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`11 Case 2:07-cv-03406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 1 of 31 PageID: 2
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`_
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`JUDITH BROWN CHOMSKY
`LAW OFFICES OF JUDITH BROWN CHOMSKY
`Post Office Box 29726
`
`Elkins Park, PA 19027
`Telephone: (215) 782-8367
`Facsimile: (215) 782—8368
`(Counsel of Record)
`
`RICHARD HERZ, ESQ.
`MARCO SIMONS, ESQ. [S.B. #237314]
`EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL
`
`1612 K. Street N.W., Suite 401
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 466—5188
`Facsimile: (202) 466—5 189
`
`RECEIVED
`
`JUL 1 9126111.,
`
`AT
`
`WILLIAM T. WALSH
`CLERK
`
`[Counsel For Plaintiffs Continued On Next Page]
`
`27— 39/243251- 3
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`DISTRICT OF
`
`NEW JERSEY
`
`JOHN DOE l, individually and as representative
`of his deceased father JOHN DOE 2;
`JANE DOE l, individually and as representative
`of her deceased mother JANE DOE 2;
`JOHN DOE 3, individually and as representative
`of his deceased brother JOHN DOE 4;
`JANE DOE 3, individually and as representative
`of her deceased husband JOHN DOE S;
`MINOR DOES 141, by and through their
`guardian JOHN DOE 6, individually and as
`representative of their deceased mother JANE
`DOE 4;
`JOHN DOE 7, individually and as representative
`of his deceased son JOHN DOE 8,
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL,
`INC, a New Jersey corporation;
`MOE CORPORATIONS 1—10;
`MOES 11-25,
`
`Defendants.
`
`uvvvvvvvvvvuvwvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv
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`Case No:
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
`DAMAGES
`
`EXTRAIUDICIAL KILLING
`CRIMES AGAIN ST HUMANITY
`TORTURE
`WAR CRIMES
`TERRORISM
`MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST
`ORGANIZATIONS
`
`CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING
`TREATMENT
`
`maQwewwr
`
`1—\OD.
`
`VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS TO LIFE,
`LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF PERSON
`AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND
`ASSOCLATION
`CONSISTENT PATTERN 0F GROSS
`VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
`. WRONGFUL DEATH
`11. ASSAULT AND BATTERY
`12. INTENTIONAL lNFLICTION OF
`EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
`l3. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
`EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
`l4. NEGLIGENCEI’NEGLIGENT HIRING/
`NEGLIGENCE PER SE
`15. LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
`
`WOO-10“
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`10
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`11
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`12
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`13
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`15
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`16
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`18
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`20
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`22
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`24
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`25
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`26
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`27
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`28
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`________Hmm________)
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`
`
`

`

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`Counsel for Plaintiffs
`
`(continued from first page)
`
`PAUL HOFFMAN
`SCHONBRUN, DESIMONE, SEPLOW,
`HARRIS & HOFFMAN LLP
`723 Ocean Front Walk
`Venice, California 90210
`Telephone: (310) 396-0731
`Facsimile: (310) 399-7040
`
`ARTURO CARRILLO
`COLOMBLAN INSTITUTE OF
`INTERNATIONAL LAW
`5425 Connecticut Ave NW #219
`Washington, DC 20015
`Telephone: (202) 365-7260
`
`On information and belief, Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, allege as follows:
`
`ADDRESSES
`
`1.
`
`Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 10.1(a), all Plaintiffs can be contacted through their counsel,
`
`2
`3
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`4
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`5
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`6 7
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`8
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`9
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`10 EarthRights International, 1612 K Street NW #401, Washington, DC 20006. The street and postal
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`11
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`12
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`13
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`addresses of the individual Plaintiffs cannot be made public clue to the substantial risk of violent
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`reprisals against them. The street and postal address of Defendant Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
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`(CBD, is 250 East Fifth Street, Cincinatti, Ohio 45202; their local office in New Jersey is 20 Berry Place,
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`14 Glen Rock, New Jersey 07452. The street and postal addresses of Defendants Moe Corporations 1—10
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`and Moes 11—25 are presently unknown to Plaintiffs.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`2.
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`This case arises as a result ofthe actions of Defendant Chiquita Brands International, Inc.,
`
`and its subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively, “Chiquita”), in funding, arming, and otherwise supporting
`
`terrorist organizations in Colombia, in order to maintain its profitable control of Colombia’s banana-
`
`growing regions. Plaintiffs are family members of trade unionists, banana workers, political organizers,
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`social activists, and others targeted and killed by terrorists, notably the paramilitary organization United
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`Self-Defense Committees of Colombia (Autodefensorias Unidas de Colombia, or AUC), during the
`
`19905 through 2004.
`
`In order to operate its banana production in an environment free of labor
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`opposition and social disturbances, Chiquita funded, armed, and otherwise supported the AUC and other
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`terrorist groups during this period. The deaths of Plaintiffs’ relatives were a direct, foreseeable, and
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`intended result of Chiquita’s illegal and tortious actions. Chiquita’s actions violated not only Colombian
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`law and US. law, but also international law prohibiting crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing,
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`15
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`16
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`17
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`18
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`19
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`20
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`21
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`22
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`23
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`24
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`25
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`26
`27
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`28
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`

