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`Case 2:18-cv-02111-RFB-BNW Document 39 Filed 01/22/25 Page 1 of 22
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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`JAVON MIGUEL,
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`Case No. 2:18-cv-02111-RFB-BNW
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`Petitioner,
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` ORDER
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`v.
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`JERRY HOWELL, et al.,
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Respondents.
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`In 2014, a jury convicted Javon Miguel (“Petitioner” or “Miguel”), a former Nevada
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`prisoner,1 of (1) Pandering of a Child; (2) First-Degree Kidnapping; and (3) Pandering by
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`Furnishing Transportation. (ECF No. 14-10.) This matter is before the Court on the remaining
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`grounds of Miguel’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Habeas Copus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No.
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`4) (“Petition”). The Court denies the Petition and denies a Certificate of Appealability.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND2
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`The complaining victim, A.B.,3 testified she engaged in prostitution at least twice in
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`Hesperia, California when she was 13 years old, but her pimp kept the money. (ECF No. 12-1 at
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`67–69, 106–107.) When she was 14 years old she, and her grandparents who were her legal
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`1 Miguel initiated this habeas proceeding while he was incarcerated. (ECF No. 1.) He was
`released on parole on January 30, 2019. (ECF No. 21.)
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`2 The Court makes no credibility findings or other factual findings regarding the truth or
`falsity of evidence or statements of fact in the state court. The Court summarizes the same solely
`as background to the issues presented in this case and does not summarize all such material. No
`assertion of fact made in describing statements, testimony, or other evidence in the state court
`constitutes a finding by this Court. Any absence of mention of a specific piece of evidence or
`category of evidence does not signify the Court overlooked the evidence in considering the claims.
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` 3
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` The Local Rules of Practice state: “[p]arties must refrain from including—or must
`partially redact, where inclusion is necessary—[certain] personal-data identifiers from all
`documents filed with the court, including exhibits, whether filed electronically or in paper, unless
`the court orders otherwise.” LR IA 6-1(a). As this includes the names of minor children, only a
`child's initials should be used. Id. The witness referred to here as “A.B.” was a minor at the time
`the events occurred.
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`guardians, moved to Apple Valley, which is near Victorville, California. (Id. at 39–40, 57–59, 69.)
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`Thereafter, A.B. met a man in Victorville called “Papa John” who, during a discussion about
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`prostitution, told her about his brother Miguel. (ECF No. 13-1 at 31–35.)
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`A.B. testified that on August 24, 2012, while she was 14 years old, her grandfather dropped
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`her off at a park in Victorville where she encountered Miguel when she and her girlfriend entered
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`a nearby store. (ECF No. 12-1 at 61–63.) Miguel asked for her name and they ended up hanging
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`out at the park with their friends. (ECF Nos. 12-1 at 61–66, 99–100; 13-1 at 28–29.) A.B. said
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`Miguel confirmed Papa John was his brother and she informed Miguel she previously prostituted.
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`(ECF Nos. 12-1 at 66–68; 13-1 at 33.) A.B believed her disclosure led to Miguel’s statements that
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`he was “hanging out making money,” doing “prostitution,” and had “girls who work for him and
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`make money for him.” (ECF Nos. 12-1 at 66–67; 13-1 at 36–38.) A.B. testified she believed
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`Miguel was a pimp because of “his personality;” his “real fancy,” “nice—proper,” clothes; and
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`because he displayed a wad of cash. (ECF No. 12-1 at 69–70, 102–04.) A.B. said Miguel did not
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`dress like a stereotypical pimp as portrayed on television, but instead wore a “nice shirt,” “blackish
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`jeans,” and a watch. (Id.) A.B. did not know whether or not Miguel’s wad of cash consisted merely
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`of a $20 bill wrapped around $1 bills. (Id.) A.B. also testified that Miguel never came right out
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`and told her he was a pimp; rather, she “kind of all put it together” and thought he “must have girls
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`working for [him],” based on her belief that he “was a player,” “makes money,” and has “a lot of
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`females.” (ECF Nos. 12-1 at 104; 13-1 at 35–38.)
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`A.B. testified while they were at the park, Miguel asked her age, and she falsely told him
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`she was 18 years old. (ECF No. 12-1 at 70.) And when Miguel asked for her identification, she
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`had none. (ECF No. 13-1 at 22, 39.) She told Miguel she lived with her grandparents but did not
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`tell him they were her legal guardians. (Id. at 40.) A.B. said Miguel told her she could “get a fake
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`ID” they could “get an apartment together,” and she would make money. (ECF No. 12-1 at 70.)
