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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`
`
`
`LEE WILLIAMS, individually and in
`his representative capacity,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
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`TECH MAHINDRA (AMERICAS),
`Inc.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`No. 3:20-CV-04684(MAS) (DEA)
`
`CLASS ACTION
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`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TECH MAHINDRA
`(AMERICAS), INC.’S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... ii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iii
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`I. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... 1
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`A. TMA’S BUSINESS MODEL AND DISCRIMINATORY SCHEME .......................... 1
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`B. PLAINTIFF WAS A VICTIM OF TMA’S DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES. ......... 3
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`C. THE GRANT V. TMA CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT. ............................................ 5
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`D. THE THIRD CIRCUIT FINDS EQUITABLE TOLLING IS AVAILABLE TO MR.
`WILLIAMS ............................................................................................................... 7
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................... 8
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`III. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................... 9
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`A. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLASS CLAIMS BASED ON
`TMA’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE ........................................................ 9
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`1. Given the Third Circuit’s Ruling, Equitable Tolling Presents a Factual
`Issue that Should Not be Resolved Against Plaintiff at this Early Stage. ..10
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`2. The Statute of Limitations Should be Equitably Tolled While Mr.
`Williams Sought to Pursue his Claim in the Grant Class Action. ..............10
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`a) Plaintiff Timely Asserted his Class Claims on June 5, 2019 through
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`a Motion for Leave to Amend in the Grant Class Action ...........................16
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`b) Plaintiff Had a Reasonable Basis for Asserting His Claims in the
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`Existing Grant Class Action in North Dakota ..............................................17
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`c) Plaintiff Diligently and Timely Filed this Action After the Motion to
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`Amend to Add Mr. Williams as a Named Plaintiff in the Grant Class Action
`was Denied .......................................................................................................20
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`
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`d) Policy Factors Favor Equitable Tolling Here ...................................23
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`3. Plaintiff Was Not Required to Anticipate and Rebut TMA’s Statute of
`Limiations Defense in his Complaint ............................................................24
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`4. Applying Equitable Tolling, Plaintiff’s Claims are Timely. ................27
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`B. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS THAT TMA ENGAGED IN A PATTERN OR
`PRACTICE OF DISCRIMINATION SATISFY HIS PRIMA FACIE CASE AND
`PLEADING OBLIGATION .......................................................................................28
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`C. ANY DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD A PATTERN OR
`PRACTICE OF DISCRIMINATION SHOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE, SO THE
`PLAINTIFF HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REPLEAD .................................................39
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`IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 40
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`
`Alameda v. Ass’n of Soc. Work Boards, 2024 WL 4302389 (Sept. 25, 2024) ........32
`
`Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018) ...............................................21
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................... 8
`
`Barrett v. Forest Labs., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) .............. 30,35,36
`
`Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62957 (D.N.J. June 23,
`2010) .....................................................................................................................17
`
`Bernstein v. Maximus Fed. Servs., Inc., 63 F.4th 967 (3d Cir. 2023) ............... 11,12
`
`Brown v. City of N.Y., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42302 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017)
` ........................................................................................................................ 32,34
`
`Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2006) .............................27
`
`Burgis v. New York City Department of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2015)
` ........................................................................................................................ 12,32
`
`Beck v. Boeing Co., 60 F. App’x 38 (9th Cir. 2003) ...............................................31
`
`Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-6292 (RBK/AMD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`62957 (D.N.J. June 23, 2010) ...............................................................................23
`
`Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) ...............................................23
`
`Catanese v. Unilever, 774 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D.N.J. 2011) ................................ 18,19
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`Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983) .......................................................21
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`Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1993) ...............13
`
`Crews v. Cathel, No. 04-4732, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24068 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007)
` ........................................................................................................................ 21,22
`
`Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 2016) .................................. 8
`
`Darden-Munsell v. Dutch Maid Logistics, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84569 (W.D. Pa.
