Case 2:21-cv-01006-CDS-DJA Document 13 Filed 08/30/21 Page 1 of 13
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`Robert P. Spretnak, Esq. (Bar No. 5135)
`LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
`8275 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 200
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89123
`Telephone: (702) 454-4900
`Fax: (702) 938-1055
`Email: bob@spretnak.com
`Edward D. Greim, Esq. (pro hac vice admission forthcoming)
`Andrew P. Alexander, Esq. (pro hac vice admission forthcoming)
`GRAVES GARRETT LLC
`1100 Main Street, Suite 2700
`Kansas City, Missouri 64105
`Telephone: (816) 256-3181
`Fax: 816-256-5958
`Email: edgreim@gravesgarrett.com, aalexander@gravesgarrett.com
`Attorneys for Parler LLC, Defendant
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEVADA
`46 LABS LLC, an Oklahoma limited
`liability company,
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No.: 2:21-cv-01006-APG-DJA
`
`))))))))))))
`
`vs.
`PARLER LLC, a Nevada limited
`liability company,
`Defendant.
`
`DEFENDANT PARLER LLC’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS AND
`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
`
`Defendant Parler LLC hereby moves the Court to Dismiss Plaintiff 46 Labs’
`Complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
`Trademark infringement claims fail as a matter of law when the parties are
`using the disputed marks for totally unrelated services. That is because trademark
`infringement requires more than just confusingly similar marks; it requires that the
`use of the marks is likely to confuse reasonable consumers about the parties’ services.
`“Likelihood of confusion” is a necessary element of an infringement claim. It requires
`probable confusion, not merely possible confusion. This means that where the parties’
`services in question are unrelated, there can be no likelihood of confusion as a matter
`of law. Allegations showing unrelated services, then, fail to state an infringement
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`claim as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
`All four Counts in this suit turn on precisely that showing: likely confusion
`between Defendant Parler’s social networking platform and Plaintiff 46 Labs LLC’s
`password-protected portal for its telecommunications infrastructure clients to view
`their account data. 46 Labs cannot deliver. It does not (and cannot) allege that its
`telecommunication-infrastructure client account portal and Parler’s well-known social
`networking platform are in any way related, so each Count fails as a matter of law and
`should be dismissed. Murray v. Cable Nat. Broadcasting Co., 86 F.3d 858, 860-61 (9th
`Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of infringement claims under § 1114(1), § 1125(a), and
`state-law unfair competition law because the parties’ services were unrelated).
`Even if 46 Labs’ and Parler’s services were related, 46 Labs would still fail to
`state a claim because it alleges no facts that plausibly show probable consumer
`confusion among their services. Rather, the two companies’ services, business
`operations, users, and marketing channels are so dissimilar that confusion cannot be
`likely. Each Claim should be dismissed.
`BACKGROUND
`Plaintiff 46 Labs admits it is a communication infrastructure and services
`company; it serves as infrastructure that supports phone calls. ¶ 6. As part of its
`services, 46 Labs provides its clients a password-protected interface called “Peeredge.”
`¶¶ 6-7. According to 46 Labs’ service mark registration, 46 Labs uses the PEEREDGE
`logo mark in connection with “cloud computing featuring software for use in the
`management of telecommunications including switching, management of call data,
`telecommunications systems and telecommunications business functions.” ECF No.
`2 at 11 (attaching Reg. No. 4,790,688). The PEEREDGE logo mark is a stylized, blue
`letter “P” with rounded segment tips. Id.; ¶¶ 7-10.
`After each 46 Labs’ telecommunications infrastructure client enters its log-in
`and password into the Peeredge interface, it is treated to an internal “dashboard”
`displaying phone call-related data, including graphs of “Minutes” and tabs for
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`“Attempts,” “Ports,” “CPS,” “Organization Ports,” “Organization CPS,” “Termination
`Ports,” and “Termination CPS.” ¶ 7 (screenshot of the dashboard). When clients see
`Peeredge’s “P,” they “see [it] in the upper left corner of the dashboard during use of the
`service, as well as on log in screens and in other places and on other materials.” Id.
`Nowhere does the Peeredge “log-in” screen or dashboard allow for posting of messages,
`chat, or social interaction between Peeredge clients. Id. Nor does 46 Labs plead that
`it lets 46 Labs clients use Peeredge (or any other service) to communicate with each
`other for online social networking. Id. 46 Labs does not plead that it uses “Peeredge”
`or its blue, rounded “P,” outside the context of its specialized telecommunications
`infrastructure services, or with anyone other than 46 Labs’ existing clients who access
`the Peeredge dashboard to view and manage their account data. ¶¶ 6-10.