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`A.B. testified that Miguel told her she could work with him as a prostitute if she wanted to,
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`but she did not have to if she did not want to, and he did not force, trick, or use threats, to get her
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`to do so. (ECF No. 12-1 at 70, 108, 112–13.) Miguel provided A.B. with his phone number written
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`on a business card. (Id. at 70, 72–73.) A.B. testified Miguel never said he wished to date her; rather,
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`her impression was he wanted to “make money” through her “work,” by which she believed he
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`meant “prostitution.” (ECF No. 13-1 at 38–39.)
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`A.B. said she told Miguel she was interested in working as a prostitute with him and they
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`agreed to meet at his house the next day. (ECF No. 12-1 at 73.) When Miguel told A.B. he was
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`going to Las Vegas to see his friend, Punchy, who was staying at the Golden Nugget, she agreed
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`to go with him. (ECF Nos. 12-1 at 109–10; 13-1 at 23.) A.B. said when her grandfather dropped
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`her off at Miguel’s house the following day, she knew they were going to Las Vegas for her to
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`work as a prostitute, so when Miguel asked if she wanted to go to “make money and go to Vegas,”
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`and if she wanted to “go find work,” she told him “yes,” believing he meant she would go with
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`him to “prostitute” in Las Vegas. (ECF No. 12-1 at 74–75, 114–15.) Miguel’s brother-in-law,
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`Terrell Timothy Parker, testified he was present at Miguel’s home the night Miguel and A.B. left
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`together for Las Vegas. (ECF No. 13-2 at 30–31.) A.B.’s grandfather, Daniel Heimbecher, testified
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`he filed a missing person report with police when A.B. did not call or come home. (ECF No. 13-1
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`at 49–51, 54–55.) Heimbecher identified A.B.’s birth certificate, which verified she was 14 years
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`old at the time of the Las Vegas trip with Miguel. (Id. at 52–54.) Heimbecher never met Miguel
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`before this case and never gave him permission to prostitute A.B. or take her to Las Vegas. (Id.)
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`A.B. agreed to prostitution because she was tired of not having money of her own. (ECF
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`Nos. 12-1 at 109–10; 13-1 at 44.) She said she would never have agreed to prostitute if Miguel had
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`not told her he would help her make money at it; and she would not have gone to Las Vegas if he
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`had not suggested it and agreed to pimp her. (ECF No. 13-1 at 43–45.) She said Miguel did not
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`force or trick her into going to Las Vegas; did not threaten or coerce her to go; and did not lock
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`her in a car or room. (ECF No. 12-1 at 111–13.)
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`According to A.B., Miguel drove them to Las Vegas in his “old-looking” burgundy-colored
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`car. (ECF No. 12-1 at 75.) She said that, during the drive, Miguel told her she would be “making
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`money in Vegas” prostituting and assured her that he would walk behind her, so nothing happened
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`to her. (Id. at 76–77.) She said he told her to look for clients “with like a lot of money, like nice
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`cars.” (ECF Nos. 12-1 at 121; 13-1 at 41.) She said he instructed her to charge no less than $100;
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`and they agreed to split the proceeds fifty-fifty. (ECF No. 12-1 at 77–79.) She said he instructed
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`her to give the proceeds to him, and he would return her portion to her. (Id.) She said Miguel gave
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`her condoms “[f]or protection” on “dates,” which she explained meant a client “wants to have sex
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`with you for money.” (Id.) She said he instructed her not to have sex with a client who refused to
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`use a condom. (Id. at 80.) She said he told her to ignore “black males” “[b]ecause they will try to
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`make you their prostitute,” and never “look them in the eye” or speak to them. (Id.) She said he
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`told her she could have sex in his car, or in a motel at his expense. (ECF No. 13-1 at 41–42.) She
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`said he told her, after Las Vegas, they would go where there was money. (Id. at 45.)
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`A.B. testified they arrived in Las Vegas in the early morning of August 25, 2012, and ate
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`at a McDonald’s near the Stratosphere as A.B. had not eaten since her arrival at Miguel’s house.
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`(ECF No. 12-1 at 80–82.) She said after they ate, Miguel told her to “get down what I was supposed
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`to do,” meaning prostitute, to earn “gas money” for the return trip to Victorville. (Id. at 81–82.)
