Case 2:14-cv-01194-RFB-EJY Document 149 Filed 12/12/23 Page 1 of 18
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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` Petitioner,
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`NICHOLAS JAMES WILLING,
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`v.
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`WILLIAM HUTCHINGS,1 et al.,
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` Respondents.
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`Case No. 2:14-cv-01194-RFB-BNW
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`ORDER
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`Petitioner Nicholas James Willing, who was sentenced to 30 to 75 years in prison after a
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`jury found him guilty of various charges stemming from a home invasion and robbery, filed a
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`petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See ECF Nos. 48; 51-6.) This matter
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`is before this court for adjudication of the merits of the remaining2 grounds in Willing’s second
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`amended petition, which allege that the prosecution suppressed favorable evidence and he was
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`denied an adequate opportunity to confront the prosecution’s witnesses. (ECF No. 48.) For the
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`reasons discussed below, this court denies the petition and a certificate of appealability.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND3
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`On December 11, 2010, around 8:00 p.m., Susan Jones (hereinafter “Susan”) was watching
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`television in her living room with her seven-year-old daughter, M.T., while her husband, Robert
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`Jones (hereinafter “Bob”), was in another room working on a computer when four individuals, one
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`1 The state corrections department’s inmate locator page states that Willing is incarcerated at Southern Desert
`Correctional Center. William Hutchings is the current warden for that facility. At the end of this order, this court
`directs the clerk to substitute William Hutchings as a respondent for the prior respondent Brian Williams. See Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 25(d).
`2 This court previously dismissed grounds 1(c), 2(c), and 3(a) as untimely. (ECF No. 98.)
`3 This court makes no credibility findings or other factual findings regarding the truth or falsity of the evidence from
`the state court. This court’s summary is merely a backdrop to its consideration of the issues presented in the case.
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`of whom was wielding a shotgun, entered her residence in Pahrump, Nevada wearing black masks
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`and black clothing. (ECF No. 50-7 at 59, 61–64, 80.) The intruders ordered Susan and M.T. to
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`“[g]et on the floor.” (Id. at 65.) While Bob was being “rough[ed] up in the hallway” after hitting
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`one of the intruders with a pool stick, the man with the shotgun repeatedly asked Susan, “[w]here’s
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`the cash?” (Id. at 66–67.) The intruders tied Bob’s hands, and Susan took the man with the shotgun
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`to the master bedroom and opened a safe. (Id. at 67–68, 112.) The man took some silver coins and
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`money from the safe, and after he again asked Susan where the cash was located, Susan took the
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`man to the garage where another safe was opened. (Id. at 69–70, 73.) The intruders then obtained
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`several hundred dollars from another room in the house, ordered Susan, Bob, and M.T. into a
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`closet, and told them they would kill them if they called the police. (Id. at 74–75.)
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`The following day, a man and woman “cash[ed] in a large amount of 50-cent” coins at a
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`store, and employees of the store called law enforcement. (ECF No. 50-8 at 63.) Detective Michael
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`Eisenloffel with the Nye County Sheriff’s Office obtained video surveillance footage from the
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`store, and a married couple—Jamie Sexton and Dylan Spellman—were identified as the
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`individuals who cashed in the coins. (Id. at 70, 75–76.) Sexton and Spellman were apprehended,
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`interviewed, and “indicated that they had indeed been part of the reported robbery at [the] Jones’
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`house.” (Id. at 79.) A search warrant was executed on their residence, and law enforcement
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`recovered a “notebook contain[ing] handwriting, which . . . appeared to be entry instructions into
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`[the] Jones’ home,” “a two-page floor plan or diagram of the home,” and a shotgun. (Id. at 80.)
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`Sexton and Spellman implicated three other people in the robbery: Joshua Cotton, Jemere Reid,
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`and Willing. (Id. at 90, 92, 99.) A search of Cotton’s residence yielded money and a bandana, and
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`a search of Reid’s residence yielded money, a handgun, a black hat, and rope. (Id. at 89, 92.)
