Case 2:19-cv-15517-CCC-MF Document 63-1 Filed 01/19/21 Page 1 of 17 PageID: 671
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`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`
`
`VEEVA SYSTEMS INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`IQVIA INC. et al.,
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`Case No.: No. 2:19-cv-18558-CCC-MF
` Case No.: No. 2:19-cv-15517-CCC-MF
`(Consolidated)
`
`
`
`Hon. Claire C. Cecchi
`Hon. Mark Falk, U.S.M.J.
`Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh, Ret.
`U.S.D.J.
`
`BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
`TO LIFT STAY
`
`Motion Date: February 16, 2021
`
`Document Filed Electronically
`
`))))))))))))))
`
`
`
`
`
`
`James T. Southwick
`(jsouthwick@susmangodfrey.com)
`SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
`1000 Louisiana, Suite 5100
`Houston, TX 77002
`Telephone: (713) 651-9366
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Veeva Systems Inc.
`
`Arnold B. Calmann
`(acalmann@saiber.com)
`SAIBER LLC
`18 Columbia Turnpike, Suite 200
`Florham Park, NJ 07932
`Telephone: (973) 622-3333
`
`Steven F. Benz
`(sbenz@kellogghansen.com)
`KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,
`FIGEL & FREDERICK, P.L.L.C.
`1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`Telephone: (202) 326-7900
`
`
`
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`
`

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`Case 2:19-cv-15517-CCC-MF Document 63-1 Filed 01/19/21 Page 2 of 17 PageID: 672
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 
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`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................2 
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`I. 
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`II. 
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`The Stay Is No Longer Appropriate Given IQVIA I’s Extended
`Schedule ...................................................................................................................2 
`
`The Stay Prevents Veeva from Protecting Its Proprietary Software
`from IQVIA’s Repeated, Unauthorized Intrusions ..................................................7 
`
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................11 
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`i
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`Case 2:19-cv-15517-CCC-MF Document 63-1 Filed 01/19/21 Page 3 of 17 PageID: 673
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`APP Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Ameridose, LLC,
`2011 WL 816622 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2011), APP ......................................................................8, 9
`
`Avaya Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`2011 WL 4962817 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2011).................................................................................3
`
`Catellani v. City of Atl. City,
`2014 WL 201955 (D.N.J. Jan. 15 2014) ....................................................................................4
`
`Cordis v. Abbott Labs.,
`2009 WL 8591527 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2009) ..........................................................................10, 11
`
`De’Omilia Plastic Surgery v. Sweeton,
`2013 WL 6070037 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2013) ...............................................................................4
`
`Dermafocus LLC v. Ulthera, Inc.,
`2018 WL 5113960 (D. Del. Oct. 19, 2018) ...............................................................................2
`
`Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc.,
`2016 WL 7394911 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2016) .............................................................................6
`
`Eagle View Techs., Inc. v. Xactware Solutions, Inc.,
`2016 WL 7165695 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2016) ..................................................................................7
`
`Forrest v. Corzine,
`757 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D.N.J. 2010) ............................................................................................4
`
`Geeky Baby, LLC v. Idea Vill. Prod. Corp.,
`2016 WL 4771385 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2016) .............................................................................10
`
`Givaudan Fragrances Corp. v. Krivda,
`2013 WL 5781183 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2013).................................................................................3
`
`Gold v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
`723 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1983).....................................................................................................4
`
`Horizon Pharma, Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc.,
`2018 WL 3574878 (D.N.J. July 25, 2018) .................................................................................7
`
`Imagevision Net v. Internet Exchange,
`2013 WL 663535 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2013) ...............................................................................10
`
`
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`ii
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`
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`Indus. Tech. Research Inst. v. LG Elecs.,
`2013 WL 5180108 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2013) ...............................................................................5
`
`InterMetro Indus. Corp. v. Enovate Med., LLC,
`2017 WL 901100 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017)................................................................................8
`
`IQVIA Inc. v. Veeva Systems Inc.,
`17-177 (CCC).........................................................................................1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11
`
`IQVIA Inc. v. Veeva Systems Inc.,
`19-15517 (CCC)...................................................................................................................1, 13
`
`LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
`2011 WL 487574 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2011) ....................................................................................5
