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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 1 of 39 PageID #: 813
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`No. 4:21-CV-00287-AGF
`
`THE STATES OF MISSOURI, ALASKA,
`ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, INDIANA,
`KANSAS, MONTANA, NEBRASKA,
`OHIO, OKLAHOMA, SOUTH
`CAROLINA, TENNESSEE, and UTAH,
`
` Plaintiffs,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official
`capacity as President of the United States of
`America, et al.,
`
` Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFFS’COMBINED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
`THEIR MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
`AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 2 of 39 PageID #: 814
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………… 1
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW…………………………………………………………….. 6
`
`ARGUMENT…………………………………………………………………………… 7
`
` I. Plaintiff States have Article III standing…………………………………..……... 7
`
` A. Plaintiffs States have suffered a clear procedural injury............................... 8
`
` B. Plaintiffs States have pleaded the Interim Values will cause injuries that are
`
`“certainly impending” and present a “substantial risk” of harm…........................10
`
` C. Plaintiff States’ injury is fairly traceable to Defendants’ unlawful conduct..15
`
` D. The Court can provide Plaintiff States relief.................................................17
`
` E. Plaintiff States’ claims are ripe......................................................................20
`
` II. Plaintiff States’ Claims Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits............................. 22
`
` A. Plaintiff States have shown a likelihood of success on Count I.................... 22
`
` B. Plaintiff States have alleged a plausible claim for Count II.......................... 25
`
` C. Plaintiff States have shown a likelihood of success on Count III and have
`
`alleged a plausible claim for Count IV................................................................... 25
`
`III. Plaintiff States’ Preliminary Injunction should be granted because they suffer
`
`irreparable harm and the public interest favors the injunction............................ 28
`
`CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 29
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.......................................................................................... 32
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 3 of 39 PageID #: 815
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Air All. Houston v. Env’t Prot. Agency,
`906 F.3d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez,
`458 U.S. 592 ....................................................................................................................... 10, 12
`
`Allen v. Wright,
`468 U.S. 737 (1984) .................................................................................................................. 16
`
`Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno,
`57 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 5
`
`Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
`187 U.S. 94, (1902) ................................................................................................................... 24
`
`Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.,
`575 U.S. 320 (2015) .................................................................................................................. 24
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 6
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 6
`
`Bennett v. Spear,
`520 U.S 154 (1997). .............................................................................................................. 5, 25
`
`Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh,
`295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................... 24
`
`Block v. Meese,
`793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ................................................................................................ 14
`
`Brown v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
`738 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................... 6
`
`California v. Bernhardt,
`472 F. Supp. 3d 573 (2020) ...................................................................................................... 18
`
`California v. Trump,
`No. CV 19-960 (RDM), 2020 WL 1643858 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2020) ........................ 5, 14, 16, 18
`iii
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 4 of 39 PageID #: 816
`
`Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc.,
`833 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 6
`
`Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Reich,
`74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ............................................................................................ 19, 24
`
`City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump,
`897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................. 17
`
`City of Los Angeles v. Barr,
`929 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................... 2
`
`Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
`568 U.S. 398 (2013) .............................................................................................................. 7, 14
`
`Clinton v. Jones,
`547 U.S. 417 (1998) .................................................................................................................. 19
`
`Collins v. Yellen, No. 19-422,
`594 U.S. ___, slip op. (June 23, 2021) ...................................................................................... 16
`
`Connecticut Light & Power,
`673 F.2d ...................................................................................................................................... 9
`
`Couzens v. Donohue,
`854 F.3d 508 (8th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................... 6
`
`Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump,
`453 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2020) ...................................................................................... 23, 25
`
`Ctr. for Biological Diversity,
`538 F.3d 1172 (9th 2008).......................................................................................................... 18
`
`Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
`140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) ................................................................................................................ 3
`
`Department of Commerce v. New York,
`139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) ............................................................................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 16
`
`FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
`556 U.S. 502 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 10
`
`FEC v. Akins,
`524 U.S. 11 (1998) .................................................................................................................... 18
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 5 of 39 PageID #: 817
`
`Franklin v. Massachusetts,
`505 U.S. 788 (1992) ............................................................................................................ 18, 19
`
`Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
`469 U.S. 528 (1985) .................................................................................................................. 13
`
`Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n,
`387 U.S. 167 (1967) .................................................................................................................. 20
