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`Case 3:20-cv-05526—MAS-ZNQ Document 37 Filed 06/01/21 Page 1 of 20 PageID: 707
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`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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`JODI FITTIPALDI and LEXI
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`FITTIPALDI, on behalf of themselves and
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`all others similarly situated,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`Civil Action No. 20-05526 (MAS) (ZNQ)
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY,
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`Defendant.
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`SHIPP, District aIudge
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`This matter comes before
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`the Court upon Defendant Monmouth University's
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`(“Monmouth” or “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) lead Plaintiffs Jodi and Lexi
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`Fittipaldi’s (collectively “Plaintiffs") Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20). Plaintiffs opposed the
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`motion (ECF No. 25), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 27). Both Parties filed several Notices of
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`Supplemental Authority and replies with the Court. (ECF Nos. 26, 28—35.) The Court has carefully
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`considered the Parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to
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`Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in-part and denies in-part
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`Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
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`BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`Facts
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`This matter is a putative class action brought “on behalf of all people who paid tuition and
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`fees for the Spring 2020 academic semester at Monmouth” University. (Am. Compl. ‘l[ l, ECF No.
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`20.) Monmouth is a private university with an enrollment of approximately 6,300 students,
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`including both undergraduate and graduate students. (Id. ‘I[ 2.) The university is located in West
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`Long Branch, New Jersey. (Id. ‘|[ 22.)
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`Plaintiff Lexi Fittipaldi is an undergraduate student attending Monmouth. (Id. ‘ll 18.) She
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`is majoring in Cybersecurity. (Id.) Plaintiff Jodi Fittipaldi is Lexi Fittipaldi's mother, and is a
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`citizen of New Jersey. (Id ‘][ l7.) Plaintiffs paid Monmouth approximately $19,796 in tuition for
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`the Spring 2020 semester. (Id.)
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`Monmouth, on its website and through other literature, seeks to advertise the on-campus
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`experience at the university. (Id. ‘][‘]I 28, 29, 31, 38.) In various promotional materials, it discusses
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`the benefits of its location, campus, facilities, and in-person learning programs. (Id) Monmouth
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`also maintains various departmental policies and handbooks outlining differences between online
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`and in-person classes and emphasizing the importance of attendance. (Id. ‘lI‘l[ 35—39.) Furthermore,
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`Monmouth provides students an academic catalog. (See id. ‘l[‘][ 38 n.15, 64, 78, 82.) This catalog
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`contains a disclaimer that reads “[t]he information provided herein does not provide an irrevocable
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`contract between Monmouth University and the student." (Ex. A to Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 24-3.)
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`When choosing schools, Plaintiffs specifically sought “an on-campus experience [at
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`Monmouth] for the variety of educational and extracurricular opportunities and benefits that only
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`an in-person program can provide.” (Am. Compl. ‘l[ 19.) Accordingly, sometime prior to the Spring
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`2020 semester, Plaintiffs accessed an online portal where Lexi Fittipaldi registered for classes
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`which were to be conducted on-campus. (Id. ‘fl‘ll I3, 20.) The registration portal provided specified
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`rooms on-campus where classes were to be held. (Id. ‘II 13.)
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`On March 9, 2020, Monmouth, via correspondence from the University President,
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`suspended all classes in response to the COVID-l9 pandemic. (Id. ‘ll 3.) On March 12, 2020, via
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`correspondence from the University President, Monmouth transitioned all classes to remote online
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`instruction until April 3, 2020. (Id. ‘H 4.) While the switch to online learning was at first temporary,
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`in light of the evolving pandemic, the school decided on March 24, 2020, to carry out the remainder
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`of the spring semester online. (Id. rl[ 6.) Students could still largely take their usual classes and
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`credits, but no in-person instruction was offered. (See Id. ‘11 54.) After March 9, 2020, in addition
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`to classes moving online. the campus and its facilities were closed to all students. (1d. ‘ll‘l[ 54-55,
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`61, 109.) Students paid for access to these amenities. (Id. 1 30.)
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`While prorated refunds were given for unused room contracts, meal plans, and parking
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`fees, no such refund was given to students for tuition or other fees. (Id. ‘l[ 6 n.4 (referring to a March
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`24 letter from University President Dr. Leahy articulating what refunds would be given)); see also
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`id. ‘11 l7.)' The Plaintiffs, therefore, were not refunded any of the $19,7962 they paid for the Spring
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`2020 semester. (Id. ‘l[ 17.)
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`B.
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`Parties’ Positions
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`1.
