`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`
`
`LIZA GARDNER,
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SEAN COMBS, AARON HALL,
`UMG RECORDINGS, INC.,
`UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, N.V.,
`
` Defendants.
`
`
`Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge
`
`Court No. 2:24-cv-07729
`
`
`OPINION
`
`[Granting Defendants UMG Recordings, Inc. and Universal Music Group, N.V.’s motion
`to dismiss; and granting in part and denying in part Defendant Combs’ motion to dismiss.]
`
`Dated: January 14, 2026
`
`Tyrone A. Blackburn, T.A. Blackburn Law, PLLC, of Brooklyn, N.Y., argued for
`Plaintiff Liza Gardner.
`
`Erica A. Wolff, Sher Tremonte, LLP, of New York, N.Y., argued for Defendant Sean
`Combs. With her on the brief was Yonatan Y. Jacobs.
`
`Lisa A. Linsky , McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, of New York, N.Y. , argued for
`Defendants UMG Recordings Inc. and Universal Music Group, N.V. With her on the brief
`were Jessica G. Griffith and Elizabeth A. Rodd.
`
`Gordon
`1, Judge: In this action, Plaintiff Liza Gardner (“Plaintiff”) brings claims
`against Defendants UMG Recordings, Inc. (“UMGR”) and Universal Music Group, N.V.
`(“UMGNV”), alleging negligent infliction of emotional distres s; negligence; vicarious
`liability; violation of the New Jersey Child Sexual Abuse Act, N.J. Stat. § 2A:61B-1;
`
`1 The Honorable Leo M. Gordon, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade,
`sitting by designation.
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`negligent hiring, training, accreditation, and supervision; failure to detect, investigate, and
`report sexual abuse; and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421, et seq. , (“the Mann Act”).
`See Am. Compl., ECF No. 42. Plaintiff also brings claims against
`Defendant Sean Combs, alleging battery, assault/sexual assault, negligent infliction of
`emotional distress, and violation of the Mann Act. Id. These various claims arise out of
`a series of events alleged by Plaintiff culminating in an alleged sexual assault by
`Defendants Combs and Hall
`2 in New Jersey. See generally id.
`Before the court are: (1) Defendants UMGR and UMGNV’s joint motion to dismiss
`Plaintiff’s amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of
`Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) , and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
`Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF No. 51; see also Defs. UMGR and UMGNV Mem. in Supp.,
`ECF No. 52 (“Defs. UMGR and UMGNV’s Br.”); Defs. UMGR and UMGNV’s Reply,
`ECF No. 68; and (2) Defendant Combs’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint
`for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and
`for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
`ECF No. 53; see also Def Combs’ Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 55 (“Def. Combs’ Br.”);
`Def. Combs’ Reply, ECF No. 69; Pl.’s Joint Mem. in Opp’n to Defendants’ Mots.
`to Dismiss, ECF No. 63 (“Pl.’s Resp.”). The court held oral argument . See Oral Arg.,
`ECF No. 78 (Nov. 17, 2025).
`
`2 While Aaron Hall is a named defendant, Plaintiff has been unable to personally serve
`him. Plaintiff is now moving this Court for the second time for an order permitting service
`of the summons and amended complaint by publication. Pl.’s Second Mot. for Serv.
`by Pub’n, ECF No. 94.
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`For the following reasons, the court grants Defendants’ UMGR and UMGNV ’s
`motion to dismiss. The court also grants Defendant Combs’ motion to dismiss in part and
`denies it in part.
`I. Background
`Plaintiff’s allegations are as follows: in 1990, when Plaintiff was 16 years old, she
`was invited to New Jersey from North Carolina by members of the music group known as
`“Jodeci.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 25–27, 38, 106. At the time, Jodeci was signed to a record
`contract with Uptown Records (“Uptown”) .3 Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
`Combs was an Uptown employee, who was responsible for “developing” the music group.
`Id. ¶ 32.
`Plaintiff asserts that at a time in either late Summer or early Fall 1990, she and a
`friend attended an event hosted by Music Corporation of America (“MCA”), Inc. 4, at its
`New York City office and met Defendants Hall and Combs. Id. ¶¶ 34–35. Plaintiff further
`alleges that, despite being underage, the two adolescents were “provided a lot of alcohol,”
`and that they left the event with Defendants Hall and Combs to go to dinner .
