`
`Case No. _____
`______
`In the Supreme Court of Nevada
`Kevin Collymore,
`
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`The Eighth Judicial District
`Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the
`County of Clark; and The Honorable
`Danielle Pieper, District Judge,
`
`Respondents,
`
`and
`
`Kathleen Villani and James Villani,
`
`Real Parties in Interest.
`
`Electronically Filed
`Jan 10 2025 08:50 AM
`Elizabeth A. Brown
`Clerk of Supreme Court
`
`Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition
`District Court Case No. A-23-871232-C
`
`Abraham G. Smith
`Nevada Bar No. 13250
`Lauren D. Wigginton
`Nevada Bar No. 15835
`Erica C. Medley
`Nevada Bar No. 13959
`Matthew C. Morris
`Nevada Bar No. 15068
`Holland & Hart llp
`9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
`(702) 669-4600
`
`George M. Ranalli
`Nevada Bar No. 5748
`Ernest MP Moran
`Nevada Bar No. 10934
`Stephanie M. Hayes
`Nevada Bar No. 14544
`Gregory S. Caruso
`Nevada Bar No. 13086
`
`Ranalli Zaniel
`Fowler & Moran, llc
`2340 W. Horizon Ridge Pkwy., #100
`Henderson, Nevada 89052
`(702) 477-7774
`
`
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`
`
`
`
`Docket 89933 Document 2025-01445
`
`
`
`
`
`NRAP 26.1 Disclosure
`
`The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following are
`
`persons and entities as described in NRAP 26.1(a) and must be dis-
`
`closed. These representations are made so that the judges of this court
`
`may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
`
`Kevin Collymore is an individual.
`
`George M. Ranalli, Ernest MP Moran, Stephanie M. Hayes, and
`
`Gregory S. Caruso of Ranalli Zaniel Fowler & Moran, llc repre-
`
`sented Collymore in the district court. They, along with Abraham G.
`
`Smith, Lauren D. Wigginton, Erica C. Medley, and Matthew C. Mor-
`
`ris of Holland & Hart llp, represent Collymore in this Court.
`
`January 9, 2025.
`
`
`
`______________________
`Abraham G. Smith
`
`Attorney for Petitioner
`
`i
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Table of Contents
`
`NRAP 26.1 Disclosure ........................................................................ i
`
`Table of Contents ............................................................................... ii
`
`Table of Authorities ............................................................................v
`
`Cases ......................................................................................v
`
`Statutes .................................................................................. xi
`
`Court Rules ............................................................................ xi
`
`Treatises ................................................................................ xi
`
`Routing Statement ........................................................................... xiii
`
`Issues ............................................................................................... xiv
`
`Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition ..................................... 1
`
`Relief Sought ..................................................................................... 2
`
`Facts ................................................................................................... 3
`
`The parties agree to settle claims
`from a two-party collision........................................................ 3
`
`The Villanis renege on the settlement and sue Collymore. ...... 5
`
`Villani opposes based on the purported
`insufficiency of the settlement amount
`and the parties’ post-settlement conduct. .............................. 6
`
`The district court refuses to enforce the settlement. ............... 7
`
`Why the Writ Should Issue ................................................................ 9
`
`I. This Court should hear the petition. ........................................... 10
`
`A. Traditional writ relief is warranted because
`no other remedy is plain, speedy, or adequate. ...................... 10
`
`ii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1. Enduring litigation to await an appeal
`on settled claims is inadequate relief................................ 11
`
`2. Mandamus provides effective relief
`for failure to enforce settlement. ..................................... 13
`
`B. Alternatively, the critical issue of enforcing parties’
`settlements warrants advisory mandamus. ............................ 14
`
`1. The district court’s order undermines
`Nevada’s policy favoring settlement. ............................... 14
`
`2. The petition is a good vehicle. ......................................... 15
`
`3. The recurrent nonenforcement of valid settlement
`agreements merits this Court’s intervention. .................. 16
`
`II. The parties’ settlement is valid. .................................................. 17
`
`A. Standard of review. ............................................................... 17
`
`B. Common-law contract principles decide this case. ................ 18
`
`C. There was a meeting of the minds on all essential terms. ....... 19
`
`1. The parties concluded a valid contract. ........................... 19
`
`a. Villani’s offer was valid. ............................................ 19
`
`b. Collymore accepted. ................................................. 21
`
`c. The agreement is supported by consideration. ......... 22
`
`2. The agreement covered the essential terms. .................... 23
`
`a. May does not require a separate release document. ... 23
`
`b. Simple cases can be settled simply. ............................ 24
`
`c. The district court improperly
`required a formal release. .......................................... 25