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`Spellman testified that he had worked as a manual laborer and Willing had been his
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`supervisor. (ECF No. 50-8 at 122–24, 150.) Spellman testified that Willing “was the one that gave
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`[him and Sexton] the information about where . . . the safes were [located in the Jones’ residence],
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`the layout of the house.”4 (Id. at 150.) Spellman explained that the robbery started as a joke, but
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`“then stuff started getting more detailed.” (Id. at 160.) Although Willing was not going to be
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`present for the robbery and did not know when it was going to occur, Willing “knew it was going
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`to happen” and promised to compensate Spellman and Sexton for committing the robbery. (Id. at
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`170–72; ECF No. 50-9 at 18.) Spellman and Sexton recruited Reid and Cotton to assist them in
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`completing the robbery. (ECF No. 50-8 at 173.) Spellman, Sexton, Cotton, and Reid all pleaded
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`guilty to second-degree kidnapping and robbery.5 (Id. at 177.)
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`Bob testified that he was the public administrator and facilities manager for Nye County at
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`the time of the robbery. (ECF No. 50-7 at 140.) Willing worked for Bob as “a Maintenance Man
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`II in Buildings and Grounds.” (Id. at 144.) Bob had directed Willing to do some groundskeeping
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`work at a park, and Willing had been using a backhoe to complete that work. (Id. at 145.) Willing
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`complained to Bob that he was “working out of class” by using the backhoe and “wanted to be
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`paid as a Maintenance Man III.” (Id. at 148–50.) Instead of increasing Willing’s classification and
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`compensation, Bob took “the backhoe from [Willing] and g[a]ve him a wheelbarrow.” (Id. at 150.)
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`Thereafter, Willing injured his back at the park jobsite and required surgery. (Id. at 151–52.)
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`4 Susan and Bob testified that Willing had been to their residence several times. (ECF No. 50-7 at 78–79, 155–56.)
`5 Sexton’s testimony was consistent with Spellman’s testimony concerning Willing’s involvement in the robbery: the
`robbery was conducted at Willing’s behest, Willing told her and Spellman that Bob had safes and “there were over 30
`gold bars in the house,” Willing was going to compensate her and Spellman for the robbery, Willing told her and
`Spellman the layout and location of the house, Willing showed her and Spellman some pictures of the Jones’ house,
`Willing had multiple planning sessions with her and Spellman, and Willing knew the robbery was going to happen.
`(ECF No. 50-9 at 42, 46–48, 50–51, 57, 63.)
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`Spellman and Willing’s ex-girlfriend testified that Willing hated and blamed Bob for his
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`back injury. (ECF Nos. 50-8 at 157; 51 at 7–8, 11.) And Sexton testified that Willing wanted
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`revenge on Bob: “He said that Bob was going to pay like he was because he was out of work and
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`he was going through financial struggles, and he wasn’t able to move. He wasn’t able to work. He
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`had a hard time paying his medical bills, and he wanted revenge.” (ECF No. 50-9 at 28, 44.) Sexton
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`also testified that Willing “didn’t want anything from the robbery. He just wanted . . . Bob to be
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`robbed so that when [the robbery] was investigated,” it would be clear that Bob “was stealing from
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`the County and that there would be things in his house that weren’t supposed to be, which would
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`help [Willing] with his lawsuit” against Bob. (Id. at 60.)
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`Willing was interviewed by law enforcement and “made several comments in relation to
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`the event that he didn’t intend for or didn’t want Bob Jones’ wife or daughter to be injured, that
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`his . . . anger was for Bob Jones specifically.” (ECF No. 50-9 at 120–21.) Willing also “eventually
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`admit[ted] that he told [Sexton and Spellman] details about the [Jones’] house” and “admitted that
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`he told at least two people that he would do the robbery himself except for his lawsuit.” (Id. at 122,
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`126.) Willing testified at the trial and denied having discussions with Sexton and Spellman about
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`robbing Jones and denied telling them to rob Jones. (ECF No. 51 at 41, 54, 70.)