`46 Labs admits that Parler, in contrast, is a social media platform, and that at
`Parler’s launch, Parler “promot[ed] itself as an alternative to larger social media
`platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.” ¶ 11. 46 Labs pleads that “Parler once
`claimed to have over 20 million users, and was the number one free app on Apple’s App
`store in January 2021.” Id. Parler uses a red stylized “P” mark with three, pointed
`segment tips (the “PARLER” logo mark). ¶¶ 11-12.
`46 Labs pleads that Parler “gained national notoriety” during the runup to the
`2020 election, when news and media outlets “disseminated numerous images” of
`Parler’s logo. ¶ 13. 46 Labs does not allege that either Parler or national news media
`reported that Parler provided communications infrastructure services to clients, or that
`it was held out to be anything other than a social networking platform.
`46 Labs alleges that not until November 2020 did an unknown number of
`unnamed “customers” “contact” it regarding Parler. ¶ 14. 46 Labs does not name any
`customer or plead what any of them said in their “contact.” Id. Without further
`factual detail, 46 Labs speculates that its clients’ contact was “based on their confusion
`that 46 Labs was responsible for or affiliated with Parler.” Id. Its clients’ alleged
`confusion, 46 Labs further speculates, is “due to” what 46 Labs claims is the “nearly
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`for Parler’s social networking platform and 46 Labs’
`logos”
`identical
`telecommunications infrastructure client portal. Id. at ¶ 14. 46 Labs therefore pleads
`“[o]n information and belief,” without supporting facts, that “Parler’s use” of its
`PARLER logo “has caused confusion among other customers of 46 Labs and is likely
`to cause additional confusion in the future.” ¶ 15.
`46 Labs pleads that Parler was offline between about January 10 and February
`15, 2021. ¶ 20. By February 15, 2021, 46 Labs claims without any supporting facts
`or detail that “irreparable damage had been done” to the PEEREDGE logo mark and
`to 46 Labs’ reputation and goodwill. ¶ 20. 46 Labs claims that Parler’s use of the
`PARLER logo mark rendered 46 Labs’ PEEREDGE logo mark “unusable” and has
`“completely destroyed” the PEEREDGE logo mark’s goodwill and value — and 46 Labs
`has lost control over its product identity and reputation. ¶ 21. However, 46 Labs
`provides no factual information to support these legal conclusions. Id.
`ARGUMENT
`A complaint that does not allege facts that state “a claim for relief that is
`plausible” on its face should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Bell Atl. Corp. v.
`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A claim is facially
`1
`plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
`the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned,
`the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. Rule 8’s “plausible” claim
`standard requires more than a mere possibility that the pleader is entitled to relief.
`Id. at 679.
`Determining whether a Complaint states a claim “is a context-specific task that
`requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
`
` A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
`1
`that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`The Court may consider only well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations. Id. at
`678-80. Threadbare recitals of a cause’s elements or mere conclusory statements
`cannot support a claim under Rule 8. Id. at 678.
`The “nub” of 46 Labs’ complaint is the likelihood of consumer confusion,
`presented as claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition (each governed
`by the same legal standard). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565; see ECF No. 2 at ¶1. In fact,
`all four Counts are essentially the same trademark infringement claim. Section I
`below explains in the context of Count I why 46 Labs fails to state a claim: (a) it alleges
`totally unrelated services, which cannot support an infringement claim as a matter of
`law; and (b) even if the parties’ services were related (they are not), 46 Labs’
`allegations would fail to plausibly show that consumer confusion is likely under the
`Sleekcraft factor test. Section II then establishes that Counts II, III, and IV likewise
`fail to state a claim because they are governed by the same legal standard as Count I.
`All four Counts should be dismissed.
`
`I.
`
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`Count I should be dismissed because 46 Labs does not plausibly allege
`a likelihood of confusion.
`Count I alleges trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), which
`prohibits the unauthorized use of a reproduction, copy, counterfeit, or colorable
`imitation of a registered mark in a way that is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause
`mistake, or to deceive.” The key element of an infringement claim is that the offending
`use must be likely to cause consumer confusion. Aronca, Inc. v. Farmacy Beauty, LLC,
`976 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2020); see CA9 Civ. Instr. 15.18. “The test for
`likelihood of confusion is whether a reasonably prudent consumer in the marketplace
`is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks.”
`Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2015)
`(quotation and citation omitted). “The confusion must ‘be probable, not simply a
`possibility.’” Id. (quoting Murray v. Cable Nat. Broadcasting Co., 86 F.2d 858, 861 (9th
`Cir. 1996)).
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`A.
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`The complaint must be dismissed because Parler’s social
`networking platform is not related to 46 Labs’ Peeredge services.
`When the services associated with the two marks at issue in an infringement
`claim are “totally unrelated, there can be no infringement because confusion is
`unlikely” as a matter of law. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.
`1979) (overruled, on other grounds, by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions,
`353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003)). Thus, when the services are not related, dismissal is
`appropriate at the pleading stage. Murray, 86 F.3d at 861 (affirming dismissal because
`the parties’ services were unrelated). That is the case here: the Complaint does not
`(and could not) show that Parler’s social networking platform are related in any way
`to 46 Labs’ Peeredge service, a password-protected portal
`for 46 Labs’
`telecommunications-infrastructure clients to view their account data. They are totally
`unrelated.
`When determining whether services are unrelated as a matter of law, the Court
`should consider the following factors: whether the services have the same function or
`use, are sold to the same class of purchaser, are sold through the same marketing
`channels, and are likely to be connected in the mind of a prospective purchaser because
`of the similarity of their uses.2
`The two services at issue serve very different functions. Parler uses the
`PARLER mark in connection with its social networking platform, which is much like
`Twitter or Facebook. ¶ 11. Social networking platforms, such as Parler, allow people
`and organizations to connect and communicate freely with one another via an app (or
`web browser) and make use of aspects of the platform that facilitate new peer-to-peer
`social connections. Social media is often used to express personal ideas and exercise
`free speech — and most often for noncommercial purposes. See ¶ 13.
`
` Murray v. Cable Nat. Broadcasting Co., 86 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1996); Toho
`2
`Co. Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1981); J.B. Williams
`Co., Inc. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 192-93 (9th Cir. 1975).
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`In contrast, 46 Labs provides infrastructure for phone calls. It uses the
`PEEREDGE mark in connection with a password-protected portal for its own
`commercial clients so that they can view their account data; these commercial clients
`use 46 Labs for a cloud computing and telecommunications management system
`serving business functions. ECF No. 2 at 11. 46 Labs does not allege that Peeredge
`is anything like a social networking platform. Rather, Peeredge is an inherently
`sophisticated and specialized tool for businesses and commercial communications
`infrastructure that is not used for recreation or free speech expression within the
`marketplace of ideas.
`The two services thus also have very different users: in Peeredge’s corner,
`businesses who have need for sophisticated telecommunications infrastructure; in
`Parler’s corner, any person with an internet connection who desires to disseminate his
`or her views among the general public. They are also marketed very differently.
`Parler’s social media platform is widely available free-of-cost to every person and
`3
`organization on the planet with an internet connection. It is marketed through, e.g.,
`app stores (such as Apple’s, Google’s, and Amazon’s). See ¶ 18. But Peeredge is
`available only to 46 Labs’s existing telecommunication infrastructure clients.
`These distinctions make clear that Parler’s social networking platform and 46
`Labs’ Peeredge client data portal are highly unlikely to be connected in the minds of
`46 Labs’ clients. They serve such distinct purposes and are for such different classes
`of users that a reasonable consumer in the position of 46 Labs’ clients would not
`consider them together. The two services are extremely dissimilar — totally unrelated.
`As a matter of law, 46 Labs’ infringement claim cannot prevail unless the
`services in question are related. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348. Here, they are not.
`This alone is fatal to infringement claims, which should be dismissed. Murray, 86 F.3d
`at 861.
`
`3
`
` Compare ¶ 11 (Parler has “users”) with ¶ 14 (46 Labs has “customers”).
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`B.
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`Even if the Peeredge and Parler services were related, Count I
`would nevertheless fail because the services are not competitive
`and reasonable consumers are not likely to be confused.