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`She said she walked down Las Vegas Boulevard to the Stratosphere with Miguel trailing behind
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`her. (Id. at 82–83.) She said she occasionally looked back to ensure he was watching her because
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`she would have been “mad” and “scared” if he was not. (Id. at 82–84.) She said Miguel never
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`asked her to initiate conversations with men and never introduced her to men. (Id. at 121–22.)
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`Although four men approached her about sex in exchange for money, no deals were struck, and
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`after two hours her feet hurt so they went to rest in Punchy’s hotel room at the Golden Nugget. (Id.
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`at 84–85.) A.B. said they rested in Punchy’s hotel room until they returned to the Stratosphere area
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`later that night, where A.B. once again walked the strip while Miguel walked behind her. (ECF
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`No. 12-1 at 85–88.) She said this time three men approached her about sex or doing drugs in
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`exchange for money, but no deals were struck. (Id.) She engaged in no sexual conduct based on
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`her walks on the strip, and around 4:00 a.m., they were ready to return to California, as planned,
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`and Miguel told her he would meet her at his car. (ECF Nos. 12-1 at 87–88, 116, 121; 13-1 at 42.)
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`Officers Erik Perkett and Andrew Keller, of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
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`(“Metro”), testified they stopped A.B. around 4:00 a.m., near the Stratosphere, in an area locals
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`call “the Naked City.” (ECF No. 11-1 at 28–31, 35, 64–67.) The officers stopped her because she
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`was jaywalking; but as they approached, they noticed she was wearing “provocative” clothes and
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`appeared “about 12 to 13 years old.” (Id. at 31–33, 46–47, 68.) According to both officers, A.B.
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`spontaneously told them she was “not a prostitute.” (Id. at 46–47, 67.) A.B. told the officers she
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`was 18 years old, gave them a phony birthdate in 1993 that placed her at 19 years old, and said she
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`was meeting her “boyfriend” or “friend” at his red or maroon four-door sedan. (ECF Nos. 11-1 at
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`31–33, 69–70; 12-1 at 88–90.) The officers told A.B. that giving false information to an officer is
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`against the law, but she maintained she was 18 years old. (ECF No. 11-1 at 48.) The officers
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`confirmed, through the California Department of Motor Vehicles, that A.B. was from California
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`and only 14 years old. (Id. at 33, 50, 69.) When the officers confronted A.B. with the information,
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`she admitted she was only 14 years old. (Id.) Based on A.B.’s age, clothes, statements, and the
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`area, Keller called vice detectives to investigate prostitution. (Id. at 49, 51.)
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`Officers Perkett and Keller noticed Miguel and a woman watching from a distance. (ECF
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`No. 11-1 at 34–35, 38, 62, 70–71.) Perkett peered at them using binoculars, and they started
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`walking away. (Id.) Keller said the woman was dressed in the “seductive style” of a prostitute, and
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`although people wear provocative clothing to all-night clubs on the strip, such as the Stratosphere
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`nightclub, he detected nothing indicating she was clubbing when he spoke to her.4 (Id. at 73, 77,
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`80.) Based on their knowledge that pimps and prostitutes maintain proximity, the officers believed
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`the couple were “involved with [A.B.] being a prostitute,” and Miguel might be a “pimp,” for both
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`females, so they stopped them to investigate. (Id. at 39, 58–59, 74–75.)
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`Miguel identified himself with a California driver’s license; told them A.B. was his
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`girlfriend and he was concerned about her; and permitted the officers to search his vehicle, which
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`matched A.B.’s description of her boyfriend’s car. (ECF No. 11-1 at 39–41, 51–53, 57, 71–72,
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`76.) The officers found no contraband in Miguel’s car. (Id.) Officer Keller thought Miguel lied
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`when he told them he was walking to his car because Keller saw Miguel walking away from his
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`car. (Id. at 80.) Officer Perkett believed Miguel was A.B.’s “boyfriend” because they each said so.
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`(Id. at 52, 57.) Police did not arrest Miguel for any crimes, but they arrested A.B. for “jaywalking,
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`curfew violations and providing false information to a police officer.” (Id. at 42, 56.) Metro found
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`a business card and three condoms in A.B.’s possession. (Id. at 43–44, 53–54.)