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`Plaintiffs’ Position
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`Plaintiffs allege that Monmouth‘s failure to provide in-person instruction despite Plaintiffs‘
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`payment of full-tuition expenses constitutes a breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion,
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`and money had and received. (Id. ‘ll‘l[ 75—126.)
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`In particular, Plaintiffs allege that
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`through its “website and in its handbooks, policy
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`manuals, brochures, .
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`.
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`. online course portal, advertisements, and other promotional materials[,]"
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`Monmouth promised students that
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`in exchange for tuition they would receive “in-person
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`educational services, experiences, opportunities, and other related services.” (Id.
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`‘1]‘][ 78, 79.)
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`' A court may consider documents outside of the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss if the
`documents are “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” McCouIe-y v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
`No. 18-7942, 20 l 9 WL 145624, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2019) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
`I I4 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).) Here, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint provided links and relied upon
`statements and decisions made by the University President and published by Monmouth on its website.
`Thus, they may be considered at this stage.
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`3 [t is unclear how the tuition payments break down, and what portion of students' tuition is attributable to
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`Furthermore, they allege that from those promises, Plaintiffs developed a “reasonable expectation”
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`that Monmouth would provide on-campus classes and allow access to on-campus facilities. (Id.
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`‘11 82.) Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that Monmouth breached its contract with Plaintiffs by failing to
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`provide in-person classes and access to facilities. (See id. ‘][‘I[ 75—91.) This breach led to subsequent
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`damage by way of tuition loss and lack of access to facilities bargained for. (Id. ‘][‘fl 75—101.)
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`On the same facts, as alternative theories of recovery, Plaintiffs seek damages resulting
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`from unjust enrichment, conversion, and money had and received where Monmouth retained
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`tuition monies for the Spring 2020 semester despite moving classes online and restricting access
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`to campus. (Id. ‘][‘]1 102-26.)
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`2.
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`Defendant’s Position
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`In moving to dismiss, Defendant first argues that “Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of
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`contract, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and money had and received
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`must be dismissed because they constitute claims for ‘educational malpractice,‘ which are not
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`actionable under New Jersey law.” (Def.’s Moving Br.
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`I l, ECF No. 24-1 .)
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`In the alternative, Defendant argues, Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims, express and
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`implied,'must be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiffs do not plausibly identify any contract promising
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`in-person instruction; (2) “Plaintiffs do not identify any meeting of the minds” between the parties;
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`(3) “New Jersey courts have repeatedly refused to recognize the existence of an implied contractual
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`relationship” stemming from student catalogs, manuals, or handbooks; (4) the reservation of rights
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`provision in Monmouth’s academic catalog disposes of Plaintiffs‘ contract-based claims; and
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`(5) “Monmouth's policy on tuition and fees recognizes that tuition is paid in exchange for a
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`student’s ability to earn credits toward graduation[,]” not attend school in-person. (Id. at 20—25.)
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`As to Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim, Defendant argues it fails for three reasons: (1) it
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`is duplicative of the breach of contract claim; (2) “Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that
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`Monmouth unjustly retained the benefit of their tuition and fees”; and (3) there is no allegation
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`that Monmouth used tuition fees for anything other than continuing its charitable mission during
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`this pandemic. (Id. at 28-30.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs‘ money had and received claim fails
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`for the same reasons. (Id. at 33.)
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`Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ conversion claim is similarly duplicative of their
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`breach of contract claims and “do[es] not plausibly allege the essential element that Monmouth
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`wrongfully exercised dominion and control over the tuition and fees .
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`.
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`. paid.” (Id. at 31—32.)
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`Rule 8 (a)(2)3 “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
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`pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the .
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`.
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`. claim is and
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`the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007) (alteration
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`in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
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`A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss
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`pursuant to Rule l2(b)(6). Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 201 I). “First, the court
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`must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (alteration in original)
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`(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all of
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`the plaintiff‘s well-pleaded factual allegations and construe the complaint
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`in the light most
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`favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
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`omitted). The court, however, may ignore legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations
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`that merely state “the[ ] defendant[ ] unlawfully[ ] harmed[ ] me.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Finally, the court must determine whether “the facts alleged in the
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`complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.” Fowler, 578
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`F.3d at 21 l (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw
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`the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 1d. at 210 (quoting
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`iqbai, 556 US. at 678). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing
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`that no claim has been presented" upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United States, 404
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`F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005).