`When the goods or services at issue in a likelihood of confusion claim are related
`to, but not competitive with, one another, then the Plaintiff can only prevail by
`demonstrating a likelihood of confusion under the factor test first set forth in
`Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348. 46 Labs does not allege that Parler’s social media
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`platform and Peeredge are competitive at all. See ECF No. 2. So to survive this
`Motion to Dismiss (and again, assuming solely for purposes of this section that Parler’s
`and 46 Labs’ services are related), 46 Labs must allege facts that would show a
`likelihood of confusion under the Sleekcraft “all relevant circumstances” test. 599 F.2d
`at 348. The eight guiding “Sleekcraft” factors are:
`1. strength of the plaintiff’s mark; 2. relatedness of the
`goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual
`confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. likely degree of
`purchaser care; 7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark;
`8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
`Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming
`dismissal for failure to sufficiently allege likelihood of confusion). This eight-factor
`analysis is “illustrative rather than exhaustive, and best understood as simply
`providing helpful guideposts.” Id. In light of all relevant circumstances, allegations
`that do not show that consumer confusion is “probable, not simply a possibility,” are
`insufficient to state a claim. Murray, 86 F.3d at 861 (quotation and citation omitted).
`Relevant to this inquiry, 46 Labs essentially alleges only that the two logo
`marks are confusingly similar. 46 Labs also includes a vague allegation that an
`unspecified number of customers “contacted” it about Parler, and speculates (without
`any factual allegations) that this contact was “based on” the similarity of the marks,
`which it further speculates caused 46 Labs’ commercial business clients to believe that
`
` By contrast, where the services are both related and competitive, then
`4
`likelihood of confusion can be found if the marks are sufficiently similar. Sleekcraft,
`599 F.2d at 348.
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`46 Labs had morphed from a telecommunications infrastructure provider into a social
`networking business. ECF No. 2, at ¶ 14. Tellingly, 46 Labs can only allege “on
`information and belief” that Parler’s mark “caused confusion” or is “likely to cause
`confusion.” ECF No. 2, at ¶ 15. That bare-bones speculation falls well short of facts
`that plausibly plead probable consumer confusion.
`46 Labs does not allege that Parler selected the PARLER mark with the intent
`to copy the PEEREDGE mark, to drive 46 Labs’ Peeredge customers to Parler (they
`could not, of course, because the products are so dissimilar), or to otherwise ride on the
`coattails of the PEEREDGE mark. 46 Labs also does not allege that its PEEREDGE
`mark has commercial strength due to actual widespread market recognition. See
`Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th
`Cir. 2011). It instead alleges only that it is a global leader in phone call infrastructure,
`has been in business for about nine years, and that it has unspecified goodwill. Again,
`46 Labs speculates that actual confusion occurred “on information and belief” — but
`such a thin, fact-free restatement of the element itself does not plausibly plead a
`likelihood of confusion. See Russell v. Caesar, No. C 01-2478 MJJ, 2001 WL 1835165,
`at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2001).
`Further, no allegation suggests that 46 Labs is likely to expand its Peeredge
`product to offer a social networking platform like Parler’s — or that Parler is likely to
`expand its platform to include services like 46 Labs’ Peeredge phone-call-infrastructure
`user interface service. 46 Labs’ clients are sophisticated commercial entities that buy
`telecommunications infrastructure platforms that will exercise care when adopting
`expensive telecommunications infrastructure platforms, not individuals who sign on
`to social media networks for free in a matter of seconds. This cuts deeply against 46
`Labs’ likelihood of confusion allegation.
`And perhaps most importantly, as discussed in detail above, 46 Labs does not
`allege that the products are related to one another, supplied in the same marketing
`channels, or otherwise proximate in any way. If they are related at all, that
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`relationship is so attenuated that it is simply implausible that any prospective
`purchaser of 46 Labs’ services (or existing 46 Labs client) has been diverted to the
`Parler platform or has quit 46 Labs because it believes 46 Labs is Parler.5
`46 Labs’ allegations do not “nudge” its allegations “across the line from
`conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Instead, they fall well short of
`alleging probable consumer confusion between its services and Parler’s based on the
`use of a similar mark. Count I should be dismissed.
`II.
`Counts II, III, and IV also turn on likelihood of confusion and are
`governed by the same standards as Count I; they should likewise be
`dismissed.
`Count II alleges trademark infringement by false association under section 43(a)
`of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). There is no dispute that this claim is
`governed by the same legal standard as Count I (likelihood of confusion). 15 U.S.C. §
`1125(a)(1)(A) (employing the same “likely to cause confusion” language as § 1114(1));
`Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (“It is, of course, also
`undisputed that liability under § 43(a) requires proof of the likelihood of confusion.”);
`Multi Time Machine, Inc., 804 F.3d at 935-36 (applying same analysis under both §§
`1114(1) and 1125(a)); CA9 Civ. Instr. 15.18. Count II thus fails for the same reasons
`as Count I.