`
`High Country Conservation Advocs. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
`52 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014) ........................................................................................ 18
`
`Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block,
`771 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................... 12
`
`Johnsonv. State of Missouri,
`142 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................. 14
`
`Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc.,
`868 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................... 7
`
`Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) .................................................................................................................... 7
`
`Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council,
`962 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ...................................................................................... 27
`
`Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Council,
`811 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2016)...................................................................................................... 27
`
`Maryland v. King,
`567 U.S. 1301 (2012) ................................................................................................................ 28
`
`Massachusetts v. EPA,
`549 U.S. 497 (2007) .............................................................................................. 3, 4, 11, 12, 28
`
`Massachusetts v. Mellon,
`262 U.S. 447 (1923) .............................................................................................................. 4, 12
`
`Meyer v. Bush,
`981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ...................................................................................... 4, 26, 27
`
`Michigan Corrections Organization v. Michigan Department of Corrections,
`774 F.3d 895 (6th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................... 24
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 6 of 39 PageID #: 818
`
`Missouri v. Yellen,
`No. 4:21-cv-376 (HEA), ---- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2021 WL 1889867 (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2021) . 21
`
`Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior,
`538 U.S. 803 (2003) .................................................................................................................. 20
`
`Newdow v. Roberts,
`603 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 19
`
`Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club,
`523 U.S. 726 (1998) .................................................................................................................. 20
`
`Hias, Inc. v. Trump,
`No. 20-1160, 2021 WL 69994 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2021) .............................................................. 17
`
`Pennsylvania v. New Jersey,
`426 U.S. 660(1976) (per curiam ............................................................................................... 13
`
`Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC,
`652 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2011)........................................................................................................ 9
`
`RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty.,
`136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) .............................................................................................................. 23
`
`Rumsfeld v. FAIR,
`547 U.S. 47 (2006) ...................................................................................................................... 7
`
`Sierra Club v. Costle,
`657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................. 14
`
`Soucie v. David,
`448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ................................................................................................ 26
`
`Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
`555 U.S. 488 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 9
`
`Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
`573 U.S. 149 (2014) .................................................................................................................... 7
`
`United States v. Johnson,
`632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................... 9
`
`Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found.,
`454 U.S. 151 (1981) .................................................................................................................. 11
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 7 of 39 PageID #: 819
`
`WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt,
`2021 WL 363955 (D. Mont. Feb. 3, 2021) ............................................................................... 18
`
`Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
`502 U.S. 437 (1992) ............................................................................................................ 11, 13
`
`Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
`343 U.S.679 (1952) ................................................................................................................... 28
`
`Statutes
`
`5 U.S.C. § 551 ......................................................................................................................... 20, 23
`
`5 U.S.C. § 553(c) ............................................................................................................................ 9
`
`5 U.S.C. § 706 ................................................................................................................................. 8
`
`Utah Code §§59-21-1, 35A-8-303, 59-21-2 ................................................................................. 11
`
`Regulations
`
`86 F.R. 27150 (May 19, 2021) ...................................................................................................... 13
`
`86 F.R. 24669 (May 7, 2021) ........................................................................................................ 27
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vii
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`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 8 of 39 PageID #: 820
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`With respect to the Interagency Working Group, Defendants concede that “[n]o statute
`
`establishes it, nor delegates it any legislative authority.” Doc. 28, at 41. And Defendants also
`
`concede that, pursuant to Executive Order 13990, the Working Group’s Interim Values are binding
`
`on federal agencies, unless a statute specifically prohibits their use. “To be sure, the Executive
`
`Order requires agencies to use the Interim Estimates,” Defendants write, unless “the agency faces
`
`any conflicting statutory obligation.” Doc. 28, at 23 (emphasis added); see also id. (conceding
`
`that agencies “will … rely on the Interim Estimates when they have discretion to do so”); id. at 38
`
`(conceding that “agencies may, at least in some circumstances, be bound by the Executive Order”).
`
`This concession follows the plain language of the Executive Order, which directs that “agencies
`
`shall use” the Interim Values “when monetizing the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions
`
`resulting from regulations and other relevant agency actions.” Doc. 1-1, at 5 (EO 13990,
`
`§ 5(b)(ii)(A)) (emphasis added). Thus, under the Interim Values, federal agencies must use their
`
`delegated authority in a specific way on a critical, substantive policy question—even though “[n]o
`
`statute establishes [the Working Group], nor delegates it any legislative authority.” Doc. 28, at
`
`41.