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`4 The woman was arrested on an outstanding warrant, but not for prostitution although she
`had a previous arrest for prostitution. (ECF No. 11-1 at 41, 56, 63, 77–81, 96–97.)
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`5
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`Metro Vice Detective William Van Cleef testified he spoke with A.B. at juvenile hall and
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`contacted A.B.’s grandparents, who collected her and returned to California. (ECF Nos. 11-1 at
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`109, 121; 12-1 at 2.) Van Cleef determined Miguel was the sole subscriber for the phone number
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`on the business card found in A.B.’s possession. (ECF No. 11-1 at 122–23.) Van Cleef later
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`contacted A.B. by telephone, and although initially reluctant to talk about prostitution, A.B.
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`eventually gave a taped interview to Detectives Van Cleef and Rochelle Zerbe at A.B.’s home in
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`California. (ECF No. 12-1 at 3–4, 16–17, 25–26.) Van Cleef testified, in his experience, “nine
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`times out of ten” a juvenile victim is too fearful to talk to police if their pimp is nearby. (Id. at 24–
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`25.) Van Cleef explained pimps have rules which include “checking in before or after time with a
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`potential client of prostitution,” “how much to charge,” “who and where acts” will occur, and
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`whom “to talk to because they’re in fear of that girl maybe choosing up another pimp,” and to
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`avoid talking to a specific type of person whom the pimp suspects is a “police officer” or “bum.”
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`(ECF No. 11-1 at 116–18.) Van Cleef said that, in his experience, pimps collect 100% of the
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`earnings and the victim prostitute is never paid the agreed share even where a victim prostitute is
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`under the impression the pimp holds the victim’s money until he or she wants it. (Id.)
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`Miguel unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on state direct appeal and state post-
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`conviction review. (ECF Nos. 19-3; 20-9.)
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`18
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`III.
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`GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
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`If a state court has adjudicated a habeas corpus claim on its merits, a federal court may
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`only grant habeas relief with respect to that claim if the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a
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`decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
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`[f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[;]” or “resulted in a
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`decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
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`presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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`A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within
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`the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
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`governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of
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`facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless
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`arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
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`73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000), and citing Bell v. Cone, 535
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`U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established
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`Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) “if the state court
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`identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but
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`unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75
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`(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). “The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state
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`court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous . . . [rather] [t]he state court’s application of
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`clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (quoting
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`Williams, 529 U.S. at 409–10, 412) (internal citation omitted). State courts are not required to be
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`aware of or cite Supreme Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-
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`court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “State-court decisions are
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`measured against [the Supreme Court]’s precedents as of ‘the time the state court renders its
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`decision.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (quoting Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71–72).
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`“[A] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so
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`long as ‘fairminded
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`jurists could disagree’ on
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`the correctness of
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`the state court’s
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`decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
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`U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary
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`conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102 (citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75); see
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`also Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (stating the standard is a “difficult-to-meet” and “highly deferential
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`standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the
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`benefit of the doubt”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Petitioners have the burden
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`of proof. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)).
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`IV. DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Ground 2—Sufficiency of the Evidence
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`In Ground 2, Miguel claims there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for
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`(A) Pandering and (B) First-Degree Kidnapping, in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth
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`Amendment rights to due process. (ECF No. 4 at 5–6.) For the reasons discussed below, Ground
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`2 is denied because the state appellate court’s determinations rejecting these claims are neither
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`contrary to nor constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
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`authority and are not based on an unreasonable determination of fact.
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`1.
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`Applicable Legal Principles
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`A federal habeas petitioner faces a “considerable hurdle” when challenging the sufficiency
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`of evidence to support his conviction. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 2004).
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`According to the Supreme Court, a jury’s verdict must stand if, after viewing the evidence in the
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`light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
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`elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
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`307, 319 (1979).) A reviewing court, when faced with a record of historical facts that supports
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`conflicting inferences, must presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of
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`the prosecution and defer to that resolution, even if the resolution of specific conflicts by the state
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`court trier of fact does not affirmatively appear in the record. See id. (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at
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`326.) The Jackson standard is applied with reference to the substantive elements of the criminal
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`offense as defined by state law. See id. (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 & n.16.) When the
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`deferential standards of AEDPA and Jackson are applied together, the question on federal habeas
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`review is whether the state court unreasonably applied the Jackson standard to the evidence at
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`trial. See e.g., Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
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`Where circumstantial evidence is used to establish guilt, the Supreme Court has held that
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`it is “intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence” because although “circumstantial
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`evidence may in some cases point to a wholly incorrect result” this is “equally true of testimonial
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`evidence.” Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (rejecting contention that
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`circumstantial evidence must exclude every hypothesis but that of guilt). “In both instances, a jury
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`is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of
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`inaccuracy or ambiguous inference,” and “[t]he jury must use its experience with people and events
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`in weighing the probabilities.” Id. “If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, [the
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`Supreme Court requires] no more.” Id; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324–26 (finding
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`circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove specific intent to kill).