`

`
`
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`l
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`1
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`2
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`3
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`4
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`torture, war crimes, and other abuses.
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`JURISDICTION
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`3.
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`The Court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question
`
`jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. §1350 (Alien Tort Claims Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Racketeer Influenced and
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`5 Corrupt Organizations Act); and 28 U.S.C. §1332 (diversity jurisdiction). Plaintiffs and Defendants are
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`6
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`7
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`8
`9
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`citizens of different states and the damages sought by this Complaint exceed the jurisdictional minimum
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`for this Court.
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`4.
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`In addition, Plaintiffs invoke the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court with respect to
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`claims based upon laws of the State of New Jersey or any other applicable jurisdiction pursuant to 28
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`10 U.S.C.§1367.
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`11
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`12
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`5.
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`The term “Plaintiffs” herein includes the named plaintiffs and the decedent on behalf of
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`PARTIES
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`13 whom they bring this action.
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`14
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`15
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`16
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`17
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`18
`19
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`20
`21
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`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
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`6.
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`Plaintiff John Doe I is a resident and citizen of Colombia. He brings this action
`
`individually and as representative of his deceased father, John Doe 2.
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`7.
`
`Plaintiff Jane Doe I is a resident and citizen of Colombia. She brings this action
`
`individually and as representative of her deceased mother, Jane Doc 2.
`
`Plaintiff John Doe 3 is a resident and citizen of Colombia. He brings this action
`8.
`individually and as representative of his deceased brother, John Doe 4.
`
`Plaintiff Jane Doe 3 is a resident and eitizen of Colombia. She brings this action
`9.
`individually and as representative of her deceased husband, John Doe 5.
`
`10. Minor Does 1—4 are residents and citizens of Colombia. They are all minor children, who
`prosecute this action by and through their guardian John Doe 6. They bring this action individually and
`as representatives of their deceased mother, Jane Doc 4.
`1 1.
`Plaintiff John Doe 7 is a resident and citizen of Colombia. He bring this action
`individually and as representative of his deceased son, John Doe 8.
`12.
`Defendant Chiquita Brands International, Inc, is a United States—based corporation
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`organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey.
`
`Its corporate headquarters are located in
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`
`
`

`

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`1
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`2
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`3
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`Cincinnati, Ohio. CBI is a leading international producer, distributor, and marketer of bananas and other
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`produce; it is one of the largest banana producers in the world and a major supplier of bananas in Europe
`
`and North America. The company was founded in 1899 as the United Fruit Company, became the
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`4 United Brands Company in 1970, and changed its name to Chiquita Brands International in 1990.
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`5
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`6
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`13.
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`On information and belief, at all times relevant herein, CBI wholly owned, dominated and
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`controlled C.I. Bananos de Exportacion, S.A. (“Banadex”), headquartered in Medellin, Colombia.
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`7 Banadex produced bananas in the Uraba and Santa Marta regions of Colombia and, by 2003, was
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`8 Chiquita’s most profitable banana—producing operation. At all times material herein, Banadex was an
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`9
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`10
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`11
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`12
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`13
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`agent, alter ego, co-conspirator, and joint tortfeasor with CBI, with whom it cooperated in a joint
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`criminal enterprise.
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`14.
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`Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Defendants who are sued
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`herein as Moe Corporations 1—5 and Moes 6—25, and Plaintiffs sue these Defendants by such fictitious
`
`names and capacities. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege the Moes’ true names and
`
`14
`capacities when ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that each
`15
`fictitiously named Defendant is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged and that
`16
`the injuries to Plaintiffs herein alleged were proximately caused by the conduct of such Defendants, in
`17
`that each caused, conspired to cause, worked in concert to cause, participated in a joint criminal
`18
`enterprise that caused, or aided and abetted the injuries complained of, and/or was the principal,
`19
`employer, or other legally responsible person for the persons who caused, conspired to cause, worked in
`20
`concert to cause, participated in a joint criminal enterprise that caused, and/or aided and abetted such
`21
`injuries. Whenever and wherever reference is made in this Complaint to any conduct committed by CBI,
`22
`and/or Banadex, such allegations and references shall also be deemed to mean the conduct ofCB1 and
`23 Banadex, acting individually, jointly and severally, through personnel working in the United States and
`24 Colombia for the benefit of CBI and Banadex.
`
`At all times herein material, with respect to the events at issue, CBI, Banadex, Moe
`15.
`25
`26 Corporations 1—5 and Moos 6—25 conspired with each other, and/or participated in ajoint criminal
`27
`enterprise with each other, and/or acted in concert, and/or aided or abetted each others’ actions, and/or
`28
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`were in an agency or alter ego or joint venture relationship, and were acting within the course and SCOpe
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`
`
`