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`A jury found Willing guilty of burglary with the use of a deadly weapon, robbery with the
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`use of a deadly weapon, three counts of first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon,
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`grand larceny with the use of a deadly weapon, grand larceny of firearms with the use of a deadly
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`weapon, battery with intent to commit grand larceny, three counts of assault with a deadly weapon,
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`and conspiracy to commit robbery. (ECF No. 51-6.) Willing’s judgment of conviction was
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`affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. (ECF No. 51-19.) While his direct appeal was pending,
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`Willing moved for a new trial based on the discovery of new evidence. (ECF No. 51-10.) The state
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`district court denied the motion, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial. (ECF Nos.
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`51-17; 51-24.)
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`II.
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`GOVERNING STANDARDS OF REVIEW
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`28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review generally applicable in habeas corpus
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`cases under AEDPA:
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`An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
`to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
`was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
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`(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
`of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
`United States; or
`(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
`in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
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` state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the
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`meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law
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`set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are
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`materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
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`U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000), and citing Bell v.
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`Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly
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`established Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “if the state court
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`identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but
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`unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 75 (quoting Williams,
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`529 U.S. at 413). “The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be
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`more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application of clearly established law must be
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`objectively unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409–10) (internal citation omitted).
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`The Supreme Court has instructed that “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks
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`merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
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`correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing
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`Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has stated “that even a
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`strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id.
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`at 102 (citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)
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`(describing the standard as a “difficult to meet” and “highly deferential standard for evaluating
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`state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”
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`(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Ground 1—suppression of evidence by the prosecution
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`In ground 1, Willing argues that his rights to due process and a fair trial under the Fifth,
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`Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the prosecution suppressed favorable
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`and material evidence. (ECF No. 48 at 13.) Specifically, in ground 1(a), Willing argues that the
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`prosecution hid its agreement not to charge Sexton with an unrelated jewelry theft case in
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`exchange for her continued cooperation and testimony against Willing. (Id. at 16.) And in ground
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`1(b), Willing argues that the prosecution did not disclose that Sexton’s plea deal was made in
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`exchange for her testimony against Willing. (Id. at 18–22.)
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`1.
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`Background information
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`On December 22, 2010, a criminal complaint was filed in state justice court charging
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`Willing, Spellman, Sexton, Cotton, and Reid with burglary with the use of a deadly weapon, three
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`counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, three counts of first-degree kidnapping with
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`the use of a deadly weapon, grand larceny with the use of a deadly weapon, grand larceny of a
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`firearm with a deadly weapon, battery with intent to commit grand larceny, three counts of assault
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`with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery and destroying evidence.6 (ECF No. 49-5 at
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`2–15.) At a preliminary hearing held for the five defendants, the prosecutor, Wesley White,
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`represented that the State had reached negotiations with Spellman, Cotton, Sexton, and Reid:
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`“[t]hey’re going to unconditionally waive their right to preliminary hearing . . . and . . . will be
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`pleading guilty to one count of robbery and one count of kidnapping in the second degree.” (ECF
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`No. 49-6 at 7–8.) White also represented that after Spellman, Cotton, Sexton, and Reid entered
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`guilty pleas, “the State’s going to agree to reduce bail between five and $20,000.” (Id. at 8–9.)
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`Specifically, “[t]he 5,000 bail [was] going to apply to Miss Sexton, who will be offering testimony
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`. . . at the preliminary hearing [against Willing].” (Id. at 9.)
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`As agreed, at their arraignment, Spellman, Cotton, Sexton, and Reid pleaded guilty to
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`robbery and second-degree kidnapping, and the state district court reduced Sexton’s bail to $5,000
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`and Spellman’s, Cotton’s, and Reid’s bail to $20,000. (ECF No. 49-10 at 19, 25.) White articulated
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`the terms of the plea agreements at the beginning of the arraignment and stated, inter alia, that
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`Sexton was “also going to be testifying at the trial of Willing should that become necessary, and
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`the State reserves the right, obviously, to call any defendant in this case after they’ve entered their
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`pleas.” (Id. at 11.)
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`At the trial, during Sexton’s direct examination, the following colloquy took place between
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`White and Sexton:
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`Q.
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`A.
`Q.
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`Other than giving you and [Spellman] a bail reduction and allowing your
`sentencing to be stayed pending this trial, did the State promise you
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`No.
`Did I promise you anything?
