8:24-cv-00474-BCB-RCC Doc # 73 Filed: 04/22/25 Page 1 of 37 - Page ID # 679
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
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`
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`8:24CV474
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`
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
`MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS
`FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`
`
`
`
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`ISAIAH HOOD-BEY,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`
`
`
`CHAD M. BROWN, Judge; KEITH
`KOLLASCH, Attorney; JESSICA WALKER,
`OMAHA POLICE DEPARTMENT, DMV,
`BEAU FINLEY, Judge; MARCELA KEIM,
`DEREK R. VAUGHN, GRANT A.
`FORSBERG, THOMAS K. HARMON, STATE
`OF NEBRASKA, DOUGLAS COUNTY
`CORRECTIONS, LACEE GERWICK, SADIE
`ABOOD, KAITLIN HAHN, HALL OF
`JUSTICE-DOUGLAS, OMAHA, NE, JADYN
`ANDERSON, DR. ALYSSA BISH, DHHS,
`PROJECT HARMONY, EMILY KIERSCHT,
`Teacher; MARIA RODEN, Principal; SUNNY
`SLOPE ELEMENTARY, OMAHA PUBLIC
`SCHOOLS, CHI IMANNUEL HEALTH,
`SCOTT, Officer; TANNER REISS, RAUN L.
`ELLEB, BENJAMIN WEIDNER, AUSTIN
`BECK, LUCIANO S. RIZZO, NOAH
`ZENDEJAS, and DOUGLAS E. JOHNSON,
`
`
`Defendants.
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`Pro se plaintiff Isaiah Hood-Bey brings this suit against 33 defendants, ranging from police
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`officers and state court judges to an elementary school and the “Hall of Justice-Douglas, Omaha,
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`NE.” Filing 1 at 6. Hood-Bey’s claim is that he was injured and his children were “kidnapped” by
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`the Department of Health and Human Services after an injury was found on his son at school and
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`his children were allegedly removed from his custody. The Court has reviewed the state court
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`docket and found five criminal prosecutions against Hood-Bey which seem to give rise to Hood-
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`Bey’s lawsuit. See State v. Isaiah Hood, Case No. CR23-6798; State v. Isaiah R Hood, Case No.
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`1
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`CR24-4952; State v. Isaiah R Hood, Case No. CR24-5367; State v. Isaiah R Hood, Case No. CR24-
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`20084; State v. Isaiah R Hood, Case No. CR25-1622. The Court takes judicial notice of these five
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`state court cases. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 108 F.4th 673, 677 n.2 (8th Cir. 2024)
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`(explaining that a court may take judicial notice of public records). It appears that the five state
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`court prosecutions stem from the four factual incidents alleged in this case, Case No. 8:24CV474,
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`two of which are police encounters also alleged in a second case before this Court, Case No.
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`8:24CV255. The Court’s review of the state court docket has also revealed that Hood-Bey has
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`outstanding warrants in all five criminal cases.
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`Hood-Bey seeks various forms of relief, including the “release of [his] children,” the
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`dismissal of multiple “Citations – Summons[es] / Ticket[s] – Suit[s] / (misrepresented) Bill[s] of
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`Exchange,” and compensatory and punitive damages from each defendant. Filing 1 at 85–87. Some
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`of the defendants have moved to dismiss Hood-Bey’s claims against them, and the Court presently
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`considers three Motions to Dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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`Filing 7; Filing 10; Filing 58. The Court also considers seven Motions for Default Judgment filed
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`by Hood-Bey, Filing 27; Filing 28; Filing 60; Filing 62; Filing 64; Filing 68; Filing 69. Hood-Bey
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`has also filed a Motion to Expedite the Court’s decision on the Motions for Default Judgment.
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`Filing 72. For the reasons below, the Court grants two of the Motions to Dismiss, grants in part
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`and denies in part the third Motion to Dismiss, denies all of the Motions for Default Judgment, and
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`denies the Motion to Expedite.
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`In this Order, the Court dismisses 14 of the 33 defendants in this case. The Court stays a
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`single claim against one police officer, not because the Court is convinced an actionable claim has
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`actually been made against that officer, but instead because the Court has determined that evidence
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`is likely needed to fully address that claim given that Hood-Bey alleges the officer injured him
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`while trying to detain him. The Court gives notice to Hood-Bey that he must file a motion seeking
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`an extension of time to serve the remaining 18 defendants providing good cause why those
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`defendants have not yet been served within the statutorily required 90 days. If Hood-Bey fails to
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`make such a motion or does not provide good cause, those claims will be dismissed as well.
