Case 2:20-cv-12969-WJM-MF Document 139-1 Filed 11/06/20 Page 1 of 39 PageID: 111
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`
`Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-12969
`(WJM) (MF)
`
`
`MOTION RETURN DATE: JANUARY
`4, 2021
`
`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
`
`
`
`JILL CLARK, on behalf of herself and
`others similarly situated,
`Plaintiff,
`v.
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
`AMERICA, INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
`TO DISMISS
`
`GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
`Richard Edlin, Esq.
`David Jay, Esq.
`Robert Herrington, Esq. (admitted pro hac vice)
`500 Campus Drive, Suite 400
`Florham Park, NJ 07932
`(973) 360-7900
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`
`
`I. 
`II. 
`
`C. 
`
`2. 
`
`2. 
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................... 1 
`RELEVANT BACKGROUND ....................................................................... 3 
`A. 
`Procedural History ................................................................................. 3 
`B. 
`Plaintiff’s Allegations ........................................................................... 4 
`III.  ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 6 
`A. 
`Standard of Review ............................................................................... 6 
`B. 
`The Court Lacks Federal Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s
`Complaint. ............................................................................................. 8 
`Plaintiff has not alleged a factual basis for and cannot prove
`1. 
`that the elements of CAFA jurisdiction are satisfied. ................. 9 
`Plaintiff cannot meet the MMWA’s amount-in-controversy
`requirement. .............................................................................. 13 
`Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails To State A Plausible Claim For
`Relief. .................................................................................................. 16 
`The MMWA claim fails because Plaintiff has not identified
`1. 
`any written affirmation that qualifies as a warranty under the
`statute. ....................................................................................... 16 
`Plaintiff fails to state a common law or NJCFA fraud claim
`because she does not meet the heightened pleading standard
`under Rule 9(b). ........................................................................ 21
`Plaintiff fails to state a claim for fraud or violation of the
`a. 
`NJCFA based on an affirmative misrepresentation. ....... 23 
`Plaintiff fails to plead a claim for fraud based on
`omission because she does not allege facts that give
`rise to any duty to disclose. ............................................ 26 
`Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because
`there is no direct relationship between Plaintiff, an indirect
`
`b. 
`
`3. 
`
`i
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`

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`purchaser, and Samsung, and she cannot allege that she
`expected remuneration from Samsung. .................................... 28 
`IV.  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 31 
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`ii
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`

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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`Argabright v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
` 201 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2016) ................................................. 26, 27
`
`Bedi v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
` 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9365 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2016) ........................................... 30
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
` 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ............................................................................................... 7
`
`Boring v. Google Inc.,
` 362 Fed. Appx. 273 (3d Cir. 2010) ........................................................................ 7
`
`Christidis v. First Penn. Mortg. Trust,
` 717 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983) ................................................................................... 21
`
`Cole v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC,
` 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153800 (D.N.J. 2011) ..................................................... 15
`
`Donachy v. Intrawest U.S. Holdings, Inc.,
` 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34029 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2012) ........................................ 30
`
`Donnelly v. Option One Mortg. Corp.,
` 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92663 (D.N.J. July 1, 2013) ........................................... 22
`
`Drake v. Thor Indus.,
` 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202216 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2018) ............................... 14, 16
`
`Evancho v. Fisher,
` 423 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2005) ................................................................................... 7
`
`F.D.I.C. v. Bathgate,
` 27 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 1994) ............................................................................ 22, 23
`
`Forcellati v. Hyland's, Inc.,
` 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3867 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015) ....................................... 18
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`
`
`
`Frederico v. Home Depot,
` 507 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 22, 24
`
`Gallagher v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos.,
` 169 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.N.J. 2016) ......................................................................... 7
`
`Gray v. Bayer Corp.,
` 2009 WL 1617930 (D.N.J. June 8, 2009) ............................................................ 30
`
`Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
` 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002) ................................................................................. 29
`
`Heleine v. Saxon Mortg. Servs.,
` 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47466 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2013) ................................ 9, 10, 12
`
`In re Clorox Consumer Litig.,
` 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107704 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2013) .................................. 29
`
`In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron,
` 678 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2012) ................................................................................... 6
`
`In re Scotts EZ Seed Litig.,
` 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73808 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2013) ............................. 19, 20
`
`In re Shop-Vac Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
` 964 F. Supp. 2d 355 (M.D. Pa. 2013) .................................................................. 21
`
`In re Toshiba Am. HD DVD Mktg. & Sales practices Litig.,
` 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82833 (D.N.J. 2009) ....................................................... 24
`
`Inventory Recovery Corp. v. Gabriel,
` 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100908 (D.N.J. July 20, 2012) ....................................... 26
`
`Kanter v. Barella,
