Case 3:18-cv-14637-FLW-LHG Document 137 Filed 01/19/21 Page 1 of 17 PageID: 4113
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`*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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`AMY JOHNSON, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`MAUREEN KASSIMALI, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`SHERRON GAVIN, Individually and on
`Behalf of all Distributees of the Estate of
`Rosalyn Gavin, Deceased, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`Civil Action No. 18-1423
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`OPINION
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`Civil Action No. 18-5534
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`Civil Action No. 18-10319
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`AMANDA REISING, Individually and on
`Behalf of the Estate of Christine Reising,
`Deceased, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`CYNTHIA GIBSON, Individually and on
`Behalf of the Estate of Devin Gibson,
`Deceased, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., et al.,
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`LISA HITTLER, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`2
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`Civil Action No. 18-10320
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`Civil Action No. 18-14637
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`Civil Action No. 18-17106
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`Civil Action No. 19-5590
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`Civil Action No. 19-9365
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`Civil Action No. 19-13476
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`TASHAY BENFORD, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`LAURA MCCONNELL, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`CYNTHIA KANNADY, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`WOLFSON, Chief District Judge:
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`These matters, nine of the transferred-member cases in the Johnson & Johnson Talcum
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`Powder Products multidistrict litigation (“MDL”), each come before the Court on a motion to
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`reopen and for reconsideration of the Court’s June 29, 2020 Omnibus Opinion and Order.1 (See
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`Hittler v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 18-17106, ECF No. 115 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020); Johnson
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`v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 18-1423, ECF No. 130 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020); Reising v. Johnson
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`& Johnson, Inc., No. 18-10320, ECF No. 140 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020); Kannady v. Johnson &
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`Johnson, Inc., No. 19-13476, ECF No. 82 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020); Kassimali v. Johnson & Johnson,
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`Inc., No. 18-5534, ECF No. 143 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020); Gibson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No.
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`18-14637, ECF No. 130 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020); Gavin v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 18-10319,
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`ECF No. 150 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020); McConnell v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 19-9365, ECF
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`No. 108 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020); Benford v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 19-5590, ECF No. 110
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`(D.N.J. July 13, 2020).) The instant motions for reconsideration have been filed by Plaintiffs in
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`cases which were not remanded to state court by the Court’s June 29 Opinion. Defendants Johnson
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`& Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., f/k/a Johnson & Johnson Consumer
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`Companies, Inc. (collectively, the “Johnson & Johnson Defendants”), PTI Royston, LLC (“PTI
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`Royston”), and PTI Union, LLC (“PTI Union”) (collectively, the “PTI Defendants”) oppose the
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`motions.2 For the reasons expressed herein, Plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration are DENIED.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Because the relevant background is set forth in the Court’s June 29 Opinion, I will recount
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`1
`The Court’s Omnibus Opinion and Order resolved motions filed in the instant actions, as
`well as those in Hannah v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 18-1423; Cartwright v. Johnson & Johnson,
`No. 18-5535; and Barsh v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 18-17103. Both Hannah and Cartwright were
`remanded in full to the state court. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand in Barsh was denied. Motions
`for reconsideration were not filed in Hannah, Cartwright, and Barsh.
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` 2
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`The PTI Defendants did not file a memorandum of law in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motions
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`but, rather, adopt the arguments set forth by the Johnson & Johnson Defendants, that the Court (1)
`correctly determined that PTI Union has been fraudulently joined and (2) correctly determined PTI
`Royston’s citizenship for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Hittler, No. 18-17106,
`ECF No. 118.)
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`only the facts necessary for the resolution of these Motions. Hannah v. Johnson & Johnson Inc.,
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`MDL No. 16-2738, 2020 WL 3497010 (D.N.J. June 29, 2020). Each of these cases are multi-
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`plaintiff actions, asserted collectively by plaintiffs from various states, which originated in
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`Missouri state court and were removed by the Johnson & Johnson Defendants to federal court.
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`(See, e.g., Compl. 1, Johnson, No. 18-1423, ECF No. 1-2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2017); Notice of
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`Removal 2, Johnson, No. 18-1423, ECF No. 1, (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2017).) Following removal, the
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`cases were transferred to this Court by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
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`to be included in In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices
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`and Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2738. (See, e.g., Order of MDL Transfer 1, 3, Johnson,
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`No. 18-1423, ECF No. 67 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2018).)
