UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
`CENTRAL DIVISION
`
`
`
`Case No.: 2:24-cv-04055-BCW
`
`
`
`
`Hon. Brian C. Wimes
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`CAREY COURTRIGHT, Individually and on
`behalf of K.C., a Minor,
`
`
`
`
`
`EPIC GAMES, INC.; ROBLOX CORP.;
`MOJANG AB; MICROSOFT CORP.; META
`PLATFORMS, INC.; GOOGLE LLC;
`ANOTHER AXIOM, INC.; REC ROOM, INC.;
`VRCHAT INC.; BANANA ANALYTICS, LLC;
`AND JANE & JOHN DOE I-XX,
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`REPLY SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT OF
`DEVELOPER DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
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`
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`Case 2:24-cv-04055-BCW Document 171 Filed 11/19/24 Page 1 of 31
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page(s)
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`INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 1
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`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 2
`
`I.
`
`The First Amendment Bars Each of Plaintiff’s Claims ........................................ 2
`
`A.
`
`The Allegedly Addictive “Defects” in Developer
`
`Defendants’ Games Are Protected, Expressive Content, Not
`
`Conduct ..................................................................................................... 3
`
`B.
`
`The First Amendment Bars Claims Targeting Developer
`
`Defendants’ Allegedly Inadequate Parental Controls and
`
`Failure to Warn ......................................................................................... 9
`
`C.
`
`Plaintiff’s Other Arguments Fail to Overcome the First
`
`Amendment ............................................................................................. 10
`
`II.
`
`Plaintiff’s Claims Fail for Multiple Other Reasons ............................................ 12
`
`A.
`
`Plaintiff Fails to Allege Proximate Causation ........................................ 12
`
`B.
`
`Developer Defendants’ Video Games Are Expressive,
`
`Intangible Media, Not Products .............................................................. 13
`
`C.
`
`Developer Defendants Owe Plaintiff No Legal Duty ............................. 16
`
`D.
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`Plaintiff Cannot Rely on COPPA to Support Her
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`Negligence Per Se Claim ........................................................................ 16
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`E.
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`Plaintiff Fails to Plead Fraud-Based Claims with
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`Particularity ............................................................................................. 17
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`F.
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`Plaintiff’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
`
`Claim Fails .............................................................................................. 18
`
`G.
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`Plaintiff’s Loss of Consortium Claim Fails ............................................ 19
`
`H.
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`Plaintiff’s Civil Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting
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`Claims Fail .............................................................................................. 20
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`CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 20
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`

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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`A.H. ex rel. Hubbard v. Midwest Bus Sales, Inc.,
`823 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................... 12
`
`ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez,
`679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................................ 6
`
`Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick,
`244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................... 2, 14
`
`Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach,
`621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................................... 7
`
`Balke v. Cent. Missouri Elec. Coop.,
`966 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ............................................................................... 14
`
`Barbera v. Brod-Dugan Co.,
`770 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) ............................................................................. 20
`
`Bill v. Superior Ct.,
`137 Cal. App. 3d 1002 (Ct. App. 1982) .......................................................................... 10
`
`Blake v. Career Educ. Corp.,
`2009 WL 140742 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009) ................................................................... 17
`
`Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n,
`564 U.S. 786 (2011) ................................................................................................. Passim
`
`CGB Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Baumgart,
`504 F. Supp. 3d 1006 (E.D. Mo. 2020)........................................................................... 20
`
`Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
`501 U.S. 663 (1991) .......................................................................................................... 7
`
`Dancin Dev., L.L.C. v. NRT Missouri, Inc.,
`291 S.W.3d 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) ............................................................................. 17
`
`Ent. Software Ass’n v. Swanson,
`519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................ 2
`
`Estate of B.H. v. Netflix, Inc.,
`2022 WL 551701 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022) ....................................................... 11, 13, 15
`
`iii
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`
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`Freitas v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.,
`703 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2013) .......................................................................................... 17
`
`Gillis v. Principia Corp.,
`111 F. Supp. 3d 978 (E.D. Mo. 2015)............................................................................. 19
`
`Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc.,
`464 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)............................................................................. 15
`
`Green v. Miss United States of Am.,
`52 F.4th 773 (9th Cir. 2022) ........................................................................................... 12
`
`Hobbs v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc.,
`152 S.W.3d 367 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) ............................................................................. 15
`
`In re Blackbaud, Inc., Customer Data Breach Litig.,
`567 F. Supp. 3d 667 (D.S.C. 2021) ................................................................................. 17
`
`In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prod. Litig.,
`25 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ................................................................................ 10
`
`Interactive Digital Software Assn’s v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo.,
`329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................. 2, 6, 16
`
`James v. Meow Media, Inc.,
`300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................ 8, 13, 15
`
`Johnson v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc.,