` 489 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2007) ................................................................................... 7
`
`Kelley v. Microsoft Corp.,
` 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66721 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 10, 2007) .............................. 20
`
`Lieberson v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos.,
` 865 F. Supp. 2d 529 (D.N.J. 2011) ....................................................................... 22
`
`
`iv
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`

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`
`
`Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.,
` 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993) ................................................................................... 26
`
`Littlehale v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc.,
` 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162530 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2012) .................................... 18
`
`Mardini v. Viking Freight, Inc.,
` 92 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D.N.J. 1999) ......................................................................... 23
`
`Martin v. Monsanto Co.,
` 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22565 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2017) .................................... 18
`
`Mele v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,
` 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16185 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 1993) ................................. 14, 15
`
`Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
` 549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977) ...............................................................................8, 9
`
`Nahas v. Shore Med. Ctr.,
` 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33307 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2016) ........................................ 10
`
`Neuss v. Rubi Rose, LLC,
` 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83444 (D.N.J. May 31, 2017) .......................................... 7
`
`New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements,
` 101 F.3d 1492 (3d Cir. 1996) ................................................................................. 6
`
`Noble v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
` 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21545 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2018) ........................................... 28
`
`Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
` 515 F.3d 224 (3rd Cir. 2008) .................................................................................. 7
`
`Ponzio v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,
` 447 F. Supp. 3d 194 (D.N.J. 2020) ....................................................................... 10
`
`Popejoy v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
` 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75182 (D.N.J. June 9, 2016) .......................................... 24
`
`Ramon v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys.,
` 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11665 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2007) ......................................... 26
`
`
`v
`
`

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`
`
`Rosenblatt v. Nuplexa Group, Inc.,
` 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84302 (D.N.J. June 29, 2016) ........................................ 13
`
`Roxbury v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc.,
` 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69877 (D.N.J. Sep. 15, 2008) ......................................... 15
`
`Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc.,
` 357 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2004) ................................................................................... 6
`
`Semeran v. BlackBerry Corp.,
` 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379 (D.N.J. July 6, 2016) ........................................... 10
`
`Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp.,
` 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984) ................................................................................. 26
`
`Shibles v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
` 730 Fed. Appx. 103 (3d Cir. 2018) ........................................................................ 6
`
`Spera v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
` 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45073 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2014) ........................................... 29
`
`Stevenson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.,
` 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70945 (D.N.J. June 2, 2015) .......................................... 27
`
`Toms v. Funai Corp.,
` 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83413 (D.N.J. June 25, 2015) ........................................ 28
`
`Walters v. Vitamin Shoppe Indus.,
` 701 F. App'x 667 (9th Cir. 2017) ......................................................................... 17
`
`Warma Witter Kreisler, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
` 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112773 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2009) ........................................ 30
`
`Weske v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
` 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32289 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2012) ........................................ 29
`
`Yost v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
` 651 F. Supp. 656 (D.N.J. 1986) ..................................................................... 24, 26
`
`
`
`vi
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`

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`Federal Statutes
`15 U.S.C. § 2301 ......................................................................................... 17, 18, 19
`
`15 U.S.C. § 2310 ......................................................................................... 13, 14, 15
`
`15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 ............................................................................................ 3
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................ 6
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1332 ......................................................................................... 5, 6, 9, 11
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1367 ........................................................................................................ 6
`
`
`State Statutes
`N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1 ........................................................................................................ 3
`
`
`Rules
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ..................................................................................... 1, 6, 8
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................. 1, 2, 7, 8
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ..................................................................... 2, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26
`
`
`Regulations
`16 C.F.R. § 700.3(a) .......................................................................................... 18, 20
`
`
`
`
`vii
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`Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc. respectfully submits this
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`Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
`
`and (6), to dismiss the Plaintiff Jill Clark’s Complaint in its entirety.