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`In addition to naming the Johnson & Johnson Defendants, Plaintiffs name as Defendants
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`PTI Royston and PTI Union, who they allege participated in the Johnson & Johnson Defendants
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`and Imerys’s conspiracy, and processed, bottled, labeled, or distributed Johnson & Johnson’s talc
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`products, which allegedly cause ovarian cancer. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 11–15, Hannah, No. 18-
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`1422; Compl. ¶¶ 96–100, Kannady, No. 19-13476, ECF No. 1-1.) Defendants claim that the
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`products were only manufactured by PTI Royston in Georgia, whereas another product, Shimmer
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`Effects, was manufactured by PTI Union in Missouri. (Decker Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, Kannady, No. 19-
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`13476, ECF No. 1-4 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2019).) Both PTI Defendants are Delaware limited liability
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`companies which, for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, were citizens of Georgia and Missouri
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`until June 6, 2018, and citizens of Georgia and Florida after June 11, 2018. Hannah, 2020 WL
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`3497010, at *3.
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`Following removal, Plaintiffs filed motions to remand to state court. As these cases
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`presented common legal questions, the Court resolved the motions in the June 29 Omnibus
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`Opinion. Because of the large volume of plaintiffs, the Court’s June 29 Opinion grouped the
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`plaintiffs into three classes:
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`(1) Plaintiffs who share citizenship with the Johnson & Johnson Defendants or Imerys Talc
`America, Inc. f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc. (“Imerys”)3;
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`(2) Plaintiffs who share citizenship with the PTI Defendants; and
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`(3) Plaintiffs who do not share citizenship with any defendants.
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`“Class One” plaintiffs included all New Jersey and California citizens. “Class Two” plaintiffs
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`consisted of the Missouri citizens in Johnson, Kassimali, Gavin, Reising, and Gibson; the Florida
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`citizens in Hittler; and the Georgia citizens in Johnson. Finally, “Class Three” included the
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`Missouri citizens in Hittler, Benford, McConnell, and Kannady; the Florida citizens in Johnson;
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`and plaintiffs who are not citizens of California, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, or Missouri in
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`Johnson, Kassimali, Gavin, Reising, Gibson, Hittler, Benford, McConnell, and Kannady. As
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`relevant to the pending motions for reconsideration, the June 29 Opinion severed the claims of
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`each plaintiff in Class Three and required that they file separate complaints and proceed under a
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`separate civil action number; dismissed the claims of the Class Three Plaintiffs against PTI
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`Royston for lack of personal jurisdiction; dismissed the claims of any Class Three Plaintiffs who
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`are not citizens of Missouri and did not allege they purchased products in Missouri, for lack of
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`personal jurisdiction as to the Johnson & Johnson Defendants; and remanded all claims of the
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`Class One and Two Plaintiffs for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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`II.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 7.1 govern motions for
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`reconsideration. In particular, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), a party moving for
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`3
`Imerys has filed for bankruptcy protection. Accordingly, these matters are stayed as to
`Imerys pursuant to the automatic stay imposed as a result of the bankruptcy petition.
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`reconsideration must “set[] forth concisely the matter of controlling decisions which the party
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`believes the Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked.” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Motions for
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`reconsideration are considered “extremely limited procedural vehicle[s].” Resorts Int’l v. Greate
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`Bay Hotel & Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992). Indeed, requests for reconsideration
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`“are not to be used as an opportunity to relitigate the case; rather, they may be used only to correct
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`manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Blystone v. Horn, 664
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`F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l Inc., 602
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`F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also N. River. Ins. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
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`1218 (3d Cir. 1995).
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`A “‘judgment may be altered or amended [only] of the party seeking reconsideration shows
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`at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the
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`availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion . . . ; or (3)
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`the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.’” Blystone, 664
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`F.3d at 415 (first alteration in original) (quoting Howard Hess Dental Labs, Inc., 602 F.3d at 251).
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`“A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision,
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`and ‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original
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`decisions fails to carry the moving party’s burden.’” G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275
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`(D.N.J. 1990) (citation omitted). In other words, “a motion for reconsideration should not provide
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`the parties with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple.” Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Sup.
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`2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998) (citation omitted). Rather, a difference of opinion with the court’s
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`decision should be dealt with through the appellate process. Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v.