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`6 Sexton and Spellman were also charged with burglary and an offense involving stolen property regarding the cashing
`of the coins. (ECF No. 49-5 at 15–16.)
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`A.
`Q.
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`A.
`Q.
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`No.
`In fact, I’m free to stand in front of the Judge and ask for 20 years for you
`if I want to, aren’t I?
`Yes.
`Are you doing this - - are you saying these things about Nick Willing just
`to try to avoid going to prison?
`No.
`A.
`Q. Why are you saying them?
`A.
`I’m telling the truth.
`Q.
`Okay. Why are you - - or tell the jury why you want to be here to tell the
`truth?
`Because I’m making my amends for my wrongs, and I feel very guilty for
`my part in this.
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`A.
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`(ECF No. 50-9 at 65–66.)
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`Following the jury verdict, as a part of his motion for a new trial, Willing submitted a letter
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`allegedly written by Sexton to another person regarding, inter alia, a promise made to her by the
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`prosecutor, Wesley White. (ECF No. 51-13 at 7–8.) In that letter, Sexton wrote, “Wes promised
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`me I wouldn’t do time but it was never written on paper so [I don’t know] my outlook now.” (Id.
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`at 7.) Additionally, as a part of his motion for a new trial, Willing submitted an affidavit of Chris
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`Rasmussen, Sexton’s counsel. (ECF No. 51-14.) In that affidavit, Rasmussen indicated, inter alia,
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`that (1) the State was investigating a “jewelry ‘theft’ felony case” against Sexton “during the time
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`in which the Willing matter was being litigated,” (2) Rasmussen “was under the impression that
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`as long as Sexton continued with her cooperation, Sexton would not be charged in the jewelry theft
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`case,” (3) an interview was held between White, Sexton, and Rasmussen prior to the preliminary
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`hearing in which “it was discussed that Sexton could avoid jail time if she was able to assist in the
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`prosecution of Willing,”7 (4) White later informed Rasmussen “that he would not proceed with
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`7 Rasmussen also signed a declaration on June 30, 2016, in which he stated, inter alia, that although it was not
`memorialized in writing, “it was well understood by all involve [sic] that [Sexton] would only get the benefit of the
`deal if she testified against Nicholas Willing.” (ECF No. 53-12 at 4.) This court is limited on habeas review “to the
`record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388,
`1398 (2011). The Nevada Supreme Court did not have Rasmussen’s 2016 declaration when it affirmed the state district
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`[the] jewelry theft case that had been submitted by the Nye County Sheriff’s Office,” (5) it
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`appeared to Rasmussen that Sexton “appeared to be the organizer” of the robbery, (6) “it was
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`obvious to [Rasmussen] that from the discovery and Jamie Sexton’s admissions to law
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`enforcement that the only way for Sexton to avoid serving prison time would be to negotiate a deal
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`which involved cooperation,” and (7) Sexton’s testimony at Willing’s trial “that she had personal
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`knowledge that Willing was involved . . . was a change from the only proffer that took place prior
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`to the preliminary hearing.” (ECF No. 51-14 at 5–6.)
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`In its opposition to Willing’s motion for a new trial, the State included an affidavit of
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`White. (ECF No. 51-15 at 16.) In that affidavit, White indicated, inter alia, that (1) he never
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`promised Sexton that she would not go to prison, (2) Sexton was told that her “sentencing was up
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`to the Judge” and White “would remain free to argue at [her] sentencing, but [he] would certainly
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`take [her] testimony and cooperation into consideration when arguing,” and (3) “[t]he entire deal
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`for . . . Sexton . . . [was] contained in [her] Guilty Plea Agreement[ ].” (Id.) The State also included
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`an affidavit of Tierra Jones, a deputy district attorney with the Nye County District Attorney’s
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`Office. (Id. at 13.) In that affidavit, Jones indicated, inter alia, that: (1) she “was tasked with
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`handling most of [White’s] remaining open cases” after he resigned following Willing’s trial, (2)
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`she contacted Rasmussen about Sexton’s jewelry theft case before Sexton’s sentencing in the
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`robbery case, and Rasmussen “informed [her] that he had never spoken with Mr. White regarding
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`any [jewelry theft] case and that he was not aware of any [jewelry theft] case,” (3) White informed
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`her that the jewelry theft case “was not part of any negotiations in the robbery case,” and (4) she
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`court’s denial of Willing’s motion for a new trial in 2014. (See ECF No. 51-24.) As such, this court is prevented from
`considering Rasmussen’s 2016 affidavit.