`
`I.
`
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
`
`Plaintiff Jill Clark seeks to represent a purported “New Jersey class” of
`
`consumers, asserting claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
`
`(“NJCFA”), as well as for common law fraud and unjust enrichment, based on the
`
`allegation that Samsung Galaxy S7, S7 Edge and S7 Active phones were not as
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`water resistant as advertised.1 As a threshold matter, this Court lacks subject matter
`
`jurisdiction over the action and should dismiss the Complaint on that ground alone,
`
`pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
`
`First, Clark’s attempt to rely on the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)
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`fails because she offers only conclusory assertions about the jurisdictional
`
`requirements. As the proponent of federal jurisdiction, Clark has the burden of
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`proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all CAFA’s requirements are
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`satisfied: an amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000, minimal diversity, and
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`at least 100 class members. But Clark fails to allege any facts to support her
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`conclusory assertion that these requirements are met, and naked legal conclusions
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`are not taken as true in evaluating jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff fails to allege any
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`1 Clark also alleges an individual claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
`Act solely on a breach of express warranty theory.
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`1
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`

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`facts showing that CAFA’s requirements are met, dismissal is required.
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`Second, Clark cannot manufacture federal question jurisdiction by asserting
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`an individual claim for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
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`(“MMWA”) because her individual claim (the only MMWA claim asserted) does
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`not satisfy the $50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for bringing such
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`claims in federal court. Courts in this circuit have consistently held that this
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`requirement must be based solely on the MMWA claims in the case; pendent state
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`claims, attorneys’ fees, and court costs are not included. And because Plaintiff
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`asserts her MMWA claim individually, the only damages that can be considered in
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`determining whether the $50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied
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`are those associated with her individual MMWA claim, which fall far short of the
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`jurisdictional threshold. Accordingly, the Court has no federal question jurisdiction
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`over Plaintiff’s individual MMWA claim.
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`Third, even if Plaintiff could establish federal jurisdiction (she cannot), all
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`of her claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because she fails to allege
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`facts that plausibly state a claim. Plaintiff’s MMWA claim does not identify any
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`written affirmation that qualifies as a warranty under the statute. The fraud-based
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`allegations are too conclusory to meet the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard.
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`And the unjust enrichment claim fails because there is no direct relationship
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`between Plaintiff, an indirect purchaser, and Samsung, and thus Plaintiff cannot
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`2
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`allege that she expected remuneration from Samsung. Thus, all of Clark’s claims
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`should be dismissed.
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`II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`Procedural History
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`On September 12, 2016, plaintiff Dulce Alondra Velasquez-Reyes filed a
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`putative class action against Samsung in the District Court for the Central District
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`of California, styled Velasquez-Reyes v. Samsung, Docket No. 5:16-cv-01953,
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`alleging fraud, false advertising, and related claims based on the sale of Samsung’s
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`Galaxy S7, S7 Edge and S7 Active phones (the “California Action”). (California
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`Action ECF No. 1.)2 Almost four years later, on May 19, 2020, a Second Amended
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`Complaint was filed in the California Action (“SAC”), which, among other things,
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`added Clark as a new named plaintiff, and added claims under the NJCFA
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`(N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1 et seq.) on behalf of Clark and a proposed New Jersey Class, as
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`well as a claim under the MMWA (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312) individually on
`
`behalf of Clark. (California Action ECF No. 83.) In exchange for Samsung’s
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`stipulation to the filing of the SAC (among other things), plaintiffs removed all
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`2 The complete procedural history of the California Action is beyond the scope
`of this Motion. But plaintiff Dulce Alondra Velasquez-Reyes’s claims were
`dismissed from the California Action on July 16, 2020. (California Action ECF
`No. 97.) And the claims of the only other remaining plaintiff in the California
`Action, Martin Baclija, were compelled to arbitration on October 21, 2020.