`July 13, 2011) ......................................................................................................... 9
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`Demby v. City of Camden, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 4239 (3d Cir. Feb. 22, 2023)
` ........................................................................................................................ 25,26
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`Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) .................................34
`
`Doherty v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 16 F.3d 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) ...............15
`
`EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10-3095 (JAP)(DEA), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136006
`(D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2014)................................................................…………….…33
`
`EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1994)
`…………………………................................................................…………….…13
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`EEOC v. Pbm Graphics, 877 F. Supp. 2d 334 (M.D.N.C. 2012)...…………….…30
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`EEOC v. Propak Logistics, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79784 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6,
`2010)............................................................…………….…29
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`EEOC v. Rosebud Rests., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2015) .....................30
`
`E.E.O.C. v. Ruby Tuesday, 919 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2013). ................... 19,20
`
`EEOC v. Scrub, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99898 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2009) .......29
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`El-Hallani v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 623 Fed. Appx. 730 (6th Cir. 2015) ............33
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`Fabian v. St. Mary’s Medical Center, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128341 (E.D. Pa.
`Aug. 17, 2017) ......................................................................................................39
`
`Flores v. Predco Servs. Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25588 (D.N.J. Mar. 11,
`2011) .....................................................................................................................14
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`Fraker v. Bayer Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125633 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2009) ..38
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`Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1977) .........24
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`Grant v. Tech Mahindra (Americas), Inc. ("Grant Class Action"), No. 3:18-cv-171
`(D.N.D. 2019) ............................................................................................... passim
`
`Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) ..................................................................28
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`Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) ..................................31
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`Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) .................................................................21
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`Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) ......20
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`Island Insteel Sys. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2002) ............................... 14,21
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`Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1997) .................... 29,31,35
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`Jurbala v. United States, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33878 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2015) 10
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`Koehler v. Infosys Techs. Ltd. Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 940 (E.D. Wisc. 2015) ..........37
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`Lozano v. Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1 (2014) ......................................................................21
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`MacLean v. Wipro Ltd.,No. 20-3414 (FLW), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177231
`(D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2022) ................................................................................... 36,37
`
`Margolis v. Warner Chilcott (US), LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92033 (D.N.J.
`May 31, 2018) .......................................................................................................26
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`Martinez-Santiago v. Pub. Storage, 331 F.R.D. 94, 100 (D.N.J. 2019) ..................28
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`Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. U.S., 577 U.S. 250 (2016) ...............................15
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`Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C 2012) ........15
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`McClain v. Golden, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119215 (E. D. Pa. July 28, 2017) ...............36
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`McKinney v. Fitzgerald, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4278 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2022) .......26
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`Miller v. Hudson (Estate of Miller), 528 Fed. Appx. 238 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2013) .26
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`Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Fannie Mae, 294 F. Supp. 3d 940 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .33
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`Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994) .........25
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`Parks v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76469 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 30,
`2020) .....................................................................................................................24
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`Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 494 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill. 1980) .....................24
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`Petruska v. Reckitt Benckiser, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38935 (D.N.J. Mar. 26,
`2015) .....................................................................................................................39
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`Polysciences Inc. v. Masrud, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 11635 (3d Cir. May 11, 2023)
` ........................................................................................................................ 12,24
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`Rajaram v. Meta Platforms, No. 22-CV-02920, *3, 15 (N.D. Cak,. Feb. 25, 2025)
` ......................................................................................................... 31,32,36,37,38
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`Raymond v. City of New York, 317 F. Supp. 3d 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ....................32
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`Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western Int'l, 862 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988) ......................24
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`Robinson v. Dep't of Motor Vehicle, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77959 (D. Conn. May
`23, 2017) ...............................................................................................................10
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`Rodrigues v. Wells Fargo Bank, 751 F. App’x 312 (3d Cir. 2018) .........................25
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`Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) ........................................ 9,12,13,25
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`Sebso v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198103
`(D.N.J. Oct. 14, 2021) ..........................................................................................29
