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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`
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`Case No.: 2:06-cr-00234-GMN-GWF-1
`
`ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
`SENTENCE REDUCTION
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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`Pending before the Court is Defendant Donnie Bryant’s Renewed Motion for Sentence
`
`Reduction (“MSR”) under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), (ECF No. 877). The Government
`filed a Response, (ECF No. 883), to which Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 884).
`For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Sentence
`
`Reduction because he has not met his burden of showing extraordinary and compelling reasons
`warranting such a reduction or that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors favor a reduction.
`BACKGROUND
`I.
`The Court incorporates the background and procedural history of this case from its Order
`
`
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`DONNIE BRYANT,
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`
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`Defendant.
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`Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
`Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Order 1:15–4:5, ECF No. 838). In short, in 2008,
`Defendant was convicted on several counts of Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity
`(“VICAR”) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959 and Use of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence
`in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for acts he committed when he was 16. (J., ECF No. 18).
`Defendant was initially sentenced to life imprisonment for the VICAR murder counts, plus an
`additional 50 years for his firearm offenses. (Id.). Defendant’s judgment of conviction has been
`amended several times following his sentence. (First Am. J., ECF No. 617); (Second Am. J.,
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`Case 2:06-cr-00234-GMN-GWF Document 886 Filed 05/06/24 Page 2 of 20
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`ECF No. 694); (Third Am. J., ECF No. 828); (Fourth Am. J., ECF No. 840). Defendant is now
`sentenced to 70 years imprisonment for his VICAR murder counts and firearm offenses. (See
`generally Fourth Am. J.). Defendant filed his First MSR, (ECF No. 849), which the Court
`denied without prejudice. (Order, ECF No. 865). The Court gave Defendant leave to file
`another motion for sentence reduction which remedied the deficiencies identified in its Order.
`(Id.). Defendant then filed the instant Renewed MSR, (ECF No. 877).
`LEGAL STANDARD
`II.
`Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may, in certain circumstances, grant a
`defendant’s motion to modify his or her term of imprisonment. Before filing such a motion, the
`defendant must first petition the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) for compassionate release. Id. A
`court may grant the defendant’s motion for a modification in sentence only if the motion was
`filed “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the
`[BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf” or after thirty (30) days have lapsed “from
`the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.” Id.
`If the exhaustion requirement is met, a court may modify or reduce the defendant's term
`of imprisonment “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a)]” if the
`Court finds, as relevant here, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
`reduction” and “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
`Sentencing Commission.” Id. As the movant, the defendant bears the burden to establish that
`he is eligible for compassionate release. See United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 951 (9th Cir.
`2022) (explaining it is the “[defendant’s] burden to establish his eligibility for compassionate
`release”).
`The Sentencing Commission has recently passed guidance as to when “extraordinary
`and compelling reasons” exist for compassionate release. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). Such
`circumstances include, among others: (1) the medical circumstances of the defendant, (2) the
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`Case 2:06-cr-00234-GMN-GWF Document 886 Filed 05/06/24 Page 3 of 20
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`advanced age of the defendant resulting in “a serious deterioration in physical or mental
`health,” (3)“[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child,” (4)
`the defendant, while in custody was the victim of sexual or physical abuse, or (5) “other
`circumstance or combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together
`with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those
`described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” Id.
`III. DISCUSSION
`The Government does not dispute that Defendant has exhausted his administrative
`remedies. (See generally Resp., ECF No. 877). As such, the Court turns to whether Defendant
`has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction. Here,
`Defendant argues that a sentence reduction is warranted because: (1) there is a sentencing
`disparity between the sentence he received and the sentence he would likely receive under
`present sentencing law; (2) there is an impermissible sentencing disparity between his sentence
`and that of his codefendant Johnathon Toliver, especially when considering Defendant’s
`juvenile status at the time of his offense; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.1
`(See Renewed MSR). The Court examines each reason in turn.
`///
`///
`///
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`
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`1 Defendant also requests that the Court recalculate his criminal history score to remove two points that he
`contends were improperly added under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). (Renewed MSR 16:3–7). U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d)
`provides that two points should be added to the defendant’s criminal history score “if the defendant committed
`the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release,
`imprisonment, work release, or escape status.” It is true that Defendant committed the instant offense while
`under supervised release for his 2004 conviction of Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (Murder and
`Conspiracy to Commit Murder). (ECF No. 878-1, SEALED PSR ¶ 85). However, in calculating Defendant’s
`criminal history score, his PSR did not add any criminal history points for committing this offense while under
`supervised release. (See generally PSR ¶ 87). Instead, Defendant was assigned four criminal history points for
`three prior convictions. (Id.). Accordingly, the Court declines to recalculate his criminal history score.