`Id. ¶¶ 36–37. Plaintiff claims that throughout the event and after dinner, Defendants Hall
`and Combs continuously offered them alcoholic drinks and marijuana, and that the
`
`3 Plaintiff alleges that Uptown was a subsidiary of MCA, and that both merged into the
`current Defendant UMGR, a subsidiary of UMGNV. Id. ¶ 5.
`
`4 While the parties do not define MCA, it appears that it is an acronym for “Music
`Corporation of America.” See Busch, Anita M., A whole new U for MCA, Variety (Dec. 9,
`1996), https://variety.com/1996/scene/vpage/a- whole-new-u-for-mca-1117466464/
`(on file with the court).
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`Defendants were “flirtatious and handsy.” Id. ¶¶ 37–38. Following dinner, Plaintiff asserts
`that Defendants Hall and Combs transported her and her friend to Defendant Hall’s
`apartment—that was owned or subsidized by Uptown. Id. ¶¶ 10, 41.
`Once there, Plaintiff alleges that she was offered more alcoholic drinks by
`Defendants Hall and Combs, became intoxicated, and was forced into having sex with
`Defendant Combs. Id. ¶ 47. Following Defendant Combs’ alleged sexual assault, Plaintiff
`asserts that Defendant Hall entered the room, pinned her down, and forced her to also
`have sex with him. Id. ¶ 51. Following the assaults, Plaintiff claims that she and her
`friend left Defendant Hall’s apartment. Id. ¶ 54. According to Plaintiff, the next day ,
`Defendant Combs appeared where Plaintiff and her friend were staying, yelled at Plaintiff,
`and assaulted and choked her until she lost consciousness. Id. ¶ 56.
`II. Standard of Review
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides for dismissal in actions in which
`the court does not have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, so as not to
`“offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Daimler AG v. Bauman ,
`571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014); Ontel Prods. Corp. v. Mindscope Prods., 220 F. Supp. 3d 555,
`559 (D.N.J. 2016). With a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the central concern is “the relationship
`among the defendant, the forum [state], and the litigation.” Daimler , 571 U.S. at 126
`(citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). The Supreme Court has developed
`two categories of personal jurisdiction: (1) specific jurisdiction, in which a plaintiff’s suit
`“aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum [state],”
`Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984); and
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`(2) general jurisdiction, in which a non- resident defendant’s “affiliations with the [forum]
`State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in [that] State.”
`Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In addition, the
`Supreme Court has established that a party may consent to personal jurisdiction.
`Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985).
`As to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
`granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court assumes all
`factual allegations to be true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff ’s favor.
`Zuber v. Boscov’s, 871 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2017). A plaintiff’s factual allegations must
`be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all
`the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
`“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
`elements of a cause of action will not do. ’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
`(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Therefore, the court is “not bound to accept as true
`a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
`(1986). Instead, “to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”
`Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
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`III. Discussion
`Before the court is Defendants UMGR and UMGNV’s joint motion to dismiss and
`Defendant Combs’ motion to dismiss. The court will first address Defendants UMGR and
`UMGNV’s motion before turning to the motion by Defendant Combs.
`A. Jurisdiction over Defendants UMGR and UMGNV
`1. General Personal Jurisdiction
`To exercise general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant that is a resident of the
`non-forum state, a court must find that the defendant’s “affiliations with the [forum] State
`are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in [that] State.”
`Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Absent an
`“exceptional case,” a corporate defendant is “at home in the forum State” that is its place
`of incorporation or principal place of business. Id. at 138–39; see also Display Works, LLC
`v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d 166, 173 (D.N.J. 2016) (internal citations omitted).
`Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants UMG R and UMGNV are incorporated or
`have their principal places of business in New Jersey. See Am. Compl. ¶¶12 –13.
`(“[UMGR] is a global Music Company headquartered at 2220 Colorado Avenue in Santa
`Monica, California. . . . [UMGNV] is a Dutch -American multinational music corporation
`under Dutch law. [UMGNV]’s corporate headquarters are located in Hilver sum,
`Netherlands and its operational headquarters are located in Santa Monica, California.”).
`5
`
`5 Importantly, Plaintiff makes no allegation in her amended complaint, nor does she argue
`in her response to the motion to dismiss that UMGNV, the Netherlands -based
`parent company of UMGR, is subject to the general jurisdiction of New Jersey.