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`Sender v. Dillow, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124184 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 2013) ..........10
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`Sims v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 2:10-cv-151, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103454
`(W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010) .....................................................................................10
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`Slaight v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd., 842 F. App’x 66 (9th Cir. 2021) ............31
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`Slater v. Metro S. N.J. State Police, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21119 (D.N.J. Feb. 8,
`2023) .....................................................................................................................26
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`Sypherd v. Lazy Dog Rests., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187686 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 24,
`2020) .....................................................................................................................35
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`Toussaint v. City of N.Y., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184490 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2021)
` ..............................................................................................................................33
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`Town of New Castle v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 131 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
` ..............................................................................................................................28
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`United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1 (1991) ..............................................................21
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`United States v. Jarrah, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39352 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2017)
` ..............................................................................................................................38
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`United States v. Nobel Learning Cmtys., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 379 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
` ................................................................................................................... 29,34,38
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`Vanselous v. Bucks County Intermediate Unit No. 22, No. 13-4805, 2014 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 83906 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2014) ................................................................27
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`Walck v. Discavage, 741 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Penn. 1990) ........................................16
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`Walker v. Accenture, 511 F. Supp. 3d 169 (D. Conn. 2020) ...................................37
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`Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) ............................................ 39,40
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`Wiggins v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., No. 20-3129, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 10973,
`(3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) ................................................................................... 12,25
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`Williams v. Tech Mahindra (Ams.), 70 4th 646 (3d Cir. 2023) ...............................38
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` Williams v. Tech Mahindra Ams. Inc. (“Williams II”), 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS
`31353, *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2024) .................................................................. passim
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`STATUTES
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`42 U.S.C. § 1981 .............................................................................................. passim
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ..................................................................................... 8,9,11
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`TREATISES
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`5B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
`1357 & N.11 (3D ED. 2007) ...................................................................................... 9
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`Plaintiff Lee Williams brought this action to remedy Defendant Tech
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`Mahindra (Americas), Inc.’s (“TMA’s”) pervasive discriminatory scheme to favor
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`South Asians in employment decisions throughout the United States. TMA’s Second
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`Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 59) should be denied because: (1) TMA’s statute
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`of limitations defense is premature and has no merit and (2) Plaintiff adequately pled
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`TMA engaged in a pattern or practice of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`A. TMA’S BUSINESS MODEL AND DISCRIMINATORY SCHEME.
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`Defendant TMA is an American information technology (“IT”) outsourcing
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`and consulting company with over 5,000 employees in the United States. Compl. ¶
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`2 (Dkt. 1). TMA contracts with U.S. companies to provide IT-related services. Id. ¶
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`11. Once TMA secures a contract with a client, it hires individuals for the project,
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`and both external applicants and existing employees must apply and interview for
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`these positions. Id. ¶ 11. Once a position comes to an end, or an employee is removed
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`from a project, the employee is placed in non-productive status referred to as being
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`on the “bench” and must seek new positions within TMA, going through the same
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`application and interview process as an external applicant. Id.
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`TMA operates under a general policy of discrimination in favor of South
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`Asians and against individuals who are not South Asian, preferring South Asians in
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`its hiring, staffing, promotion, and termination decisions. Id. ¶¶ 2, 12. As a result of
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`its discriminatory staffing practices, 90% (or more) of TMA’s U.S.-based workforce
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`is South Asian, even though that racial group comprises only 1-2% of the U.S.
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`population and just 12% of the relevant labor market. Id. ¶¶ 2, 19. The vast majority,
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`if not all, of TMA’s managerial and supervisory positions in the United States are
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`filled by individuals of South Asian descent. Id. ¶ 17.
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`TMA’s policy or practice of discrimination in favor of South Asian employees
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`and applicants has several components. Id. ¶¶ 12-18. First, to fulfill its preference
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`for South Asian employees, each year, TMA fraudulently applies for massive
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`amounts of H1-B visas far more than its actual staffing needs in the United States.
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`Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Although TMA only has about 5,000 employees in the United States,
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`from 2015 to 2017, it obtained over 10,800 H-1B visas from the federal government.