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`Case 2:06-cr-00234-GMN-GWF Document 886 Filed 05/06/24 Page 4 of 20
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`A. Sentencing Disparity Following Passage of the First Step Act (“FSA”)
`First, Defendant argues that a sentence reduction is warranted because his sentence was
`impermissibly “stacked” as to his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Renewed MSR 8:18–
`13:7). The Government counters Defendant’s sentence was not stacked, as each of his § 924(c)
`convictions received only a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)
`because he discharged a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. (Resp. 4:3–24).
`Prior to the FSA, prosecutors were permitted to “stack” multiple counts of § 924(c)
`firearm violations, which resulted in defendants without previous convictions being charged for
`both a first offense—carrying a five-year mandatory minimum—and a “second or subsequent
`offense” —carrying a mandatory 20 or 25-year sentence, to be served consecutively—in the
`same indictment. United States v. Jones, 482 F. Supp. 3d 969, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing
`Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)). Thus, someone convicted of two § 924(c)
`counts in a single offense automatically faced a minimum sentence of 25 to 30 years.
`In 2018, Congress enacted the FSA. Section 403(a) of the FSA revised § 924(c) by
`eliminating the 25-year stacking provision for a “second or subsequent count of conviction”
`under § 924(c). Now, the 25-year mandatory-minimum sentence applies for a second § 924(c)
`conviction only if the defendant has a prior § 924(c) conviction that has become final.
`The FSA’s amendments to “stacking” do not impact Defendant’s sentence because he is
`not serving a “stacked” sentence. Defendant “was not convicted of violating § 924(c) once in
`three different ways, but of violating § 924(c) three times.” United States v. Charley, 417 Fed.
`App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2011). Specifically, Defendant’s convictions include three separate
`violations of § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for discharging a firearm against three separate individuals.
`(PSR at 2). Each of the three violation were treated as a first offense, not a second or third
`offense, and the mandatory sentence for a first offense is a “term of imprisonment of not less
`than 10 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, if the Court sentenced Defendant on the
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`Case 2:06-cr-00234-GMN-GWF Document 886 Filed 05/06/24 Page 5 of 20
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`same charges today, it would have no choice but to impose the same three ten-year terms, all
`consecutive to each other. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D) (requiring the imposition of
`consecutive sentences). The Court recognizes the severity of Defendant’s sentence, however
`its length is “largely driven not by outdated stacking laws, but by the plain language of [§]
`924(c).” United States v. Castillo, No. 03-cr-979, 2021 WL 268638, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
`2021). The statute requires today—as it did when Defendant was resentenced—a ten-year
`mandatory minimum on each of the charges. Accordingly, Defendant has not shown he is
`eligible for a sentence reduction on this basis. See Wright, 46 F.4th at 951.
`B. Impermissible Sentencing Disparity Between Codefendants and Defendant’s
`Juvenile Status
`
`Second, Defendant argues a sentence reduction is warranted because his sentence is
`double that of his-codefendant Johnathon Toliver. (Renewed MSR 13:8–15:23). Specifically,
`Toliver was re-sentenced in 2018 to 420 months, or 35 years of imprisonment as opposed to
`Defendant’s 70-year sentence. (Id.). Defendant contends that this disparity is especially
`unwarranted because he was juvenile at the time of his offense, while Toliver was an adult.
`(Id.).
`
`At the outset, Defendant’s arguments blur his juvenile status contention with the
`contention that a sentence reduction is warranted because of the sentencing disparity between
`him and Toliver. In the Court’s view, these are two separate issues. The Court begins by
`examining whether the sentencing disparity between Defendant and Toliver warrants a
`reduction in Defendant’s sentence.
`1. Sentencing Disparity Between Defendant and Toliver
`Defendant contends that the sentencing disparity exists between him and Toliver
`warrants a sentence reduction because “Toliver was convicted in the same jury trial” but “has
`half the sentence of [Defendant] . . . .” (Reply 5:3–5, ECF No. 884).