`
`Nippon Steel v. POSCO,
`2013 WL 1867042 (D.N.J. May 2, 2013) (Falk, Mag. J.) .....................................4, 8, 9, 10, 11
`
`PDL Biopharma, Inc. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Indus. Ltd.,
`2008 WL 11383951 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2008) ..............................................................................10
`
`SenoRx, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.,
`2013 WL 144255 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 2013) ..................................................................................6
`
`Tobin Family Educ. & Health Found. v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc.,
`2012 WL 12916043 (D.N.J. July 24, 2012) ...............................................................................8
`
`Trusted Transp. Sold., LLC v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,
`2018 WL 2187379 (D.N.J. May 11, 2018) ................................................................................8
`
`Veeva Systems Inc. v. IQVIA Inc.,
`19-18558 (CCC) . Dkt. 61..........................................................................................................1
`
`Statutes
`
`Lanham Act ......................................................................................................................................8
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`iii
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`INTRODUCTION
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`In its August 21, 2020 Order, this Court stayed proceedings in the consolidated cases of
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`IQVIA Inc. v. Veeva Systems Inc., 19-15517 (CCC), and Veeva Systems Inc. v. IQVIA Inc., 19-
`
`18558 (CCC) (collectively, “IQVIA II”). Dkt. 61. The Court reserved the power to “revisit and
`
`revise” the stay as necessary. Id. at 7. The Court should assert that power and lift the stay for two
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`reasons.
`
`First, lifting the stay would promote efficiency. The Court acknowledged that “a lack of
`
`progress in” IQVIA Inc. v. Veeva Systems Inc., 17-177 (CCC) (“IQVIA I”), might necessitate lifting
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`the stay on IQVIA II. Dkt. 61 at 7. That concern has proven prescient. IQVIA I has stalled. Key
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`discovery motions have been pending for years, halting advancement toward expert discovery and
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`summary judgment briefing. Lifting the stay would allow discovery to proceed in IQVIA II, which
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`would expedite rather than slow the ultimate resolution of the parties’ overall dispute. Prompt
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`resolution of the IQVIA cases is particularly important because IQVIA’s anticompetitive
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`conduct—and associated harm to competition and customers—is ongoing and will continue
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`unimpeded during the stay.
`
`Second, the stay is premised on the Court’s finding that resolution of IQVIA’s trade secret
`
`claims in IQVIA I might affect the questions presented by IQVIA II. Dkt. 61 at 5–6. Yet IQVIA II
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`raises new issues unrelated to IQVIA I. In IQVIA II, Veeva seeks redress for IQVIA’s unauthorized
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`access to Veeva’s software applications, which constitutes intentional interference with Veeva’s
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`customer contracts. Dkt. 69 (Veeva’s Am. Compl.) ¶¶ 17, 237–44. Nothing in IQVIA I bears on
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`that key issue. At the very least, the Court should dissolve the stay with respect to that claim.
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`1
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`
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`ARGUMENT
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`“When a court has imposed a stay, but ‘circumstances have changed such that the court’s
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`reasons for imposing [that] stay no longer exist or are inappropriate,’ the court also has the inherent
`
`power and discretion to lift the stay.” Dermafocus LLC v. Ulthera, Inc., 2018 WL 5113960, at *2
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`(D. Del. Oct. 19, 2018). This Court recognized that power in its original order. Dkt. 61. Pursuant
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`to that power, this Court should terminate the stay on IQVIA II because the reason for instituting
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`the stay no longer holds since IQVIA I is stagnant and IQVIA II contains an independent and
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`unrelated intentional interference claim.
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`I.
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`
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`The Stay Is No Longer Appropriate Given IQVIA I’s Extended Schedule
`
`In entering the stay, this Court explained that it could “revisit and revise a stay should a
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`lack of progress in IQVIA I give reason to do so.” Dkt. 61 at 7. That reason has materialized: IQVIA
`
`I is languishing. In 2019 and early 2020, the parties took and defended 70 depositions and
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`exchanged hundreds of thousands of documents. But the case has since stalled. IQVIA I cannot
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`proceed to summary judgment and trial until this Court resolves three matters that have been
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`pending for years.
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`
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`First, Veeva appeals the Special Master’s denial of Veeva’s motion to compel IQVIA’s
`
`responses to Veeva’s Interrogatories 33–35. Order & Op., IQVIA I, 17-177 (CCC) (D.N.J. Sept.