`

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`J
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`1
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`41mm
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`5
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`5
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`of such conspiracy, joint criminal enterprise, concerted activity, aiding and abetting, and/or agency or
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`alter ego or joint venture relationship. As described herein, “agency” includes agency by ratification.
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`Whenever reference is made in this Complaint to any conduct by a defendant, such allegations and
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`references shall be construed to mean the conduct of each of the defendants, acting individually, jointly,
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`and severally.
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`16.
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`At all times herein material, with respect to the events at issue, Chiquita conspired with,
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`7 worked in concert with, participated in a joint criminal enterprise with, acted as the principal of,
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`8
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`9
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`10
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`1 1
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`12
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`employed, and/or aided and abetted the violent terrorist organizations responsible for Plaintiffs’ injuries,
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`including but not limited to the AUC, and the terrorist organizations were acting within the course and
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`scope of such agency, employment, andfor concerted activity. The wrongful conduct alleged herein was
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`perpetrated by Chiquita management and personnel both in Colombia and the United States.
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`17.
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`Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and belief allege that
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`13 C81 management and other personnel in the United States and in Colombia were informed of the
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`1‘4
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`15
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`16
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`ongoing events complained of herein and personally participated in the decision making, planning,
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`preparation, ratification, andfor execution of the acts complained of.
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`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`The Colombian Conflict and Paramilitary Terrorist Organizations
`17
`In the early 19803, Colombia saw a vast expansion in trade in illegal drugs, particularly
`18.
`18
`cocaine. An emerging class of drug barons began to create private armies to combat left—wing guerrilla
`19
`forces, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de
`20
`Colombia, or FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito Nacional de Liberacion, or ELN), who
`21
`22 were engaged in terrorist activities such as extortion, kidnappings, and assassinations. These
`23
`paramilitaries acted autonomously and were dispersed, and their influence was reduced to the local scale.
`24
`19.
`In 1981, the Medellin cartel created a death squad, Muerte a Secuestradores (“Death to
`25 Kidnappers”), that targeted guerillas for elimination and adopted brutal, terrorist tactics. As the 1980s
`26
`progressed, paramilitaries maintained links with drug barons, large landowners, industrialists, and
`27
`bankers who funded them, although in some cases they achieved some autonomy in their violent
`28
`activities.
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`
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`
`
`