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`In this case, along with Case No. 8:24CV255, Hood-Bey has purportedly tried to sue a total
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`of 34 defendants, filed hundreds of pages of documents, mailed piles of documents to the Court,
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`and made nonsensical and baseless claims against numerous people and entities. It appears Hood-
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`Bey has tried to sue anyone involved with holding him accountable for his alleged criminal
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`conduct.
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`Given Hood-Bey’s conduct in these lawsuits, the Court finds it appropriate to make sure
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`Hood-Bey knows the potential consequences of making legally frivolous claims in Federal Court.
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`A plaintiff who files frivolous claims or documents can be sanctioned and held personally
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`financially responsible for the costs associated with requiring defendants to respond to nonsense.
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`Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203–04 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that Rule 11 of the Federal
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`Rules of Civil Procedure “allows the district court to impose sanctions whenever a plaintiff”—
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`including a pro se plaintiff—“has filed a frivolous lawsuit”). In certain cases, and upon appropriate
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`legal action being taken, a plaintiff’s assets can be seized to pay for the costs associated with a
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`plaintiff’s conduct. See, e.g., Eckert v. Lane, 678 F. Supp. 773, 777 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 26, 1988)
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`(imposing Rule 11 sanctions upon a pro se plaintiff for “frivolous filings” and directing the United
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`States Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas “to collect such amount by garnishment,
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`execution, or other appropriate means”). Further, if a plaintiff persists in making frivolous filings
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`in court, the Court can ban a plaintiff from making filings or filing any lawsuits in Court for a
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`certain duration in the future. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1988) (“The Court may,
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`in its discretion, place reasonable restrictions on any litigant who files non-meritorious actions for
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`obviously malicious purposes and who generally abuses judicial process. These restrictions may
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`be directed to provide limitations or conditions on the filing of future suits.” (internal citations
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`omitted)).
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`A. Factual Background
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`Hood-Bey’s “Complaint” is a 121-page collection of documents, ranging from a list of
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`“Proclamations Affirming Moors Are Aboriginals” and a copy of the “Declaration of The Rights
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`of The Child” to Omaha Police Department incident reports and a heavily annotated narrative
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`report from the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. See, e.g., Filing 1 at 12, 22,
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`27, 33. The Court has determined that two documents in particular function as Hood-Bey’s
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`operative Complaint: the form document titled “Complaint for a Civil Case” spanning the first six
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`pages of Filing 1 and the document titled “Legal Notice of Removal”1 found on pages 73 to 88 of
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`Filing 1. The Court refers to these two documents together as the Complaint and thus draws the
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`factual background to the case from the nonconclusory allegations contained in these documents.
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`See Bauer v. AGA Serv. Co., 25 F.4th 587, 589 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing Pietoso, Inc. v. Republic
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`Servs., Inc., 4 F.4th 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2021)). As for the remaining 99 pages of appended material,
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`the Court will only address this material to the degree that it is incorporated in or referenced by
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`the Complaint. Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2004)
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`1 The “Legal Notice of Removal” contains all the hallmarks of a typical complaint, including discussions of
`jurisdiction, the parties, Hood-Bey’s cause of action, and his request for relief, as well as a demand for jury trial. See
`Filing 1 at 73–88. Liberally construing this document and all 121 pages of Hood-Bey’s docketed “Complaint,” as the
`Court must, the Court concludes that the “Legal Notice of Removal” is properly construed as an operative pleading.
`See Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (“A pro se complaint must be liberally
`construed, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), and ‘pro se litigants are held to
`a lesser pleading standard than other parties[,]’ Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402, 128 S.Ct. 1147,
`170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2018).”).
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`(“Though matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in deciding a Rule 12 motion to
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`dismiss, documents necessarily embraced by the complaint are not matters outside the pleading.”
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`(quotations omitted)).