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`Case 2:06-cr-00234-GMN-GWF Document 886 Filed 05/06/24 Page 6 of 20
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`Like Defendant, Toliver was convicted on several counts of VICAR in violation of 18
`U.S.C. § 1959 and Use of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.
`§ 924(c) and sentenced to life imprisonment plus an additional 90 years in July 2008. (J., ECF
`No. 560 in United States v. Bryant et al., No. 2:06-cr-00234-RHW-GWF-2). However, in
`2018, Toliver was resentenced based on a plea agreement he entered with the Government in
`which he pled guilty to one count of Use of a Firearm During and In Relation to a Crime of
`Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 925(j)(1). (Plea Agreement, ECF No. 812 in United States
`v. Bryant et al., No. 2:06-cr-00234-RHW-GWF-2). Thus, Toliver’s judgment of conviction
`and corresponding sentence is materially different than Defendant’s because it does not include
`a VICAR murder count, nor does it include as many counts for the related firearm offenses.
`(Compare Second Am. J., ECF No. 820 in United States v. Bryant et al., No. 2:06-cr-00234-
`RHW-GWF-2 with Fourth Am. J, ECF No. 840 in United States v. Bryant et al., No. 2:06-cr-
`00234-RHW-GWF-1). And the Ninth Circuit has made clear that acceptance of a guilty plea is
`a permissible explanation for a sentencing disparity. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez-Lopez, 4
`F. 4th 886, 893 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Valdez-Lopez’s codefendants had received shorter sentences
`after pleading guilty, and a codefendant’s acceptance of a guilty plea is a permissible
`explanation for a sentencing disparity.”)
`Defendant’s argument rests on the proposition that a sentence reduction is warranted
`merely because of the difference in length between his and Toliver’s sentence. Defendant’s
`contention is misplaced because at least some disparity is attributable to Toliver’s plea
`agreement, and there is nothing extraordinary or compelling about a consequence of a
`bargained-for-plea agreement. See United States v. Burleson, No. 2:16-cr-00046, 2022 WL
`17343788, at *8 (D. Nev. Nov. 29, 2022) (rejecting the defendant’s sentencing disparity
`argument where “[a]ny sentencing disparity between [d]efendant and his codefendants is a
`///
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`consequence of bargained-for-plea agreements”). Accordingly, Defendant has not shown he is
`eligible for a sentence reduction on this basis. See Wright, 46 F.4th at 951.
`2. Juvenile Status
`Defendant next argues that the sentencing disparity between him and Toliver warrants a
`reduction because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and Toliver was not a juvenile.
`(Reply 5:4–6). For the reasons discussed above, the disparity between Defendant and Toliver
`does not warrant a sentence reduction because in Toliver’s plea agreement, the Government
`dismissed the VICAR murder count and several counts for the related firearm offenses.
`Nevertheless, Defendant’s juvenile status at the time the offense was committed may be an
`independent justification for a sentence reduction that warrants further inquiry.
`Accordingly, the Court examines whether Defendant’s age at sentencing can constitute
`an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction. If it can, the Court
`then determines whether it does in this case.
`a. Youth as an Extraordinary and Compelling Reason
`The Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue. Courts outside the Ninth Circuit
`
`are divided whether a defendant’s youth constitutes an extraordinary and compelling
`circumstance warranting a sentence reduction. The diverging outcomes reached by courts are
`based on two lines of reasoning. The first considers that facts known at sentencing, including
`age, cannot be used to support a motion under § 3582. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, No.
`06-cr-20411, 2023 WL 5321073, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2023) (relying on the Sixth
`Circuit’s decision in United States v Hunter, 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021)); United States v.
`Susinka, No. 03-CR-90-16, 2023 WL 2402914, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2023) (relying on the
`Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wrice, 2021 7209619, at *1 (7th Cir. 2021)); see
`also United States v. Augustin, 2021 WL 6059564, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2021). The aim of
`this approach is prioritizing finality and consistency. See McLeskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492
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`(1991) (“A procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law
`in a vain search for ultimate certitude” is a system that “no longer reflects humane concern but
`merely anxiety and a desire for immobility.”) (citation omitted). Facts must be assigned
`finality because “there will always be a new academic article a defendant can marshal to
`recharacterize their background and the facts of the offense, and there is no limit on the number
`of successive motions a defendant can file under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Hunter, 12 F.4th at 571.