`

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`_
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`1
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`2
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`20.
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`By the mid 19905, paramilitary groups had achieved a substantial degree of independence
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`due to their increased participation in, and benefit from, drug trafficking. The largest and most
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`3 well-organized paramilitary group in Colombia was the Rural Self-Defense Group of Cdrdoba and
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`4 Uraba (A umdefensas Campesinas de Cordoba and Umbri, or ACCU). The organization featured a
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`5
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`6
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`7
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`central command that coordinated the activities of local fronts. Both mobile and stationary units existed,
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`and fighters received a base salary plus food, a uniform, weapons, and munitions. The
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`commander-in-chief of the ACCU was Carlos Castafio, a long-time paramilitary fighter with family ties
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`to the drug trade. In 1994, Castafio and the ACCU sponsored a summit of the Self—Defense Groups of
`8
`9 Colombia, bringing together regional paramilitaries from across the country. This summit led to the
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`10
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`11
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`formation ofthe AUC, a national federation uniting Colombia’s regional paramilitaries under Castafio’s
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`leadership. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Castafio remained the leader of the AUC.
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`The AUC grew rapidly in size during the late 19905 and into the twenty—first century. In
`21.
`12
`1997, it comprised roughly 4,000 combatants. By 2001, Castafio claimed to have 11,000 members,
`13
`though government estimates put the number somewhere between 8,000 and 9,000. By 2002, AUG
`14
`forces were present in nearly the whole of Colombia. AUC leaders have claimed that the organization
`15
`comprised as many as 17,000 armed fighters and 10,000 associates at its peak before a demobilization
`16
`process that began in 2004.
`17
`22.
`The efforts ofthe AUC were directed toward elimination of anyone considered close to
`18
`the guerrillas or who opposed or complicated the paramilitaries’ control ofterritory or population in the
`19
`area in which they exerted their power. The AUC’s primary method was terrorism against individuals or
`20
`communities. To this end, the AUC, like the ACCU before it, routinely engaged in death threats,
`21
`extrajudicial killings, massacres, torture, rape, kidnapping, forced disappearances, and looting. While the
`22
`23 AUG periodically engaged in direct combat with armed guerrilla forces, the vast majority ofits victims
`24 were civilians targeted by a policy ofpolitical and social cleansing, typically rural workers, trade
`25
`unionists, community activists, human rights defenders, leftist politicians, judicial investigators,
`26
`indigenous persons, and anyone considered socially undesirable (including suspected petty criminals).
`27
`Inhabitants of small towns in contested rural areas were particularly vulnerable. AUC violence has often
`28
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`caused entire communities to disperse, either due to threats of an impending massacre or in the wake of
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`

`

`I
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`I
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`kWh)
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`\DOO-HION
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`10
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`I4
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`15
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`24
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`25
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`26
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`27
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`such massacres and the looting and destruction that commonly accompanied them.
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`23.
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`The abuses of the AUC and its constituent groups, including the ACCU, covered a large
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`area, affected a large population, and were carried out systematically. The ACCU operated throughout
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`the banana-growing region of Uraba, as well as in other parts of Colombia, and on many occasions from
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`at least 1994 through 2004 carried out multiple executions or massacres; the ACCU and other AUC
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`groups were reSponsible for at least 150 massacres by 1997. From its founding, its activities and abuses
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`have been carried out under the direction of a central command.
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`24.
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`The AUC and its constituent groups, including the ACCU, have, at least since 1994, been
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`participating in an internal armed conflict in Colombia, at times engaging in direct conflict with guerrilla
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`armies. The AUC itself has accepted that it is subject to the laws of war, with the limited exception that
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`it believes it has the privilege to execute guerrillas from de combat, and has accepted training in the laws
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`of war from the International Committee of the Red Cross.
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`
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`25.
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`Longstanding and pervasive ties exist between the AUC and official Colombian security
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`forces, which include the Colombian Armed Forces and the Colombian National Police. Collusion with
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`government forces has been a feature of Colombian paramilitaries since their inception. In the 19803,
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`paramiiitaries were partially organized and armed by the Colombian military and participated in
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`campaigns of the official armed forces against guerilla insurgents. Paramilitary forces included
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`active-duty and retired army and police personnel among their members. Although a 1989 government
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`decree established criminal penalties for providing assistance to paramilitaries, the continued existence
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`of military/paramilitary ties has been documented by Colombian non-governmental organizations,
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`international human rights groups, the U.S. State Department, the Office of the UN. High
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`Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Colombian Attorney General's office. Cooperation with
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`paramilitaries has been demonstrated in half of Colombia's eighteen brigade-level Army units, spread
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`across all of the Army's regional divisions. Such cooperation is so pervasive that the paramilitaries are
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`referred to by many in Colombia as the “Sixth Division,” in addition to the five official divisions of the
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`Colombian Army.
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`26.
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`Government security forces have habitually tolerated the presence of paramilitaries,
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`willfully failed to prevent or interrupt their crimes, actively conspired with them, and coordinated
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`
`
`