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`Id. ¶ 14. All, or substantially all, of these visas are for TMA’s South Asian employees
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`located in India that TMA then prioritizes for open U.S. positions and/or removes
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`non-South Asian individuals from U.S. positions to place them. Id. ¶ 15. Second,
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`TMA hires a disproportionate number of South Asians within the U.S. that far
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`exceeds their proportion in the relevant labor market. Id. ¶ 16. Third, TMA gives
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`preference to South Asians over non-South Asians in promotions, thereby resulting
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`in diminished career prospects and lower pay for non-South Asians. Id. ¶ 17. Fourth,
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`for the few non-South Asians TMA hires, it terminates them at disproportionately
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`higher rates compared to their South Asian colleagues. Id. ¶ 18. TMA’s business
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`model of preferring South Asians in employment decisions impacts both existing
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`employees and external applicants alike. Id. ¶ 12.
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`B.
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`PLAINTIFF WAS A VICTIM OF TMA’S DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES.
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`Plaintiff Lee Williams is a highly skilled senior technology sales executive
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`with over 20 years of professional experience. Id. ¶ 20. He has held a variety of
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`director and vice president-level roles throughout his career, including before joining
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`TMA, and is Caucasian. Id. ¶¶ 4, 20.
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`Mr. Williams was hired by TMA in May 2014 as a Regional Manager / Senior
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`Director of Business Development and was responsible for generating business and
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`sales from new banking clients with whom TMA had no prior business relationship.
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`Id. ¶ 21. At the time of his hire, TMA was particularly interested in Mr. William’s
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`contacts with the approximately ten banking clients to whom he would be assigned
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`to sell TMA’s services to in the Midwest. Id.
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`Mr. Williams was assigned to sales group of approximately eight employees,
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`of whom, just two were non-South Asian. Id. ¶ 22. He reported to Manish Sharma,
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`Vice President, who is of South Asian race. Id. During his employment, Mr.
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`Williams attended three regional meetings typically attended by project managers,
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`salespeople, and subject matter experts employed by TMA. Id. ¶ 25. Of the
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`approximately 90 to 100 meeting attendees, the vast majority (over 90%) were South
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`Asian. Id. Hindi was often spoken socially at these meetings, to the exclusion of Mr.
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`Williams, a native English speaker. Id.
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`Shortly after he was hired, TMA asked Mr. Williams to enter his professional
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`banking contacts into TMA’s Salesforce CRM system, which he had acquired
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`through his over twenty years of sales experience. Id. ¶ 23. Mr. Williams complied
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`with this request. Id. Upon calling on his assigned banking clients shortly after
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`joining TMA, Mr. Williams learned TMA had a poor relationship with them,
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`contrary to what TMA told him in the interview process. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24. As a result,
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`it often took Mr. Williams months to set up meetings with these accounts, and deals
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`were often lost due to TMA’s poor history with these potential clients. Id. ¶ 24.
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`Despite these significant challenges, Mr. Williams performed well in his role,
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`and successfully identified sales opportunities, including four opportunities with
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`PNC totaling over $3 million in potential sales. Id. ¶ 26. However, TMA never
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`promoted Mr. Williams. Id. ¶ 27. Instead, in June 2015, TMA put Mr. Williams on
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`a 60-day performance improvement plan, setting unreasonable revenue goals that
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`were unattainable given the company’s poor working relationship with the accounts
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`in Mr. Williams’ territory. Id. The imposition of this plan was a pretext designed to
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`set Mr. Williams up to fail so that TMA could terminate his employment in
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`accordance with its discriminatory scheme. Id. On August 19, 2015, TMA fired Mr.
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`Williams because of TMA’s pattern or practice of discrimination. Id. at ¶ 28.