`Thus, if facts are perpetually reconsidered as time progresses (or a new judge is assigned as in
`this case), no sentence is truly final. Applying this reasoning, the age of an offender at the time
`of the offense is an immutable fact that is to be considered only by the sentencing judge. See
`United States v. Rimpson, No. 20-3467, 2021 WL 6098440, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 2021)
`(“The district judge knew their ages when it imposed the sentences initially, and so that fact
`provides no reason—let alone an extraordinary and compelling one—to reduce those sentences
`now.”).
`The second approach is holistic. It considers how Supreme Court precedent has changed
`regarding juvenile offenders, how science has developed, the applicable Sentencing Guidelines,
`and the facts underlying the defendant’s conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 658 F.
`Supp. 3d 22 (D. R.I. 2023); United States v. Golding, No. 05-cr-538, 2022 WL 2985014, at *2–
`3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022); United States v. Ramsay, 538 F. Supp. 3d 407, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
`2021); United States v. Espino, 03-cr-20051, 2022 WL 4465096 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2022).
`“These cases draw on recent developments in neuroscience, psychology, and sociology, which
`demonstrate why standard penological goals apply with much less force to younger defendants
`in light of their immaturity, susceptibility to peer and other influences, salvageability, and
`dependence on family and other features of their environment that lie beyond their control.”
`Golding, 2022 WL 2985014, at *2. Deference should be given to facts considered at
`sentencing, but not blind or absolute deference. This is because judges are often tasked with
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`evaluating nuanced issues which later require re-examination. For example, the Court is not
`tasked with considering Defendant’s age at the time of sentencing—a straightforward issue that
`was done by the sentencing judge—but rather to consider “the fact of his age in the context of
`the subsequent growth in understanding the differences between the brains of adolescents and
`emerging adults.” United States v. Clary, No. 1:96-cr-587, 2022 WL 173243434, at *9 (D.N.J.
`Nov. 29, 2022).
`Although neither approach is perfect,2 the Court finds the reasoning of the second
`approach to be more persuasive, for two reasons. First, when a defendant does not meet the
`criteria for a sentence reduction based on his medical condition, advanced age, or family
`circumstance, the Court can still conclude that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a
`reduction in his sentence under U.S.S.G § 1B1.13(b)(5) for “other” reasons that are “similar in
`gravity to those described in [§ 1B1.13(b)(1) through (4)].” The Sentencing Commission’s
`policy statement provides that “an extraordinary and compelling reason need not have been
`unforeseen at the time of sentencing . . . to warrant a reduction in the term of imprisonment.
`Therefore, the fact that a[] . . . reason could have been known or anticipated by the sentencing
`court does not preclude consideration for a reduction under this policy statement.” Thus, the
`Sentencing Guidelines make clear that a sentence reduction can be based on facts that were
`known at sentencing.
`
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`Second, and related to the first, there has been a marked development in Supreme Court
`jurisprudence surrounding a defendant’s age in sentencing. The Supreme Court has recently
`emphasized that “youth matters in sentencing.” See Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 105
`
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`2 The first approach is rigid, as it does not account for intervening changes in law and science. However, its
`rigidity can also be categorized as a strength. Specifically, the second approach can lead to inconsistent
`outcomes as judges may view a defendant’s youth as it relates to law and fact differently in deciding whether a
`sentence reduction is warranted. In practice, the first approach promotes uniform outcomes because facts are
`assigned finality at sentencing. The second approach’s strength comes from its flexibility as it accounts for
`society’s evolving standards of how certain facts are or should be perceived when guided by Supreme Court
`precedent and the Sentencing Guidelines.
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`(2021). It previously explained that “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the
`penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences of juvenile offenders, even when
`they commit terrible crimes.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012). In recent years, the
`Supreme Court and lower courts have relied on scientific development regarding youth and
`brain development to “better understand the neurological differences in young brains that can
`drive youthful crimes.” United States v. Johnson, No. 05-CR-00167, 2021 WL 5037679, at *2
`(N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2021).