`885 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1994) ........................................................................................... 16
`
`Jones v. Google LLC,
`73 F.4th 636 (9th Cir. 2023) ........................................................................................... 17
`
`King v. Ellis,
`359 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1962) ........................................................................................... 13
`
`Latham v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`818 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ............................................................................. 14
`
`Lawton v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc.,
`2024 WL 2318623 (W.D. Mo. May 20, 2024) ............................................................... 12
`
`McDannel v. City of Gladstone,
`2024 WL 4189745 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 2024) .............................................................. 19
`
`Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,
`74 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .............................................................................. 6
`
`iv
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`
`
`Moody v. NetChoice, LLC,
`144 S. Ct. 2383 (2024) ...................................................................................................... 7
`
`NetChoice v. Bonta,
`113 F.4th 1101 (9th Cir. 2024) ....................................................................................... 10
`
`NetChoice, LLC v. Reyes,
`2024 WL 4135626 (D. Utah Sept. 10, 2024) .................................................................... 9
`
`NetChoice, LLC v. Yost,
`716 F. Supp. 3d 539 (S.D. Ohio 2024) ............................................................................. 9
`
`Nigro v. Rsch. Coll. of Nursing,
`876 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ............................................................................. 18
`
`Perkins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
`2021 WL 3472636 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 6, 2021) .................................................................. 14
`
`Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Newman,
`51 F.4th 1125 (9th Cir. 2022) ........................................................................................... 7
`
`In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prod. Liab. Litig.,
`702 F. Supp. 3d 809 (N.D. Cal. 2023) .............................................................................. 8
`
`Sanders v. Acclaim Ent., Inc.,
`188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002) ..................................................................... Passim
`
`Schneider v. BJC Healthcare Sys.,
`2009 WL 1176273 (E.D. Mo. May 1, 2009) .................................................................. 18
`
`Shervin v. Huntleigh Sec. Corp.,
`85 S.W.3d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) ............................................................................... 18
`
`Switon v. Exel Inc.,
`2024 WL 3527247 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2024) ................................................................ 19
`
`Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero,
`936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................ 6, 7
`
`Thornburg v. Fed. Express Corp.,
`62 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) ............................................................................... 19
`
`Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
`273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)............................................................................................ 11
`
`Watters v. TSR, Inc.,
`715 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Ky. 1989) ............................................................................. 2, 10
`
`v
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`
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`Watters v. TSR, Inc.,
`904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................................... 2, 16
`
`Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab’y, Inc.,
`797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).......................................................................................... 11
`
`Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc.,
`198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002) ................................................................... 2, 12, 13
`
`Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
`938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) .......................................................................................... 8
`
`Wright v. Barr,
`62 S.W.3d 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) ............................................................................... 20
`
`Zamora v. C.B.S.,
`480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) ........................................................................ 2, 12, 16
`
`Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc.,
`10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)............................................................................... 11
`
`Zutz v. Nelson,
`601 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................................... 20
`
`Statutes
`
`15 U.S.C. § 6502(d) .................................................................................................................... 17
`
`Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.71 ................................................................................................. 15
`
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`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff’s Opposition urges this Court to defy binding precedent, staking out the
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`extraordinary position that “the First Amendment” is “simply [] not applicable” to her claims
`
`targeting video games. ECF 160, Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Opp’n”) at 37. The Supreme
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`Court already rejected that argument in Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, holding that video games
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`and their “features” are “as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.”
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`564 U.S. 786, 796 n.4 (2011).
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`Although the Opposition acknowledges that the First Amendment protects “the
`
`dissemination of ideas or content” and “expressive conduct,” Opp’n at 36-37, it almost entirely
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`ignores the First Amendment’s application to this case. Instead, it draws a false distinction between
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`a video game’s “content” and Developer Defendants’ “conduct” in designing their games—a
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`distinction with far-reaching ramifications for all forms of media, arts, and entertainment and
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`which no court has adopted. The distinction is also untethered from the Amended Complaint,
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`which alleges that content of Developer Defendants’ games makes them addictive. Perhaps
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`because of this, the Opposition never quite settles on what the supposed “conduct” is—instead
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`alluding to unspecified “non-expressive” or “addictive” design choices without explaining what
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`those could be. E.g., id. at 37-38.