`
`These concessions are fatal to virtually every argument Defendants make, both on standing
`
`and on the merits. Defendants liken Executive Order 13990 to prior Executive Orders that imposed
`
`procedural requirements on the federal agency rulemaking process, such as centralized review and
`
`preparing RIAs. Doc. 28, at 2. The analogy breaks down because EO 13990 dictates how agencies
`
`must exercise their delegated authority on a specific, substantive legislative question—thus
`
`exercising quintessentially legislative authority.
`
`
`
`1
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`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 9 of 39 PageID #: 821
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`Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims will be “hypothetical” and “speculative” until
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`another federal agency relies on the Interim Values in a final rulemaking. Doc. 28, at 14. But
`
`there is nothing “hypothetical” about how the agencies will use the Interim Values. According to
`
`the Executive Order, if agencies may consider the “social cost” of greenhouse gases in their
`
`exercise of discretion, they must do so, and (what is more) they must use the specific numerical
`
`values calculated by the Interagency Working Group. Doc. 28, at 3; Doc. 28-4, at 13. This
`
`requirement permanently tilts the playing field in future agency rulemakings against the Plaintiff
`
`States, who would raise substantive arguments against the use of such values, and against the
`
`Working Group’s particular numbers. In future rulemakings, the agencies’ adoption on the Interim
`
`Values is a foregone conclusion—commanded by the President of the United States—and the
`
`Plaintiff States’ substantive objections to them will be disregarded. That is a concrete injury in
`
`itself. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]his inability
`
`to compete on an even playing field constitutes a concrete and particularized injury.”).
`
`Indeed, on Defendants’ view, the Executive will make a policy decision of great import—
`
`the calculation of the “social costs” of greenhouse gases—without any opportunity for input from
`
`interested parties or the public, at any point. The Working Group did not accept any public
`
`comments, and future agencies are bound by the Working Group’s numbers. This flouts the basic
`
`requirements of the APA.
`
`Moreover, there is nothing “speculative” about Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Interim Values
`
`will inevitably be used to justify increased regulatory costs in foundational sectors of the American
`
`economy, including energy, agriculture, and manufacturing. That is the whole point of the Interim
`
`Values. There is nothing speculative about predicting that the Interim Values will function exactly
`
`as designed, and as Defendants say they will. Plaintiff States’ injuries are far more concrete and
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 10 of 39 PageID #: 822
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`imminent than the predicted loss of centimeters of coastline over 100 years that the Supreme Court
`
`found sufficient to support State standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007). See
`
`also id. at 520 (holding that States are “entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis”).
`
`And they are far more imminent and less speculative than the injuries predicted by the Plaintiff
`
`States in Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565-66 (2019), where it was
`
`predicted that unlawful aliens “will likely react in predictable ways.” Here, Plaintiff States merely
`
`predict that federal agencies will follow an executive order from the President of the United States.
`
`Defendants argue that it is too early to consider the legality of the Working Group’s actions
`
`until they are used by some other federal agency. But the Interim Values present an Executive-
`
`Branch-wide, binding determination on a critical policy question now. And the Supreme Court
`
`recently cast doubt on the notion that a lawsuit challenging a later agency’s action is a “proper
`
`vehicle[] for attacking” an earlier agency’s action that the later agency relies on. Dep’t of
`
`Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910 (2020). Thus, Defendants
`
`seek to place Plaintiffs in a Catch-22—now, they say that it is too early to challenge the Working
`
`Group’s actions, but when another agency relies on them, they will say it is too late. See id. Article
`
`III does not insulate the Executive’s violation of the separation of powers from all judicial review.
`
`Defendants concede that they never afforded Plaintiffs notice or opportunity to comment
`
`on the Interim Values, but they contend that this is a supposedly a “bare procedural violation,
`
`divorced from any concrete harm.” Doc. 28, at 29. On the contrary, as Plaintiffs allege, the Interim
`
`Values impose a wide array of concrete harms on them, including prejudicing their ability to
`
`participate in future rulemakings, impacting their operation of cooperative-federalism programs,
`
`and inflicting specific pocketbook injuries. On Defendants’ view, the exception would swallow
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 11 of 39 PageID #: 823
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`the rule, and all deprivations of the right to comment would be non-actionable “bare procedural
`
`violations.” The States have standing, and the Interim Values must be vacated, on this basis alone.