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`“requested that [Sexton’s jewelry theft] case be denied” after she was sentenced in the robbery
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`case. (Id.)
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`2.
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` Relevant law
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`“[T]he suppression by the prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
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`violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective
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`of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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`Because a witness’s “‘reliability . . . may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’
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`nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the Brady] rule.” Giglio v. United
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`States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). “There
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`are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the
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`accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have
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`been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”
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`Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). The materiality of the evidence that has been
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`suppressed is assessed to determine whether prejudice exists. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 916
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`(9th Cir. 2006). Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
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`been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United
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`States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). “The question is not whether the defendant would
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`more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its
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`absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”
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`Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Accordingly, “[a] ‘reasonable probability’ of a
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`different result is . . . shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines
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`confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
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`3.
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`State court determination
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`In affirming the denial of Willing’s motion for a new trial, the Nevada Supreme Court
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`Willing contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a
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`new trial because he presented newly discovered evidence that accomplice Jamie
`Sexton had an open felony theft case and was promised she would not be charged
`in that case, nor go to prison in the instant case if she testified against him. We
`review a district court’s determination whether to grant a new trial for a clear abuse
`of discretion. See McCabe v. State, 98 Nev. 604, 608, 655 P.2d 536, 538 (1982).
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`[FN1] The district court analyzed Willing’s motion under Brady v.
`Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), rather than a motion for a new trial
`pursuant to NRS 176.515; however, its findings of fact and
`conclusions of law is a model of clarity and addresses the relevant
`considerations.
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`We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The record
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`supports the district court’s determination that the evidence regarding “side deals”
`was not credible and Sexton testified truthfully in that regard. The record also
`supports the district court’s determination that, even if the jury had been informed
`of the theft case, there was not a reasonable likelihood the result at trial would have
`been different because Sexton’s credibility was explored at trial, other testimony
`incriminated Willing, and substantial evidence was presented which demonstrated
`that it would have been almost impossible for Sexton to plan the crimes without
`Willing’s involvement. See Sanborn v. State, 107 Nev. 399, 406, 812 P.2d 1279,
`1284-85 (1991) (newly discovered evidence must be “not only an attempt to
`contradict, impeach, or discredit a former witness, unless the witness is so important
`that a different result would be reasonably probable”); King v. State, 95 Nev. 497,
`500, 596 P.2d 501, 503 (1979).
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`(ECF No. 51-24 at 2-3.)8
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`8 Willing argues that the Nevada Supreme Court’s finding that “[t]he record supports the district court’s determination
`that the evidence regarding ‘side deals’ was not credible” was an unreasonable determination of the facts, so this court
`should review ground 1 de novo. (ECF No. 133 at 11.) This court disagrees. The state district court determined that
`Sexton did not have an explicit agreement with the prosecution involving “no jail time” or her jewelry theft case. (ECF
`No. 51-17 at 11–12.) Because the “no jail time” and dismissal of the jewelry theft case issues were not discussed (1)
`during the prosecutor’s recitation of Sexton’s plea deal at the preliminary hearing, (2) in Sexton’s guilty plea
`agreement, or (3) at Sexton’s arraignment, the Nevada Supreme Court’s finding that the state district court’s
`determination that these issues were not an explicit part of the negotiations was reasonable. (See ECF Nos. 49-6 at 8–
`9; 49-10 at 10–11; 51-15 at 19–21.) And even if this court were to review this ground de novo, it would fail for lack
`of prejudice as discussed below.
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`4.