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`C. THE GRANT V. TMA CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT
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`On August 10, 2018, another plaintiff, Roderick Grant, filed a similar class
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`action lawsuit against TMA: Grant v. Tech Mahindra (Americas), Inc., No. 3:20-
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`CV-04684 (D.N.D) (“Grant Class Action”), alleging discrimination against non-
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`Indians and non-South Asians in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. §
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`2000e, et seq. See Ex. 4 to Kotchen Decl. (Dkt. 33). Mr. Grant filed that lawsuit in
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`the District of North Dakota, which was a proper venue for his claims because TMA
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`had employed Mr. Grant in Fargo, North Dakota. Kotchen Decl. ¶ 7 and Ex. 4 at ¶
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`3. The Grant Class Action also targeted TMA’s pattern or practice of discrimination
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`against non-South Asians, and Mr. Grant sought to represent a class of “All persons
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`who are not of South Asian race or Indian national original who sought a position
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`with (or within) TMA and were not hired, who sought a promotion within TMA and
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`were not promoted, and/or who TMA involuntarily terminated.” Kotchen Decl. at
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`Ex. 4 at ¶ 33. Since Mr. Williams is not South Asian and TMA involuntarily
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`terminated him on August 19, 2015, he was a member of that putative class. Kotchen
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`Decl. at ¶ 8 and Ex. 4 at ¶¶ 4, 28,33; Compl. ¶¶ 4, 28 (Dkt. 1).
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`On October 15, 2018, TMA filed a motion to dismiss the Grant Class Action.
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`Kotchen Decl.¶ 9. However, on February 26, 2019, TMA withdrew that motion and
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`filed a motion to compel arbitration of Mr. Grant’s individual claims, thereby
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`procedurally precluding his class claims. Id. Mr. Grant’s Counsel—the same
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`attorneys who now represent Mr. Williams against TMA—disputed
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`the
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`enforceability of the arbitration clause, including because they believed that the
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`arbitration agreement had expired and did not cover post-expiration disputes, that it
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`did not cover Mr. Grant’s statutory antidiscrimination claims, and that it expressly
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`did not cover at least some of the relief sought in the class action. Kotchen Decl. ¶
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`10; see id. at Ex. 2 at 5-11.
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`On June 5, 2019, Mr. Grant filed a motion to amend to add Mr. Williams as a
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`representative plaintiff to the class action. Kotchen Decl. ¶ 11; see id. at Ex. 1. That
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`motion attached a proposed amended complaint as an exhibit asserting the § 1981
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`pattern or practice discrimination claim Mr. Williams later pled in this case. Id.
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`In advocating for leave to amend to add Mr. Williams’ claims and add him as
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`a class plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Counsel advised the court that “[w]hile Plaintiff disputes
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`the enforceability of the arbitration agreement in Mr. Grant’s employment letter and
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`opposes TMA’s motion to compel arbitration, the [proposed] amendment will
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`promote efficiency by ensuring that if Mr. [Grant], the current sole named plaintiff,
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`becomes unable to serve as class representative at some point there will be another
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`individual present to take his place.” Kotchen Decl. at Ex. 1, p. 7. Plaintiff’s Counsel
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`also argued that permitting the amendment, rather than having Mr. Williams file his
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`similar claims in a separate class action, would promote efficiency and may be
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`required by Rule 19 to prevent inconsistent verdicts. Id. at Ex. 1, p. 8.
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`TMA opposed the motion for leave to amend because it claimed that it was
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`not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in North Dakota as to Mr. Williams’
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`claims, that Mr. Williams’ claims were dissimilar to Mr. Grant’s, and that a decision
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`in TMA’s favor on the motion to compel arbitration would render Plaintiff’s motion
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`to amend moot. Kotchen Decl. at ¶ 12, Ex. 2 at 2.
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`On December 5, 2019,
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`the magistrate
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`judge
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`issued a report and
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`recommendation for granting TMA’s motion to compel arbitration of Mr. Grant’s
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`individual claims, staying that case, and denying the motion to amend to add Mr.
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`Williams as a class plaintiff. Kotchen Decl. at Ex. 2. On February 6, 2020, the district
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`court entered an order adopting those recommendations, compelling Mr. Grant to
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`arbitrate his individual claims, denying the motion for leave to amend, and otherwise
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`staying the case. Kotchen Decl. at Ex. 3. Mr. Williams then filed this action just two
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`months later, on April 21, 2020. Dkt. 1.
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`D. THE THIRD CIRCUIT FINDS EQUITABLE TOLLING IS AVAILABLE TO MR.
`WILLIAMS.
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`The Third Circuit vacated a prior dismissal of Williams’ complaint based on
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`TMA’s statute of limitations defense because it determined that “the doctrine of
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`wrong-forum tolling is available to Williams.” Williams v. Tech Mahindra Ams. Inc.