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`Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1998).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A. Severance under Rule 21
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`Plaintiffs first seek reconsideration of the Court’s decision to sever each plaintiff’s claims
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`from the multi-plaintiff complaints pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. Specifically,
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`I found that even if joinder of the Plaintiffs is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20,
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`severance of each plaintiff’s claims was appropriate in order to resolve the tangle of jurisdictional
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`issues presented by these complaints. Hannah, 2020 WL 3497010, at *6. My decision in this
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`regard, was based on the discretion afforded to the Court by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.
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`See id. Plaintiffs, nevertheless, contend, that this decision was erroneous because “[t]here is no
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`authority for using Rule 21 to sever the claims of properly joined plaintiffs in order to create
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`diversity jurisdiction in a case removed from state court.” (Kannady, 18-1423, ECF No. 130-1, at
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`5.) I disagree.
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides that “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground
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`for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add
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`or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. As the
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`Supreme Court has made clear, “Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to allow a
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`dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has been rendered.”
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`Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2004) (quoting Newman-Green,
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`Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989)). This authority is discretionary. Aetna Life
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`Ins. Co. v. Foundation Surgery Affiliates, LLC, 358 F. Supp. 3d 426, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“A
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`district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to sever a party pursuant to Federal Rule of
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`Civil Procedure 21.”); Turner Const. Co., Inc. v. Brian Trematore Plumbing & Heating, Inc., No.
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`07-666, 2009 WL 3233533, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009) (“District courts have ‘broad discretion’ in
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`deciding whether to sever a party pursuant to Rule 21.”). Both the Supreme Court and the Third
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`Circuit have specifically held that a court may use its Rule 21 authority to sever a nondiverse,
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`dispensable party even if doing so creates diversity jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist
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`on the face of the complaint. See, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 832–38 (explaining this
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`authority is “well-settled”); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 22223 (3d
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`Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
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`Plaintiffs, nevertheless, contend that severance of a party to preserve diversity jurisdiction
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`is permitted only where the action was originally filed in federal court, as opposed to removed
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`from state court. While the Court acknowledges that some “[f]ederal courts have frowned on using
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`the Rule 21 severance vehicle to conjure removal jurisdiction that would otherwise be absent,”
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`Kips Bay Endoscopy Ctr., PLLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 14-7153, 2015 WL 4508739, at *4
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`(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2015); see also Saviour v. Stavropoulos, No. 15-5362, 2015 WL 6810856, at
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`*5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2015), there is no doubt that “it is well established that courts, both district
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`and circuit alike, have the power under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 to dismiss dispensable parties to the suit
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`in order to preserve diversity.” CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357
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`F.3d 375, 382 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004); Enza v. We The People, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 975, 977 (E.D. Pa.
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`1993). In that connection, “Rule 21 is a safety net against misjoinder of a dispensable party . . .
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`and gives a district court broad discretion to re-align the parties in an action according to their true
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`interests.” Burns v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 18-12323, 2019 WL 1238829, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar.
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`18, 2019); see also In-Tech Marketing Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 436, 441–42 (D.N.J.
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`1988) (citing Dawson v. Columbia Avenue Saving Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust, Co., 197 U.S.
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`178, 180 (1905)). Simply put, “[t]he Rule allows a district court to dismiss so-called ‘jurisdictional
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`spoilers’ – parties whose presence in the litigation destroys jurisdiction – if those parties are not
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`indispensable and if there would be no prejudice to the parties.” Aetna Life Ins., 358 F. Supp. 3d
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`at 436. It is thus evident that the Court’s power to sever parties to preserve diversity jurisdiction
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`is not limited to those actions that were filed in federal court and extends to actions removed
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`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See, e.g., In re Benicar (Olmesartan) Prods. Liab. Litig., 198 F.