`
`3. The district court’s assumptions about Villani’s
`subjective intent are improper and irrelevant. .................. 26
`
`iii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`D. Once the parties settled, later events could not undo it. ........ 27
`
`1. Neither Collymore’s provision of a separate release
`nor payment was a condition precedent to formation. ..... 27
`
`2. Good-faith engagement with the litigation process
`does not bar enforcement of a valid settlement. ............... 30
`
`E. The agreement was not unconscionable. ............................... 31
`
`1. The district court’s order confuses
`unconscionability with nonexistence. .............................. 32
`
`2. To be unenforceable, a contract must be both
`procedurally and substantively unconscionable. .............. 32
`
`a. The district court found no
`procedural unconscionability. .................................... 33
`
`b. Even if there were procedural unconscionability,
`no substantive unconscionability exists. .................... 34
`
`III. James’s loss-of-consortium claim falls with the settlement. ......... 36
`
`A. James did not dispute that his derivative claim depends
`on the absence of a valid settlement with Kathleen. .............. 36
`
`B. Kathleen’s valid settlement extinguishes
`James’s derivative claim. ....................................................... 37
`
`1. The loss-of-consortium claim is derivative. ..................... 37
`
`2. Villani’s settlement of her claim bars
`James’s claim for loss of consortium. .............................. 37
`
`Conclusion ........................................................................................ 39
`
`Verification ...................................................................................... xvi
`
`Certificate of Compliance ............................................................... xvii
`
`Certificate of Service ...................................................................... xviii
`
`iv
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Table of Authorities
`
`Advanced Countertop Design, Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
`115 Nev. 268, 984 P.2d 756 (1999) ................................................ 10
`
`Atronic Int'l, GmbH v. SAI Semispecialists of Am., Inc.,
`2006 U.S. Dist. lexis 66078 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2006) .............20
`
`Baisa v. Estate of Smith,
`No. 88600, 554 P.3d 723, 2024 WL 4010115, 2024 Nev.
`Unpub. lexis 707 (Aug. 30, 2024) ............................................. 16
`
`Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of
`Nev.,
`128 Nev. 723, 291 P.3d 128 (2012) ................................................ 11
`
`Bennett v. Topping,
`102 Nev. 151, 717 P.2d 44 (1986) ............................................. 37, 38
`
`Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp.,
`89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (1973) .................................................. 32
`
`Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct.,
`118 Nev. 438, 49 P.3d 647 (2002) ........................................... 32, 33
`
`Camacho v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
`13 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2014) ............................................20
`
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
`542 U.S. 367 (2004) ..................................................................... 13
`
`Clark v. Elza,
`406 A.2d 922 (Md. 1979) ........................................................ 12, 13
`
`v
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
`337 U.S. 541 (1949) ...................................................................... 11
`
`Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
`437 U.S. 463 (1978) ...................................................................... 11
`
`Culture Shock Toys v. Macaluso,
`2020 Nev. Dist. lexis 718 (May 20, 2020)................................ xiv
`
`D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.,
`123 Nev. 468, 168 P.3d 731 (2007) ................................................ 11
`
`D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green,
`120 Nev. 549, 96 P.3d 1159 (2004) ............................................... 33
`
`Dauphin Deposit Bank & Tr. Co. v. Hess,
`727 A.2d 1076 (Pa. 1999) .............................................................. 35
`
`Davis v. Ewalefo,
`131 Nev. 445, 352 P.3d 1139 (2015) .......................................... 17, 31
`
`Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,
`511 U.S. 863 (1994) ...................................................................... 12
`
`Dombroski v. NV Energy, Inc.,
`No. 67405, 132 Nev. 962, 2016 Nev. Unpub. lexis 320
`(Mar. 18, 2016) ............................................................................ 32
`
`El Jen Med. Hosp., Inc. v. Tyler,
`139 Nev., Adv Op. 36, 535 P.3d 660 (2023) .................................. 37
`
`Estate of LoMastro ex rel. LoMastro v. Am. Family Ins. Grp.,
`124 Nev. 1060, 195 P.3d 339 (2008) .............................................20
`
`Estate of Smith v. Baisa,
`Case No. A-23-875696-C ....................................................... xiv, 16
`
`vi
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,
`449 U.S. 368 (1981) ...................................................................... 13
`
`First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Hughes,
`826 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. 2019) ................................................... 19, 20, 21
`
`Fodor v. Ancell,
`A-14-706583-C, 2015 Nev. Dist. lexis 2436 (Eighth Jud.