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`Based on the “Cause of Action” section in Hood-Bey’s Complaint, all his claims against
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`all the defendants appear to arise out of four undated incidents. Filing 1 at 76–78. The first two
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`incidents are similar in nature: it appears that on two occasions, Hood-Bey was detained by police
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`officers while he was parked in his vehicle and that each time, he was charged with violating
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`multiple statutes (which Hood-Bey claims are private policies “being classed as law”). Filing 1 at
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`76. Hood-Bey provides noticeably more factual allegations regarding the third and fourth
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`incidents. The third incident allegedly took place while Hood-Bey was parked at a gas station and
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`“[s]eeking help” because he had been assaulted and had his keys and phone stolen in a robbery.
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`Filing 1 at 76. According to Hood-Bey, he had a difficult time communicating with police officers
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`at the gas station because he had suffered a concussion at some point. Filing 1 at 76. After Hood-
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`Bey explained his “appellation” to the officers, the officers told him that he “had warrants.” Filing
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`1 at 76. Hood-Bey alleges that when he tried to explain to the officers that he was already “taking
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`care of the matter in Federal court,” he was “told [he was] being charged for trespassing snatched
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`to the ground handcuffed and then [he] was punched in the face where [he] had [his] nose broken.”
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`Filing 1 at 76. The officers took Hood-Bey to CHI Immanuel Health to see a doctor and then to
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`Douglas County Corrections where he was allegedly placed on “Suicide Watch and Water
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`Restriction” and experienced a number of unfavorable conditions. Filing 1 at 76.
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`The fourth incident involves Hood-Bey’s family. Filing 1 at 76. According to the
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`Complaint, a teacher and an administrator at Hood-Bey’s son’s elementary school called Child
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`Protective Services after “seeing [a] 2-3 inch scratch about the size of a paper cut on [Hood-Bey’s]
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`son” and learning from the son that he received the scratch “from wrestling with his father.” Filing
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`1 at 76. Hood-Bey alleges that “the way [his son] explained [the scratch] caused a lot of havoc
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`because he lied about the events and how they took place[,] [s]tating I stabbed him with my key
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`because I grounded him due to his grades and I wouldn’t let him play his xbox,” when in reality,
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`Hood-Bey claims, the “son lies when he can’t get his way.” Filing 1 at 77. Hood-Bey asserts that
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`after the educators reported the scratch to Child Protective Services, his son and his three other
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`children were “kidnap[ped]” and made “state wards (which they are not , They are Moorish
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`American Nationals).” Filing 1 at 77 (capitalization and punctuation in the original).
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`It appears that all these incidents resulted in criminal cases against Hood-Bey that are still
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`pending in state court. See State v. Isaiah Hood, Case No. CR23-6798; State v. Isaiah R Hood,
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`Case No. CR24-4952; State v. Isaiah R Hood, Case No. CR24-5367; State v. Isaiah R Hood, Case
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`No. CR24-20084; State v. Isaiah R Hood, Case No. CR25-1622. Hood-Bey himself alerted the
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`Court to these state prosecutions by requesting the following relief in his Complaint:
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`/
`/ Ticket – Suit
`All UNCONSTITUTIONAL Citations – Summons
`(misrepresented) Bill of Exchange: Number (OP4438368, K1195830, K1205889,
`K1213132, AU20358, AU25355, C 01 CR 23 0006798, C 01 CR 24 0004952, C
`01 CR 24 0005367). , and any other ‘Order’ or ‘Action’ associated with it / them,
`to be dismissed and expunged for the record on it’s face and merits; or, otherwise,
`be brought before a legitimately – delegated, and competent ‘Court of Law’ of
`International jurisdiction / venue.
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`Filing 1 at 86 (¶ 7) (spacing, punctuation, capitalization, and spelling in the original). The Court’s
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`review of the docket for the County Court of Douglas County has revealed that the various
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`“Citations – Summons[es] / Ticket[s] – Suit[s] / (misrepresented) Bill[s] of Exchange” referenced
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`by Hood-Bey relate to these five state criminal proceedings. The Court also notes that Hood-Bey
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`has outstanding warrants in all five state court criminal cases.