`(California Action ECF No. 124.) At this time, the California Action is stayed in its
`entirety pending arbitration of Baclija’s claims on an individual basis. (Id.)
`
`3
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`

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`nationwide class allegations, and the California District Court ordered—pursuant
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`to the parties’ stipulation—that plaintiffs “shall not seek further leave to amend the
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`SAC[.]” (Id. ECF No. 82.)
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`On June 18, 2020, Samsung filed a motion to dismiss Clark’s complaint
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`under Rule 12(b)(2) and (6), for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a
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`claim, showing that there was no general or specific jurisdiction over Clark’s
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`claims in California. (Id. ECF No. 87.) Clark did not contest the jurisdictional
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`challenge, instead filing a cross-motion to transfer to the District of New Jersey.
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`(Id. ECF Nos. 99, 100.) On September 17, 2020, the California District Court
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`ordered Clark’s claims severed and transferred to the District of New Jersey. (Id.
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`ECF No. 115.) Consistent with the parties’ stipulation that there would be no
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`further amendments to the Complaint (id. ECF No. 79), Clark rests on her
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`allegations as set forth in the SAC filed in the California Action. (See New Jersey
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`ECF No. 126.)
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`B.
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`Plaintiff’s Allegations
`Clark alleges that she purchased a new Galaxy S7 phone (the “S7”) from a
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`Best Buy in New Jersey on or about December 27, 2017, after supposedly
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`reviewing (unspecified) advertisements saying the phone is water resistant.
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`(Compl. ¶ 32.) Clark complains that, after she purchased her S7, the device was
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`“briefly exposed to water and began acting strange.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Clark alleges that
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`4
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`she contacted Samsung by phone about the problems, but Samsung supposedly
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`“never followed up with any feedback.” (Id. ¶ 36.)
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`Clark alleges that Samsung’s advertising supposedly included “objective
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`affirmations of facts and promise[s],” but the only specific statement she identifies
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`in her MMWA claim is that the S7 is “water resistant up to 5 feet of water for up to
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`30 minutes.” (Id. ¶ 109.) Clark alleges that she “was exposed to and relied on” this
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`statement “when she decided to buy an S7 Phone,” but does not explain when,
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`where, or how she saw it. (Id. ¶ 110.)
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`Based on these allegations, Clark has asserted claims for fraud, violation of
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`the NJCFA, and unjust enrichment against Samsung, on behalf of herself and a
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`proposed New Jersey Class defined as “all individuals who purchased a new
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`Galaxy S7, Galaxy S7 Edge or Galaxy S7 Active cellular phone in New Jersey.”
`
`(Id. ¶ 41.)3 Plaintiff also brings a claim under the MMWA, individually.
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`Plaintiff asserts, without any supporting factual allegations, that the Court
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`has jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
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`(Id. ¶ 11.) Yet Clark alleges she is a citizen of New Jersey (id. ¶ 9), that Samsung
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`has its headquarters and principal place of business in New Jersey (id. ¶ 6), and
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`that the putative class is limited to New Jersey purchasers. (Id. ¶ 41.) The
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`Complaint contains no factual allegations supporting the requirements for CAFA
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`3 Clark did not purchase an S7 Edge or S7 Active but purports to represent
`individuals who purchased these different devices.
