`
`
`DERRICK PALMER, KENDIA MESIDOR,
`BENITA ROUSE, ALEXANDER ROUSE,
`BARBARA CHANDLER, LUIS PELLOT-
`CHANDLER, and DEASAHNI BERNARD,
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`
`
`
`No. 1:20-cv-02468-BMC
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs
`
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON.COM
`SERVICES, LLC,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
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`
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`v.
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 2 of 35 PageID #: 1540
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`The Court should not defer to OSHA under the primary
`jurisdiction doctrine ............................................................................................ 1
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`1.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims are not within the special
`competence of OSHA ............................................................................. 1
`
`2.
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`3.
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`
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`OSHA has no jurisdiction over public health and
`safety issues governed by state law ........................................................ 3
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`Amazon’s arguments as to the Court’s competence to
`decide this matter would apply to a wide swath of
`common law claims ................................................................................ 4
`
`Plaintiffs state a NYLL § 200 claim ................................................................... 6
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
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`ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 1
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`Plaintiffs challenge Amazon’s post-July 13 practices
`because workers continue to be unaware of the modified
`productivity requirements ..................................................................... 15
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`1.
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`2.
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`Plaintiffs’ § 200 claim is not preempted by the OSH Act ...................... 6
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`Plaintiffs need not establish causation of an existing
`injury in order to seek injunctive relief under § 200 ............................... 9
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`Plaintiffs state a claim for public nuisance ....................................................... 11
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`1.
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`2.
`
`3.
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`Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged interference with a
` public right ........................................................................................... 11
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`Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged special injury ................................. 12
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`Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged actual and
`proximate causation of the increased risk of exposure ......................... 14
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`Plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief .............................................. 15
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`Plaintiffs have standing to ensure that newly hired
`workers are notified about the modified productivity
`requirements .......................................................................................... 17
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`Workers’ compensation exclusivity does not bar employee-plaintiffs’
`claims ................................................................................................................ 18
`
`Plaintiffs state a claim for failure to pay wages under NYLL § 191 ................ 19
`
`Plaintiffs retain standing to challenge Amazon’s pre-July
`13 practices because it is not “absolutely clear” that they
`will not recur ......................................................................................... 16
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`E.
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`F.
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`CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 24
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`Leave Law payments are wages subject to the provisions
`of New York Labor Law § 191 ............................................................. 19
`
`Amazon’s $2 hazard pay was a raise and workers were
`entitled to receive that raise in their Leave Law payments ................... 21
`
`Plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief on
`behalf of a class ..................................................................................... 22
`
`Section 191 of the New York Labor Law provides a
`cause of action for breach of statutory rights ........................................ 23
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`
`
`ii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`FEDERAL CASES
`
`
`Page
`
`Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Co.,
`
`No. 09 Civ. 0395, 2010 WL 2925955 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2010) ................................... 5
`
`Businesses for a Better New York v. Angello,
`
`341 F. App’x 701 (2d Cir. 2009) .................................................................................... 7
`
`Cavalotti v. Daddyo’s BBQ, Inc.,
`
`No. 15 Civ. 6469, 2018 WL 5456654 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2018) .................................. 24
`
`City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
`
`461 U.S. 95 (1983) .................................................................................................. 16, 17
`
`City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
`
`315 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) .......................................................................... 14
`
`City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
`
`524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008).......................................................................................... 18
`
`Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
`
`568 U.S. 398 (2013) ...................................................................................................... 23
`
`Crawford v. Coram Fire Dist,
`
`No. CV 12-3850, 2015 WL 10044273 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2015) ................................. 20
`
`Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co.,
`
`467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006).............................................................................................. 4
`
`Does v. Scalia,
`
`No. 3:20-cv-01260, ECF No. 1 (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2020) .......................................... 2, 5
`
`DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd.,
`
