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`No. 57724 FILED
`JUL 2 4 2013
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`CURTIS COE,
`Appellant,
`vs.
`MARCO CENTENO-ALVAREZ,
`Respondent.
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`TRAC1E K. LINDEMAN
`CLERC.OF UPREME COU
`Y
`•
`ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART AIVI9EPuTY cLERK
`REMANDING
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`BY ..._.
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`This is an appeal from a district court judgment in a tort
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`action and from post-judgment orders denying a new trial and awarding
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`attorney fees and costs.
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`Appellant Curtis Coe failed to stop at a stop sign and his
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`vehicle collided with another driven by Respondent Marco Centeno-
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`Alvarez. Coe admitted his liability, but disputed the amount of damages.
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`Prior to trial, Centeno-Alvarez presented Coe with an offer of
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`judgment in the sum of $1,250,000 pursuant to NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115.
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`Coe did not accept the offer and it lapsed. Following a jury trial, Centeno-
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`Alvarez was awarded $36,465 in past damages along with prejudgment
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`and post-judgment interest. However, the district court granted Centeno-
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`Alvarez's motion for a new trial. Coe appealed and this court affirmed,
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`concluding that the district court acted within its discretion in ordering a
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`new trial.
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`A second trial resulted in a verdict totaling $1,594,229 plus
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`prejudgment and post-judgment interest. Coe filed a motion to alter or
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`amend the judgment, arguing that the district court had miscalculated
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`prejudgment interest. The district court denied both motions. Centeno-
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`Alvarez moved for an award of attorney fees, based upon the offer of
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`judgment that Coe rejected. The district court granted the motion, but
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`reduced the amount of attorney fees from the $1,440,102 requested to
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`$210,000. Coe now presents this appeal.
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`At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by
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`awarding Centeno-Alvarez attorney fees and whether the district court
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`erred by awarding prejudgment interest on appellant's award of future
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`damages.' This court reviews a district court's decisions regarding
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`attorney fees and prejudgment interest for an abuse of discretion. MC.
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`Multi-Family Dev. v. Crestdale Assocs., 124 Nev. 901, 916, 193 P.3d 536,
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`546 (2008).
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`The district court erred in its award of attorney fees
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`Coe argues that all of the factors that a district court must
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`apply in awarding attorney fees under Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 668
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`P.2d 268 (1983), weigh against an award of attorney fees and the award
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`should be reversed.
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`"Coe also asserts that Centeno-Alvarez's counsel committed
`prejudicial misconduct warranting either a new trial or reversal on appeal
`by making inflammatory and disparaging remarks against respondent and
`his counsel, making Golden Rule arguments, expressing personal opinion,
`and engaging in jury nullification. We have found each of these claims to
`be without merit.
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`This court can only overturn an order of attorney fees if the
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`district court's exercise of discretion in evaluating the Beattie factors is
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`arbitrary or capricious. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire v. Mercer, 111 Nev. 318,
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`324, 890 P.2d 785, 789 (1995), superseded by statute on other grounds as
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`stated in RTTC Commn'ns, LLC v. Saratoga Flier, Inc., 121 Nev. 34, 41-
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`42, 110 P.3d 24, 29 (2005). In exercising its discretion in awarding
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`attorney fees and costs, a district court must evaluate "(1) whether the
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`plaintiffs claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the defendants'
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`offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and
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`amount; (3) whether the plaintiffs decision to reject the offer and proceed
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`to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees
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`sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount." Beattie, 99
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`Nev. at 588-89, 668 P.2d at 274. However, in Yamaha Motor Co. v.
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`Arnault, this court concluded that a district court must consider Beattie
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`factors in a different way when the plaintiff, rather than the defendant,
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`has given the offer of judgment. 114 Nev. 233, 252, 955 P.2d 661, 673
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`(1998). In such cases, instead of determining whether the plaintiffs claim
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`was brought in good faith, the district court should evaluate whether the
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`defendant's defenses were litigated in good faith.
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`Id. The Yamaha court
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`also held that no single Beattie factor is determinative and that the
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`district court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees so long as all
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`factors are considered in a non-arbitrary manner.
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`Id. at 251 n.16, 955
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`P.2d at 672 n.16.
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`Here, the Beattie analysis was improperly conducted contrary
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`to Yamaha because the district court evaluated whether the plaintiffs
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`claims were brought in good faith, not whether the defendant defended in
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`good faith. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in its
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`consideration of the first Beattie factor. However, because no single factor
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`is determinative, this court must also look to the district court's
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`consideration of the other factors.
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`In considering the second factor, the court found that the
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`plaintiffs offer of judgment was in good faith and was reasonable in
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`timing and amount because he already had accumulated $220,000 in
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`medical bills and his doctors correlated his injuries with the accident.
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`This portion of the analysis does not appear arbitrary.
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`As to the third Beattie factor, however, the district court
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`stated in its order that the "defendant's rejection of the offer of judgment
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`was grossly unreasonable" based upon the fact that "plaintiffs medical
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`bills were over $220,000.00 at the time the offer of judgment was served,"
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`that his medical records indicated that he required further extensive
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`medical treatment, and that "defendant had stipulated to liability."
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`However, at a hearing on December 15, 2010, the district court stated that
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`defendant's rejection of the offer "was a completely reasonable position to
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`take by any stretch." Based on the statement of the district court and the
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`fact that the offer of judgment was more than six times the amount of
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`plaintiffs medical bills at the time of the offer, we conclude that the
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`district court's contradictory determination that defendant's rejection was
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`grossly unreasonable was an abuse of discretion.
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`Regarding the fourth Beattie factor, the reasonableness of the
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`attorney fees, the district court considered each of the Brunzell factors and
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`awarded an attorney fee equivalent to $100 per each attorney hour. See
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`Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33
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`(1969). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
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`analyzing the fourth Beattie factor.
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`Considering all four Beattie factors together, the district court
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`abused its discretion in its consideration of two of the factors. Accordingly,
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`we vacate the award of attorney fees and remand this matter to the
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`district court for reconsideration of the Beattie factors in accordance with
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`this order.
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`The district court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest
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`Coe argues that the district court's decision to award
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`prejudgment interest on the award of future damages was an abuse of
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`discretion. NRS 17.115 allows the court to give the prevailing party
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`interest on the judgment from the time of the offer to the time of entry of
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`the judgment. NRS 17.115(4)(d)(2). In Uniroyal, this court clarified that
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`NRS 17.115 does not distinguish between past and future damages in the
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`judgment, so any interest awarded on the judgment applies to all of the
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`judgment, including both past and future damages awarded. 111 Nev. at
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`324, 890 P.2d at 789-90. Further, this court in Uniroyal stated that the
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`purpose of awarding prejudgment interest on future damages is to
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`"provide[ ] a financial incentive for early settlement of litigation," and
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`therefore the type of damages are immaterial to the purpose of the statute.
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`Id. Here, the district court's award of prejudgment future damages falls
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`within the scope of NRS 17.115 as contemplated in Uniroyal. Therefore,
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`the district court did not err by awarding prejudgment interest on both
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`past and future damages. Based on the foregoing, we
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`ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN
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`PART AND VACATED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the
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`district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
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`Gibbons
`
`Saitta
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`J.
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`cc: The Honorable James M. Bixler, District Judge
`Leonard I. Gang, Settlement Judge
`Ranalli & Zaniel, LLC/Henderson
`Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg
`Ganz & Hauf
`Vannah & Vannah
`Eighth District Court Clerk
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`SUPREME COURT
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