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`Supp. 3d 385, 388–89 (D.N.J. 2016) (severing plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to case management
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`order and granting motion to remand only with respect to those plaintiffs that share citizenship
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`with any defendant); Alday v. Organon USA, Inc., Nos. 09-1415, 08-1964, 2009 WL 3531802, at
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`*2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2009) (severing claims of non-Missouri plaintiffs and requiring that those
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`individuals re-file separate complaints)
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`Plaintiffs further argue that the Court’s decision violates the long-accepted practice that the
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`plaintiff is the master of his complaint. See Foster v. City of Philadelphia, 826 F. Supp. 2d 778,
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`781 (E.D. Pa. 2011). While the Court recognizes that practice, it does not plainly protect plaintiffs
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`who employ thinly veiled litigation strategy to avoid participation in MDL proceedings. As I
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`expressed in my decision in Plavix, I am increasingly concerned with “the manner in which
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`seemingly unrelated plaintiffs and non-diverse plaintiffs have joined their claims in single
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`multiple-plaintiff actions.” In re Plavix Prod. Liab. & Marketing Litig., MDL No. 13-2418, 2014
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`WL 4954654, at *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2014). Other judges in MDL proceedings have similarly
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`observed that non-diverse plaintiffs are often joined for the sole purpose of defeating diversity
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`jurisdiction and avoiding the MDL proceeding. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs, No. 98-20478, 1999
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`WL 554584, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1999) (“This case, with eleven Plaintiffs selected from seven
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`different states where, coincidentally, a number of Defendants also have citizenship seems to have
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`been an innovative, but unwise, pleading strategy that interferes with the court's ability to
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`administer this case for pretrial purposes.”); see also In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 03-
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`1507, 09-104, 2009 WL 331313, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 10, 2009). Indeed, Rule 21 severance is a
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`tool that has been increasingly employed in MDL proceedings to resolve complex issues prompted
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`by the filing of multi-plaintiff complaints. See, e.g., In re Benicar (Olmesartan) Prods. Liab.
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`Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 388–89; In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No.03-17000, 2010
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`WL 7699456, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June 4, 2010) (noting that early in the MDL the “Court put on a
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`standing Order directing that multiple plaintiffs in any such case be severed from each other,
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`“thereby creating an individual case on behalf of each such plaintiff”); Alday, 2009 WL 3531802,
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`at *2; In re Diet Drugs, 325 F. Supp. 2d 540, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (severing multi-plaintiff
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`complaint under Rule 21 based on finding that “proceeding with this one action with multiple
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`plaintiffs would severely impair the efficient administration of justice”).
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`The Court further notes the practical importance of severing plaintiffs in cases such as this.
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`The joinder of large numbers of unrelated plaintiffs who are citizens of different states creates a
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`snarl of personal jurisdictional issues, as the Supreme Court has stressed that personal jurisdiction
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`must be evaluated on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
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`San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–82 (2017). In that regard, Bristol-Myers highlights the
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`problems of joining numerous plaintiffs of different states in a single products liability action.
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`There, more than 600 plaintiffs, most of whom were not California residents, filed a complaint
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`against Bristol Myers in California state court, alleging injuries caused by Plavix. Id. at 1777–78.
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`The Supreme Court determined that California did not have personal jurisdiction over claims
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`brought by the out-of-state plaintiffs because there was no “connection between the forum and the
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`specific claims at issue.” Id. at 1781. In essence, the Court’s decision in Bristol Myers ensures
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`that the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations on the personal jurisdiction of the state courts cannot
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`be sidestepped through the permissive joinder of plaintiffs who have no connection to that forum.
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`Here, exercising authority under Rule 21 to sever Plaintiffs’ claims, ensures that the strictures of
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`personal jurisdiction are met and can be assessed in a fair, efficient, and individualized manner.
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`Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the plain language of Rule 21 does not permit severance of
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`plaintiffs properly joined in a multi-plaintiff complaint. Rather, Plaintiffs maintain, Rule 21
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`provides that a court may only drop a party or sever claims against a defendant. (Kannady, ECF
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`No. 130-1, at 8.) Plaintiffs provide no legal authority for this interpretation of Rule 21. Nor is
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`their interpretation correct. District courts have invoked Rule 21 to sever the claims of individual
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`plaintiffs in products liability actions to promote judicial economy. See, e.g., Nelson-Devlin v. Eli
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`Lily & Co., No. 14-2811, 2015 WL 5436700, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015) (severing claims of
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`non-California plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 21 as “[m]aintaining the various non-California
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`plaintiffs in the same action, which would require the application of sixteen different state laws,
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`would not promote judicial economy as joinder of the California plaintiffs does”); Arroyo v. PHH
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`Mortg. Corp., No. 13-2335, 2014 WL 2048384, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014) (finding
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`severance of plaintiffs’ claim appropriate under Rule 21 to promote judicial economy).
