings
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`from one crop are transferable to the other.
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`30.
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`Dr. Kruger’s duties required him to make multiple presentations about Plaintiff’s
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`products and strategies to Monsanto executives.
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`31.
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`In addition to making presentations about Plaintiff’s products, strategies, and
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`technologies, Dr. Kruger was also present when other executives made similar presentations. By
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`attending these meetings, Dr. Kruger learned even more Trade Secrets and how they were being
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`applied.
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`32.
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`Dr. Kruger was further provided regular written communications that included
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`considerable information about Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets.
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`33.
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`Critically, Dr. Kruger was instrumental in developing products and strategies
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`designed to allow Plaintiff to better compete against Syngenta’s competing seeds and other
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`advanced agricultural products. He received documents and attended meetings where Plaintiff’s
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`strategy to compete against Syngenta was discussed and fine-tuned.
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`34.
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`The following examples illustrate Dr. Kruger’s substantial Trade Secret
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`knowledge that he was provided and regularly used in performing his duties during the last five
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`years of his employment. This list is not exhaustive.
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`A.
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`Dr. Kruger is aware of Trade Secret information regarding Plaintiff’s
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`pipeline of future seeds. Dr. Kruger regularly attended meetings at which the pipeline was
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`discussed, including Plaintiff’s priorities and how its future products were progressing. At these
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`sessions, Dr. Kruger learned about material, non-public testing results and future testing plans for
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`a large variety of products. Dr. Kruger therefore knows of the products Plaintiff wants to bring to
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`market over the next decade or more, when and at what locations it intends to do so, and
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`Plaintiff’s strategy to get these products to the market faster than competitors, including
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`Syngenta. Dr. Kruger is aware of the strengths and relative weaknesses of the products that
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`Plaintiff hopes to bring to market in the coming years. He is aware of which products are ahead
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`of schedule and which are behind schedule. He is aware of which products Plaintiff intends to
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`invest most heavily in and which ones it deems less important. He also has knowledge of Trade
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`Secret information regarding expected market potential, sales, efficacy, and expected profits for
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`the products that Plaintiff is bringing to market and intends to bring to market in the future.
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`Syngenta could clearly use this information to advance its own research into competing products,
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`to avoid wasting time and money on products that Plaintiff has found are less likely to be
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`successful, and to determine which products it should focus its research and development on
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`given Plaintiff’s progress and plans on competing products.
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`B.
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`For example, Monsanto, like its competitors (including Syngenta), is
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`working on the development of “short corn,” i.e., corn plants that do not grow as tall as
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`traditional ones. With taller corn, corn plants are at significantly greater risk of yield loss due to
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`lodging or green snap and yield per acre is constrained by the density with which the seeds can be
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`planted. Plants growing too close to one another increases stress and can reduce yield. That
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`stress is reduced if the corn plants are shorter. Therefore, developing short corn will protect corn
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`from yield loss and allow increased density in planting, which will in turn allow increased yield.
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`Dr. Kruger is aware of Plaintiff’s strategies and work to produce short corn, both by traditional
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`breeding and by making genetic modifications to existing germplasm. He knows what Plaintiff
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`has found is working well and what is not working as well. All of this knowledge would be
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`extraordinarily helpful to Syngenta as it attempts to develop competing short corn products.
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`C.
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`Dr. Kruger is also aware of Plaintiff’s collection of Trade Secrets in the
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`area of plant breeding that allow it to more quickly get new seed products to market than
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`competitors like Syngenta. These Trade Secrets include the proprietary improvement and trade-
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`secret integration of a series of processes to dramatically improve the creation of new and highly
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`improved corn inbreds, which are the genetic basis for competitive corn hybrids sold in the
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`market. Inbreeding corn following the creation of experimental populations is the basis for
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`creating new and improved corn inbred lines. Being able to do this more rapidly has been of
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`interest to corn breeders across the industry and most companies engaged in corn breeding have
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`been using a process known as doubled haploids to more rapidly inbreed corn lines. The basic
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`method as known in the art is very inefficient and not easily scalable because of low efficiency in
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`creating haploid seeds and the subsequent step of doubling the genetic content of these haploid
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`seeds and restoring them to a normal, fertile diploid plant (doubled haploid). Plaintiff has
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`developed proprietary methods to dramatically improve the haploid creation and sorting step
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`(haploid induction and sorting from undesired diploid kernels) as well as substantial
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`improvement in the subsequent chromosome-doubling step, which restores the haploid seedlings
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`to a doubled haploid state. These steps require the creation of proprietary inducer corn lines
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`which when used as a pollen source generate ears of corn with both non-desired diploid kernels
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`and desired haploid kernels. These novel inducer corn lines create haploid and diploid kernels
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`which are amenable to very accurate and very high throughput sorting because of differences in
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`kernel oil content and are sorted using proprietary equipment invented and built by Plaintiff for
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`internal use. This has allowed the dramatic scaling of the first step. Alternative methods known
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`in the art use color sorting which is not always penetrant and recalcitrant to automation because
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`of errors in sorting and forces the reliance on manual sorting (by the human eye) and limits
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`scaling. Plaintiff has also discovered proprietary process improvements in the use of chemical
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`treatments to expedite the doubling process, dramatically reducing the labor and land
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`requirements needed to generate doubled haploid corn plants. Plaintiff also has discovered a
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`proprietary way of conducting whole genome selection that uses DNA information from corn,
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`soy, cotton, and canola seeds to eliminate an entire year of field testing from the R&D breeding
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`process. To optimize the genomic selection process, a proprietary high throughput non-
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`destructive seed sampling method (seed chipping) was also invented. This genomic selection
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`process is combined with the doubled haploid process and seed chipping of haploid seed to
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`create a trade secret method of making optimal genetic selection decisions.