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`B. Procedural Background
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`On December 10, 2024, Hood-Bey sued nearly everyone involved in the four alleged
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`incidents, including the government entities he interacted with, the police officers who detained
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`him, the judges assigned to his cases, the educators who reported his son’s injury, and the child
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`services specialists who removed his children. Filing 1 at 76–77. Specifically, Hood-Bey names
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`the following defendants: Judge Chad M. Brown; Judge Beau Finley; Judge Marcela Keim; Judge
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`Derek R. Vaughn; Judge Grant A. Forsberg; Judge Thomas K. Harmon; the State of Nebraska; the
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`DMV; Douglas County Corrections; Lacee K. Gerwick, a corrections officer; the Hall of Justice-
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`Douglas, Omaha, NE; the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS); Project
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`Harmony; Dr. Alyssa Bish, the Director of the DHHS Division of Children and Family Services;
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`Jadyn Anderson, a Children and Family Services specialist; Kaitlin Hahn, a Children and Family
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`Services specialist; Sadie Abood, a Children and Family Services specialist; Keith Kollasch, an
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`attorney; Omaha Public Schools; Sunny Slope Elementary School; Emily Kierscht, a teacher;
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`Maria Roden, a principal; CHI Immanuel Health; the Omaha Police Department; Officer Jessica
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`Walker; Officer Scott (first name unknown); Officer Tanner Reiss; Officer Raun L. Elleb; Officer
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`Benjamin Wiedner; Officer Austin Beck; Officer Luciano S. Rizzo; Officer Noah Zendejas; and
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`Officer Douglas E. Johnson. Filing 1 at 6, 73–75.
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`Hood-Bey’s Complaint does not contain specific causes of action against the defendants,
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`but instead makes general allegations of various constitutional and other violations. Hood-Bey
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`claims that most2 of the defendants:
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`knowingly and willingly conspire[ed] (under a Color-of-Authority) to deny this
`Petitioner, Isaiah Hood-Bey, (after this Petitioner made a reservation of rights and
`stating for the record: name, correct spelling of name, and national status) His
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`2 Hood-Bey omits the four School Defendants and defendant CHI Immanuel Health from the otherwise-inclusive
`list of defendants he claims “knowingly and willingly conspir[ed]” to deny his rights under the United States
`Constitution and various other treaties. Filing 1 at 78.
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`Inalienable Rights, the right to a Name and Nationality of His choosing, etc. The
`State / Judge / Accuser(s) alleged and assumed the Petitioner of being a Corporate
`Ward-ship 14th Amendment Artificial Negro Person / citizen, which resulted in an
`unlawful arrest-of-rights, immunities and liberties; which is in direct contradiction
`to, and a violation of, the Fourth (IV) Amendment of the Constitution for the United
`States (Republic); violating Article VI of the Constitution, by way of violating The
`Treaty of Peace and Friendship of EIGHTEEN HUNDRED-THRITY-SIX (1836)
`A.D.; Congressional Resolution # 75, Philadelphia Pennsylvania; a violation of
`Article 15 of ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ of Nineteen Hundred
`and Forty-Eight (1948) A.D. – General Assembly, United Nations; a violation of
`‘The Declaration of the Rights of the Child’ of
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`Nineteen
`[hyperlink
`
`Hundred
`
`and
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`Fifty-Nine(1959) A.D.
`omitted]; and violating ‘The Rights of Indigenous Peoples’; and that the Officers
`of THE STATE OF NEBRASKA knowingly committed ‘fraud’ against the
`Petitioner (Isaiah Hood-Bey) by abusing their authority, in that they failed to correct
`a known violation; and did not aid in preventing said such abuse of authority, while
`having (by law) the obligation to do so; and violated the Fifth Amendment of The
`Bill of Rights of Seventeen Hundred and Ninety-One (1791) A.D.; impeding the
`Peoples’ right to due process under the Law, and equal protection of the Law,
`Article 1 Section 10 of The Constitution for The United States of America
`(Republic) which secures this Petitioner the right to contract and conspiracy to
`commit fraud against this Petitioner and against the United States Republic.
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`Filing 1 at 78 (emphasis, spacing, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization in the original).