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`Since filing her Opposition, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Microsoft Corporation and
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`Mojang AB (collectively, the “Microsoft Defendants”) from this action. ECF 165, Notice of
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`Dismissal. Because the Amended Complaint lumps all defendants together, the dismissal of the
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`Microsoft Defendants makes Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Developer Defendants1 even
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`1 Following Plaintiff’s dismissal of the Microsoft Defendants, the “Developer Defendants”
`includes Epic Games, Inc., Another Axiom Inc., Rec Room Inc., Banana Analytics, LLC, and
`VRChat Inc.
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`more deficient. Among other things, the Amended Complaint fails to identify which allegations
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`apply to which remaining Developer Defendants. Further complicating matters, Plaintiff addresses
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`her arguments throughout the Opposition towards video games (Call of Duty, World of Warcraft
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`and Overwatch) that are created by non-party Activision Blizzard, Inc. (“Activision”) and are not
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`part of this case. Opp’n at 17-20, 33-34, 36.
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`In Fortnite, Gorilla Tag, Rec Room, Capuchin, and VRChat, Developer Defendants have
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`accomplished what many game developers or other artists only hope to do: create content that
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`delights and entertains millions. Under Brown, the First Amendment protects that expressive
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`endeavor. For these and the other reasons described below, the Amended Complaint should be
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`dismissed with prejudice.
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`ARGUMENT
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`I.
`
`The First Amendment Bars Each of Plaintiff’s Claims
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`The First Amendment prohibits video game censorship even if sought “solely to protect
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`the young from ideas or images” some consider “unsuitable[.]” Brown, 564 U.S. at 790, 795; see
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`also, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001); Interactive
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`Digital Software Assn’s v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2003); Ent. Software
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`Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2008). Characterizing expression as “addictive”
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`does not diminish this protection. See, e.g., Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167,
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`182 (D. Conn. 2002) (First Amendment barred claims based on video game’s allegedly “addictive
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`power”); Zamora v. C.B.S., 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (First Amendment barred suit
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`alleging minor became “addicted to” violent television); Watters v. TSR, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 819,
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`820 (W.D. Ky. 1989) (similar), aff’d, 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990); Sanders v. Acclaim Ent., Inc.,
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`188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1268, 1279-80 (D. Colo. 2002) (similar).
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`A.
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`The Allegedly Addictive “Defects” in Developer Defendants’ Games
`Are Protected, Expressive Content, Not Conduct
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`Confronted with binding First Amendment precedent, the Opposition proposes an illusory
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`distinction between a game’s “content” and Developer Defendants’ alleged “conduct.” Opp’n at
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`36-42. The Opposition refers to unspecified “non-expressive” and “addictive” “design choices” to
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`which the First Amendment purportedly does not apply. Id. This distinction—the Opposition’s
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`sole ground for rejecting Brown, Sanders, Midway, and the rest, id. at 38-39—fails.
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`First, the purported distinction ignores and mischaracterizes Plaintiff’s own allegations.
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`The Amended Complaint includes extensive allegations claiming that K.C. became addicted to
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`Fortnite, Gorilla Tag, Rec Room, Capuchin, and VRChat because of the expressive elements of
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`those games. This supposedly “addictive” game content includes:
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` Engaging graphics:
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`o Fortnite’s “bright and vibrant colors and cartoonish representation of the
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`game,” which keeps players “drawn in.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 212, 223.
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` Varied gameplay:
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`o Fortnite’s “continual gameplay variety,” including “random rewards,” “daily
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`quests,” and new rollouts that include “engaging and fresh features, new maps,
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`live events, and the latest trends”; these game “mechanics” “inject elements of
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`variety, allowing [players] to find ideal hiding spots, loot drops, explore the
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`map, build towers and forts,” thus “ensur[ing] that [players] never once get
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`bored.” Id. ¶¶ 213-214, 223.