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`D.
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`Finding the optimal way to quickly and accurately test potential seeds is a
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`major advantage for any seeds company. Plaintiff has also developed Trade Secret knowledge
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`relating to the use of greenhouses in the seed development and breeding process, in particular
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`when doing so in conjunction with the other trade secret processes discussed above. Dr. Kruger
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`was heavily involved in developing this testing strategy, and he even made a presentation to the
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`Research & Development Leadership Team (the top 18 R&D leaders in the entire company)
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`where he explained how a new greenhouse could be used by Monsanto to greatly expedite the
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`development of new seeds. He is aware of all of these Trade Secrets and how Plaintiff has
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`learned to effectively use them together, information that he could not help but use to improve
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`Syngenta’s R&D processes.
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`E.
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`Dr. Kruger is also privy to Trade Secrets regarding Plaintiff’s use of
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`predictive technologies and methods to improve and expedite its breeding and seed testing
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`programs, including through its use of artificial intelligence. At any given time, seed companies
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`are working on thousands of different potential seed products. Most of these potential products,
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`however, will never actually be brought to market; they will simply fail to deliver yield
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`improvements that justify their development. Because testing products that eventually fail is
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`time-consuming and expensive, it is a huge competitive advantage to be able to quickly and
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`accurately predict which seeds will succeed and which will fail. Dr. Kruger has direct knowledge
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`of Plaintiff’s Trade Secrets regarding how to do this. He is aware of what grower and test results,
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`after 20 years of collecting data, Plaintiff has found to be the most reliable predictors of future
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`success. He is aware of how much data is required to make reliable predictions, and where
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`Plaintiff has found the best data to originate in terms of crops, regions, and weather. He knows
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`Monsanto’s Trade Secrets that allow it to optimize the number of seed products that are tested
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`and how those tests are used. He is aware of how Plaintiff uses artificial intelligence to drive this
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`process, including how the artificial intelligence is developed and trained in order to be most
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`useful. All of this information is kept confidential and is not shared with persons without a need
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`to know. Dr. Kruger’s knowledge of these Trade Secrets would quickly accelerate Syngenta’s
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`competing R&D processes.
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`F.
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`Dr. Kruger is aware of Plaintiff’s Trade Secret knowledge in the area of
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`virtual field trials – using algorithms to predict results rather than actually performing the
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`expensive and time-consuming testing process. Virtual field trials have several advantages over
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`actual field trials. Not only are virtual field trials less expensive and time-consuming to run,
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`actual field trials can be rendered ineffective due to unusual weather conditions (drought,
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`excessive heat, etc.). Virtual field trials do not suffer from this weakness. Dr. Kruger
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`understands how Plaintiff has changed its breeding practices to allow it to eliminate many early
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`field tests and replace them with virtual tests. Because of this knowledge, Dr. Kruger could jump
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`start Syngenta’s competing virtual field trial process. Not only would this allow Syngenta to
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`unfairly streamline its R&D process, Dr. Kruger’s knowledge could allow Syngenta to beat
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`Plaintiff to market with a particular product.
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`G.
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`Dr. Kruger also knows Plaintiff’s recently developed Trade Secrets about
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`novel methodologies to further speed the breeding process so as to allow Monsanto to get
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`products to market even faster. While working in the biotechnology area, he has been one of the
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`leaders in projects with the breeding organization to streamline the R&D process. For example,
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`when predicting whether a particular seed is going to perform well, seed companies typically rely
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`on genetic sequencing of seed DNA. This can be done by sequencing all or just part of the seed
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`DNA. The more genetic markers that are sequenced, the more accurate the predictions of how
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`that seed will perform. However, additional sequencing costs more money and takes longer to
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`perform. Dr. Kruger has worked on projects and been present when presentations have been
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`made whereby Monsanto has developed Trade Secrets that optimize the balance between
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`accuracy, speed, and cost as applied across the breeding pipeline. This includes learning how
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`much better predictions would be if the number of genetic markers is increased, and how much
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`worse they would be if the numbers were decreased. He has been involved in creating Trade
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`Case: 4:20-cv-01070 Doc. #: 1 Filed: 08/13/20 Page: 15 of 28 PageID #: 15
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`Secret methodologies that look at the cost, speed, and accuracy of using different amounts of
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`genetic information in combination to determine how much of each type should be obtained. He
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`is aware of where Monsanto intends to invest its capital expenditures as a result. These learnings
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`– along with knowing Monsanto’s capital expenditure strategy – would be very helpful to
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`Syngenta in determining how to optimize its competing breeding strategies.
