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`Case 2:08-cr-00273-JCM-RJJ Document 107 Filed 07/21/23 Page 1 of 4
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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`* * *
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`Case No. 2:08-CR-273 JCM (RJJ)
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`v.
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`PRINCE FIGUEROA,
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`Plaintiff(s),
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`Defendant(s).
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`ORDER
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`Presently before the court is defendant Prince Figueroa’s motion for early termination of
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`his supervision. (ECF No. 102). The government filed a response (ECF No. 105), to which
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`defendant replied (ECF No. 106).
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`I.
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`Background
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`On October 8, 2010, defendant was sentenced to 70 months in custody and lifetime
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`supervised release pursuant to a guilty plea on one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor
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`and another count of sexual abuse. (ECF No. 64). Defendant began his term of supervision in
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`June 2015. He now moves to terminate that supervision. (ECF No. 102).
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`II.
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`Legal Standard
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`Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the court may, after considering the factors set forth in 18
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`U.S.C. § 3553(a), terminate supervised release after one year “if it is satisfied that such action is
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`warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. §
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`3583(e)(1). Those factors include, inter alia, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
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`history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
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`established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
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`defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (4).
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`James C. Mahan
`U.S. District Judge
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`

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`Case 2:08-cr-00273-JCM-RJJ Document 107 Filed 07/21/23 Page 2 of 4
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`III. Discussion
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`Defendant argues that his supervision should be terminated because he has complied with
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`all conditions, developed a prosocial support system, and been adequately deterred from future
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`criminal activity. (ECF No. 102). Specifically, he also seeks termination because his supervision
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`prevents “upward mobility and advancement” in his career, and he “continues to have trouble
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`qualifying for apartments and homes because of his active supervision status.” Id. at 3–4.
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`Mere compliance with supervised release conditions, without more, is not enough to
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`modify or terminate supervision. United States v. Boozer, No. 2:12-cv-00004-APG-EJY, 2019
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`WL 7666537, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 1, 2019). While a defendant need not show undue hardship,
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`changed circumstances, or even exceptionally good behavior to warrant termination, he must show
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`that, on balance, the relevant sentencing factors weigh in favor of termination. United States v.
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`Ponce, 22 F.4th 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2022). The relevant factors here are (1) the nature and
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`circumstances of the offense and defendant, (2) deterrence of future criminal conduct, (3) the need
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`to protect the public from future crimes, (4) providing the defendant with needed treatment and
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`services, (5) other kinds of sentences available, (6) the pertinent sentencing commission policy
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`statements, (7) the need to avoid sentencing disparities, and (8) defendant’s restitution obligations.
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`Considering those factors, the court is not persuaded that termination is warranted yet.
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`Defendant has clearly made progress toward rehabilitation and built some level of prosocial
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`support system, and he has been mostly compliant with the terms of release—as should be
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`expected. He has also fully satisfied his restitution obligations.
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`However, every other relevant factor tends to weigh against termination. Defendant’s
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`crime was a grave one, and the weighty punishment levied by the court recognizes the seriousness
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`of the offense. In less than twenty-four hours, defendant sexually abused two teenage girls (ages
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`18 and 14) when all were present at a campground near Lake Mead. His callous and predatory
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`behavior represents a serious offense that the court cannot treat lightly.
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`Moreover, the court cannot ignore the high recidivism rates amongst sex offenders. See
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`United States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 405–06 (5th Cir. 2006). While that alone cannot be the
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`determining factor as to termination, the court finds it persuasive given that the legislative history
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`James C. Mahan
`U.S. District Judge
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`- 2 -
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`Case 2:08-cr-00273-JCM-RJJ Document 107 Filed 07/21/23 Page 3 of 4
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`shows Congress contemplated the recidivism when it authorized lifetime terms of supervised
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`release for sex offenses. See id. at 406, n.7 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 108–66, at 49–20 (2003)
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`(conf.rep.), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 684).
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`Defendant does present some mitigating evidence weighing toward other factors. See (ECF
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`No. 102). His only violation in seven years was a self-reported violation in 2016. His probation
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`officer notes that he is low-risk. He has found employment and advanced in his position. On top
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`of all of that, he has regularly attended therapy as required (now reduced to two sessions annually)
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`and successfully moved for joint custody of his seven-year-old son.
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`The court credits this progress, but considering the circumstances in their entirety, they do
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`not justify termination. While notable, the fact that defendant has secured employment, spent time
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`with his family, and been (almost) violation free do not outweigh the fact that he committed a very
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`serious crime that presents a unique danger to the public. He continues to receive twice-yearly
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`therapy through probation, and there is no evidence that he would continue his treatment but for
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`the probation office requiring it. His continued supervision also carries a deterrent effect that
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`would disappear after termination.
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`In short, considering the factors above and the fact that defendant is not entitled to the
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`Guide to Judiciary Policy’s presumption in favor of termination as a sex offender, the court is not
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`convinced that the relevant sentencing factors weigh in favor of termination at this time. This
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`court enjoys “broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion to terminate supervised
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`release,” United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014), and it exercises that discretion
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`to deny that motion here, without prejudice. Defendant may move to terminate his supervision
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`again in the future should the balance of the relevant factors meaningfully shift.
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`. . .
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`James C. Mahan
`U.S. District Judge
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`Case 2:08-cr-00273-JCM-RJJ Document 107 Filed 07/21/23 Page 4 of 4
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`IV. Conclusion
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`Accordingly,
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`IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendant’s motion for
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`early termination (ECF No. 102) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
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`DATED July 21, 2023.
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`__________________________________________
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`James C. Mahan
`U.S. District Judge
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`- 4 -
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