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`o Rec Room’s “immersive” and “simplistic game design and easy gameplay,”
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`which offers numerous “creative opportunities” and access to creative
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`“developer tools,” and “entice[s]” players “to spend countless hours engaged
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`with” the game and results in the player’s “complete immersion in a multi-user,
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`virtual world.” Id. ¶¶ 72-77*, 83-86*, 90*.2
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`o VRChat’s “varied gameplay” across “thousands of connected worlds in which
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`players can interact with each other through virtual avatars,” including at “a
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`number of events and conventions in its virtual world” and through creative
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`“developer tools” allowing players to create and then “monetize their in-game
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`creations.” Id. ¶¶ 400, 404, 407, 414.
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`o Gorilla Tag’s “multiple game modes,” featuring “clean movements, simple
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`controls, and easy-to-understand gameplay” and “immersive VR systems” that
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`“allow users to escape reality for hours at a time” and provide “intense
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`psychological rewards and cause compulsive use.” Id. ¶¶ 429, 439, 441.
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`o Capuchin’s “thrilling and social VR interactions,” including “exciting
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`challenges” in which “players have to avoid being eaten by monster[s]” while
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`“embody[ing] monkey avatars” and mov[ing] using a “distinctive method of
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`movement [that] enhances the immersive nature of the game”; these game
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`elements “take[] advantage of the user’s immersion in the virtual world to target
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`and addict” players. Id. ¶¶ 460-461, 466-467.
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` Dynamic difficulty:
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`o Developer Defendants’ “rubber-banding” and “feedback loops,” which
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`“enhance the [player’s] experience by maintaining a consistent level of
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`challenge.” Id. ¶¶ 144, 164-165.
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`o Fortnite’s “near miss” effect, which “ensures that [players] lose[ ] by only a
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`slight margin” when they lose, and “variable interval schedule,” which rewards
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`players for their victories. Id. ¶¶ 210-211.
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`2 The Amended Complaint skips from ¶ 298 to ¶ 71 on page 102, and then from ¶ 105 to ¶ 299 on
`page 110. To avoid confusion, this brief denotes these misnumbered paragraphs with an asterisk.
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` Personalized content:
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`o Developer Defendants’ “microtransactions,” including “loot boxes,” via which
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`players can acquire “cosmetic or aesthetic items that can be used to customize
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`characters or weapons.” Id. ¶¶ 143.
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`o Fortnite’s microtransactions using V-Bucks, which players can earn through
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`gameplay or purchase, and then spend to unlock “cosmetic items like character
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`models or . . . a tiered progression of customization rewards.” Id. ¶ 204.
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`o Rec Room’s “tokens” that can be used “to purchase cosmetic items,
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`consumables,
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`and
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`other . . . upgrades”
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`to
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`“customize
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`and
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`dress
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`their . . . avatar.” Id. ¶ 80-81*.
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`o VRChat’s “expressive cosmetic items,” including options to acquire “custom
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`user icons,” “badge[s] to display on their profile,” “avatars,” and “in-game
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`creations” created by other users. Id. ¶¶ 405-407, 414.
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`o Capuchin’s “bananas” that can be used to acquire “cosmetic . . . upgrades for a
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`user’s avatar” and “to personalize a user’s in-game character,” “allow[ing] for
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`a diverse and visually appealing community” while also “keep[ing] users
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`engaged.” Id. ¶¶ 463-465, 467.
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`Instead of explaining how these game elements could be “non-expressive,” the Opposition
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`claims Developer Defendants are trying to “change Plaintiff’s allegations so that they target
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`content and expression when they clearly do not.” Opp’n at 37. In contrast to the Developer
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`Defendants’ direct quotes from the Amended Complaint, the Opposition does not affirmatively
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`identify even one affirmative allegation supporting Plaintiff’s “conduct versus content”
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`distinction. See Opp’n at 36-41. Other than a single “see generally” cite gesturing to the entire 991-
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`paragraph pleading, see id. at 36, the Opposition’s First Amendment argument is devoid of
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`citations to the Amended Complaint. In short, Plaintiff targets the very essence of the experiences
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`that Fortnite, Gorilla Tag, Rec Room, Capuchin, and VRChat offer, claiming Developer
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`Defendants should have made entirely different games—ones that are less vibrant, less
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`personalized, and less entertaining.