`Count III alleges common-law trademark infringement under Nevada law. To
`the extent Nevada law recognizes common-law trademark infringement, it adopts the
`same likelihood of confusion standard expressed by the Ninth Circuit that applies to
`Counts I and II under the Lanham Act. A.L.M.N., Inc. v. Rosoff, 104 Nev. 274, 278-79,
`282-83, 757 P.2d 1319, 1321, 1324 (1988) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s likelihood of
`confusion test); Caesars World, Inc. v. Milanian, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1193 (D. Nev.
`
` Tellingly, 46 Labs’s damage allegation also does not square with trademark
`5
`infringement: it alleges that it was harmed by the political views expressed by Parler
`users. 46 Labs does not allege that it lost any business because of Parler’s use of the
`PARLER logo — or by what measure 46 Labs determined its PEEREDGE mark to be
`rendered valueless by Parler’s mark and notoriety.
`
`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
`
`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
`
`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
`
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`Case 2:21-cv-01006-CDS-DJA Document 13 Filed 08/30/21 Page 11 of 13
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`2003) (“The elements necessary to make out a claim of Nevada common law trademark
`infringement are identical to the elements necessary under section 43(a) of the
`Lanham Act.”). Accordingly, Count III also fails for the same reasons as Count I.
`Finally, Count IV alleges common-law unfair competition under Nevada law for
`use of an infringing mark that is likely to cause confusion. ¶ 39. Nevada law supports
`no cognizable common-law unfair competition claim other than trademark
`infringement; A.L.M.N., Inc., appears to be the only published case recognizing such
`a claim, which it recognizes as trademark infringement. 757 P.2d at 1321. In any
`event, the allegations in Count IV squarely fit a trademark infringement “likelihood
`of confusion” claim — just like Counts I, II, and III. It is thus governed by the same
`legal standard as all three other counts. Id. at 1324. Count IV also fails for the same
`reasons as Count I.
`
`CONCLUSION
`Trademark infringement allegations that fail to plausibly allege probable
`consumer confusion should be dismissed at the pleading stage. Murray, 86 F.3d at 861.
`Here, all four Counts are governed by the same “likelihood of confusion” standard. All
`four suffer the same pleading deficiencies: failure to allege related services — which
`is alone fatal to all four Counts — and failure to otherwise allege facts that plausibly
`show probable consumer confusion between 46 Labs’ and Parler’s noncompeting
`services.
`The Court should dismiss all four Counts for failure to state a claim.
`
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
`
`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`Case 2:21-cv-01006-CDS-DJA Document 13 Filed 08/30/21 Page 12 of 13
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`DATED: 30 August 2021.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
`By: /s/ Robert P. Spretnak
` Robert P. Spretnak, Esq.
`8275 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 200
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89123
`GRAVES GARRETT LLC
`By: Edward D. Greim, Esq.
` (pro hac vice admission forthcoming)
` Andrew P. Alexander, Esq.
` (pro hac vice admission forthcoming)
`1100 Main Street, Suite 2700
`Kansas City, Missouri 64105
`Attorneys for Parler LLC, Defendant
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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`Case 2:21-cv-01006-CDS-DJA Document 13 Filed 08/30/21 Page 13 of 13
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`I certify that on August 30, 2021, I caused to be served, through the CM/ECF
`electronic filing system of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada,
`a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Defendant Parler LLC’s Motion
`to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support to the parties of interest identified as
`follows:
`
`Manita Rawat, Esq. (mrawat@duanemorris.com)
`Tyson E. Hafen, Esq. (tehafen@duanemorris.com)
`Duane Morris LLP
`100 North City Parkway, Suite 1560
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89106-4617
`Jennifer Lantz, Esq. (JMLantz@duanemorris.com)
`Duane Morris LLP
`2475 Hanover Street
`Palo Alto, California 94304-1194
`Meghan C. Killian (mckillian@duanemorris.com)
`Duane Morris LLP
`One Market Plaza, Suite 2200
`San Francisco, California 94105-1127
`
`/s/ Robert P. Spretnak
`On behalf of the Law Offices of Robert P. Spretnak
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`THE LAW OFFICES OF
`ROBERT P. SPRETNAK
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`A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T IO N
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`8275 S. EA ST E R N AV EN U E
`SU IT E 200
`LA S VE G A S, NE V A D A 89123
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