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`Multiple defendants have moved to dismiss Hood-Bey’s Complaint pursuant to Federal
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`Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant Keith Kollasch, an attorney, filed a Motion to Dismiss
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`the claims against him on December 30, 2024. Filing 7. On January 9, 2025, defendants Omaha
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`Public Schools, Sunny Slope Elementary School, Maria Roden, and Emily Kierscht (collectively,
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`the School Defendants) likewise moved to dismiss. Filing 10. Defendants Omaha Police
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`Department (OPD), Jessica Walker, Officer Scott, Tanner Reiss, Raun L. Elleb, Benjamin
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`Weidner, Austin Beck, Luciano S. Rizzo, Noah Zendejas, and Douglas E. Johnson (collectively,
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`the OPD Defendants) filed their Motion to Dismiss on February 6, 2025. Filing 58. In response to
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`these Motions to Dismiss, Hood-Bey has filed seven Motions for Default Judgment. Filing 27
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`(“Supplemental” Motion for Default Judgment against the School Defendants); Filing 28
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`(“Supplemental” Motion for Default Judgment against all defendants); Filing 60 (Motion for
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`Default Judgment against the OPD Defendants); Filing 62 (Motion for Default Judgment against
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`the School Defendants); Filing 64 (Motion for Default Judgment against the OPD defendants);
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`Filing 68 (Motion for Default Judgment against the OPD Defendants); Filing 69 (Motion for
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`Default Judgment against all defendants). Hood-Bey has filed a Motion for Clerks Entry of Default
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`Judgment against all the defendants, but this Motion has been stricken pursuant to NEGenR
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`1.3(a)(4) because it is a duplicate of Filing 69. Filing 70; Filing 71 (Text Strike Order). Hood-Bey
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`has also filed a Motion to Expedite the Court’s decision on the Motions for Default Judgment.
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`Filing 72.
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`II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
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`A. Preliminary Matters
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`The Court begins with a few preliminary matters before it turns to the three Motions to
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`Dismiss and Hood-Bey’s numerous Motions for Default Judgment.
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`1.
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`Hood-Bey’s Claims for Injunctive Relief
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`First, the Court addresses a threshold jurisdictional issue regarding Hood-Bey’s claims for
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`injunctive relief. The Court has already mentioned that Hood-Bey seeks the dismissal of various
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`“Citations – Summons[es] / Ticket[s] – Suit[s] / (misrepresented) Bill[s] of Exchange” related to
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`the five state court prosecutions against him. Filing 1 at 86 (¶ 7). In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
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`37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held “that concepts of comity and federalism require
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`federal courts to abstain from interfering with pending state court criminal proceedings, except
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`under ‘special circumstances’ such as bad-faith prosecution or when a criminal statute is
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`‘flagrantly and patently’ unconstitutional on its face.” Wassef v. Tibben, 68 F.4th 1083, 1086–87
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`(8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 41, 44–45, 53–54). In other words, the Younger
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`abstention doctrine dictates that “federal courts may not enjoin pending state court criminal
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`proceedings except in very unusual situations.” Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, Ark., 163
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`F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has identified a “three-part
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`inquiry” for determining whether Younger abstention applies:
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`First, does the underlying state proceeding fall within one of the three “exceptional
`circumstances” where Younger abstention is appropriate? Second, if the underlying
`proceeding fits within a Younger category, does the state proceeding satisfy what
`are known as the “Middlesex” factors? And third, even if the underlying state
`proceeding satisfies the first two inquiries, is abstention nevertheless inappropriate
`because an exception to abstention applies?
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`Wassef, 68 F.4th at 1087 (quoting 375 Slane Chapel Rd., LLC v. Stone Cnty., Missouri, 53 F.4th
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`1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2022)).
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`Younger abstention is appropriate for Hood-Bey’s claims seeking dismissal of his pending
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`state criminal charges. First, Hood-Bey’s five pending state criminal cases are “ongoing state
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`criminal prosecutions” that fall within the exact “class of cases in which federal-court abstention
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`is required” under Younger. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72, 78 (2013)
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`(“Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there
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`is a parallel pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state
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`prosecution.”). Second, to the extent the Middlesex factors bear on whether Younger applies to
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`underlying criminal proceedings, they support abstention here. The Middlesex factors evaluate
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`whether there is “(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding that (2) implicates important state
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`interests and (3) provides the federal plaintiff adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges.”