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`(“Williams II”), 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 31353, *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2024).
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`The Third Circuit remanded so this Court “determine whether equitable
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`tolling principles support tolling in this case.” Id. at *9. The Court suggested this
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`Court consider whether “(1) the first action gave defendant timely notice of
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`plaintiff’s claim; (2) the lapse of time between the first and second actions will not
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`prejudice defendant; and (3) plaintiff acted reasonably and in good faith in
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`prosecuting the first action and exercising diligence in filing the second action.” Id.
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`at *9, n. 5. These are issues of fact that are not appropriate to determine based on the
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`pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
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`matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
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`Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft
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`v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
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`“[A]t least for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish
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`a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 788. Instead, “the
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`… pleading standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation
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`that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element[s].’” Id. at 789 (quoting
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`Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008)). This “determination
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`is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
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`experience and common sense.’” Id. at 786-787 (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679).
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`When evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) motions that challenge the pleadings, “(1) the
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`complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, (2) its allegations
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`are taken as true, and (3) all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
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`pleading are drawn in favor of the pleader.” 5B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
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`FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357 & n.11 (3d ed. 2007); see also Darden-
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`Munsell v. Dutch Maid Logistics, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84569, at *4-5 (W.D. Pa.
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`July 13, 2011).
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`Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and often requires
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`development of a factual record, dismissal of a claim as barred by the statute of
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`limitations is appropriate on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only where the bar is “‘apparent
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`on the face of the complaint.’” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)
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`(quoting Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir.2002)).
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`TMA’s Second Renewed Motion to Dismiss should be denied because TMA’s
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`statute of limitations defense is premature and has no merit. Additionally, Plaintiff
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`has sufficiently pled his pattern or practice of discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C.
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`§ 1981. To the extent this Court finds otherwise—a decision it should not reach—
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`this Court should afford Plaintiff the opportunity to amend to cure any deficiency in
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`the pleading of that claim.
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`A. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLASS CLAIMS BASED ON
`TMA’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE.
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`Mr. Williams’ claim is not time-barred because the statute of limitations
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`should be equitably tolled from June 5, 2019 (the date Mr. Grant filed a motion to
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`amend to add Mr. Williams to the Grant Class Action) until February 6, 2020 (the
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`date that motion was denied), while Mr. Williams reasonably, but mistakenly,
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`pursued his claim in the existing Grant Class Action.
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`Since the Third Circuit has already determined that equitable tolling is
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`available as a matter of law, the remaining issue presents a question of fact that
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`should not be decided against the Plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage. Williams
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`II, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 313553, *1 (“the doctrine of wrong-forum tolling is
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`available to Williams,”). As such, TMA’s arguments for dismissal based on its
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`statute of limitations defense are premature and have no merit.
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`1. Given the Third Circuit’s Ruling, Equitable Tolling Presents a
`Factual Issue that Should Not be Resolved Against Plaintiff at this
`Early Stage.
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`Whether a statute of limitations deadline should be equitably tolled generally
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`presents questions of fact and requires weighing of the equities, so it is premature to
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`decide this issue at the motion to dismiss stage. Robinson v. Dep't of Motor Vehicle,
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`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77959, at *6 (D. Conn. May 23, 2017) (Since “equitable
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`tolling may apply, the court concludes that it would be premature to decide the time-
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`barring question at this motion to dismiss stage.”); Jurbala v. United States, 2015
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`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33878, at *20-21 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2015) (recommending denial
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`of motion to dismiss because plaintiff’s wrong forum equitable tolling arguments
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`“cannot be determined on the pleadings”); Sender v. Dillow, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`124184, at *13 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss because
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`plaintiff’s wrong forum equitable tolling argument “is a matter which the court
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`cannot determine upon a motion to dismiss given the record and allegations currently
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`before the court”). As such, this Court should at least defer ruling on the applicability
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`of equitable tolling until it can decide the issue based on an appropriate evidentiary
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`record. See McClain v. Golden, No. 08-1347, 2