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`2.
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`The State Court’s Determination
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`The state appellate court rejected Miguel’s insufficiency of evidence claims as follows:
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`insufficient evidence
`Appellant Javon Miguel claims
`supports his convictions for pandering of a child and first-degree
`kidnapping. He specifically asserts that the State did not present
`sufficient evidence to prove he inveigled, enticed, or compelled
`A.B. to become a prostitute or to continue to engage in prostitution
`and the State did not present sufficient evidence of his subjective
`intent at the time of the alleged acts to support the conviction for
`kidnapping.
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`When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
`evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
`prosecution and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could
`have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
`doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Mitchell v.
`State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). “[I]t is the
`function of the jury, not the appellate court, to weigh the evidence
`and pass upon the credibility of the witness.” Walker v. State, 91
`Nev. 724, 726, 542 P.2d 438, 439 (1975). And circumstantial
`evidence is enough to support a conviction. Lisle v. State, 113 Nev.
`679, 691–92, 941 P.2d 459, 467–68 (1997), holding limited on other
`grounds by Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1117 n.9, 968 P.2d
`296, 315 n.9 (1998).
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`A.B. testified she met Miguel at a park in Victorville,
`California. When A.B. asked Miguel what he was doing at the park,
`he responded that he was “just hanging out making money.” A.B.
`believed that Miguel was a pimp based on Miguel's personality, the
`way he was dressed, and the amount of money he had. After
`disclosing to Miguel that she had previously engaged in prostitution,
`Miguel told her he made money doing prostitution and explained
`that he has girls who work for him and make money for him. Miguel
`told A.B. that if she wanted to work for him, she could and if she
`did not want to she did not have to. Miguel gave A.B. a business
`card with his phone number written on it and said she could call him
`if she wanted to work for him. If she worked for him, Miguel said
`they could get an apartment, she could get a fake identification card,
`and she would make some money. A.B. responded that she was
`interested in working with him as a prostitute and arranged to meet
`Miguel the next day. Although A.B. was only 14 years old at the
`time, she told Miguel that she was 18 years old. She also told Miguel
`that she lived with her grandparents.
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`The following day, A.B. went to Miguel’s home. Miguel
`asked A.B. if she wanted to make some money and go to Las Vegas.
`A.B. agreed and she and Miguel drove to Las Vegas later that day.
`While driving to Las Vegas Miguel and A.B. discussed A.B. making
`money working as a prostitute. Miguel said he would walk a short
`distance from her so he could watch her and make sure that nothing
`happened to her, A.B. was to charge no less than $100, and they
`would split the money she earned fifty-fifty. Miguel also told A.B.
`not to talk to black males because they would try to make her their
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`prostitute. A.B. was also to avoid eye contact with black males.
`Miguel gave A.B. condoms and his phone number. Miguel advised
`A.B. that the condoms were for her protection when she goes on
`“dates” and told her if her “date” did not want to use a condom she
`could not have sex with him.
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`After arriving in Las Vegas, Miguel took A.B. to a
`McDonald’s near the Stratosphere. A.B. walked between the
`McDonald’s and the Stratosphere for approximately two hours.
`Although Miguel did not point out people for A.B. to approach, he
`did tell her to look for men with a lot of money, i.e. men who drove
`nice cars. Miguel told A.B. that if she got a “date” she should take
`the “date” to either a hotel room, which Miguel would pay for, or
`take him to Miguel’s car to perform the sex act. During the two hour
`period, A.B. was approached by four men, but she did not engage in
`sex with any of them. Miguel then took A.B. to his friend’s hotel
`room, where he and A.B. rested for a while. Sometime later, Miguel
`and A.B. returned to the same area near the Stratosphere, where A.B.