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`Analysis
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`To be sure, the following would have been favorable impeachment evidence, if proven,
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`pursuant to Brady’s first prong: (1) an agreement—whether explicit or implicit—that Sexton’s
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`jewelry theft case may be dismissed depending on her testimony at Willing’s trial and her
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`sentence for the robbery, and (2) an agreement—whether explicit or implicit—that Sexton’s plea
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`agreement, whereby multiple charges were dismissed, was contingent on her testimony against
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`Willing. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154–55 (determining that a witness’ credibility was “an
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`important issue in the case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future
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`prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it”); see also
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`Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316–17 (1974) (“[T]he exposure of a witness’ motivation in
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`testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
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`examination.”); United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1986) (“While it is clear
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`that an explicit agreement would have to be disclosed because of its effect on [the witness]’s
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`credibility, it is equally clear that facts which imply an agreement would also bear on [the
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`witness]’s credibility and would have to be disclosed.”).
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`Turning to Brady’s second prong, suppression, neither of these alleged agreements were
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`disclosed to the defense because the prosecution maintained that there was no agreement
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`regarding Sexton’s jewelry theft case and Sexton’s plea agreement in the robbery case was
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`contained entirely in the guilty plea agreement, which did not mention that it was contingent on
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`9 Notably, however, the prosecutor did indicate at Sexton’s arraignment that she was “going to be testifying at the trial
`of Willing should that become necessary.” (ECF No. 49-10 at 11.)
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`Nevertheless, turning to Brady’s third prong, prejudice, the Nevada Supreme Court
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`reasonably determined that there was no reasonable probability the result of Willing’s trial would
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`have been different had this alleged impeachment evidence been disclosed to the defense and
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`presented against Sexton. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. As the Nevada Supreme Court reasonably
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`noted, Sexton’s credibility was broadly explored by Willing’s counsel at trial. Indeed, Willing’s
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`counsel impeached Sexton during cross-examination about, inter alia, (1) her lying to store
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`employees and law enforcement about where she obtained the coins, (2) her lying to Susan twice
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`to obtain entry into the Jones’ residence prior to the robbery to gain information about the house,
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`(3) her receiving the benefit of multiple charges being dropped as a result of her plea, and (4) her
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`“[o]ccasionally . . . getting high” prior to getting together with Willing. (ECF No. 50-9 at 71–73,
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`75–77, 80.) Further, as the Nevada Supreme Court reasonably noted, Spellman testified
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`extensively about Willing’s part in the robbery and detectives testified that Willing admitted he
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`told Sexton and Spellman details about the Jones’ house and would have done the robbery
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`himself except for his lawsuit. See Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012) (“[O]bserv[ing] that
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`evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong
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`enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.”); cf. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 700–01 (2004)
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`(holding that impeachment evidence was material where it pertained to a witness whose
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`testimony, which was “uncorroborated by any other witness,” was “crucial to the prosecution”);
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`Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385, 393 (2016) (determining that there was a lack of confidence in the
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`jury’s verdict due to the suppression of evidence related to two witnesses’ motivations for
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`testifying because “the only evidence directly tying [the defendant] to th[e] crime was [one
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`witness’s] dubious testimony, corroborated by the similarly suspect testimony of [the other
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`Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination that Willing failed to demonstrate
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`prejudice constitutes an objectively reasonable application of Brady’s prejudice prong. Brady,
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`373 U.S. at 87; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.
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`Willing is not entitled to federal habeas relief for grounds 1(a) or 1(b).
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`B.
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`Ground 2—confrontation
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`In ground 2, Willing argues that he was denied an adequate opportunity to confront
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`Sexton due to the prosecution’s suppression of the favorable and material evidence outlined in
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`ground 1. (ECF No. 48 at 26.) Specifically, in ground 2(a), Willing argues that the prosecution’s
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`failure to inform the defense that it did not charge Sexton in the jewelry theft case in exchange
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`for her continued cooperation and testimony against him denied him his constitutional right to
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`confront Sexton. (Id.) And in ground 2(b), Willing argues that the prosecution’s failure to inform
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`the defense that it allowed Sexton to plead guilty to reduced charges in exchange for her
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`continued cooperation and testimony against him denied him his constitutional right to confront
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`Sexton. (Id. at 29.)
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`1.
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`The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides: “In all criminal prosecutions,
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`the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const.
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`amend. VI. “[A] primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-
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`examination.” Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497
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`U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability
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