`(footnote continued)
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`Rather, Plaintiff claims that general jurisdiction exists because UMGR “is registered as a
`foreign business in the State of New Jersey.” Am. Compl. ¶12. Plaintiff contends that
`the court has general jurisdiction over Defendants UMG R because “UMG[R]’s presence
`and activities in New Jersey” make it “essentially at home.” Pl.’s Resp. at 11. In support
`of its argument, Plaintiff maintains that: (1) “[UMGR ] is registered to do business in
`New Jersey”; (2) “[UMGR ] has engaged in sustained business operations within
`New Jersey for decades”; (3) “[UMGR] owns several subsidiaries that are headquartered
`or operate within New Jersey”; (4) “[UMG R]’s artists and affiliated frequently conduct
`business within the state”; (5) “[UMG R] [b]enefits [f]inancially from the New Jersey
`[m]arket”; and (6) “[UMGR]’s long-standing presence and integration into New Jersey’s
`entertainment industry solidify its ‘at home’ status.” Id. at 11–13.
`Despite these arguments, Plaintiff’s action does not amount to the type of
`“exceptional case” in which a corporate defendant’s operations , without incorporation or
`principal place of business in a forum state, “may be so substantial and of such a nature
`as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 130 n.8;
`BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017). The inquiry as to whether a corporate
`defendant’s operations amount to an exceptional case, “calls for an appraisal of a
`corporation’s activities in their entirety; a corporation that operates in many places can
`
`See Am. Compl. ¶13; Pl.’s Resp. at 11– 13. Instead, Plaintiff’s claim that UMGNV is
`subject to the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the allegations that UMGR and UMGNV
`are liable as successors in interest and that UMGNV’s jurisdiction attaches as the parent
`company to UMGR . See infra Section 3. As such, Plaintiff’s jurisdiction claims relate
`solely to UMGR.
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`scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” BNSF, 581 U.S. at 414. While UMGR has
`conducted and profited from business operations in New Jersey over a long period
`of time, that in and of itself does not “render [it] essentially at home.” Daimler, 571 U.S.
`at 127; BNSF , 581 U.S. at 414 (holding that railroad corporation that maintained
`2,000 miles of railroad track and employed over 2,000 people in state “is sufficient to
`subject [it] to specific personal jurisdiction,” but is not one such “exceptional case” and “at
`home” because “in- state business does not suffice to permit assertion of general
`jurisdiction over claims . . . that are unrelated to any activity occurring in” state).
`Additionally, the fact that UMG R “owns several subsidiaries that are headquartered or
`operate within New Jersey,” Pl.’s Resp. at 11, is the very argument that the Daimler Court
`rejected. The Court specifically noted that “subject[ing] foreign corporations to general
`jurisdiction whenever they have an in- state subsidiary or affiliate [is] an outcome that
`would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we [previously]
`rejected.” 571 U.S. at 136 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown,
`564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011)). Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that general jurisdiction exists
`because “UMGR is registered to do business in New Jersey,” Pl.’s Resp. at 11, is an issue
`of consent—a separate inquiry discussed below. Display Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 179.
`Accordingly, there is no general jurisdiction as to Defendants UMGR or UMGNV.
`2. Consent to Personal Jurisdiction
`The court next addresses whether Defendant UMGR consented to personal
`jurisdiction because it “is registered as a foreign business in the State of New Jersey.”
`Am. Compl. ¶12. The court observes that Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant UMGR
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`consented to personal jurisdiction in the State of New Jersey because of UMGR’s
`registration as a foreign business. Rather, Plaintiff mistakenly argues that Defendant
`UMGR’s registration as a foreign business is a factor for determining general jurisdiction.
`Pl.’s Resp. at 11. Similarly, Defendants UMGR and UMGNV do not address the issue of
`consent to personal jurisdiction in their motion. See Defs. UMGR and UMGNV’s Br.
`at 10–16. However, because the court has an independent obligation to determine
`whether jurisdiction exists, it will, on its own initiative, determine whether Defendant
`UMGR’s status as a registered foreign business in New Jersey “carries with it consent
`to be sued” in New Jersey. Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991).
`Consent to personal jurisdiction, “express or implied . . . by word or deed,” Mallory
`v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. , 600 U.S. 122, 138 (2023), can be evidenced by , “under certain
`circumstances, a corporation’s registration to do business in a state.” Cryopak Inc. v.