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`There is no daylight between Plaintiff’s claims and Brown. The engaging graphics, varied
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`gameplay, expansive game worlds, dynamic difficulty, multiplayer options, and personalized
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`content the Complaint targets are artistic choices that enhance interactivity and “communicate
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`ideas” to the player. Brown, 564 U.S. at 790. And they are features “distinctive to the medium,”
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`which Brown held to be protected. Id.; see also, e.g., Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard,
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`Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (video game’s “highly realistic visual graphics,
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`complex narratives, distinctive use of music and sound, and multitude of dimensions on which
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`players may interact with the game and one another” entitled it to First Amendment protection).
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`Second, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly rejected similar attempts to divide artistic works
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`into expressive and allegedly nonexpressive components. In Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, the
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`court rejected the very argument the Opposition makes: that “producing” expression is unprotected
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`“conduct.” 936 F.3d 740, 752 (8th Cir. 2019). The Lucero court explained that, even though
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`“producing a video requires several actions that, individually, might be mere conduct . . . what
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`matters . . . is that these activities come together to produce finished videos that are media for the
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`communication of ideas.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v.
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`Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595-97 (7th Cir. 2012) (the First Amendment protects the inputs that
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`“facilitate[]” content creation just as much as the resulting expressive work). In Interactive Digital
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`Software Association, the Eighth Circuit likewise rejected a purported distinction between “the
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`expressive parts of [a video] game,” such as its “story lines,” and the player-controlled, interactive
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`portions of the game. 329 F.3d at 957. The Opposition fails to mention these cases, let alone
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`explain why this Court is not bound by this Eighth Circuit precedent expressly rejecting the
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`argument that “producing” expression is unprotected “conduct”—“[s]peech is not conduct just
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`because [plaintiff] says it is.” Lucero, 936 F.3d at 752.
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`The Opposition’s reliance on Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach further undermines its
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`purported distinction between speech and conduct. Opp’n at 37 (citing Anderson, 621 F.3d 1051
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`(9th Cir. 2010)). As the Opposition concedes, Anderson reaffirms that “the process of creation of
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`expression is intertwined with the expression itself and . . . warrants First Amendment protection.”
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`Id. The Opposition never explains how Developer Defendants’ alleged “design choices” fall
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`outside “the process of creation of expression.” Id. And Anderson, which recognizes that
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`“design[ing]” a creative work is “expressive activity,” would in any event foreclose that position.
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`621 F.3d at 1062; see also Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 144 S. Ct. 2383, 2393 (2024) (those who
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`“create express[ion] . . . receive the First Amendment’s protection.”).3
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`Third, Plaintiff relies on cases regarding misconduct by journalists that stand for the
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`unremarkable proposition that “journalists must obey laws of general applicability” when
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`investigating and reporting the news. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Newman, 51 F.4th
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`1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2022) (journalists liable for “forging signatures, creating and procuring fake
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`driver’s licenses, and breaching contracts”); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,
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`670 (1991) (journalist liable for identifying confidential source despite promising not to). These
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`cases are inapplicable when it is “the content of publications that would trigger liability.” Cohen,
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`501 U.S. at 670. Far from having a mere “incidental” effect on speech, as in Cohen and the cases
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`following it, the Amended Complaint aims squarely at Developer Defendants’ protected
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`expression. See Am. Compl. ¶ 223 (Fortnite’s “addictive features” include “a ‘near miss’ effect,
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`3 Although the Opposition argues First Amendment protection does not extend to “device[s] or
`tool[s] used in the process” of creating expression, Opp’n at 37, Anderson nowhere draws the
`distinction that Plaintiff suggests. See generally 621 F.3d 1051.
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`loot boxes, random rewards, bright and vibrant colors, and continual gameplay variety”), id. ¶ 414
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`(VRChat’s “addictive features” include “varied gameplay, microtransactions, expressive cosmetic
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`items, social interaction, and opportunities to monetize creations”); see also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 135, 143-
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`144, 164, 194, 212-214, 269, 279, 282, 405, 465.
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`Even the outlier case identified in the Opposition reaffirmed that “ideas, thoughts, and free
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`expression” are not a proper basis for products liability. In re Soc. Media Adolescent
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`Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prod. Liab. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 3d 809, 843 (N.D. Cal. 2023).4 The court
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`reasoned that, because social media applications recommend and deliver expression created by
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`others, protected speech was not at issue, allowing certain product liability claims to proceed. Id.
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`at 847. But the court also expressly distinguished that theory from claims accusing video games
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`of products liability, which are a direct expression of the ideas of video game developers. Id. at
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`842, 849-52.5
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`In sum, the Opposition’s argument ignores the Amended Complaint’s allegations that K.C.