`
`13, 2018), (Dkt. 147); Veeva’s Appeal, IQVIA I, 17-777 (CCC) (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2018), (Dkt.
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`150). Those interrogatories seek bedrock information on IQVIA’s trade secret claims. They ask
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`which “trade secrets” Veeva supposedly “misappropriated” and how Veeva allegedly used those
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`“secrets” to improve its products. The Special Master ruled in September 2018 that IQVIA’s bare-
`
`bones responses were adequate “at this time” and “at this stage of discovery.” Order & Op. at 6,
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`IQVIA I, 17-177 (CCC) (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2018), (Dkt. 147). More than two years, 70 depositions,
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`2
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`and hundreds of thousands of documents later, IQVIA has not adequately supplemented its
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`responses, depriving Veeva of fair notice as to what exactly it allegedly misappropriated. See, e.g.,
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`Avaya Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 4962817, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2011) (“[I]dentification
`
`of a trade secret . . . is certainly a necessary precondition to conducting discovery.”); Givaudan
`
`Fragrances Corp. v. Krivda, 2013 WL 5781183, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2013) (“Generally, a
`
`plaintiff in a misappropriation of trade secrets case must identify with precision the trade secrets
`
`at issue at the outset of the litigation.”). Veeva’s appeal has been pending since September 2018.
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`
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`Second, and relatedly, Veeva appeals the Special Master’s denial of Veeva’s motion to
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`compel IQVIA’s response to Veeva’s Interrogatory 14, which asks IQVIA to precisely identify
`
`each trade secret that Veeva allegedly misappropriated. Order & Op., IQVIA I, 17-177 (CCC)
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`(D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2018), (Dkt. 183); Veeva’s Appeal, IQVIA I, 17-777 (CCC) (D.N.J. Dec. 14,
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`2018), (Dkt. 194). To this day, IQVIA has not adequately responded to Interrogatory 14 by
`
`identifying a supposedly misappropriated “trade secret.” Untethered to any specifics, IQVIA has
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`sought boundless, never-ending discovery, including entire software source code repositories and
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`forensic examination of hundreds of old and irrelevant computers. Consequently, Veeva also
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`appeals the Special Master’s denial of a protective order shielding it from those oppressive
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`discovery requests. Order and Op., IQVIA I, 17-777 (CCC) (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2018), (Dkt. 183);
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`Veeva’s Appeal, IQVIA I, 17-777 (CCC) (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2018) (Dkt. 194). These appeals have
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`been pending since November 2018.
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`
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`Third, Veeva requests a stay of the November 30, 2018 Order pending resolution of
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`Veeva’s appeal. Mot. to Stay, IQVIA I, 17-777 (CCC) (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2018), (Dkt. 205). The
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`Special Master temporarily stayed the Order to allow Veeva to request a permanent stay from the
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`Court. Order, IQVIA I, 17-777 (CCC) (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2018), (Dkt. 201). Continuation of the stay
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`3
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`is necessary to protect Veeva’s right to appeal. If Veeva were compelled to comply with the Order
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`before the Court decided the appeal, then Veeva’s right to appeal would be neutralized. Veeva’s
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`motion to stay has been pending since December 2018.
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`
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`The stay on IQVIA II hinges on IQVIA I’s progress. Dkt. 61 at 7. Such progress is
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`impossible without resolution of these and other long-pending matters. Veeva appreciates the
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`judicial emergency thrust on this Court by the COVID-19 pandemic. Ex. 11 (Extension of Standing
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`Order 2020-17). But those very crisis conditions render the stay ineffective as they impede the
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`prompt resolution of the parties’ overall dispute. With Veeva’s appeals (among other issues)
`
`hanging in the balance, IQVIA I remains suspended indefinitely. This Court has repeatedly denied
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`indefinite stays as unduly prejudicial. E.g., Gold v. Johns-Manville Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1075
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`(3d Cir. 1983) (denying stay and explaining “[i]n these cases, the clear damage to the plaintiffs is
`
`the hardship of being forced to wait for an indefinite and, if recent experience is any guide, a
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`lengthy time before their causes are heard”); Forrest v. Corzine, 757 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479 (D.N.J.
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`2010) (“The delay occasioned by a stay is indefinite and could very well extend beyond the one
`
`year stay period projected by [defendant]. Such an indefinite stay is disfavored.”); Nippon Steel v.