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`H. Moreover, because they allow more efficient capturing of data, Plaintiff
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`has developed methods to obtain data on soil conditions and seed performance by using drones
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`and/or satellites to take pictures of crops as they grow in the field. Exactly when and how often
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`in the growing process to take these images in order to obtain the best data is critical. Dr. Kruger
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`is aware of these Trade Secrets.
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`I.
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`One way of making changes to plant DNA is through a process known as
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`gene editing, which is replacing older genetic modification technology that Monsanto and its
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`competitors have previously used. Gene editing allows Monsanto to more quickly develop and
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`introduce desirable characteristics for seeds that it sells, which could significantly accelerate the
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`process of new product development. Dr. Kruger has been intimately involved in Monsanto’s
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`highly confidential strategy in the area of gene editing. He knows the relative strengths and
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`weaknesses of Monsanto’s program, and Monsanto’s current and planned work on this project.
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`A competitor could use this highly confidential information to make important decisions – such
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`as where to focus its efforts so as not to waste time and money on projects not likely to succeed
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`or to attempt to establish business relationships with companies having products or processes that
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`Monsanto has identified as important to its strategy.
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`Case: 4:20-cv-01070 Doc. #: 1 Filed: 08/13/20 Page: 16 of 28 PageID #: 16
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`J.
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`In many of these areas, Plaintiff engages with third parties to assist in its
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`efforts. Dr. Kruger is aware of which companies Plaintiff has so engaged, which of them have
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`turned out to be most effective, and which have not. For example, Dr. Kruger has worked
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`directly with third parties on gene editing. He is aware of which third parties are best to work
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`with and which are less able to assist, as well as the pricing and services they can provide. All of
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`this Trade Secret information would be extremely beneficial to Syngenta.
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`Defendant Misleads Plaintiff Regarding His Intention to Accept Syngenta Employment
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`35.
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`On or about June 26, 2020, Jeremy Williams, Plaintiff’s Sr. Vice President of
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`Plant Biotechnology, had a telephonic meeting with Dr. Kruger to discuss his future at Monsanto.
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`The genesis of this meeting was a June 19, 2020, email that counsel for Plaintiff had received
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`from a law firm asking for it to waive a conflict of interest. The law firm sought permission to
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`represent Syngenta in connection with its hiring of Dr. Kruger.
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`36.
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`At the June 26, 2020, meeting, Dr. Kruger was directly asked if he was
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`considering leaving Monsanto’s employment to join Syngenta. Dr. Kruger falsely denied that he
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`intended to do so. He stated that he felt very valued at Monsanto, felt challenged in his job and
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`was not dissatisfied, and that while he had been contacted by recruiters, he had not reached out
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`proactively and was not interested in other opportunities. These statements were all made with
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`the intent to mislead Monsanto.
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`37.
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`Dr. Kruger then continued to actively work for Monsanto for approximately 11
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`days – through July 7, 2020. He then commenced a paid vacation that lasted through and
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`including Friday, July 24, 2020.
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`Case: 4:20-cv-01070 Doc. #: 1 Filed: 08/13/20 Page: 17 of 28 PageID #: 17
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`38.
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`Early in the morning of Monday, July 27, 2020, on his first day back from
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`vacation, Dr. Kruger sent an email to Dr. Jeremy Williams stating that he was resigning his
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`employment with Monsanto effective that same day, and that he would begin new employment
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`with Syngenta. Dr. Kruger intended to begin employment with Syngenta just seven days later, on
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`August 3, 2020.
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`39.
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`The Monsanto Employment Agreement required that Dr. Kruger provide
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`Monsanto with ten days’ advanced notice of his beginning new employment. The purpose of this
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`notice period is to allow Monsanto adequate time to determine whether to invoke its non-
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`compete option under the Monsanto Employment Agreement. Dr. Kruger only gave Monsanto
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`seven days’ notice.
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`40. Monsanto pays employees for their unused vacation at termination of
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`employment. Thus, Dr. Kruger could have resigned from Monsanto effective July 7 and been
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`paid for the period of time for which he took vacation. The reason to take vacation instead was
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`to deprive Monsa