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`5
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`

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`jurisdiction – minimal diversity, over 100 class members or the $5 million amount-
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`in-controversy. Plaintiff also alleges, incorrectly, that this Court has jurisdiction
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`under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on her MMWA claim, and that supplemental
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`jurisdiction exists over her state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Id. ¶ 10.)
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`Standard of Review
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`A party attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts has the
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`burden to show that the jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. Samuel-Bassett v.
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`Kia Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). There are two principal
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`bases upon which a district court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction: federal
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`question or diversity of citizenship among the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
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`1332. “The limited nature of federal jurisdiction needs little discussion. This
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`principle marks a fundamental precept of the American court system.” New Rock
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`Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, 101 F.3d 1492, 1502 (3d
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`Cir. 1996).
`
`Under Rule 12(b)(1), “a court must grant a motion to dismiss if it lacks
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`subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim.” Shibles v. Bank of Am., N.A., 730 F.
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`App’x 103, 105 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678
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`F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012)). “When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged
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`under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion.” Neuss v.
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`6
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`

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`Rubi Rose, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83444, at *7 (D.N.J. May 31, 2017)
`
`(citation omitted); see also Gallagher v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 169
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`F. Supp. 3d 598, 602 (D.N.J. 2016).
`
`In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court is “required to
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`accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the
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`facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Phillips v. Cnty. of
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`Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). This Rule, however, “requires more
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`than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
`
`of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
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`above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
`
`see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. “A court need not credit either ‘bald assertions’
`
`or ‘legal conclusions’ in a complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Kanter
`
`v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d
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`347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005)). “Legal conclusions receive no such deference, and the
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`court is ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
`
`allegation.’” Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2010).
`
`Here, it is clear from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this Court does
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`not have subject matter jurisdiction based on CAFA or Plaintiff’s individual
`
`MMWA claim, and thus the Complaint must be dismissed. In the alternative,
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`Plaintiff’s allegations do not state any claims and should be dismissed under Rule
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`7
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`12(b)(6).
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`B.
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`The Court Lacks Federal Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Complaint.
`This Court lacks federal jurisdiction because Plaintiff does not allege a
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`factual basis to support CAFA jurisdiction, and she cannot satisfy the requirements
`
`for CAFA. Plaintiff’s MMWA claim also does not meet the $50,000 amount-in-
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`controversy requirement for bringing claims in federal court. Accordingly, there is
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`no federal jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.
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`A defendant may attack a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction in one of
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`two ways. First, a defendant may challenge subject matter jurisdiction by asserting
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`that the complaint, on its face, does not allege sufficient grounds to establish
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`jurisdiction. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d
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`Cir. 1977). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on the pleadings, the court
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`must assume that the allegations contained in the complaint are true. Id. Second, a
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`defendant may challenge a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction by factually
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`attacking the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations as set forth in the complaint. Id.
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`In such circumstances, “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy
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`itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. “[N]o presumptive
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`truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed
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`material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits
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`of jurisdictional claims.” Id. Here, there is no subject matter jurisdiction because
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`the Complaint fails to allege any facts supporting jurisdiction at all, and the facts
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`alleged show Plaintiff cannot satisfy CAFA’s requirements.
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`1.
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`Plaintiff has not alleged a factual basis for and cannot prove that
`the elements of CAFA jurisdiction are satisfied.
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`Plaintiff’s CAFA allegations are subject to both a facial and factual
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`challenge, as she alleges nothing showing that CAFA’s minimal diversity or
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`amount-in-controversy requirements are satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Plaintiff
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`recites, in a single conclusory paragraph, the legal elements of CAFA without any
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`facts to support her conclusions. (See Compl. ¶ 11.) These unsupported legal
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`conclusions—which do not differentiate between the California and New Jersey
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`“classes” and provide no information at all about the putative New Jersey class—
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`should not be accepted as true in deciding this motion. See Heleine v. Saxon Mortg.