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`In sum, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Court’s decision to sever Plaintiffs’ claims
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`was erroneous. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider on this point is denied.
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`B. Fraudulent Joinder
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`Plaintiffs next seek reconsideration of the Court’s finding that PTI Union was fraudulently
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`joined. In the prior Opinion, I determined that PTI Union was fraudulently joined because
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`Plaintiffs did not state a colorable claim of strict liability against it. Specifically, I found that
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`Plaintiffs allege that PTI Union manufactured only Shimmer Effects, a variant of Johnson &
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`Johnson’s talc products that has never been alleged to be defective in any of the complaints and
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`which no plaintiff alleged she used. Hannah, 2020 WL 3497010, at *13. Further, I rejected
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`Plaintiffs’ argument that PTI Union was a part of Pharma Tech, a now-defunct entity, which was
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`not set forth in their Complaints but, rather, presented in their briefing. Id. at *13. In that regard,
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`I limited my fraudulent joinder analysis to the four corners of each complaint, none of which
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`mentioned that PTI Union and Pharma Tech are one and the same, let alone allege that the two
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`companies are interrelated in any way, or that alter ego existed. Id.
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`Plaintiffs now argue that in finding that PTI Union is fraudulently joined, the Court
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`improperly turned the fraudulent joinder analysis into a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. Indeed, Plaintiffs
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`maintain that their allegation that they used “Shower to Shower” products encompasses that they
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`may have alleged the injurious use of Shimmer Effects because that product was part of the
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`Shower-to-Shower line. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that PTI Union was responsible for all
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`variants of Shower to Shower, as successor to Pharma Tech. As the Court previously determined,
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`Plaintiffs’ Complaints fail to make any connection between PTI Union and Pharma Tech, and thus,
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`Plaintiffs have not stated a colorable claim for relief against PTI Union. Most critical to Plaintiffs’
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`motions to reconsider, however, is that Plaintiffs made this exact argument in support of their
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`remand motions and it was then rejected. In that connection, Plaintiffs seek a “second bite at the
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`apple,” which is not an appropriate ground for granting a motion for reconsideration. See
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`Bhatnagar v. Surrenda Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming district court
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`denial of motion for reconsideration where the motion was “a classic attempt at a ‘second bite of
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`the apple’”).
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`Next, Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred in restricting its fraudulent joinder analysis to
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`the four corners of the complaints and maintain that the Court should have considered their
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`evidence of the relationship of PTI Union and Pharma Tech. Again, Plaintiffs are incorrect. In
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`support of their argument that the Court should have considered evidence extraneous to the
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`complaints, they cite to Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1985). In
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`Abels, the Third Circuit considered whether fictitiously named “Doe” defendants, who were not
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`diverse from plaintiffs, were fraudulently joined. Id. at 29. Having determined that there were
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`sufficient allegations made against the fictitious defendants, the Third Circuit looked beyond the
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`allegations of the complaint to determine whether plaintiffs intended to prosecute their claims
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`against the fictitious defendants. Id. at 32. Since Abels, the Third Circuit has made clear that a
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`district court’s consideration of allegations outside the complaint should be limited to
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`“consideration of reliable evidence that the defendant may proffer to support the removal” and that
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`the district court “must not step from the threshold jurisdictional issue into a decision on the
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`merits.” In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 218–20 (3d Cir. 2006).
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`Indeed, the Third Circuit has repeatedly stated that “in applying the fraudulent joinder
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`doctrine, ‘the district court must focus on the plaintiff’s complaint at the time the petition for
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`removal was filed.’” Hogan v. Raymond Corp., 536 F. App’x 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting
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`Batoff v. State Farm Ins., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also Abels, 770 F.2d at 29 (“The
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`defendant’s right to remove is to be determined according to the plaintiffs’ pleading at the time of
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`the petition for removal, and it is the defendant’s burden to show the existence of federal
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`jurisdiction.”). As such, information outside of the complaint should only be considered for
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`jurisdictional purposes when it clarifies an allegation included in the complaint. See, e.g.,
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`Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1995). As the Fifth
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`Circuit explained in Cavallini,4 a district court’s fraudulent joinder analysis should be limited to
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`the allegations of the complaint at the time of removal “because a complaint amended post-removal
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`4
`The Third Circuit has cited approvingly to Cavallini for its rational of focusing on the
`plaintiff’s complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed. See Hogan, 536 F. App’x at
`211.