`Dist. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015) ...................................................................20
`
`Garcia v. MaineGeneral Health,
`No. 1:18-cv-00019-NT, 2018 WL 6071998, 2018 U.S. Dist.
`lexis 197437 (D. Me. Nov. 20, 2018) ................................... 27, 28
`
`Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bush,
`88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972) ............................................ 37, 38
`
`Gerber v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y,
`117 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954) ............................................... 27
`
`Gillespie v. Bodkin,
`902 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) .............................. 21, 22
`
`Grisham v. Grisham,
`128 Nev. 679, 289 P.3d 230 (2012) ............................................... 17
`
`Holcomb Condo. Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Stewart Venture,
`LLC,
`129 Nev. 181, 300 P.3d 124 (2013) ................................................ 14
`
`HSBC Mortg. Servs. v. Daya,
`No. 16-CV-80-JPS, 2016 U.S. Dist. lexis 169239 (E.D.
`Wis. Dec. 7, 2016) ............................................................ 24, 28, 29
`
`In re Hopedale Mining LLC,
`No. 20-12043 (GRH), 2021 Bankr. lexis 1266 (Bankr. S.D.
`Ohio May 7, 2021) ....................................................................... 29
`
`vii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`James Hardie Gypsum (Nev.) Inc. v. Inquipco,
`112 Nev. 1397, 929 P.2d 903 (1996) ........................................ 18, 26
`
`Keddie v. Beneficial Ins., Inc.,
`94 Nev. 418, 580 P.2d 955 (1978) ................................................. 21
`
`Majett v. Smith,
`2018 Nev. Dist. lexis 2099 (Sept. 14, 2018) ........................ xiv, 20
`
`May v. Anderson,
`121 Nev. 668, 119 P.3d 1254 (2005) ........................ xiv, 17, 18, 19, 23
`
`MDC Rests., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.,
`134 Nev. 315, 419 P.3d 148 (2018) ................................................ 10
`
`Mitchell v. Forsyth,
`472 U.S. 511 (1985) ...................................................................... 11
`
`Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter,
`558 U.S. 100 (2009) ................................................................ 12, 13
`
`Money v. Money,
`297 S.W.3d 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) .................................. 33, 34, 35
`
`Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp.,
`840 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1988) ........................................... 14, 15, 35
`
`NAD, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.,
`115 Nev. 71, 976 P.2d 994 (1999) .................................................. 15
`
`New Horizon Kids Quest III, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.,
`133 Nev. 86, 392 P.3d 166 (2017) .................................................. 14
`
`Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown,
`97 Nev. 49, 623 P.2d 981 (1981) ................................................... 37
`
`viii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Owners Ins. Co. v. Keeble,
`2022 U.S. Dist. lexis 65493, at *5-6 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 8,
`2022) ...........................................................................................20
`
`Phung v. Doan,
`134 Nev. 996, 420 P.3d 1029, 2018 Nev. Unpub. lexis 399
`(May 10, 2018) ............................................................................. 18
`
`Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
`506 U.S. 139 (1993) ...................................................................... 11
`
`Remark, LLC v. Adell Broad. Corp.,
`702 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2012) ........................................................ 24
`
`Reno Club v. Young Inv. Co.,
`64 Nev. 312, 182 P.2d 1011 (1947) ................................................ 17
`
`Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller,
`472 U.S. 424 (1985) ................................................................ 12, 13
`
`Rish v. Simao,
`132 Nev. 189, 368 P.3d 1203 (2016) .............................................. 36
`
`Robaina-Moralez v. Choi,
`2018 Nev. Dist. lexis 2084 (Sept. 21, 2018) ............................. xiv
`
`Ruvalcaba v. Amphenol Corp.,
`No. 22NWCV00167, 2023 Cal. Super. lexis 29809 (May
`10, 2023) ...................................................................................... 35
`
`Sandy Valley Assocs. v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Ass’n,
`117 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964 (2001) ................................................. 18
`
`Serpa v. Darling,
`107 Nev. 299, 810 P.2d 778 (1991) ................................................ 28
`
`ix
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Shoels v. Klebold,
`375 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2004) ..................................................... 25
`
`Siribuor v. UHS of Denver, Inc.,
`Civil Action No. 12-cv-00077-RBJ-KLM, 2012 U.S. Dist.