`again walked the area looking for “dates.” This time A.B. was
`approached by three men. She did not engage in sex with any of
`them. At approximately 4:00 a.m., A.B. was walking to Miguel’s
`car when she was stopped for jaywalking and because the officers
`believed she was approximately 12 or 13 years old and out past
`curfew. A.B. was taken into custody and her grandfather, who is her
`guardian, was called to retrieve her. The property on A.B. at the time
`of her arrest included three condoms and a business card with
`Miguel’s phone number written on it.
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`A.B. testified that she would not have agreed to work as a
`prostitute if Miguel had not told her he would help her make money
`and she would not have gone to Las Vegas to prostitute herself if
`Miguel had not suggested it.
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`A.B.’s grandfather testified that he did not know Miguel, did
`not give Miguel permission to take A.B. anywhere, and did not give
`Miguel permission to prostitute A.B. He further testified that when
`A.B. did not return home he filed a missing person’s report with the
`police.
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`The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented
`that Miguel willfully induced, persuaded, encouraged, or enticed
`A.B., who was a child under the age of 18, to become a prostitute or
`to continue to engage in prostitution, see 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 426, §
`42, at 2430–31, and that Miguel led, took, enticed, or carried away
`A.B., a minor, with the intent to keep or confine her from her parents
`or guardians, or with the intent to hold A.B. to unlawful service, see
`NRS 200.310(1). It is for the jury to determine the weight and
`credibility to give conflicting testimony, and the jury’s verdict will
`not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial evidence
`supports the verdict. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d
`20, 20 (1981); see also McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d
`571, 573 (1992).
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`(ECF No. 19-3.)
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`3.
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`Ground 2(A)—Pandering
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`At the relevant time, Nevada defined pandering as: “[a] person who[] [i]nduces, persuades,
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`encourages, inveigles, entices, or compels a person to become a prostitute or to continue to engage
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`in prostitution.” NRS § 201.300(1)(a), as amended by 1997 Laws, p. 295. See also ECF No. 14-1
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`at 4, 7–17. “[T]o be convicted of pandering under NRS § 201.300(1)(a), a defendant must act with
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`the specific intent of inducing (or persuading, encouraging, inveigling, enticing, or compelling)
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`his target to become or remain a prostitute.” Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 613–14, 262 P.3d 1123,
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`1126–27 (2011). “Success is not a necessary component of the crime . . . [i]t is the act of
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`encouragement, persuasion or inveiglement which is forbidden.” Id. at 623–24 (citations omitted).
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`At the time of Miguel’s trial, the testimony of a victim or targeted person need not be supported
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`by corroboration because the statute requiring corroboration was repealed in 2005. See id. at 616
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`(citations omitted). At the relevant time, the term “prostitution” meant “engaging in sexual conduct
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`for a fee,” and the term “prostitute” was defined as “a male or female person who for a fee engages
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`in sexual intercourse, oral-genital contact or any touching of the sexual organs or other intimate
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`parts of a person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either person.” NRS
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`§ 201.295, as amended by 2009 Laws, c. 160 § 5.
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`In Miguel’s case, corroboration of A.B.’s testimony was not necessary and there was ample
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`evidence upon which a rational jury could infer that Miguel, with the specific intent that A.B. do
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`so, induced, persuaded, encouraged, inveigled, enticed, or compelled A.B. to become a prostitute
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`or continue to engage in prostitution, i.e., for a fee, engage in sexual intercourse, oral-genital
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`contact, or touching of the sexual organs or other intimate parts of a person for the purposes of
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`arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either person.
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`A.B. testified that, during her conversation with Miguel at the park, she got the distinct
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`impression he was a “pimp” based on his dress, manner, and clothes.5 She testified that, after she
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`told him she had prostitution experience, he told her she could work for him. She testified he told
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`her she could get a fake ID, they could get an apartment, and she could make money. He gave her
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`5 “A ‘pimp’ solicits patrons for the prostitute and lives off her earnings, while a ‘panderer’
`recruits prostitutes and sets them up in business.” Ford, 127 Nev. at 616 (quotation marks and
`citations omitted.)
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`his phone number and agreed to take her with him to work in Las Vegas if she came to his house
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`the next day. A.B. testified she never would have agreed to return to prostitution, or gone to Las
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`Vegas with Miguel, had he not convinced her she could make money as a prostitute with him and
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`offered to “pimp” her. See text, supra, at 2–5. During the drive to Las Vegas, Miguel told A.B.
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`that he would