`Freshly LLC, Civ. No. 23-18896, 2024 WL 4986818, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2024). In the
`U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third Circuit”), little guidance exists on
`consent-by-registration. Display Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 173. In Bane, the
`Third Circuit held that the Pennsylvania business registration statute contained explicit
`language “that the qualification of a foreign corporation to do business” within the state
`additionally “carries with it consent to be sued in Pennsylvania courts .” Id. Therefore,
`“by registering to do business in a state, a court may find that a corporation consented to
`personal jurisdiction,” but “the answer depends on whether the text of the state’s
`registration statute constitutes express consent to jurisdiction.”
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`Display Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 174 (emphasis added) (citing Bane, 925 F.2d 637) .
`The Third Circuit’s guidance on consent by registration ends there.
`While the Third Circuit has not examined whether the parallel New Jersey business
`r
`egistration statutes, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:A:1-1, et seq, carry with them consent to be
`sued in New Jersey, the majority of decisions from this District have followed the holding
`in Display Works, that “the New Jersey statutory scheme does not permit jurisdiction by
`consent by virtue of registration to do business here or actually doing business here.”
`182 F. Supp. 3d at 175; Kim v. Korean Air Lines Co., 513 F. Supp. 3d 462, 469
`(D.N.J. 2021); see also Simplot India LLC v. Himalaya Food Int’l Ltd., No 23- 1612,
`2024 WL 1136791, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2024) (collecting cases holding that
`New Jersey business registration statutes do not provide consent to personal jurisdiction).
`These decisions are based on the common reasoning that, unlike the Pennsylvania
`business registration statute examined in Bane, the New Jersey business registration
`statutes do not “explicitly provide that registering to conduct business in New Jersey
`constitutes express consent to general or specific jurisdiction.” Basse v. Bank of Am. ,
`Civ. No. 22-3674, 2023 WL 2696627, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2023) (citing Display Works,
`182 F. Supp. 3d at 166). This Court agrees and will follow the rationale of Display Works.
`Accordingly, it holds that Defendant UMGR did not consent to personal jurisdiction simply
`because it is registered as a foreign business in the State of New Jersey.
`3. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
`The court turns to the question of specific jurisdiction over Defendants UMGR and
`UMGNV. For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-forum state defendant,
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`the lawsuit must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.
`Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). A plaintiff must establish three things for a
`court to possess specific jurisdiction over a non-forum state defendant:
`First, the defendant must have “ purposefully directed [its] activities” at the
`forum. The first prong is a “threshold” inquiry. “Second, the litigation must
`‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of those activities.” Third, if the two
`prior conditions are satisfied, a court may exercise specific personal
`jurisdiction should it otherwise “comport with ‘fair play and substantial
`justice.’”
`CBD & Sons, Ltd. v. Setteducati, No. 3:18-CV-4276-BRM-DEA, 2019 WL 396982, at *6,
`D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2019), appeal dismissed sub nom. , No. 19- 1502, 2019 WL 4160152
`(3d Cir. May 28, 2019) (internal citations omitted).
`It is undisputed that neither corporate Def endant existed at the time that the
`alleged activities took place. Defs. UMGR and UMGNV’s Br. at 12; see generally
`Pl.’s Resp. Even so, Plaintiff’s claims relate to the companies in existence at the time of
`the alleged incidents: Uptown and MCA, now allegedly part of UMGR and UMGNV. To
`obtain personal jurisdiction over the current corporate Defendants, Plaintiff claims that
`UMGR and UMGNV are “successors in interest” to U ptown and MCA .
`Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6.
`To determine whether personal jurisdiction over a successor corporation exists,
`“
`courts apply the same test used for successor liability.” Ortho -Clinical Diagnostics, Inc.
`v. Physicians Stat Lab, Inc., No. 21-2530, 2021 WL 4284581, at *2 (D.N.J. Sep. 21, 2021).
`“The general rule of corporate-successor liability is that when a company sells its assets
`to another company, the purchaser is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the seller
`simply because it has succeeded to the ownership of the assets of the seller.” Oticon,
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`Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 514 (D.N.J. 2011); see also
`Glynwed, Inc. v. Plastimatic, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D.N.J. 1994) (“It is well settled
`that ‘where one company sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company,
`the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the transferor.’ Fletcher Cyc. Corp.