`lexis 102421 (D. Colo. July 23, 2012) ........................................ 24
`
`State ex rel. List v. Courtesy Motors,
`95 Nev. 103, 590 P.2d 163 (1979) .................................................. 26
`
`State Taxicab Auth. v. Greenspun,
`109 Nev. 1022, 862 P.2d 423 (1993) ............................................. 11
`
`Taylor v. Brill,
`139 Nev., Adv. Op. 56, 539 P.3d 1188 (2023) ................................ 17
`
`Tough Turtle Turf, LLC v. Scott,
`139 Nev., Adv. Op. 47, 537 P.3d 883 (2023) ........................... 32, 33
`
`U.S. Home Corp.,
`134 Nev., Adv. Op. 25, 415 P.3d at 40 .......................................... 31
`
`Voris v. Molinaro,
`31 A.3d 363 (Conn. 2011) ............................................................. 38
`
`Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
`136 Nev. 678, 476 P.3d 1194 (2020) .............................................. 10
`
`Will v. Hallock,
`546 U.S. 345 (2006) ..................................................................... 12
`
`Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C.,
`71 A.3d 888 (N.J. 2013) ................................................................ 35
`
`Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.,
`133 Nev. 369, 399 P.3d 334 (2017) ................................................ 13
`
`x
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Yockey v. Horn,
`880 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1989) ........................................................ 30
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) .......................................................................... 13
`
`1975 Nev. Rev. Stat. 558, Ch. 393, SB 506, § 1 ................................... 38
`
`NRS 12.020(2) .................................................................................. 38
`
`NRS 34.170 .................................................................................. 10, 13
`
`Court Rules
`
`NRAP 17 ...................................................................................... xiv, 7
`
`NRCP 12(a)(1) .................................................................................. 30
`
`NRCP 16.1(b) .................................................................................... 30
`
`Treatises
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981) ........... 19
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 (1981) ............ 21
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 36(2) (1981) ....... 28
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) ............ 21
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 60 (1981) ........... 21
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 61 (1981) ............ 21
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981) ............ 21
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 73 (1981) ............ 22
`
`xi
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224 (1981) ......... 28
`
`Restatement (Second) of Torts § 693 (1977) .................... 38
`
`8 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts
`§ 18:10 (4th ed. 2023) .................................................................. 32
`
`W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts § 125, p. 933
`(5th ed. 1984) ............................................................................... 38
`
`xii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Routing Statement
`
`The Supreme Court should retain this petition.
`
`First, the petition has broad impact. Every day across Nevada,
`
`plaintiffs agree to drop their claims for payment from defendants’ in-
`
`surance. Increasingly, however, district judges feel emboldened to ex-
`
`cuse regretful plaintiffs from their contracts.1 The order here sketches
`
`a one-sided blueprint for plaintiffs to enforce or disclaim their settle-
`
`ments at will. Uncorrected, such orders will undermine public confi-
`
`dence in the settlement process, impacting cases across Nevada.
`
`NRAP 17(d)(2)(D).
`
`Second, the petition raises a question of first impression: whether
`
`a single plaintiff’s agreement to “settle[]” her claim against a single
`
`defendant constitutes an enforceable release under May v. Anderson,
`
`121 Nev. 668, 119 P.3d 1254 (2005). NRAP 17(d)(2)(A).
`
`
`1 See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Baisa, Case No. A-23-875696-C (8th Jud.
`Dist. Ct.); see also, e.g., Culture Shock Toys v. Macaluso, 2020 Nev. Dist.
`lexis 718, *4 (May 20, 2020) (denying enforcement based on fact
`questions despite admitted agreement on terms); Majett v. Smith, 2018
`Nev. Dist. lexis 2099, *4 (Sept. 14, 2018) (denying enforcement, de-
`spite parties’ agreement on terms, because defendant delayed payment
`and requested information); Robaina-Moralez v. Choi, 2018 Nev. Dist.