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`Wassef, 68 F.4th at 1087 (citing Middlesex Cnty Ethics Comm. V. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
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`U.S. 423, 432–35 (1982)). Hood-Bey’s state court criminal proceedings are ongoing because there
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`are outstanding warrants for his arrest in each case. See Key v. Does, 217 F.Supp.3d 1006, 1009
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`(E.D. Ark. Nov. 17, 2016) (“[I]f [the federal plaintiff] is requesting relief from an outstanding
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`warrant related to the conviction and nonpayment of fines, then this Court must abstain from
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`interfering with the ongoing state action, whether criminal or civil, absent exceptional
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`circumstances, which are not alleged.”). Additionally, “criminal proceedings implicate state
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`interests of the highest order,” Ronwin v. Dunham, 818 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 1987), and Hood-
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`Bey can “presumably raise” his constitutional claims as defenses to those criminal proceedings,
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`Cormack v. Settle-Beshears, 474 F.3d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 2007). Finally, Hood-Bey’s Complaint
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`does not allege that there was “bad faith, harassment, or some extraordinary circumstance that
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`would make abstention inappropriate.” Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F.3d at 476 (internal quotation marks
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`omitted) (quoting Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432).
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`Because Younger abstention is appropriate, the Court dismisses Hood-Bey’s claims
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`requesting the dismissal of his underlying and ongoing state criminal cases. See Wassef, 68 F.4th
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`at 1086–87, 1091. See also Auleciems v. Twp. of West Lakeland, No. 24-cv-1661, 2025 WL
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`509188, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 2025) (dismissing without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction the
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`federal plaintiff’s claims seeking injunctive relief related to his underlying state criminal case).
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`Accordingly, Hood-Bey’s claims for injunctive relief are dismissed from his Complaint.
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`2.
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`Hood-Bey’s Claims for Damages
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`Hood-Bey also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. While Younger requires courts
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`to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over claims for injunctive or declaratory relief that would
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`interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings, “[c]laims for damages are different” and
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`generally “a federal court may not decline to exercise jurisdiction over” such claims. Yamaha
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`Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate
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`Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996)). Instead, “federal courts applying abstention principles in
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`damages actions [can] enter a stay, but [the Supreme Court has] not permitted them to dismiss the
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`action altogether.” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730. In Wallace v. Kato, the Supreme Court
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`explained that where a plaintiff files a “claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending
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`or anticipated criminal trial[ ], it is within the power of the district court and in accord with
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`common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case
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`is ended.” 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007).
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`The Court will discuss Hood-Bey’s claims in more detail below, but the Court
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`acknowledges here that because the factual basis for Hood-Bey’s claims before this Court appears
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`to be the same as the factual basis for his five state court prosecutions, his claims for damages are
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`“related to rulings that will likely be made in” his ongoing state cases. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393.
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`Thus, it is within the Court’s power to stay Hood-Bey’s entire civil action. See id. However, the
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`Court concludes that a wholesale stay of Hood-Bey’s action is not appropriate because his
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`Complaint fails to state a claim as to the majority of the claims for other reasons. The Court will
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`examine those other reasons in its analysis of the Motions to Dismiss and will only exercise its
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`power to stay with respect to Hood-Bey’s claims that are not otherwise deficient.
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`3.
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`Construing Hood-Bey’s Motions for Default Judgment
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`Finally, the Court must briefly discuss the nature of Hood-Bey’s first six motions.3 Filing
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`27; Filing 28; Filing 60; Filing 62; Filing 64; Filing 68. All six motions are docketed as Motions
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`for Default Judgment, see Docket No. 8:24CV474, and to the extent that the motions actually are
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`Motions for Default Judgment, the Court addresses their merits in Section II.C. below. Upon
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`review, however, it appears that Hood-Bey’s Motions for Default Judgment also function as
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`responses to the various Motions to Dismiss. See Filing 27 at 1 (“Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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`and Counter Motion for Default Judgment”); Filing 28 at 1 (same); Filing 60 at 1 (“Response to
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`Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim”); Filing 62 at 1 (“Plaintiff’s Counter-Motion to
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`Dismiss Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Request for Relief”); Filing 64 at 1 (“Counter Motion
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`3 Unlike Hood-Bey’s first six Motions for Default Judgment, Hood-Bey’s final Motion for Default Judgment,
`Filing 69 (Motion for Default Judgment against all defendants), was not filed shortly after a Motion to Dismiss and
`does not appear to be a multipurpose document.