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`DISCUSSION
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`Whether a plaintiff can bring a cause of action for breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
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`conversion, or money had and received against a college or university after the institution
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`transitioned to online learning in response to the COVID-l9 pandemic is the subject of numerous
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`cases.4 After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments, and based on the specific Amended
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`Complaint in the present case, the Court grants in-part and denies in-part Defendant’s Motion to
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`Dismiss.
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`Under New Jersey law, “[t]o state a claim for breach of contract, [a plaintiff] must allege
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`(1) a contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing therefrom;
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`and (4) that the party stating the claim performed [its] own contractual duties.” Frederico v. Home
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`Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Enr.,
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`Inc, 210 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (D.N.J. 2002)). Traditionally, there are three types of contracts:
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`express, implied-in-fact, and implied-in-law. Wanaqne Borough Sewerage Ath. v. Twp. of W.
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`4 See, e.g., Dovoi v. Fairleigh Dickinson, No. 4966-20 (NJ. Super. Feb. 5, 2021) (denying defendant
`Fairleigh Dickinson’s motion to dismiss breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims against the
`university for its decision to move classes online in response to the COVID-l9 pandemic); Met:ner v.
`Quinnipiac Univ., No. 20-784, 2021 WL 1 146922, at *5—12 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2021) (granting in-part and
`denying in-part defendant’s motion to dismiss while addressing educational malpractice, breach of contract,
`unjust enrichment, and conversion claims); Shaffer v. George Wash. Unin, No. 20-1145, 2021 WL
`1 124607, at *1—3 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff” s breach of contract, conversion, and unjust
`enrichment claims); Hassan v. Fordham Univ., No. 20-3265, 2021 WL 293255, at *5—13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
`28, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff‘s claims against the university for breach of implied contract, unjust
`enrichment, conversion, and money had and received claims); Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chi, No. 20-
`3116, 2021 WL 243573, at *2-5 (ND.
`Ill. Jan. 25, 2021) (dismissing breach of contract and unjust
`enrichment claims); Lindner v. Occidental COIL, No. 20-8481, 2020 WL 7350212, at *7—10 (CD. Cal. Dec.
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`Milford, 677 A.2d 747. 752 (NJ. 1996) (elaborating on these three types of contracts and observing
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`that a “contract implied in law .
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`.
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`. is commonly referred to as a quasi-contract”).
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`“The contract is express if the agreement is manifested by written or spoken words." Id.
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`Relatedly, an “implied-in—fact” contract “is a true contract arising from mutual agreement and
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`intent to promise, but in circumstances in which the agreement and promise have not been verbally
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`expressed. The agreement is rather inferred from the conduct of the parties.” Brier v. Chase, 392
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`F.3d 609, 616 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Penn. Cent. Tramp. Ca, 831 F.2d 122], 1228 (3d Cir.
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`1987)). Finally, a contract implied in law, commonly referred to as a “quasi-contract," is not a true
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`contract as it requires no mutual assent. Bettkas v. 30'. of Trs. of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 605
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`A.2d 776, 783-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); see also Wanaque, 677 A.2d at 752 (“The
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`authorities agree that a quasi-contract is not a contract at all, since there is no actual manifestation
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`of assent.”). Instead, a quasi-contract “arises because of considerations of equity and morality and
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`is distinguished from an express contract or even one [implied-in-fact] which arises from mutual
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`agreement and intent to promise." Beulcas, 605 A.2d at 784.
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`New Jersey courts have not explicitly defined when a contractual relationship arises, and
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`to what extent a contractual relationship exists between students and universities. See Doe v.
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`Princeton Univ., No. 20-4352, 2021 WL 194806, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2021) (articulating that
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`“student[] tuition payments in exchange for education ‘may in some circumstances be considered
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`contractual consideration”). Rather, “New Jersey courts repeatedly refuse to apply strict
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`contractual principles to conflicts between a university and its students.” Doe, 2021 WL 194806,
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`at *7 (citing Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 272 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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`1982)); see also Moe v. Seton Hall Unlu, No. 09-1424, 2010 WL 1609680, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 20,
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`2010) (“New Jersey courts have declined to characterize the relationship between student and
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`university as [purely] contractual.” (alteration in original»; Mittra v. Univ. ofMed. & Dentistry of
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`N.J., 719 A.2d 693, 697 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (rejecting “the rigid application of
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`contractual principles to university-student conflicts”). Instead, “[t]he ‘true’ university-student
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`‘contract’ is one of mutual obligations implied, not in fact, but by law; it is a quasi-contract which
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`is ‘created by law, for reasons ofjustice without regard to expressions of assent by either words or
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`acts.” Beukas, 605 A.2d at 783-84 (citations omitted).