`
`POSCO, 2013 WL 1867042, at *6 (D.N.J. May 2, 2013) (Falk, Mag. J.) (denying stay where the
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`“possibility of prejudice” was “exacerbated by the lack of certainty” as to a prior, related
`
`proceeding’s advancement); Catellani v. City of Atl. City, 2014 WL 201955, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 15
`
`2014) (as “there is no indication that the [ ] trial against Plaintiff will soon commence, any stay
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`would be indefinite and, thus, prejudicial to Plaintiff”); De’Omilia Plastic Surgery v. Sweeton,
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`2013 WL 6070037, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2013) (denying potentially “indefinite stay” since, “with
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`1 “Ex.” refers to exhibits attached to the Declaration of Arnold B. Calmann, filed herewith.
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`4
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`the passage of time, witnesses become unavailable, memories of conversations and dates fade and
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`documents can be lost or destroyed”).
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`The prejudice stemming from the stay’s indefiniteness is exacerbated by IQVIA’s ongoing
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`anticompetitive acts, which crush competition and customer choice and keep prices high in key
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`life sciences and technology markets. This case is not about past misconduct: it’s about IQVIA’s
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`present-day tactics to stifle competition, to the severe harm of Veeva, other competitors, and life
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`sciences customers in fast moving tech (data and software) markets. As one customer noted,
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`IQVIA’s prohibition on the use of IQVIA data with Veeva’s Nitro software “has implications,
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`significant ones on securing resources, costs and deliverables to our internal customers.” Ex. 2
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`(Mar. 21, 2019 email from S. Sevo to J. Faddis) at 1. As another customer put it, IQVIA’s
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`anticompetitive data restrictions threatened to render the customer “dead in the water.” Ex. 3 (Nov.
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`7, 2018 email from M. Jensen to A. Fuchs) at 2. This harm will continue unabated so long as the
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`stay is in place.
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`And while the harm caused by IQVIA is felt market-wide, IQVIA’s crosshairs are trained
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`principally on Veeva. Where a stay would compromise a party’s customer goodwill, this Court is
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`especially reluctant to impose one. In LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 2011 WL
`
`487574, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2011), this Court denied a stay pending patent reexamination,
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`explaining that the “undue prejudice to Plaintiffs would be substantial” since “[t]he parties are
`
`direct competitors” and “delay would cause Plaintiffs to lose substantial profits as well as goodwill
`
`in the market. The goodwill lost during the reexamination proceedings could be difficult to
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`measure and thus difficult to compensate fully with money damages after trial.” Id.; see also Indus.
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`Tech. Research Inst. v. LG Elecs., 2013 WL 5180108, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2013) (emphasizing
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`the impropriety of a stay where the parties “are direct competitors” and the nonmoving party “risks
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`5
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`losing goodwill that would be difficult to measure”); SenoRx, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., 2013 WL
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`144255, at *7 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 2013) (“Courts have recognized that when the parties are direct
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`competitors, there is a reasonable chance that delay . . . will have outsized consequences . . .
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`including the potential for loss of market share and an erosion of goodwill.”); Dominion Res. Inc.
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`v. Alstom Grid, Inc., 2016 WL 7394911, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2016) (denying a stay and
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`explaining “[w]e cannot allow delay to be a business leverage tool between competitors absent
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`extraordinary good cause and timely grounds”).
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`
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`IQVIA, of course, benefits from the stay. It can maintain and extend its monopolies while
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`using its unfounded allegations in IQVIA I and IQVIA II to smear Veeva in the marketplace,
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`jeopardizing customer goodwill. Following the stay’s entry, IQVIA sent a letter to one of the
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`parties’ mutual customers denying its request to use IQVIA data with Veeva software. Ex. 4
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`(IQVIA Ltr. to H. Madeira). In that letter, IQVIA leveraged the stalled IQVIA I proceedings to
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`cover for its monopolization. It noted that “a final court decision on the merits of the [IQVIA I]
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`dispute is unlikely to occur before 2022” and explained that, in the meantime, IQVIA would
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`continue withholding its monopoly data with impunity, barring customers from adopting the Veeva
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`software they prefer. See id at 1–3. IQVIA proceeded to falsely accuse Veeva of “repeated theft
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`and unlawful use of IQVIA market research data, the cover-up of unlawful activities,” and
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`“misleading statements” to customers. Id. at 1.