`
`Citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), Defendants argue that States cannot
`
`assert parens patriae standing against the federal government. Doc. 28, at 27. The Supreme Court
`
`rejected this very argument in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007). Here, the
`
`States do not seek to “‘protect [their] citizens from the operation of federal statutes,’ (which is
`
`what Mellon prohibits).” Id. (citing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 484-85). Instead, they seek “to assert
`
`[their] rights under” a federal statute, id.—here, the Administrative Procedure Act—as well as
`
`asserting their own sovereign interests. This is squarely permitted by Massachusetts v. EPA. Id.
`
`Defendants argue that the States’ asserted federalism injuries merely raise “abstract
`
`questions” of political power and sovereignty. Doc. 28, at 29. On the contrary, the Interim Values
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`are binding in future agency proceedings, and thus they directly impact the States’ sovereign
`
`interests. Among other things, they directly affect the States’ ability to be heard in future agency
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`rulemakings—because the States’ substantive objections to the Interim Values will receive no
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`meaningful consideration in the face of the President’s directive—and they directly impact the
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`States’ administration of cooperative-federalism programs.
`
`Defendants argue that the Working Group is not an “agency” at all because it is supposedly
`
`akin to President Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, discussed in Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d
`
`1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Doc. 28, at 39. But Defendants correctly describe that Task Force as
`
`“oversee[ing] the new regulatory review process,” id. (emphasis added), not as dictating binding
`
`substantive numerical values that agencies must use when they have discretion. The Working
`
`Group bears no resemblance to the Task Force at issue in Meyer.
`
`
`
`4
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`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 12 of 39 PageID #: 824
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`Defendants argue that there is not a “final agency action” under Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
`
`at 177-78, but again, their concession that the Interim Values are binding undermines their
`
`position. Defendants overlook that finality depends on whether the Interim Values are the
`
`“consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78 (emphasis
`
`added)—not that of some future agency. They argue that the Interim Values are devoid of “direct
`
`and appreciable legal consequences,” Doc. 28, at 38, but that argument cannot be squared with
`
`their concession that the Interim Values are binding on federal agencies now. The fact that all
`
`federal agencies with any leeway to consider such costs will now do so, and will use the Working
`
`Group’s specific numbers, is a “direct and appreciable legal consequence[],” id., of enormous
`
`practical import. And it directly forecloses the States from meaningful participation in future
`
`rulemakings of other agencies.
`
`In light of Defendants’ concessions, these and all Defendants’ other arguments lack merit.
`
`And their overarching narrative—that the Interim Values are merely internal and business-as-usual
`
`for the Executive Branch—fails even cursory review. Creating a secretive, “super” agency by
`
`executive fiat that directs other agencies to use specific valuations of costs in “regulations and
`
`other relevant agency actions” is not business-as-usual. E.O. 13990 §5(b)(ii)(a). Breaking with
`
`standard APA practice and publishing such rules without notice and comment does not “allow for
`
`meaningful and informed comment,” and is not business-as-usual. Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57
`
`F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Plaintiff States have suffered and will suffer injury from the
`
`Working Group’s increasing the social cost of carbon from roughly $7 to $51 (more than 700%)
`
`without engaging in rulemaking under the APA. Plaintiff States have already suffered injury from
`
`this procedural failure. California v. Trump, No. CV 19-960 (RDM), 2020 WL 1643858, at *14
`
`(D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2020). Plaintiff States have also alleged that they will imminently suffer future
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 13 of 39 PageID #: 825
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`injury to their sovereignty and their pocketbooks from future agency actions using the Interim
`
`Values that increase the costs of goods that they buy and diminish their tax revenue. E.g., Am.
`
`Compl. ¶ 184. Plaintiff States have alleged a “predictable effect of Government action on the
`
`decisions of third parties.” Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2566. Plaintiffs have standing, the issues
`
`are ripe, and the Executive’s actions are indefensible on the merits.
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`“A court deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) must distinguish between a ‘facial attack’
`
`and a ‘factual attack’ on jurisdiction.” Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir.
`
`2016). Under “a facial attack, ‘the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings, and the non-
`
`moving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under
`
`Rule 12(b)(6).’” Id. Although Defendants failed to include a standard of review and specify what
`
`kind of motion they filed, a fair reading indicates that they claim the injuries pleaded on the face
`
`of the Amended Complaint are legally insufficient—i.e., a “facial attack.” Plaintiff States reserve
`
`the right to respond should any dispute arise.