`lexis 2084, *1 (Sept. 21, 2018) (denying enforcement despite parties’
`agreement to terms and finding evidence of agreement “credible”).
`
`xiii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Issues
`
`1. Do parties’ identical statements of terms—each made with the
`
`other’s knowledge and assenting to settle for “policy limits”—form a
`
`contract?
`
`2. Can a district court’s personal impressions about causation
`
`and damages defeat a “meeting of the minds” or render unconsciona-
`
`ble settlement terms proposed by a counseled plaintiff?
`
`3. After agreement upon the release’s essential terms, does a pur-
`
`ported delay in forwarding a formal release or defeat the settlement’s
`
`existence?
`
`4. If Kathleen Villani validly settled her personal-injury claim, is
`
`James Villani’s loss-of-consortium claim waived or barred?
`
`xiv
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition
`
`Imagine a two-vehicle crash with two drivers, no passengers. This
`
`exchange follows:
`
`Plaintiff: I’m hurt. I believe you’re at fault. You
`have insurance limits of $25,000. I’ll settle my claim for
`those limits.
`
`Defendant: I agree to settle on those terms.
`Please provide information so my carrier can distribute
`the $25,000 payment. I’ll pay and send a formal release.
`
`Most law students would recognize that this exchange forms an en-
`
`forceable contract.
`
`Imagine the plaintiff later says, “The $25,000 I asked for is too lit-
`
`tle. I’m suing.” Most law students would recognize that the plaintiff’s
`
`misgivings cannot undo the contract.
`
`The district court, reviewing similar facts here, found otherwise.
`
`After an accident, Collymore (represented by his insurer, USAA)
`
`and Villani (represented by counsel) agreed to settle: Villani would re-
`
`lease her claims. USAA would send payment for Collymore’s policy
`
`limits and a formal release to Villani once Villani resolved her medical
`
`liens.
`
`Villani never did. Instead, she sued Collymore.
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Collymore asked the district court to enforce the settlement. The
`
`court refused. It acknowledged the parties’ objective manifestations of
`
`intent to settle, yet held that that Villani’s “substantial medical ex-
`
`penses, well beyond the offered policy limits,” vitiated mutual assent.
`
`(2APP293.)
`
`This was wrong.
`
`That error warrants this Court’s intervention. Without it, Colly-
`
`more will be forced to litigate settled claims. This undermines this
`
`Court’s policy favoring settlement, eliminates the peace Collymore
`
`thought he was buying, and straitjackets parties’ freedom to contract.
`
`Relief Sought
`
`Collymore seeks a writ of mandamus directing the district court to
`
`(1) vacate its order denying Collymore’s motion to enforce settlement;
`
`(2) enter an order enforcing the settlement; and (3) dismiss all claims.
`
`Alternatively, Collymore seeks a writ of prohibition enjoining the dis-
`
`trict court from exercising jurisdiction over the settled claims.
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Facts
`
`The parties agree to settle claims from a two-party collision.
`
`Villani claimed injuries following a vehicular collision with Colly-
`
`more. (1APP001.) Villani hired counsel. (Id.) Villani’s counsel asked
`
`Collymore’s insurer, USAA, about Collymore’s policy limits.
`
`(1APP038.) USAA responded that the bodily-injury limits were
`
`$25,000 per person. (1APP043.)
`
`USAA then offered to settle Villani’s claim for the full $25,000
`
`limits. (1APP051.)
`
`This confirms our offer of $25,000.00 in settlement of
`the following claim:
`
`Kathleen Villani
`Your client:
`USAA policyholder: Tiffany L Collymore
`Claim number:
`027032891-003
`Date of loss:
`September 15, 2021
`Loss location:
`Indian Springs, Nevada
`
`This amount is an offer to fully and finally compromise
`a claim in dispute and should not be considered as an
`offer of the undisputed value of the claim. We are willing
`to make this offer in exchange for a full and final settle-
`ment and release of all claims against Kevin and Tiffany
`L Collymore.
`
`(1APP051.)
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Villani’s attorney responded with an offer mirroring these terms:2
`
`Ms. Villani has directed me to demand your insured’s
`policy limits for settlement of this claim. This de-
`mand will expire thirty (30) days from the date of this
`correspondence.
`
`(1APP081.)