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`Before discussing Plaintiffs’ claims under a quasi-contractual theory, however, this Court
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`must first dispense with Defendant’s argument that New Jersey’s lack of recognition with respect
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`to educational malpractice claims should bar Plaintiffs’ claims sounding in breach of contract from
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`consideration in their entirety. (See Def.’s Moving Br. 11.)
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`A.
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`Educational Malpractice
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`Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims5 are merely educational
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`malpractice claims, and as such, they should be barred. This Court disagrees.
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`Defendant is correct that New Jersey does not recognize the doctrine of educational
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`malpractice. See Swidryk v. St. Michael ’5 Med. Cm, 493 A.2d 64], 643 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
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`1985) (finding there is no cause of action for educational malpractice in New Jersey). Educational
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`malpractice claims, however, are tort claims. See M.G. v. Crisfield, No. 06—5099, 2009 WL
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`2920268, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 1 l, 2009) (referring to the “tort claim for educational malpractice");
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`see also Myers v. Medford Lakes Bd. of Educ, 489 A.2d 1240, 1242 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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`1985) (“Educational malpractice, like other professional or occupational malpractice, would [only]
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`arise, if recognized as a cause of action, out of negligence principles"). Importantly then, the New
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`5 For purposes of this Section, [11(A), this Court will refer to all of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and quasi-
`contractual claims as “breach of contract claims.” Importantly, however, while both claims sound in
`contract and thus are not barred by New Jersey’s ban on educational malpractice claims, Plaintiffs’ quasi-
`contractual claims are not “breach of contract" claims in the traditional sense. Cf. Beukas, 605 A.2d at 783—
`84 (citations omitted) (a quasi-contract
`is “created by law, for reasons of justice without regard to
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`Jersey ban on educational malpractice claims can only apply against Plaintiffs” breach of contract
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`claims sounding in tort. Crisfleld, 2009 WL 2920268, at *10 (“[W]hen considering breach of
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`contract claims based on inadequate or ineffective educational services (rather than claims based
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`on breach of an express contractual provision), New Jersey courts have noted that such claims are
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`comparable to a ton claim for educational malpractice." (quoting Stein-O’Brien v. Pennington
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`Sch., No. 06-2101, 2008 WL 160588, at *6 (ED. Pa. Jan. 15, 2008))).
`
`All breach of contract claims against an institution of higher education, however, are not
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`necessarily educational malpractice claims. As such, only claims advanced by Plaintiffs suggesting
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`that Defendant breached a duty of care or that the quality of their education was affected by
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`malpractice on the part of the school when it transitioned classes online should be barred. Id.
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`(finding “to the extent [p]laintiffs premise their breach of contract claim on a general theory that
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`[d]efendant failed to provide adequate or reflective educational services to [plaintiff], the claim
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`must be dismissed” (emphasis added) (quoting O’Brien, 2008 WL [60588, at *6)); see also Winter
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`v. Am. Inst. ofMed. Scis. & Educ, 242 F. Supp. 3d 206, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Under New Jersey
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`law, claims regarding the szgj‘iciency of education, even if framed as a breach of implied contract,
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`cannot be evaluated because they are barred by the educational malpractice doctrine.” (emphasis
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`added)). Any breach of contract claim that avoids such “quality" assertions, however, is capable
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`of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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`Although claims sounding in the tort of educational malpractice are barred because New
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`Jersey does not recognize educational malpractice, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint still contains
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`allegations sounding in breach of contract, not tort. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ‘][‘l[ 59 (“The move to
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`. remote classes also deprived students of access to the facilities [and] materials .
`
`.
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`. only offered
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`on Monmouth’s physical (as opposed to virtual) campus, including .
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`.
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`. studios [and] use of on-
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`campus facilities”), 79 (“Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into a contractual relationship wherein
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`Plaintiffs would provide payment in the form of tuition and fees, and Defendant, in exchange,
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`would provide in-person educational services, experiences, opportunities, and other related
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`services”), 99 (“Defendant breached the implied contract .
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`. . [when] Defendant moved all classes
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`to online classes and restricted or eliminated Class and Subclass Members’ ability to access
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`university facilities.”).) As such, New Jersey’s prohibition on educational malpractice claims does
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`not bar Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims in their entirety.