`

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`«emu-news.)
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`DO
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`10
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`1s
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`23
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`24
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`25
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`26
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`27
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`23
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`activities with them. Documented examples include:
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`Allowing paramilitaries to establish permanent bases and checkpoints without
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`interference;
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`Failing to carry out arrest warrants for paramilitary leaders, who move about the country
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`freely;
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`Withdrawing security forces from villages deemed sympathetic to guerrillas, leaving them
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`vulnerable to attack by paramilitaries;
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`Failing to intervene to stop ongoing massacres occurring over a period of days;
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`Sharing intelligence, including the names of suspect guerilla collaborators;
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`Sharing vehicles, including army trucks used to transport paramilitary fighters;
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`Supplying weapons and munitions;
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`Allowing passage through roadblocks;
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`Providing support with helicopters and medical aid;
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`Communicating via radio, cellular telephones, and beepers;
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`Sharing members, including active-duty soldiers serving in paramilitary units and
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`paramilitary commanders lodging on military bases; and
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`Planning and carrying out joint operations.
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`27.
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`In a recurring pattern, paramilitaries have taken over villages and assaulted inhabitants
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`while nearby security forces have either not intervened or have intervened to facilitate the violence.
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`In
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`October 1997, for example, members of the Army’s Fourth Brigade reportedly established a perimeter
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`around the village of El Arc, in Antioquia. While the Army prevented entry and escape, members of the
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`AUC entered the village and over a period of five days executed at least eleven people, burned most of
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`the houses, looted stores, and destroyed the pipes that fed the homes potable water. Upon leaving the
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`village, the paramilitaries forcibly disappeared over thirty more people and compelled most of the
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`residents to flee. In January 2001, more than one hundred AUC fighters took over the village of
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`Chengue, in Sucre. The AUC executed twenty-five people before setting fire to the village and forcibly
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`disappearing ten additional villagers. Troops from the First Marine Infantry Unit positioned outside the
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`village allegedly prevented humanitarian organizations from entering the area to aid survivors. Myriad
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`
`
`

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`1
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`2
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`similar incidents have been reported.
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`28.
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`The violent and terroristic activities of the AUC and its constituent groups, including the
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`3 ACCU, have at all times been well—known throughout Colombia and the world.
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`4
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`5
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`6
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`7
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`8
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`9
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`Chiquita’s Support of the AUC and Other Terrorists
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`29.
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`Chiquita, as the successor to the United Fruit Company and the United Brands Company,
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`has been involved in the production and exportation of produce from Central and South American
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`nations, including Colombia, for over a century. At all relevant times, Chiquita has produced bananas in
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`the Uraba and Santa Marta regions of Colombia.
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`30.
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`On information and belief, from the early 19905 until at least 1997, Chiquita provided
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`10 material support, including money, to terrorist organizations such as the ACCU and other predecessors
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`11
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`12
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`13
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`ofthe AUG.
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`31.
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`On information and belief, in the years prior to Chiquita’s provision of support to the
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`paramilitaries, these armed groups did not control the territory of the banana—producing regions of
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`14 Colombia. The collaboration with Chiquita allowed the paramilitaries to consolidate as the decisive
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`15
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`16
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`17
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`18
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`actor in the political, military, and social terrain of the banana region. In exchange for its financiai
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`support to the AUC, Chiquita was able to operate in an environment in which labor and community
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`I
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`opposition was suppressed.
`
`Payments to the AUC
`
`32.
`From 1997 until at least February 2004, Chiquita provided material support to the AUG
`‘9
`in Uraba and Santa Marta. By 1997, the AUC effectively controlled large swathes ofterritory, as well as
`20
`exerting influence in institutions such as labor organizations and local governments, in these regions.
`21
`22 On information and belief, the stability and social control provided by the AUC was to Chiquita’s
`23
`benefit, in allowing exportation of bananas without interruption due to conflict. The influence ofthe
`24 AUG in the leadership of the banana workers’ trade unions was also to Chiquita’s benefit, as it reduced
`25
`labor strife. The AUC also provided protection services to banana plantations, dealing out reprisals
`26
`against real or suspected thieves, as well as against social undesirables, suspected guerrilla sympathizers
`27
`or supporters, and anyone who was suspected of opposing the AUC’s activities and social program.
`28
`
`33.
`
`Chiquita paid the AUC, directly or indirectly, nearly every month during the period
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 2:07-cv-03406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 10 of 31 PageID: 11
`“Case 2:07-cv-O3406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 10 of 31 PagelD: 11
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`1
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`18
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`19
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`20
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`21
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`22
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`23
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`24
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`25
`
`26
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`27'
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`28
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`199772004, making over one hundred payments to the AUC totaling over $1.7 million. Chiquita’s
`
`payments to the AUC were reviewed and approved by senior executives of the corporation, including
`
`high-ranking officers, directors, and employees. Chiquita’s senior executives knew that the corporation
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`was paying the AUC and that the AUC was a violent, paramilitary organization led by Carlos Castafio.
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`Payments made to the AUC or to front organizations were recorded in Chiquita’s corporate books and
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`records as “security payments” or payments for “security” or “security services.” Other payments, made
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`to Banadex executives with the intent that they would be withdrawn as cash and handed directly to the
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`AUC, were recorded as income contributions.
`
`34.
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`At all relevant times, Chiquita knew that the AUC was a violent, terrorist paramilitary
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`organization. On September 10, 2001, the United States government designated the AUC as a Foreign
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`Terrorist Organization (“FTO”), and that designation was well-publicized in the American public media,
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`including in the Cincinnati Post on October 6, 2001, and in the Cincinnati Enquirer on October 17, 2001 1
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`as well as in the Colombian media.
`
`35.
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`In 2003, Chiquita consulted with attorneys from the District of Columbia office of a
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`national law firm (“outside counsel”) about Chiquita's ongoing payments to the AUC. Outside counsel
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`advised Chiquita that the payments were illegal under United States law and that Chiquita should
`
`immediately stop paying the AUC directly or indirectly. Among other things, outside counsel advised
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`Chiquita:
`
`-
`
`-
`
`-
`
`'
`
`-
`
`-
`
`-
`
`“Must stop payments.”
`
`“Bottom Line: CANNOT MAKE THE PAYMENT”
`
`“General Rule: Cannot do indirectly what you cannot do directly”
`
`“Concluded with: CANNOT MAKE THE PAYMENT”
`
`“You voluntarily put yourself in this position. Duress defense can wear out through
`
`repetition. Buz [business] decision to stay in harm’s way. Chiquita should leave
`
`Colombia.”
`
`“[T]he company should not continue to make the Santa Marta payments, given the
`
`AUC’s designation as a foreign terrorist organization[.]”
`
`“[T]he company should not make the paymen .”
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`10
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`
`