`
`Ten days later, USAA accepted Villani’s offer. That acceptance
`
`acknowledged Villani’s offer and recognized that the settlement would
`
`resolve Villani’s claim:
`
`I am in receipt of your demand letter dated February
`26, 2022.
`
`Please note we extended our per person policy limits
`of $25,000 to settle your client’s claim.
`
`(1APP089.)
`
`Confirming that it needed no further agreement from Villani,
`
`USAA advised Villani that it would “forward the release and
`
`
`
`2 Villani concedes she made her policy-limits demand with knowledge
`of USAA’s policy-limits offer. (See 1APP112.) This arguably consti-
`tuted acceptance of Collymore’s initial offer. For simplicity, we focus
`on Villani’s policy-limits demand and Collymore’s subsequent (reiter-
`ated) acceptance as the relevant contract. The result would be the
`same under either theory of offer and acceptance.
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`payment” once Villani provided information about Medicare and
`
`other medical liens. (1APP089.) Villani never sent that information,
`
`though her counsel and USAA continued to correspond.
`
`USAA urged Villani to resolve her medical liens. (2APP264, 268.)
`
`Villani’s counsel did not confirm their resolution, and ultimately
`
`stopped responding to USAA altogether. (2APP264, 268.)
`
`The Villanis renege on the settlement and sue Collymore.
`
`Instead, Villani and her husband, James, sued. (1APP0001;
`
`1APP181.) James claimed loss of consortium. (1APP005.)
`
`Collymore raced to retain counsel, who answered the complaint.
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`(1APP190.) Counsel then learned of the earlier settlement and raised
`
`the issue at the early case conference. (1APP200.) Collymore followed
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`up with two letters asking Villani to honor her agreement. (1APP200;
`
`1APP245.)
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`The Villanis were not swayed. So, Collymore moved to enforce the
`
`settlement. (1APP019) He also moved to dismiss James’s loss-of-con-
`
`sortium claim as derivative of the settled claims. (1APP30-31.)
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Villani opposes based on the purported insufficiency of the settlement
`amount and the parties’ post-settlement conduct.
`
`Villani opposed. She acknowledged her policy-limits offer.
`
`(1APP113, 146.) And she acknowledged USAA’s agreement to pay
`
`those limits. (1APP113, 152.) But she insisted that “[t]here was no ac-
`
`ceptance and no meeting of the minds.” (1APP115.)
`
`Ignoring that she proposed the terms, Villani complained that
`
`“[h]ad Plaintiff intended to settle her claims for $25,000, she would be
`
`doing so with hundreds of thousands of dollars[’] worth of debt for a
`
`car accident that she was not at fault for.” (1APP116.) Although Villani
`
`did not allege procedural unconscionability, she argued that the terms
`
`of the agreement were “oppressive and unfairly one-sided[,]” based on
`
`the amount of the settlement viewed “in light of Plaintiff’s medical
`
`damages.”(1APP119.)
`
`Villani also argued that post-settlement developments could retro-
`
`actively negate a meeting of the minds. Collymore “never sent Plaintiff
`
`a settlement release” or tried to enforce its terms before the early case
`
`conference. (1APP116, 118.) “If there was a sufficient meeting of the
`
`minds,” Villani reasoned, Collymore’s counsel would have immedi-
`
`ately filed the motion to enforce the settlement. (1APP116.) Con-
`
`versely, Villani suggested that “[h]ad Defendant … made any attempt
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`to carry out the settlement agreement, perhaps there would have been
`
`evidence of a meeting of the minds.” (Id.)
`
`Finally, citing nothing, Villani argued that James’s loss-of-consor-
`
`tium claim survived, based solely on the purported absence of a settle-
`
`ment agreement. (1APP119.) She did not dispute Collymore’s author-
`
`ity that a valid settlement would extinguish his claim. (See id.)
`
`The district court refuses to enforce the settlement.
`
`The district court denied Collymore’s motion.
`
`First, although the district court “recognize[d] Defendant made
`
`offers” (2APP294), it ignored Villani’s own policy-limits offer. (See
`
`2APP292-93.) Instead, the district court recast is as “a demand where
`
`medical expenses were shown in excess of $589,856.06.” (2APP293.)