`
`Ultimately, New Jersey case law should not be so widely construed as to hold that all
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`breach of contract claims against colleges or universities fall within the purview of educational
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`malpractice. For these reasons, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that New Jersey’s bar on
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`educational malpractice claims is grounds to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims.‘5
`
`B.
`
`Breach of Contract
`
`Under New Jersey law, to the extent that the student~university contractual relationship is
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`defined in the context of administrative decision-making, it is one of quasi-contract. See Beukas,
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`605 A.2d at 783-84. This finding warrants further elaboration by the Court.
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`Significantly, both Parties focus their breach of contract arguments around case law arising
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`out of student-university academic discipline or performance disputes.7 This case law, following
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`the Appellate Division’s decision in Napolirano v. Trustees of Princeton University,
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`is not
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`persuasive in the context of Defendant’s administrative decision to transition to online learning as
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`6 Moreover, the Court finds it more appropriate to analyze the extent to which Plaintiffs' claims implicate
`educational malpractice on a more developed record.
`
`7 Doe, 2021 WL 194806, at *7 (discussing the student-university contractual relationship in the student
`discipline context); Mucci v. Rutgers, No. 08-4806, 2011 WL 831967, at *19 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2011)
`(discussing the student-university contractual relationship in the poor academic performance context);
`Romeo v. Seton Hall Univ., 875 A.2d 1043, 1049—50 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (discussing the
`student-university contractual relationship in the academic discrimination context); Mirtra, 719 A.2d at
`696—97 (only considering “whether contract principles should be applied in resolving disputes involving
`student dismissals for academic reasons”); Napoh'tnno, 453 A.2d at 272—73 (decided in the context of
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`a result of an exigent circumstance: COVID-l9.8 The Court, instead, finds Benkas v. Board of
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`Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson persuasive with respect to the Court’s analysis as it expressly
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`evaluates the student-university contractual relationship in the context of administrative decision-
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`making. See Mittra, 719 A.2d at 697.
`
`l.
`
`v. Board of Fairleigh Dickinson: Defining the
`Beukas
`Contractual Relationship between Student and University
`
`In Beukas, Fairleigh Dickinson University (“FDU") maintained a private college of dental
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`medicine. 605 A.2d at 777. FDU “published an annual Graduate Studies Bulletin detailing various
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`graduate programs offered and an annual bulletin for the dental college.” Id. The bulletin set forth
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`the programs offered, curriculum, and terms upon which acceptance and admission into the college
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`would be conditioned. Id. FDU‘s bulletin contained a reservation of rights provision. Id. at 777—
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`78. One such right was the right to eliminate a college. Id. at 778. In 1989, FDU lost state aid. Id.
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`The loss was so significant that FDU began contemplating shutting down the dental college. Id. at
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`778-79. Eventually, “[o]n June 14, 1989 [FDU] resolved that
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`the dental college would be
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`closed[.]" Id. at 779. The school took several measures, such as reaching transfer agreements with
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`other dental schools, to try and lessen the burden on students caused by the administrative decision
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`to shut down the school. Id. Plaintiffs, former students of FDU’s dental school, sued FDU, alleging
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`breach of contract. Id.
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`(addressing university administrative decision-making and
`“ Compare Ben/ens, 605 A.2d at 781
`distinguishing the case from Napalirano) and Miiira, 719 A.2d at 697 (articulating that Napoiitano
`addressed “whether contract principles should be applied in resolving disputes involving student dismissals
`for academic reasons" while acknowledging that the Beukas Court assessed “whether a university could
`administratively terminate a college or program for financial reasons [and]
`the court took pains to
`distinguish that issue from questions pertaining to student dismissals for poor academic performance") with
`Doe, 2021 WL 194806, at *7 (citing Napoiimno while defining student-university contractual relationship).
`and Moe, 2010 WL 1609680, at *4 (citing Napoiimno while exploring the student-university contractual
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`Specifically, the Bettkas plaintiffs argued “that a contract exist[ed] between the university
`
`and its dental students as reflected in the annual bulletins issued by [FDU] and the dental college,
`
`as well as other publications of [FDU] which they assert[ed] [were] ‘the controlling documents in
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`their contractual relationship.”’ Id. The plaintiffs argued that their first year’s tuition payment
`
`completed a binding contract between them and FDU where the school bulletins defined their
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`contractual relationship. Id. FDU argued in response that “the doctrine of judicial deference to
`
`university autonomy in academic decision[-]making as set forth in Napolitana v. Princeton
`
`University Trustees require[d] the court to decline to interfere with defendants’ administrative
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`decision to close the dental college.” Id. at 779-80 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). In the
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`alternative, FDU argued no contractual relationship existed between it and the plaintiffs, and if it
`
`did, that the reservation of rights clause was enforceable, and the plaintiffs could not recover. Id.