`

`Case 2:07-cv-03406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 11 of 31 PageID: 12
`yCase 2:07-cv-O3406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 11 of 31 PageID: 12
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`36.
`
`Although CBI’s Board of Directors agreed to disclose its payments to the AUC to the
`
`U.S. Department of Justice on or about April 3, 2003, on April 8, 2003, C131 instructed Banadex to
`
`continue making the payments to the AUC. On April 24, 2003, CB1 met with Justice Department
`
`officials, who told CBI the payments were illegal. Nonetheless, Chiquita continued to make the
`
`payments until at least February 2004.
`
`37.
`
`On March 19, 2007, Chiquita pled guilty in U.S. District Court for the District of
`
`Colombia to one count of engaging in transactions with a specially designated global terrorist. The
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`company’s sentence will include a $25 million criminal fine, the requirement to implement and maintain
`
`cameo.)
`
`-.J
`
`an effective compliance and ethics program, and five years’ probation.
`
`Other Support of the AUG
`
`38.
`
`In 2001, Chiquita facilitated the clandestine and illegal transfer of arms and ammunition
`
`from Nicaragua to the AUC.
`
`39.
`
`The Nicaraguan National Police provided 3,000 AK-47 assault rifles and 2.5 million
`
`rounds of ammunition to a private Guatemalan arms dealership, Grupo de Representaciones
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`Internationales S.A. (“GIR 8A.”), in exchange for weapons more suited to police work. GIR S.A., in
`
`turn, arranged to sell the AK-47s and ammunition for $575,000 to Shimon Yelinek, an arms merchant
`
`based in Panama. In November 2001, Yelinek loaded the arms onto a Panamanian-registered ship with
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`Panama as its declared destination, but the ship instead went to Turbo, Colombia.
`
`40.
`
`Chiquita, through Banadex, operates a private port facility at the Colombian municipality
`
`of Turbo, used for the transport of bananas and other cargo. The arms ship docked at the Chiquita port,
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`and Banadex employees unloaded the 3,000 assault rifles and 2.5 millions rounds of ammunition. These
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`arms and ammunition were then transferred to the AUC.
`
`41.
`
`On information and belief, Chiquita facilitated at least four other arms shipments to the
`
`AUC.
`
`.In an interview with the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, AUC leader Carlos Castafio
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`subsequently boasted, “This is the greatest achievement by the AUC so far. Through Central America,
`
`five shipments, 13 thousand rifles.”
`
`42.
`
`On information and belief, Chiquita was aware of the use of its facilities for the illegal
`
`transshipment of arms to the AUC, and intended to provide such support and assistance to the AUC.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`11
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`
`