`
`Taken together, youth matters at sentencing, and a court is not precluded from finding
`extraordinary and compelling reasons exist based on facts known at sentencing. Accordingly,
`the Court finds that an offender’s juvenile status can be an extraordinary and compelling reason
`warranting a sentence reduction. But simply because youth can be a reason for a sentence
`reduction does not mean it always warrants one. So, the Court now examines the appropriate
`framework for determining whether this Defendant’s juvenile status constitutes an
`extraordinary and compelling reason in this case.
`b. Whether Defendant’s Age Constitutes an Extraordinary and Compelling
`Reason Warranting a Sentence Reduction
`
`The seminal case on age as an extraordinary and compelling reason comes from the
`
`Southern District of New York in Ramsay. There, the court identified attributes of youth that
`merit consideration: immaturity, salvageability, dependence, and susceptibility. Ramsay, 538 F.
`Supp. at 417–23. Accordingly, the Court begins with considering Defendant’s immaturity.
`1. Immaturity
`The Court finds that this factor does not militate in favor of a reduction because
`Defendant’s offense did not involve a high-pressure, time-sensitive context. Instead,
`Defendant’s offense resulted from a pre-meditated plan to ambush and kill a rival gang
`member.
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`The Ramsay court relied on peer-reviewed studies in concluding that “in high-pressure,
`time-sensitive, emotional context (‘hot recognition’), adolescents tend to make riskier
`decisions. Thus, when sentencing adolescent offenders—particularly when the offense
`occurred quickly in a high-paced, emotional environment, courts should bear in mind the
`adolescent ‘maturity gap.’” Ramsay, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 419–20 (quoting Grace Icenogle et al.,
`Adolescents’ Cognitive Capacity Reaches Adult Levels Prior to Their Psychosocial Maturity:
`Evidence for a ‘Maturity Gap’ in a Multinational, Cross-Sectional Sample, 43 LAW & HUM.
`BEHAV. 19 (2019)).
`
`Unlike the defendant in Ramsay, the Defendant in this case did not commit his offenses
`in a high-pressure, time-sensitive context. Defendant, Toliver, and another individual named
`Charles Richard formed a gang called Squad Up in the early 2000s. (PSR ¶ 12). Richard was
`involved in an incident with a rival drug dealer named Jabirey Carter, resulting in Squad Up
`members planning to ambush and kill Carter. (Id. ¶ 13). The plan entailed Defendant shooting
`at Carter and his companions in an area they congregated in, leading them to run down an alley
`where Toliver and a third member of Squad Up “would be waiting in ambush.” (Id.). In
`executing the plan, Defendant, who at this time was on supervised release for his conviction of
`Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (Murder and Conspiracy to Commit Murder),3
`left home without permission to confront Carter. (Id. ¶¶ 13–15). Defendant fired three shots at
`Carter and his four companions, while Toliver and Richard fired 11 total. (Id.). One of Carter’s
`companions, Gilbert Henry, was killed, and a civilian, Trista Johnson, was struck in her right
`hand by a bullet. (Id.). When fleeing the scene, Defendant pointed his firearm at a security
`officer during a standoff before running away. (Id.).
`
`
`
`3 That prior murder conviction, another gang-related shoot-out, involved shooting at the occupants of a car
`driven by rival gang members during a high-speed chase resulting in the death of another individual. (PSR ¶¶
`14, 85).
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`Defendant’s offense was not a spontaneous occurrence. It was a pre-meditated
`
`calculated ambush. See United States v. Siraj, No. 05-CR-104 (NG), 2023 WL 2569398, at *3
`(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2023) (determining the defendant’s adolescence did not support
`compassionate release because his offense “involved weeks of planning” and was therefore
`distinguishable from the “high-pressure, time-sensitive’ contexts in which courts have found
`that adolescents tend to make riskier decisions”) (quoting Ramsay, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 420).
`This factor weighs against a sentence reduction.
`2. Salvageability
`
`Salvageability weighs against a sentence reduction because Defendant has not met his
`burden of showing his rehabilitation efforts while in prison.
`Salvageability relates to “the chance that [a defendant’s] youthful ‘character deficiencies
`will be reformed.’” Ramsay, 538 F. Supp. At 422 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
`48, 68 (2010)). The Supreme Court has noted that a “broad difference [between juveniles
`and adults] is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.
`The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
`551, 570 (2005). This “struggle to define their identity” decreases the likelihood “that even
`a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.” Id.
`In Ramsay, the court noted that the defendant had not “merely become a model inmate; he
`ha[d] become an exemplary family member, friend, student, and employee.” Ramsay, 538 F.