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`
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`IQVIA doubled down on its aspersions with yet another mutual customer just last month.
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`Ex. 5 (Dec. 4, 2020 email from IQVIA Third Party Access Program to M. East-Bratt). There,
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`IQVIA again denied the customer’s request to use IQVIA data with Veeva software while trying
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`to vilify Veeva for alleged “theft,” “cover-up[s],” and “misleading statements.” Id. at 1. IQVIA
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`continued by stating that its exclusionary conduct would persist indefinitely, as “a final court
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`6
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`decision on the merits of the [IQVIA I] dispute is unlikely to occur before 2022.” Id. These
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`communications with customers are just the tip of the iceberg—they are nearly identical and surely
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`represent form letters IQVIA has disseminated market-wide, baselessly jeopardizing Veeva’s
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`customer goodwill.
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`
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`IQVIA’s repeated acknowledgments that IQVIA I will not be resolved until 2022
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`themselves undermine the stay. See Horizon Pharma, Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., 2018 WL
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`3574878, at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2018) (noting that “a stay could delay these consolidated cases by
`
`one to two years, which is certainly substantial prejudice to Defendants”); Eagle View Techs., Inc.
`
`v. Xactware Solutions, Inc., 2016 WL 7165695, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2016) (eight-month delay
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`militated against a stay). But IQVIA’s capitalization on the delay to try to justify its
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`monopolization while maligning Veeva amounts to wholesale abuse. The prejudice to Veeva is
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`compounded since the potential loss of customer goodwill cannot be straightforwardly remedied
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`through damages. The Court should lift the stay so Veeva can refute IQVIA’s proffered
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`justification for its monopolization, terminate IQVIA’s stranglehold on competition, and
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`rehabilitate its good name from IQVIA’s groundless affronts.
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`II.
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`
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`The Stay Prevents Veeva from Protecting Its Proprietary Software from IQVIA’s
`Repeated, Unauthorized Intrusions
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`There is an independent reason why the Court should lift the stay: certain of IQVIA’s
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`ongoing bad acts are unique to IQVIA II. Veeva has learned that IQVIA continues to access its
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`proprietary software without authorization. This ongoing unauthorized access is the basis of certain
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`of Veeva’s claims in IQVIA II. The stay prevents resolution of this issue, which is not directly
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`raised in IQVIA I.
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`Where resolution of a prior case “would simplify the issues and the trial of” a subsequent
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`case, a stay of the subsequent case may be appropriate. Trusted Transp. Sold., LLC v. Guarantee
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`7
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`Ins. Co., 2018 WL 2187379, at *4 (D.N.J. May 11, 2018). But a stay is improper where the prior
`
`case has no bearing on key issues in the subsequent one. Tobin Family Educ. & Health Found. v.
`
`1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 2012 WL 12916043, at *4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2012) (denying stay despite
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`overlap between proceedings where first proceeding addressed contributory patent infringement
`
`while second proceeding addressed direct infringement); InterMetro Indus. Corp. v. Enovate Med.,
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`LLC, 2017 WL 901100, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017) (denying stay despite “an overlap of certain
`
`issues” between two proceedings where certain claims in the second proceeding would “not be
`
`affected by” the first).
`
`To illustrate, in Nippon Steel v. POSCO, 2013 WL 1867042 (D.N.J. May 2, 2013) (Falk,
`
`Mag. J.), Nippon accused POSCO of patent infringement, Lanham Act violations, and unfair
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`competition. Id. at *1. POSCO requested a stay of the litigation pending reexamination of Nippon’s
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`patents by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Id. Your Honor observed
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`that USPTO reexamination would affect only Nippon’s patent claims but not its Lanham Act or
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`unfair competition claims. Id. at *5. Consequently, Your Honor denied the stay and noted that “it
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`seems unfair—and prejudicial to Nippon—to discontinue this litigation in order to allow the
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`USPTO to weigh in on some, but not all, of the claims in this case.” Id. at *5 (emphasis in original);
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`see also id. at *8 (“The non-patent claims do not depend on the continued validity of the patents
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`and are based on different legal theories. Therefore, there is no basis to stay these claims.”).
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`Likewise, in APP Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Ameridose, LLC, 2011 WL 816622 (D.N.J.