`§ 7122 (Perm.Ed.1990)”).
`Ther e are exceptions to the general rule, and the Third Circuit has recognized that
`“the jurisdictional contacts of a predecessor corporation may be imputed to its successor
`corporation without offending due process.” In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
`Defendants Litigation, 153 Fed. App. 819, 825 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
`Thus for personal jurisdiction to exist over a successor corporation, a plaintiff must
`sufficiently plead that: “(1) the successor expressly or impliedly assumes the
`predecessor’s liabilities; (2) there is actual or de facto consolidation or merger of the seller
`and the purchaser; (3) the purchaser is a mere continuation of the seller; or
`(4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape liability.” Id.
`The first exception—that “the successor expressly or impliedly assumes the
`predecessor’s liabilities”—is “usually straightforward in application” and looks to the terms
`of the agreement between the predecessor and successor. Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v .
`Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 464 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that there
`was an agreement between U ptown, MCA, and UMGR , let alone assert any facts as to
`the terms of any such agreement. 6 See generally Am. Compl. Similarly, Plaintiff does
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`6 Plaintiff fails to make any such allegations at to UMGNV. See supra footnote 5.
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`not plead any facts as to the fourth exception, that Uptown and MCA merged into UMGR
`fraudulently to escape liability. Id. Accordingly, the court will focus on the “second and
`third grounds —de facto merger and continuation —which ‘are genuinely treated
`identically.’” Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, 2021 WL 4284581, at *2 (citing Berg Chilling
`Sys., 435 F.3d at 564–65).
`In determining merger and continuation, courts consider four factors:
`(1) “continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and
`general business operations”; (2) “a cessation of ordinary business and
`dissolution of the predecessor as soon as practically and legally possible”;
`(3) “assumption ... of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted
`continuation of the business of the predecessor”; and (4) “continuity of
`ownership/shareholders.” Glynwed, Inc. v. Plastimatic, Inc., 869 F. Supp.
`265, 275–76 (D.N.J. 1994).
`
`Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, 2021 WL 4284581, at *2.
`Even liberally construed, the amended complaint does not sufficiently plead facts
`that meets the four-factor test for successor liability. While Plaintiff makes the conclusory
`allegations that Uptown and MCA “merged into [UMGR], which is a subsidiary
`of [UMGNV],” and that UMGR and UMGV are “successors in interest”
`to Uptown and MCA,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5, she does not allege any required facts
`regarding the management, dissolution, continuation, or ownership of Uptown , MCA,
`UMGR, or UMGNV . Without a demonstration that Defendants UMG R or UMGNV are
`successors-in-interest to MCA and Uptown, the court cannot conclude that it has specific
`jurisdiction over Defendants UMGR or UMGNV.
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`Because personal jurisdiction has not attached to Defendants UMGR or UMGNV,
`their joint motion to dismiss is granted.7
`B. Jurisdiction Over Defendant Combs
`1. General Personal Jurisdiction
` Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Combs is subject to the general jurisdiction of
`this Court because his “significant business operations in New Jersey ,”
`“New Jersey-based resources,” and “long-standing industry relations within New Jersey”
`amount to “affiliations with [New Jersey] that are so continuous and systematic that he is
`essentially at home.” Pl.’s Resp. at 46 (citing Daimler , 571 U.S. at 137).
`Plaintiff’s jurisdictional theory is flawed for two reasons. First, Plaintiff misconstrues
`Daimler, and second, conflates the general jurisdiction analysis for an individual with that
`of a corporation. See 571 U.S. at 137 (emphasis added).
`As a general principle, an individual, such as Defendant Combs, is subject to the
`general jurisdiction of the forum state where he is domiciled. Id. Despite Plaintiff’s claims,
`Defendant Combs’ alleged activities in New Jersey are irrelevant for the purpose of
`general jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff alleges in her amended complaint that
`Defendant Combs “was at all relevant times a resident and domiciled in the
`
`7 Because the court grants Defendants UMG R and UMGNV’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to
`dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court does not need to reach their
`Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
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`State of New York,” Am. Compl. ¶ 8 , Defendant Combs is not subject to the general
`jurisdiction of this Court.