`

`Case 2:07-cv-03406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 12 of 31 PageID: 13
`. ; Case 2:07-cv-03406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 12 of 31 PageID: 13
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`.
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`
`43.
`
`On information and belief, Chiquita also assisted the AUC by allowing the use of its
`
`private port facilities not only for the illegal importation of arms, but also for the illegal exportation of
`
`large amounts of illegal drugs, especially cocaine. The drug trade was a major source of income for the
`
`AUC. Chiquita could have prevented this drug trade and assistance to the AUC, but knowingly allowed
`
`use of its port and banana transportation boats for this purpose.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Injuries
`
`John Doe I/John Doe 2
`
`44.
`
`John Doe 1’s father, John Doe 2, was a banana worker in Uraba and active in labor
`
`organizing. In 2001, this area was effectively controlled by the AUG.
`
`45.
`
`In 2001, John Doe 2 was traveling by bus from his home to the banana farm. The bus
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`was stopped by AUC paramilitaries. The paramilitaries removed John Doc 2 from the bus and executed
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`him.
`
`46.
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`On information and belief, Chiquita caused, intended, conspired in, and/or aided and
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`abetted the death of John Doe 2 through its support of the AUC in Uraba. On information and belief,
`
`Chiquita benefited from the death of John Doe 2 by removing a labor activist who threatened the
`
`stability of Chiquita’s operations.
`
`Jane Doe I/Jane Doe 2
`
`47.
`
`Jane Doe 1’s mother, Jane Doe 2, lived in a town in Uraba with her family. She was
`
`involved in civic and social activities of which the AUC did not approve, including advocating for
`
`marginalized groups.
`
`48.
`
`In 1998, Jane Doe 2 told Jane Doe 1 that she was afraid she would be killed for her
`
`activities. Approximately one week later, AUC paramilitaries arrived at Jane Doe 2’s house. In the
`
`presence of her family, the paramilitaries removed Jane Doe 2 from her house, and then executed her.
`
`Subsequently, the family of Jane Doe 2, including Jane Doe I, fled their community in fear.
`
`49.
`
`On information and belief, Chiquita caused, intended, conspired in, and/or aided and
`
`abetted the death of Jane Doe 2 through its support of the AUC in Uraba. On information and belief,
`
`Chiquita benefited from the death of Jane Doe 2 by removing a social activist who threatened the
`
`stability of Chiquita’s operations and the generally established social order.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`12
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`

`

`Case 2:07-cv-03406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 13 of 31 PageID: 14
`,Case 2:07-cv-03406-JMV-JBC Document 1 Filed 07/19/07 Page 13 of 31 PagelD: 14
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`John Doe 3/John Doe 4
`
`50.
`
`John Doe 3’s brother, John Doe 4, was a banana worker at a plantation in Uraba, and a
`
`leader of a labor union committee.
`
`51.
`
`In 1998, John Doc 4 was involved in a protest against low wages. John Doc 3 and John
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`Doc 4 were eating lunch at their banana plantation when AUC paramilitaries approached John Doc 4,
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`identified him by name, and executed him.
`
`52.
`
`On information and belief, Chiquita caused, intended, conspired in, andfor aided and
`
`abetted the death of John Doe 4 through its support of the AUC in Uraba. On information and belief,
`
`Chiquita benefited from the death of John Doe 4 by removing a labor activist who threatened the
`
`stability of Chiquita’s operations.
`
`Jane Doe 3/John Doe 5
`
`53.
`
`54.
`
`Jane Doe 3’s husband, John Doe 5, was a banana worker in Uraba
`
`In 1997, John Doe 5 became a target of AUC paramilitaries because they accused him of
`
`paying ransom to the PARC for his kidnapped brother. The AUC took John Doc 5 from his banana farm
`
`and executed him. AUC paramilitarics subsequently told John Doe 5’s family that they had killed him.
`
`55.
`
`011 information and belief, Chiquita caused, intended, conspired in, and/or aided and
`
`abetted the death of John Doc 5 through its support of the AUC in Uraba. On information and belief,
`
`Chiquita benefited fr