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`Mar. 8, 2011), APP accused Ameridose of infringing three patents: the ‘524 patent, and ‘489
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`patent, and the ‘086 patent. Id. at *1. The USPTO granted reexamination of the ‘524 and ‘489
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`patents, but not the ‘086 patent. Id. Ameridose requested a stay of APP’s infringement action
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`pending reexamination. Id. This Court denied the stay and explained:
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`Of particular note is that the reexamination proceedings will not resolve this case
`in its entirety, as the ‘086 patent (which has expired) is not subject to
`reexamination. Consequently, no matter what the outcome of the reexamination
`proceedings, which may not reach a final conclusion for a period of years, the
`parties will have to litigate infringement, willfulness, etc., as to the ‘086 patent
`before this Court.
`
`Id. at *2 (emphasis added). Since USPTO reexamination could affect only some, but not all, of
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`APP’s patents-in-suit, a stay pending reexamination was unwarranted.
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`
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`USPTO reexamination could not affect Nippon’s Lanham Act and unfair competition
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`claims in Nippon Steel. Neither could reexamination bear on APP’s ‘086 infringement claim in
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`APP. By the same token, IQVIA I has no relation to Veeva’s intentional interference claim in
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`IQVIA II, rendering a stay pending IQVIA I’s resolution inapposite.
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`
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`IQVIA’s ongoing, illicit access to Veeva’s software applications is a cornerstone of IQVIA
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`II. Although IQVIA accuses Veeva of “trade secret theft,” it is IQVIA that exhibits brazen
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`disrespect toward competitors’ proprietary information. Veeva has long told IQVIA that, to access
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`Veeva’s software applications, the parties must execute a Restricted Software Access Agreement
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`(“RSAA”). Dkt. 69 ¶ 17. But Veeva has discovered that in 2019 alone, more than 2,500 IQVIA
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`employees accessed Veeva’s proprietary life sciences commercial and clinical software
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`applications through customer accounts without authorization. Id. Despite Veeva’s repeated
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`warnings, IQVIA’s encroachments continue. Id. By inducing customers to grant IQVIA
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`unauthorized access to Veeva’s software, and by failing to comply with Veeva’s RSAA protocol,
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`IQVIA intentionally interferes with Veeva’s customer contracts. Id. ¶¶ 17, 237–44.
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`
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`Veeva’s IQVIA II intentional interference claim is unconnected to any IQVIA I question.
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`IQVIA I centers on two issues: (1) Veeva’s alleged “misappropriation” of IQVIA’s still-
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`unidentified trade secrets; and (2) IQVIA’s prohibition on customers’ use of its monopoly data
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`with their preferred Veeva software. Neither can shed light on IQVIA’s disruption of Veeva’s
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`customer contracts through purposeful, unauthorized software access. Since IQVIA I cannot
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`simplify (and indeed has no bearing on) Veeva’s IQVIA II intentional interference claim, the stay
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`should be lifted at least with respect to that claim. See, e.g., PDL Biopharma, Inc. v. Sun
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`Pharmaceutical Indus. Ltd., 2008 WL 11383951, at *2 n.2 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2008) (denying a stay
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`although a prior proceeding might “eliminate one trial issue” because that “does not mean there is
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`no reason for this case to continue”); Nippon Steel, 2013 WL 1867042 at *8 (denying a stay despite
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`“common nucleus of operative facts” between a prior proceeding and a subsequent one because
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`“the legal theories” underlying certain claims in the subsequent proceeding “differ substantially
`
`from” those in the prior one); Geeky Baby, LLC v. Idea Vill. Prod. Corp., 2016 WL 4771385, at
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`*4 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2016) (lifting a stay with respect to certain claims that “have a minimal
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`connection to” a related prior proceeding).
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`
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`Far from simplifying Veeva’s intentional interference claim, the stay prejudices Veeva’s
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`ability to protect itself from IQVIA’s predation. Any stay on litigation between competitors tends
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`to sow prejudice. See, e.g., Cordis v. Abbott Labs., 2009 WL 8591527, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2009)
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`(denying a stay where “the Court agrees that Cordis will be prejudiced by the imposition of a stay”
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`as “Abbott’s product directly competes with its product and has caused a significant decline in
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`Cordis’s market share”); Imagevision Net v. Internet Exchange, 2013 WL 663535, at *6 (D. Del.