`8
`2. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
`Having addressed that there is no general jurisdiction over Defendant Combs, the
`court must determine whether it has specific jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction over a
`non-forum state defendant , who has not consented to suit 9, exists if he “‘purposefully
`directed’ his activities at residents of the forum [state] and the litigation resulted from
`alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Burger King Corp., 471
`U.S. at 472 (internal citations omitted) ; see also Ataman v. Parris , Civ. No. 23-20994,
`2024 WL 4289577, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2024). Additionally, “New Jersey allows for
`‘the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who commit[s] a single
`tortious act, whether negligent or intentional, within New Jersey.” Id. at *4 (quoting
`Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1992)); see Carteret,
`954 F.2d at 148.
`In this action, Plaintiff claims t hat specific jurisdiction over Defendant Combs exists
`because the tortious actions giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action took place in
`New Jersey. See Am. Compl. Interestingly, Defendant Combs does not dispute that
`Plaintiff’s allegations —if taken as true—provide the court with personal jurisdiction.
`
`8 Plaintiff similarly alleges in her amended complaint, and argued at oral argument, that
`for purposes of general personal jurisdiction, it is the predicate act that gives rise.
`Am. Compl. ¶ 8; Oral Arg. Tr. At 45:24–46:2.
`
`9 Plaintiff does not allege, nor does the court find, on its own initiative , that Defendant
`Combs consented to jurisdiction.
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`However, Defendant Combs claims that: (1) “[a]lthough typically a court must accept a
`plaintiff’s allegations as true on a motion to dismiss, a court should not do so where, as
`here, material facts alleged in an amended pleading directly contradict those made
`repeatedly in prior pleadings”; and therefore (2) “[o]nce the court discredits Plaintiff’s . . .
`allegation that she and [Defendant] Combs were in New Jersey . . . Plaintiff cannot satisfy
`the requirements of personal jurisdiction.” Def. Combs’ Br . at 13, 19. In support of his
`argument, Defendant Combs asks the court to not credit Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
`citing that “[n]umerous courts, including the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the
`Federal Circuit Court, and [some] within the Second Circuit[,] have addressed this precise
`issue and held that a court need not unequivocally credit allegations in an amended
`pleading under circumstances akin to those involved here.” Id. at 13. In particular ,
`Defendant Combs seeks to have the court set aside two binding principles: (1) that the
`court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, and (2) that jurisdiction follows only from
`the amended complaint.
`First, Defendant Combs asks the court to set aside the Thi
` rd Circuit’s repeated
`holding in deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(2). This the court will not do. Even though
`a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of the court’s personal
`jurisdiction, the court “ must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe
`disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Laurel Gardens, LLC v. Mckenna, 948 F.3d 105,
`113 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020).
`Second, D efendant Combs asks that the court disregard the Supreme Court’s rule
`that “[t]he plaintiff is the master of the complaint.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
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`Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 36 (2025). In Royal Canin, the Supreme Court held that, when
`a plaintiff amends her complaint to eliminate federal claims after removal to federal court,
`the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over state- law claims. 604 U.S. 22.
`In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on the “the usual procedural
`principle” that “jurisdiction follows from (and only from) the operative pleading.” Id. at 35
`(emphasis added). More specifically, the Supreme Court explained:
`Begin from the beginning: The plaintiff is “the master of the complaint,” and
`t
`herefore controls much about her suit. . . . And the plaintiff’s control over
`those matters extends beyond the time her first complaint is filed. If a
`plaintiff amends her complaint, the new pleading “supersedes” the old one:
`The “original pleading no longer performs any function in the case. ” Or as
`we put the matter over a century ago: “When a petition is amended,” the
`“cause proceeds on the amended petition.” So changes in parties, or
`changes in claims, effectively remake the suit. And that includes its
`jurisdictional basis: The reconfiguration accomplished by an amendment
`may bring the suit either newly within or newly outside a federal court’s
`jurisdiction.
`
`Id. at 35–36 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
`Because the Supreme Court, in part, based its holding on “a bevy of rules hinging
`federal jurisdiction on the allegations made in the amended complaint” and
`“Congress’s usual view of how amended pleadings can . . . wipe the jurisdictional slate
`clean,” i d. at 29, 34, it is no surprise that its holding has since been applied broadly .
`The Third Circuit has applied Royal Canin to hold that d istrict courts cannot look to an
`original complaint to “help fill the factual void in [an] amended complaint” because “‘ [i]f a
`plaintiff amends his complaint, the new pleading supersedes the old one:
`The original pleading no longer performs any function in the case