Case 2:06-cv-00280-SRC-CLW Document 359 Filed 07/11/18 Page 1 of 5 PageID: 12458
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`
`
`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
`
`
`
`VALERIE MONTONE
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`CITY OF JERSEY CITY, ET AL.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`Civil Action No. 6-280 (SRC)
` Civil Action No. 6-3790 (SRC)
`
` OPINION & ORDER
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`
`
`
`JOHN ASTRIAB, ET AL.,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`CITY OF JERSEY CITY, ET AL.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`CHESLER, District Judge
`
`
`
`This matter comes before the Court upon the filing by Defendant Robert Troy of a motion to
`
`communicate directly with a member of the jury. Docket No. 356. Plaintiffs oppose this motion
`
`(Docket No. 357), and Defendant Troy has submitted a reply brief. Docket No. 358. The Court has
`
`reviewed the parties’ submissions and proceeds to rule without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is denied.
`
`I.
`
`Background
`
`This case concerns an employment dispute between Plaintiffs, all retired police sergeants
`
`of the Jersey City Police Department, and the City of Jersey City, its former mayor Jerramiah
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 2:06-cv-00280-SRC-CLW Document 359 Filed 07/11/18 Page 2 of 5 PageID: 12459
`
`Healy, and its former police chief Robert Troy. The two above-captioned cases were
`
`consolidated for trial purposes, and a jury trial was held before this Court from April 16 to May
`
`2, 2018. In its verdict, the jury found that Plaintiff Montone’s political affiliation and expression
`
`about a matter of public concern were substantial or motivating factors in Jersey City’s decision
`
`not to make promotions from the 2003-2006 Lieutenant’s list, and that Plaintiff Montone’s
`
`conduct, which is protected by the NJ Law Against Discrimination, played a role and made an
`
`actual difference in this decision. Docket No. 335 (indicating ‘Yes’ to questions 1, 2, and 3). The
`
`jury awarded a verdict of $276,834 for Plaintiff Montone and approximately $1.9 million for the
`
`other eight Plaintiffs. The jury did not award punitive damages. Docket No. 337.
`
`On May 21, a member of the jury contacted counsel for Defendant Troy through the
`
`counsel’s firm website. With the subject line “jury deliberations – Montone case,” the juror
`
`wrote:
`
`Hello, This message is for Mr. Carmagnola and not for legal
`advice. As a member of the jury for the Montone vs. Jersey City
`case, I was wondering if you’d like to know a few details that
`pushed the jury to decide in favor of Montone and the Astriab
`plaintiffs. I know if I spent as many years as you did on a case I’d
`want to know what happened!
`
`Docket No. 356-2, Ex. 1.
`
`II.
`
`Discussion
`
`Defendant argues that communication with the juror is necessary to determine “if the
`
`deliberative process was interfered with or the verdict tainted in any way.” Def. Br. 6. Such an
`
`inquiry is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which concerns post-trial juror
`
`testimony “during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment.” Rule 606 forbids jurors
`
`from testifying about “any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s
`
`deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:06-cv-00280-SRC-CLW Document 359 Filed 07/11/18 Page 3 of 5 PageID: 12460
`
`processes concerning the verdict or indictment.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). Under Local Civil Rule
`
`47.1(e), attorneys may not “directly or indirectly interview, examine or question any juror. . .
`
`during the pendency of the trial or with respect to the deliberations or verdict of the jury in any
`
`action, except on leave of Court granted upon good cause shown.”
`
`The juror’s email—referencing “details that pushed the jury” in rendering its verdict and
`
`exclaiming how defense counsel must “want to know what happened!”— implicates information
`
`protected by Rule 606 and Local Rule 47.1(e). The purpose of Rule 606 is to preserve the
`
`privacy of jury deliberations as well as the integrity and finality of the verdict. Tanner v. United
`
`States, 483 U.S. 107, 118-20 (1987). Such communication is only permitted under certain narrow
`
`circumstances, where “(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
`
`jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a
`
`mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2).
`
`The juror’s email indicates no such extraneous or outside influences. Without such a
`
`preliminary showing, this Court will not override the clear mandate of Rule 606 and Local Rule
`
`47.1(e). See United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2001) (“If courts were to permit a
`
`lone juror to attack a verdict through an open-ended narrative concerning the thoughts, views,
`
`statements, feelings, and biases of herself and all other jurors sharing in that verdict, the integrity
`
`of the American jury system would suffer irreparably.”) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 227
`
`F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir.2000)); Quintana v. Adm’r, 2017 WL 4329736, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,
`
`2017) (“The validity of a verdict may only be challenged where there is evidence of extraneous
`
`prejudicial information or an outside influence which may have affected the jury in its ability to
`
`render a verdict. Where the problem is an intra-jury issue, courts have consistently held that the
`
`sanctity of the jury's verdict should not be disturbed”) (quoting Suarez v. Mattingly, 212 F.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:06-cv-00280-SRC-CLW Document 359 Filed 07/11/18 Page 4 of 5 PageID: 12461
`
`Supp.2d 350, 355 (D.N.J. 2002).
`
`
`
`Notwithstanding the clear language from Rule 606 and Local Civil Rule 47.1(e),
`
`Defendant advances two broad arguments in favor of communicating with the juror. Defendant
`
`asserts that the “clear language of that Local Rule 47.1(e) does not apply to the circumstances
`
`herein since the juror initiated the communication with counsel.” Docket No. 358 (“Def. Reply”)
`
`1. Based on its language, however, the application of Local Civil Rule 47.1(e) does not turn on
`
`whether counsel or the juror initiates post-trial communication. Rather, the rule broadly states
`
`that attorneys are not permitted to “directly or indirectly interview, examine or question” jurors
`
`regarding their deliberation or verdict. It is not possible for counsel for Defendant Troy to
`
`respond to the juror’s email without violating this stricture.
`
`Defendant argues unpersuasively that the “the focus should be on the juror’s ability to
`
`engage in the speech without unnecessary restrictions” (Reply 2), and that a “court order
`
`prohibiting the juror from further discussions with defense counsel, as the juror has expressed,
`
`would violate the juror’s constitutional rights.” Id. Defendant mistakes the scope of Rule 606 and
`
`Local Civil Rule 47.1(e). By this Order, the Court imposes no restrictions or limitations on First
`
`Amendment rights, including the juror’s right to send unsolicited post-trial emails. The juror’s
`
`constitutional rights do not vitiate, however, the prohibition on counsel—pursuant to Federal
`
`Rule of Evidence 606(b) and Local Civil Rule 47.1(e)—from interviewing, examining or
`
`questioning jurors about the deliberative process or the verdict. As such, while unsolicited, sua
`
`sponte post-trial contact from members of the jury is not barred under the Rules, this Court will
`
`bar under these Rules any response by counsel for either party to such unsolicited
`
`communication.
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:06-cv-00280-SRC-CLW Document 359 Filed 07/11/18 Page 5 of 5 PageID: 12462
`
`III. Conclusion
`
`For the forgoing reasons, this Court will DENY Defendant’s motion to communicate
`
`directly with the juror.
`
`Date: July 11, 2018
`
` /s Stanley R. Chesler___
` STANLEY R. CHESLER
` United States District Judge
`
`
`
`5
`
`