`
`at 780.
`
`Ultimately, the Beukas Court found in favor of FDU. Id. at 785. In doing so, the Court took
`
`care to distinguish its decision from that reached in Napolimno. See id. at 730—82. The court
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`recognized that “Napolitano was an academic fraud case" involving student discipline. Id. at 780.
`
`The court then found that “[a]lthough [the] Appellate Division in Napolitano appears to have
`
`accepted a modified standard of judicial deference for review of private university decision[-
`
`]making, [Napalitano] involved the exercise of academic, rather than administrative or business
`
`judgment, as in the instant case.” Id. at 781. The Court concluded that neither “judicial deference
`
`[n]or even the Napolimno de novo type review is the appropriate standard for reaching a just
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`determination in disputes of this nature.” Id.
`
`Important to note is the fact that the Beukas Court did not purport to define the contractual
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`relationship between students and the university in the context of a school’s decision to cancel
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`classes in reaction to a pandemic. With that said, however, the Court made clear that outside of the
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`academic discipline standard, the Napolitano line of cases is not necessarily the proper standard.
`
`See id. at 782 (“[I]t is clear that Napolitano, a case involving academic fraud, did not expressly
`
`reject either the doctrine of judicial deference or the classic contract model as the theoretical
`
`framework for resolving university-student disputes in every case”). While acknowledging that
`
`rigid contract theory is discouraged in defining the student-university contractual relationship, the
`
`Beukas Court stated, “it would be naive not to recognize that in the modern world[,] the university
`
`is indeed engaged in big business, with the student as consumer of its services." Id.
`
`Ultimately, Defendant’s decision to move classes online in this case does not comport
`
`squarely with the facts of Napolitauo or Beukas because the decision to transition classes online
`
`in light of a pandemic involves neither academic discipline nor a business decision to permanently
`
`close a college. This Court finds, however, that the instant case is more akin to the administrative
`
`decision in Beukas than it is to the academic discipline decision in Napolirano. As “it is clear that
`
`Napolitano” and its progeny do “not expressly reject either the doctrine of judicial deference or
`
`the classic contract model as the theoretical framework for resolving university-student disputes
`
`in every case,” this Court finds it proper for Beukas to define the contractual relationship between
`
`the parties in this case. Id. at 782.
`
`Like in Beukas, where the sudden loss of funding necessitated an administrative decision
`
`of consequence to dental students’ education, so too here did an exigent circumstance,
`
`the
`
`emergence of COVID-l9, necessitate an administrative decision affecting students’ ability to
`
`attend classes in-person. Additionally, in Beukas, the plaintiffs argued a contractual relationship
`
`existed between the student and university as
`
`through bulletins and other university
`
`representations. Similarly, Plaintiffs here argue a contract exists between the students and
`
`Monmouth as a result of representations made in “handbooks, policy manuals, brochures, .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`online course portal, advertisements, and other promotional materials[.]" (Am. Compl. ‘|[‘][ 78—79.)
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`Finally, unlike Napolimno and its progeny, the case before this Court does not involve academic
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`discipline, but rather administrative considerations as was the case in Beukas.
`
`For these reasons, Beukas is the appropriate authority to define the student-university
`
`contractual relationship in this case. In defining that contractual relationship, the Beukas Court
`
`found that “[t]he ‘true’ university-student ‘contract’ is one of mutual obligations implied, not in
`
`fact, but by law; it is a quasi-contract which is ‘created by law, for reasons ofjustice without regard
`
`to expressions of assent by either words or acts.”’ Beukas, 605 A.2d at 783-84 (citation omitted).
`
`While the Beukas Court focused on the “bona fides of the decision[-]making and the fairness of
`
`its implementation,” to rectify the dispute between student and university in the context of closing
`
`down a dental school, importantly, the Court's primary finding was that “applying quasi-contract
`
`theory to resolv[e] university-student conflicts over an administrative decision .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`is the most
`
`effective way to avoid injustice to both the university and its students.” 1d. at 784. Thus, quasi-
`
`contractual theory must be applied to the dispute in this case.
`
`This finding, in turn, means Plaintiffs’ traditional breach of contract claims, express and
`
`implied-in-law, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As instructed by Beukas,
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`classic contract doctrine should not be used to resolve disputes of this nature where the alleged
`
`terms of the contract are