`
`Second, the district court rejected a meeting of the minds by cred-
`
`iting Villani’s view of the merits. The court found that “Defendant
`
`was on notice of Plaintiff’s extensive medical damages.” (2APP293.)
`
`The court accepted as fact that Villani’s damages totaled nearly
`
`$600,000 at the time of Collymore’s policy-limits offer, and close to $1
`
`million when Villani sued. (2APP293.) According to the court, these
`
`“substantial medical expenses, well beyond the offered policy limits,
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`indicate a lack of mutual agreement on the terms of the settlement.”
`
`(2APP293.)
`
`Third, the district court agreed that Collymore’s post-settlement
`
`conduct undercut the contract’s existence. According to the court,
`
`that “Defendant did not attempt to communicate with Plaintiff as to
`
`the status of the settlement agreement’s execution, nearly a year after
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`Defendant claimed it was formed[,]” negated “a sufficient meeting of
`
`the minds.” (2APP293.) In addition, the court said the absence of a
`
`separate, formal release left an “unresolved material term,” without
`
`specifying what remained unresolved. (2APP294.)
`
`Fourth, the district court found that the agreement was uncon-
`
`scionable. The district court believed that it could invalidate an agree-
`
`ment on either procedural or substantive grounds.
`
`In Nevada, the Court may use its discretion to decline
`enforcing an agreement if it finds the agreement was ob-
`tained under duress or if the terms were unconscionable
`at the time of formation. Unconscionability arises when
`the agreement or its circumstances unfairly oppress an
`innocent party.
`
`(2APP294.) The court found only substantive unconscionability, again
`
`in reliance on the difference between Collymore’s policy limits and
`
`Villani’s claimed damages. (2APP294.)
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`This unconscionability finding in turn undergirded the district
`
`court’s refusal to dismiss James’s loss-of-consortium claim.
`
`(2APP294.)
`
`This petition follows.
`
`Why the Writ Should Issue
`
`The parties agreed to a settlement while the outcome of then-
`
`threatened litigation was uncertain. The district court did not dispute
`
`the terms of the offer or acceptance. But it believed the difference be-
`
`tween Villani’s offer and her purported medical expenses negated the
`
`legal effect of the parties’ communications. This was error.
`
`The parties’ minds met at the time of formation. This is all Ne-
`
`vada law requires. Neither Villani’s change of heart nor Collymore’s
`
`purported delay in sending a separate release or payment invalidates
`
`the already-concluded agreement.
`
`And because James’s claims are derivative of Villani’s settled
`
`claims, the court should have dismissed the entire complaint.
`
`To protect the sanctity of the parties’ bargain, this Court should
`
`grant the petition.
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`This Court should hear the petition.
`
`This Court may direct a district court to grant a motion to dismiss
`
`“when no factual disputes exist” and “clear authority” requires dis-
`
`missal. Advanced Countertop Design, Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
`
`115 Nev. 268, 269, 984 P.2d 756, 758 (1999).
`
`Writ relief is alternatively justified “where a petitioner present[s]
`
`‘legal issues of statewide importance requiring clarification, and our
`
`decision … promote[s] judicial economy and administration by assist-
`
`ing other jurists, parties, and lawyers.’” Walker v. Second Judicial Dist.
`
`Court, 136 Nev. 678, 683, 476 P.3d 1194, 1198 (2020) (quoting MDC
`
`Rests., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 315, 319, 419 P.3d
`
`148, 152 (2018)).
`
`Writ relief is appropriate here under either framework.
`
`A. Traditional writ relief is warranted because no other
`remedy is plain, speedy, or adequate.
`
`A writ of mandamus is available whenever “there is not a plain,
`
`speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” NRS
`
`34.170. It is neither speedy nor adequate to drag Collymore through
`
`trial, only for this Court on appeal to uphold his contractual right to
`
`avoid litigation.
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1. Enduring litigation to await an appeal
`on settled claims is inadequate relief.
`
`Direct appeal is inadequate where suffering through trial squelches
`
`effective relief from the appeal. See, e.g., Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v.
`
`Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 128 Nev. 723, 730, 291 P.3d 128, 133
`
`(2012); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 468,
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`474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 737 (2007).
`
`While this Court rejects the collateral-order doctrine,3 its frame-
`
`work helps assess when an appeal after final judgment is inadequate.
`
`Under the doctrine, a “small class” of interlocutory orders get im-
`
`mediate review. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U
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