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`Servs., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47466, at *9-10 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2013)
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`(“Significantly, no presumption of truthfulness attaches to the allegations of the
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`complaint insofar as they concern subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citing Mortensen,
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`549 F.2d at 891).
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`The only allegations Clark does provide indicate that she cannot satisfy
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`CAFA’s requirements. Plaintiff alleges that she and Samsung are both New Jersey
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`citizens (Comp. ¶¶ 6, 9), but she does not identify or even allege any diverse party,
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`and thus these allegations show that Plaintiff has not satisfied the minimal-
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`diversity requirement.4 Plaintiff also does not allege anything showing that the
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`putative New Jersey Class satisfies the $5 million amount-in-controversy
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`requirement. Clark does not allege how much she paid for her S7 or how much she
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`can show in damages, nor does she plead any facts regarding the number of
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`putative members of the New Jersey Class or the quantum of damages those
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`putative class members are alleged to have suffered. In sum, she has entirely failed
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`to allege facts supporting her legal contention that CAFA applies.
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`In addition to these facial deficiencies, which require dismissal, Plaintiff’s
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`Complaint is also subject to factual challenge. Plaintiff has the burden of proving
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`by a preponderance of the evidence that CAFA’s requirements are met. See Nahas
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`v. Shore Med. Ctr., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33307, at *10-11 (D.N.J. Mar. 14,
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`2016) (“[W]here a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
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`subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a
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`preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.”);
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`Heleine, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47466, at *13 (“When CAFA jurisdiction is
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`4 The Complaint is not entirely clear about whether Plaintiff is purporting to
`represent California purchasers, but, if so, she lacks standing to do so. See Ponzio
`v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 447 F. Supp. 3d 194, 223 (D.N.J. 2020) (“Plaintiffs
`lack standing to assert claims on behalf of unnamed plaintiffs in jurisdictions
`where Plaintiffs have suffered no alleged injury.”); Semeran v. BlackBerry Corp.,
`2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379, at *18-19 (D.N.J. July 6, 2016) (“A named plaintiff
`must be a part of the class which he seeks to represent. . . . Thus, because Plaintiff
`is not a member of the class of thirty-one states, he cannot prosecute claims on
`behalf of those in that class.”).
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`challenged, as it is in the instant matter, the party asserting proper jurisdiction —
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`here, Plaintiffs — bears the burden of satisfying CAFA’s requirements by a
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`preponderance of the evidence.”). Plaintiff cannot carry this burden.
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`First, the minimal-diversity requirement is not met because Plaintiff has not
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`alleged or provided any reason to infer that any member of the proposed class is
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`diverse. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Instead, she alleges that Samsung has a
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`principal place of business in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 6.) See 28
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`U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (“a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State
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`and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state
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`where it has its principal place of business . . .”). The only named plaintiff, Jill
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`Clark, is also a citizen of New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Clark asserts claim on behalf
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`of herself, individually, and on behalf of a proposed class of New Jersey
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`purchasers. (Id. ¶ 41.) But she has not identified, or alleged any reason to suppose
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`that, any putative class member is diverse.5
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`5 Under the mandatory “home state” exception, the district court also must
`decline to exercise jurisdiction where “two-thirds or more of the members of all
`proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens
`of the State in which the action was originally filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
`Here, Plaintiff seeks to represent only a proposed “New Jersey Class” of
`purchasers. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Samsung is the only defendant in this action, and is a
`local defendant “from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff
`class” and “whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
`asserted.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa), (bb). Plaintiff provides no reason
`to believe that putative class members are not New Jersey citizens, and thus, the
`home state exception also would bar federal jurisdiction.
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`Second, Plaintiff’s factual allegations indicate that she cannot satisfy the $5
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`million amount-in-controversy requirement. The only damage she alleges is that
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`her Galaxy S7 “acts strange” when exposed to water, “goes haywire” when she
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`touches it with a damp hand, and must be dried and restarted when wet. (Compl. ¶
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`35.) But she does not allege that she cannot use her device or has had to replace or
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`repair