`
`To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
`
`matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`
`556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A
`
`complaint that does not raise a plausible claim to relief is legally insufficient. Couzens v. Donohue,
`
`854 F.3d 508, 518 (8th Cir. 2017) (dismissing complaint because asserted cause of action
`
`unrecognized); Brown v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 738 F.3d 926, 935 (8th Cir. 2013).
`
`“A claim is plausibly pleaded when its “factual context ... allows the court to draw the reasonable
`
`inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868
`
`F.3d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 2017).
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 14 of 39 PageID #: 826
`
`I.
`
`Plaintiff States have Article III standing.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`Plaintiff States have alleged facts showing actual injury and a substantial risk of injury
`
`based on the Interim Values increasing the burden of regulations in favor of future benefits and
`
`interfering with their proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign interests. The Amended
`
`Complaint alleges both procedural injury and future injuries, and these injuries are traceable back
`
`to the Interim Values due to Executive Order 13990 binding agency action.
`
`Article III standing requires an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or
`
`imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”
`
`Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). To satisfy the sufficiently traceable
`
`prong, plaintiff may rely “on the predictable effect of Government action on the decisions of third
`
`parties.” Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2566. “An allegation of future injury may suffice if the
`
`threatened injury is “certainly impending,” or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”
`
`Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409).
`
`Plaintiff must support each element “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the
`
`successive stages of the litigation.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. 158 (quoting Lujan v. Defs.
`
`of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). “[O]ne party with standing is sufficient,” Rumsfeld v.
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`FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006).
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`Defendants claim that Plaintiff States cannot show any aspect of standing for any of their
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`claims. Doc. 28 at Part I.A. Looking at the claims en masse, Defendants assert that any threatened
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`injury is speculative because any injury can only arise from future regulations issued by different
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`agencies. Id. at 15–16. But the whole point of the Interim Values is to mandate their usage in
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`federal agency actions to justify increased regulatory costs. The proposition that these burdens
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`7
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`may not come to pass because the agencies are “independent decisionmakers” contradicts
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`Defendants’ concession that the Interim Values are binding unless foreclosed by statute, including
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`the many times where the agency claims discretion. Id. at 23, 45.
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`Due to this future-injury issue, Defendants assert that any injury cannot be traced to the
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`Working Group. Id. at 21–22. They allege that the Court cannot grant relief as even without
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`Executive Order 13990, agencies would use the Interim Values because they are the “best available
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`science.” Id. at 24. Plaintiff States correctly note that no agency could rely on the Interim Values
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`when both their expert affidavit, and the 2021 TSD itself, explain that, in fact, the Interim Values
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`do “not reflect the tremendous increase in the scientific and economic understanding of climate-
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`related damages that has occurred in the past decade.” 2021 TSD at 22. This is exactly the
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`impending harm Plaintiff States pleaded to satisfy standing.
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`Defendants’ assertions ask the Court to believe that executive departments will disobey an
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`Executive Order requiring them to use the Interim Values in agency actions when monetizing the
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`benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. That is not a plausible prediction.
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`A. Plaintiffs States have suffered a clear procedural injury.
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`Plaintiff States have suffered a procedural injury because the Interim Values are effective
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`now as a final rule that did not go through APA procedures, including notice-and-comment and
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`judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706. Count III alleges that the Working Group failed to utilize
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`APA procedures in promulgating the Interim Values, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 144–145, 211–218, and that
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`the Interim Values could not be promulgated because they are arbitrary and capricious,
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`unreasonable, contrary to law, and in excess of authority, id. ¶¶ 147–151, 219–228.
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`This injury has already occurred, as members of the interested public, like Plaintiff States,
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`were deprived of the opportunity to meaningfully comment (or comment at all) on the Interim
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`8
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 35 Filed: 07/02/21 Page: 16 of 39 PageID #: 828
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`Values. Connecticut Light & Power, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (1982). The comment period should “give
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`affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the record to support their objections to the
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`rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial review.” Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652
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`F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011). This, of course, should occur before the rule is finalized. 5 U.S.C.
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`§ 553(c). And “post-promulgation comments [are] an inadequate substitute for APA procedures.”
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`United States v. Johnson,