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`cannot divest a federal court of jurisdiction.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs did not allege any connection
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`between PTI Union and Pharma Tech in their complaints and only presented limited evidence in
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`support of their motions to remand. This evidence did not clarify the allegations of the complaint
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`but, rather, set forth a whole new theory of liability against PTI Union. Because Plaintiffs’ reliance
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`on evidence of PTI Union and Pharma Tech’s alleged relationship was, as the Court previously
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`determined, an improper attempt to amend their complaints, the Court declined to consider the
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`evidence in assessing whether PTI Union was fraudulently joined. Nothing Plaintiffs argue in this
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`motion changes that conclusion. As such, the Court declines to reconsider its finding that PTI
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`Union was fraudulently joined.
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`C. PTI Royston
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`Plaintiffs, for the first time, argue that the Court erred by not evaluating whether the trusts
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`by which PTI Royston are held are traditional or business trusts in assessing the citizenship of PTI
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`Royston for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. As a limited liability company, the citizenship
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`of PTI Royston is determined by the citizenship of its members. Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life,
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`LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015). The sole member of PTI Royston is Broadview Investments,
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`LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. Thus, the Court was required to look to the members
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`of Broadview to determine the citizenship of PTI Royston. Broadview has four members: the
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`Revocable Living Trust of Edward T. Noland, Jr., the Edward T. Noland, Jr. Irrevocable Gifting
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`Trust, the Laura Noland Tarrasch Revocable Trust, and the Tarrasch Family Trust. As I explained
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`in my prior Opinion, “the citizenship of a traditional trust is based solely on that of its trustee.”
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`GBForefront, L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 888 F.3d 29, 29 (3d Cir. 2018). Therefore, I
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`found that prior to June 6, 2018, PTI Royston was a citizen of Georgia and Missouri, and that after
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`June 11, 2018, PTI Royston was a citizen of Georgia and Florida, for the purposes of diversity
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`jurisdiction. Hannah, 2020 WL 3497010, at *3
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`Plaintiffs, however, now submit, without any evidence or legal support, that PTI Royston
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`“is held in business trusts.” The Court need not consider this argument as Local Civil Rule 7.1(i)
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`“does not . . . contemplate a Court looking to matters which were not originally presented” to it.
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`Florham Park Chevron, Inc., 680 F. Supp. at 162; see also Galletta v. Velez, No. 13-532, 2014
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`WL 631891, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2014). At no point in Plaintiffs’ briefing on their motions to
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`remand did they suggest that PTI Royston is held in business trusts or that its citizenship should
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`be determined based on the beneficiaries of the trusts. Moreover, even if the Court were to
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`consider Plaintiffs’ position, they do not present any evidence or citation to support their assertion.
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`The Court cannot accept Plaintiffs’ unsupported allegations, especially when this argument could
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`have been previously raised.
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`IV. CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT’S JUNE 29 ORDER
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`Finally, Plaintiffs seek clarification of the Court’s June 29 Order with respect to the status
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`of the claims brought by Class Three Plaintiffs. In the June 29 Order, the Court dismissed the
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`claims of all Plaintiffs who are not citizens of Missouri and do not allege they purchased any
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`products in Missouri for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the Johnson & Johnson Defendants.
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`The Order permitted these Plaintiffs to re-file their own individual complaints that name only
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`Imerys and PTI Union. Plaintiffs contend that this language appears to prohibit the filing of a
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`complaint under their own respective name and civil action number against the Johnson & Johnson
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`Defendants in the appropriate district of each respective Plaintiff’s federal district court. The
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`Johnson & Johnson Defendants make no argument as to this request for clarification.
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`Upon review of the Order, the Court finds that the Class Three Plaintiffs who are not
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`residents of Missouri and do not allege any connection to Missouri are permitted to file a complaint
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`Case 3:18-cv-14637-FLW-LHG Document 137 Filed 01/19/21 Page 17 of 17 PageID: 4129
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`in the appropriate United States District Court against the Johnson & Johnson Defendants.5
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED.
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`DATED:
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`January 19, 2021
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`/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
`Freda L. Wolfson
`U.S. Chief District Judge
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`5
`The Court notes that, pursuant to Case Management Order No. 2 in the MDL proceeding,
`Plaintiffs may also directly file short-form complaints in this District to promote efficiency.
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`17
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