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`purportedly became addicted to Fortnite, Gorilla Tag, Rec Room, Capuchin, and VRChat because
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`of the expressive aspects of these games. Instead, it offers this Court a purported distinction
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`between creative content and “the creator’s conduct” in making it, which the Eighth Circuit has
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`already rejected.
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`4 This decision has not been reviewed, much less accepted or adopted, by any appellate court, in
`contrast to the long line of appellate authority holding that video games and other expressive media
`are not subject to product liability law. See, e.g., James, 300 F.3d at 701 (“video game[s] . . . are
`not sufficiently ‘tangible’ to constitute products in the sense of their communicative content”);
`Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991) (similar).
`5 Even in In re Social Media, the court held that the First Amendment barred claims against the
`social media defendants to the extent such claims were based on their own speech. See In re Soc.
`Media, 702 F. Supp. 3d at 837 (“[T]he timing and clustering of notifications of defendants’ content
`to increase addictive use is entitled to First Amendment protection”).
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`B.
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`The First Amendment Bars Claims Targeting Developer Defendants’
`Allegedly Inadequate Parental Controls and Failure to Warn
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`The Opposition specifically identifies two categories of “defect” to which it claims “[t]he
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`First Amendment is simply inapplicable”: (1) the games’ allegedly inadequate “parental controls[]
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`and self-limiting tools” and (2) Developer Defendants’ supposed failure to warn players. Opp’n at
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`39. These arguments again mischaracterize both the Amended Complaint’s allegations and the
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`law.
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`With respect to the first category, the Amended Complaint impermissibly lumps
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`defendants together and vaguely asserts “each Defendant” failed to implement adequate parental
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`controls and time limits. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 541-542, 593, 690. But this is not what Plaintiff
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`alleges makes Fortnite, Gorilla Tag, Rec Room, Capuchin, and VRChat defective. The allegedly
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`addiction-causing “defects” are the games’ art styles, gameplay, difficulty levels, personalization
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`options, and game worlds, see Section I.B, supra—precisely the kind of expression protected under
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`Brown, 564 U.S. at 790.
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`Even if allegedly inadequate parental controls and self-limiting tools formed the basis for
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`Plaintiff’s addiction claims, the First Amendment would still apply. The First Amendment does
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`not permit liability based on minors’ access to expressive speech. Id. at 795 n.3, 804-05 (striking
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`down statute restricting sale of violent video games to minors); see also, e.g., NetChoice, LLC v.
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`Yost, 716 F. Supp. 3d 539, 558 (S.D. Ohio 2024) (the law may not be wielded to “prevent children
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`from hearing or saying anything without their parents’ prior consent” (quotation marks omitted));
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`NetChoice, LLC v. Reyes, 2024 WL 4135626, at *13 & n.135 (D. Utah Sept. 10, 2024) (similar).
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`The First Amendment applies with equal force whether the claims arise from video game content
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`or from a failure to limit access to that content.
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`With respect to the second category, the Opposition argues that Developer Defendants’
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`alleged failure to warn “is entirely content agnostic.” Opp’n at 40. Not so. The Opposition asserts
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`that Developer Defendants should have warned of “defectively designed features that [allegedly]
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`make the games dangerously addictive,” id.—in other words, Developer Defendants should have
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`warned about the games’ expressive content. See ECF 147, Developer Defs.’ Suggestions Supp.
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`Mot. Dismiss (“Mem.”) at 4, 11-23 (explaining that the alleged defectively designed features are
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`themselves expressive content and are intertwined with other expression). Just as books are not
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`required to warn readers of chapter-ending cliffhangers and songs are not required to warn listeners
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`of catchy choruses, video games are not required to warn players of fun, personalized, and
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`engaging interactive experience.
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`Plaintiff’s reliance on In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prod. Litig., 25 F. Supp.
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`2d 837, 848 (N.D. Ill. 1998), is misplaced. Opp’n at 41. That court rejected the defendant’s
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`argument that it had a First Amendment right not to disclose the danger of HIV-contaminated
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`blood—a theory that would, the court observed, obviate failure to warn liability. See In re Factor
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`VIII, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 848. In re Factor VIII has nothing to do with whether the First Amendment
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`bars claims for failure to warn about al