`Supp. 3d at 425. Thus, this factor “relates to [a defendant’s] rehabilitation efforts[.]” United
`States v. Hope, No. 1:97-cr-105, 2023 WL 11109249, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2023)
`(discussing Ramsay).
`Neither Defendant’s First Motion for Sentence Reduction nor his Renewed Motion for
`
`///
`///
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`Case 2:06-cr-00234-GMN-GWF Document 886 Filed 05/06/24 Page 13 of 20
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`Sentence Reduction includes exhibits demonstrating his rehabilitation.4 (See generally First
`MSR); (Renewed MSR). For example, his Motions do not include coursework completed by
`Defendant, whether he has a clean disciplinary record, or if he has spent any time volunteering
`at his facility. See United States v. Kayrath, No. 94-cr-10128, 2024 WL 914059, at *6 (D. Kan.
`Mar. 4, 2024) (“Although Defendant was in custody with a life sentence, he has had a clean
`disciplinary record for the past ten years and has spent a significant amount of time
`volunteering and giving to the [prison] community.”). It is true that “[a]t the very crux of
`compassionate release is the recognition that no man is beyond redemption.” United States v.
`Snype, No. 02-cr-939, 2023 WL 4622870, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2023) (Chin, J. sitting by
`designation) (cleaned up). But it remains a defendant’s burden to show that they are taking
`affirmative steps towards redemption by rehabilitating. Wright, 46 F.4th at 951. Defendant has
`not done so here. Accordingly, this factor weighs against a sentence reduction.
`3. Dependence
`
`The dependence factor weighs slightly in favor of a reduction. Specifically, while
`Defendant’s mother strove to provide Defendant with a stable home, his community was
`plagued by gang involvement, and as a juvenile, Defendant lacked the freedom adults have to
`extricate himself from this setting.
`“[A]dolescent offenders are less culpable because they have been dependent on others
`for most or all of their lives. Therefore, relative to adults’ crimes, adolescents’ crimes
`are less a product of their choices and more a product of their environment.” Ramsay, 538 F.
`Supp. at 422 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). As the Supreme Court has explained, “juveniles
`
`
`
`4 Defendant’s PSR states that “since beginning his incarceration, he has completed anger management,
`interpersonal skills, grief and loss, victim impact, a writing class, and a cinema class” in addition to
`“participat[ing] as a softball and basketball official.” (PSR ¶ 97). However, this PSR is now over a decade old,
`and the Court has not received evidence demonstrating Defendant’s continued commitment towards his
`rehabilitation over this time.
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`have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment. ‘[A]s legal
`minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a
`criminogenic setting.’” Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (internal citations omitted).
`Defendant’s PSR states that “[c]onsideration is given for [his] youthful status, an absent
`father who has been incarcerated for Attempt[ed] Murder, and [his neighborhood] being located
`in a gang-infested community.” (PSR ¶ 130). According to Defendant’s mother, he “shared
`with her that he thought everyone was a member of a street gang.” (Id. ¶ 95). She explained
`that she was unsuccessful in her attempts to deter Defendant from associating with gang
`members because “he was surrounded by adult Rolling 60s Crip gang members.” (Id. ¶ 93).
`Despite Defendant’s surroundings, his mother tried “to be a positive influence in [his] and []
`surrounded him with a ‘church family.’” (Id. ¶ 95). His mother commented that “many of the
`other gang members told [him] that he did not need to be in a street gang, because he had a
`good home life.” (Id.).
`“[Defendant’s] gang involvement and absent father suggest he was highly dependent on
`others as a juvenile, and this dependence landed on role models who encouraged and
`participated in [] criminal behavior.” Hope, 2023 WL 11109249, at *8. However, Defendant’s
`surroundings are marginally counterbalanced by the fact that his mother appeared to create a
`positive home life for him. He made a choice to ignore his mother’s attempts to avoid gang
`activity. Accordingly, this factor weighs slightly in favor of a sentence reduction.
`4. Susceptibility to Peer Pressure
`
`For the same reasons as discussed in the preceding section, the Court finds that
`Defendant’s susceptibility to peer pressure weighs slightly in favor of a reduction.
`The Supreme Court has noted that an “area of difference [between juveniles and adults[]
`is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to neg