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`to Dismiss”); Filing 68 at 1 (same). Hood-Bey’s motions are disjointed—all of them reference
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`“legal authority” apparently underlying Hood-Bey’s claims or arguments, most of them provide a
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`“statement of facts” expanding on the minimal facts alleged in the Complaint, and some of them
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`do not even mention “default judgment” once. See, e.g., Filing 60 at 2–3 (discussing the “legal
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`authority” that allegedly supports Hood-Bey’s claims and requesting relief that does not include
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`default judgment); Filing 28-9 at 2 (outlining the “Legal and Ethical Violations” allegedly
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`committed by defendant CHI Immanuel Health and citing to statutes and cases presumably
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`demonstrating those violations); Filing 27 at 1–2 (presenting the “factual background” for Hood-
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`Bey’s claims); Filing 62 at 3 (requesting relief that does not include default judgment but does
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`include “Plaintiff’s original requested relief”). Hood-Bey’s first two motions are docketed as
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`“Supplemental” Motions for Default Judgment and are particularly unwieldy. See generally Filing
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`27; Filing 28. Both Supplemental Motions span more than 100 pages and include a document titled
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`“Exhibit A: Chronological Events that led to Both lawsuits 8:24CV00255 MDN-SMB and
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`8:24CV00474BCB-RCC” that alleges for the first time facts related to the four incidents
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`referenced in Hood-Bey’s Complaint. Filing 27-5 (“Exhibit A”); Filing 28-12 (“Exhibit A”).
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`The Court’s local rules make it clear that a party opposing a motion—including a motion
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`to dismiss—“must not file an ‘answer,’ ‘opposition,’ ‘objection,’ or ‘response,’ or any similarly
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`titled responsive pleading” but instead “must file a brief that concisely states the reason for
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`opposing the motion and cites to supporting authority” and only recites facts to the extent
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`NECivR 7.1(b)(2) permits. NECivR 7.1(b)(1)(A). “[A] party who does not follow [NECivR 7.1]
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`may be considered to have abandoned in whole or in part that party’s position on the pending
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`motion.” NECivR 7.1. Although Hood-Bey is proceeding pro se in this matter, he must still comply
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`with local rules, court orders, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ackra Direct Mktg.
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`Corp. v. Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1996) (“In general, pro se representation does
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`not excuse a party from complying with a court’s orders and with the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure.”); NEGenR 1.3(g) (“Unless stated otherwise, parties who proceed pro se are bound by
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`and must comply with all local and federal procedural rules.”). To the extent Hood-Bey intended
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`for his Motions for Default Judgment to function as responses to the moving defendants’ Motions
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`to Dismiss, Hood-Bey plainly has not complied with NECivR 7.1(b)(1)(A).
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`Instead of treating Hood-Bey’s arguments as abandoned, however, the Court is mindful
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`that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.” Olsen as Trustee for Xurex Inc. v. Di
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`Mase, 24 F.4th 1197, 1202 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
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`The Court accordingly applies a liberal construction to Hood-Bey’s six motions and, when
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`appropriate, construes them as briefs opposing the moving defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. See
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`Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. The Court will not consider factual allegations (like those in Exhibit A)
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`that were not included in Hood-Bey’s Complaint and that were first alleged in opposition to the
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`Motions to Dismiss. See Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019) (“While
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`[the plaintiff] presented additional facts in his oppositions to the motions to dismiss and now
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`presents additional facts on appeal, those factual allegations were not included in his amended
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`complaint and, thus, cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss.”). Furthermore, the Court
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`cautions Hood-Bey that he must comply with local rules, court orders, and the Federal Rules of
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`Civil Procedure in the future. See NEGenR 1.3(g); Bennet v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., 295 F.3d
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`805, 808 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff’s] pro se status did not entitle him to disregard the Federal
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`Rules of Civil Procedure, even without affirmative notice of the application of the rules to his
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`case.” (internal quotations marks omitted)).
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`B. The Motions to Dismiss
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`The Court now turns to the Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss filed by defendant Kollasch,
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`the School Defendants, and the OPD Defendants.
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`1.
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`Rule 12(b)(6) Standards
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`The typical grounds for Rule 12(b)(6) motions are the insufficiency of the factual
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`allegations offered to state claims. To state a claim, a complaint must contain “a short and plain
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`statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”