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`Feb. 25, 2013) (denying a stay as “[c]ourts are generally reluctant to stay proceedings where the
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`parties are direct competitors”). Such stays are especially pernicious where they bar a party from
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`protecting proprietary information from a competitor’s incursion. In Nippon Steel, Your Honor
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`denied a stay of Nippon’s claims against POSCO where Nippon suffered from “POSCO’s use of
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`Nippon’s protected information” because “it would be extremely prejudicial to force [Nippon] to
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`the litigation sideline while its business market is subjected to a potentially permanent alteration.”
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`Case 2:19-cv-15517-CCC-MF Document 63-1 Filed 01/19/21 Page 15 of 17 PageID: 685
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`
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`Id. at *5; see also Cordis, 2009 WL 8591527 at *1 (“If Cordis is required to wait for the PTO to
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`complete its reexamination before enforcing its patents against Abbott, Cordis may be harmed
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`even further.”).
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`
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`IQVIA’s exploitation of Veeva’s proprietary information poses analogous threats to
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`Veeva. Although IQVIA has long monopolized the global life sciences sales and reference data
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`markets, it has struggled to gain a foothold in adjacent software markets. Unable to develop
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`competitive software through competition on the merits, IQVIA resorts to monopolization. E.g.,
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`Dkt. 69 ¶¶ 2–12. IQVIA exploits its Third-Party Access policy by barring customers from using
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`its data with Veeva software, steering them toward IQVIA’s inferior products. Id. ¶¶ 9–12. IQVIA
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`poaches Veeva employees and pumps them for confidential information on Veeva’s technology.
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`Id. ¶ 16. Upping the ante, IQVIA now illicitly infiltrates Veeva’s proprietary software to improve
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`its rival offerings. Id. ¶ 17. As in Nippon and Cordis, it would be “extremely prejudicial” to require
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`Veeva to await resolution of unrelated IQVIA I issues before it can protect itself through IQVIA II.
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`Nippon, 2013 WL 1867042 at *5; Cordis, 2009 WL 8591527 at *1.
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`CONCLUSION
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`
`
`For the foregoing reasons, the Court should lift the stay on IQVIA II and permit discovery
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`to proceed. At the very least, this Court should lift the stay with respect to Veeva’s intentional
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`interference claim in IQVIA II, which is unconnected to any IQVIA I issue.
`
`
`Dated: January 19, 2021
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`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`/s/ Arnold B. Calmann
`Arnold B. Calmann
`Jeffrey Soos
`Katherine A. Escanlar
`SAIBER LLC
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`Case 2:19-cv-15517-CCC-MF Document 63-1 Filed 01/19/21 Page 16 of 17 PageID: 686
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`
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`
`
`18 Columbia Turnpike, Suite 200
`Florham Park, NJ 07932
`Telephone: (973) 622-3333
`Facsimile: (973) 622-3349
`acalmann@saiber.com
`jsoos@saiber.com
`kescanlar@saiber.com
`
`James T. Southwick
`Ryan Caughey
`Michael B. Brightman
`Robert Travis Korman
`SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
`1000 Louisiana, Suite 5100
`Houston, TX 77002-5096
`Telephone: (713) 651-9366
`Facsimile: (713) 654-6666
`jsouthwick@susmangodfrey.com
`rcaughey@susmangodfrey.com
`mbrightman@susmangodfrey.com
`tkorman@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Michael Gervais
`SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
`1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 789-3100
`Facsimile: (310) 789-3150
`mgervais@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Jenna Farleigh
`SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
`Seattle, WA 98101
`Telephone: (310) 789-3100
`jfarleigh@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Steve F. Benz
`Kylie C. Kim
`Christopher Sarma
`Daniel S. Severson
`KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD, FIGEL &
`FREDERICK, P.L.L.C.
`1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
`Washington, DC 20036
`Telephone: (202) 326-7900
`
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`Case 2:19-cv-15517-CCC-MF Document 63-1 Filed 01/19/21 Page 17 of 17 PageID: 687
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`
`
`Facsimile: (202) 326-7999
`sbenz@kellogghansen.com
`kkim@kellogghansen.com
`csarma@kellogghansen.com
`dseverson@kellogghansen.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Veeva
`Systems Inc.
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`13
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