`323 F. Supp. 3d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ........................................................................... 15
`
`Eastside, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. of New York, L.L.C.,
`
`405 F. Supp. 3d 408 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) ......................................................................... 13
`
`Ellis v. Tribune Television Co.,
`
`443 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006).......................................................................................... 2, 3
`
`Floyd v. City of New York,
`
`283 F.R.D. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) .................................................................................. 23
`
`iii
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`
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`
`Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
`
`528 U.S. 167 (2000) ...................................................................................................... 16
`
`Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n,
`
`505 U.S. 88 (1992) .................................................................................................. 6, 7, 8
`
`Goya Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc.,
`
`846 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1988)............................................................................................ 2
`
`Hill v. City of New York,
`136 F Supp 3d 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ............................................................................ 22
`
`
`In re Am. Fed’n of Labor,
`
`No. 20-1158, 2020 WL 3125324 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2020) .......................................... 9
`
`Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp,
`
`No. 12 Civ. 7460, 2013 WL 4565037 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) .................................. 9
`
`Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
`
`480 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2007)............................................................................................ 5
`
`Myers v. Hertz Corp.,
`
`624 F.3d 537 (2d Cir 2010)........................................................................................... 24
`
`Montauk Oil Transp. Corp. v. Tug El Zorro Grande,
`
`54 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1995)............................................................................................ 18
`
`NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc.,
`
`271 F.Supp.2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ...................................................................... 12, 14
`
`Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co.,
`
`46 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 1995).......................................................................................... 2, 3
`
`Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co.,
`
`942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1991) ............................................................................................. 5
`
`Sakellaridis v. Polar Air Cargo, Inc.,
`
`104 F. Supp. 2d 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ........................................................................ 4, 7
`
`Segedie v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc.,
`
`No. 14 Civ. 5029, 2015 WL 2168374 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) ..................................... 5
`
`Sosnowy v. A. Perri Farms, Inc.,
`
`764 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) .......................................................................... 20
`
`
`
`iv
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`
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 6 of 35 PageID #: 1544
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`Steel Inst. of New York v. City of New York,
`
`832 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ......................................................................... 7, 8
`
`Steel Inst. of N.Y. v. City of New York,
`
`716 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2013).............................................................................................. 5
`
`Summers v. Earth Is. Inst.,
`
`555 U.S. 488 (2009) ...................................................................................................... 22
`
`United States v. Herrera,
`
`584 F.2d 1137, 1149 (2d Cir. 1978)................................................................................ 6
`
`Wing Kwong Ho v. Target Const. of NY, Corp.,
`
`No. 08 Civ. 4750, 2011 WL 1131510 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) ................................ 24
`
`Wyeth v. Levine,
`
`555 U.S. 555 (2009) ........................................................................................................ 6
`
`STATE CASES
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`532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc.,
`
`750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001) .................................................................. 12, 13
`
`Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1277 v. Los Angeles Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth.,
`
`107 Cal. App. 4th 673, 32 Cal. Rtr. 2d 207 (2003) ....................................................... 19
`
`Binenfeld v. New York State Dep’t of Health,
`
`226 A.D.2d 935, 640 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1996) .................................................................... 6
`
`Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide,
`
`169 Cal. App. 4th 1540 (2009) ..................................................................................... 11
`
`Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Linder,
`
`451 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983) .......................................................................... 13
`
`Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc.,
`
`8 P.3d 837 (Nev. 2000) ................................................................................................. 19
`
`Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York,
`
`41 N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d 968 (1977) ........................................................................ 11
`
`Daniels v. New York City Transit Auth.,
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`35 N.Y.3d 938, 146 N.E.3d 1160 (2020) ........................................................................ 6
`
`Haire v. Bonelli,
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`870 N.Y.S.2d 591, 595 (2008) ...................................................................................... 12
`
`v
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`
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`Hicks v. Allegheny E. Conf. Ass’n of Seventh-Day Adventists,
`
`712 A.2d 1021, 1021-22 (D.C. Ct. App. 1998) ...................................................... 18, 19
`
`Massey v. McDonalds,
`
`20 CH 4247 (Circuit Ct. of Cook County June 24, 2020) ............................................ 11
`
`Meeker v. Van Rensselaer,
`
`15 Wend. 387 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) ............................................................................. 11
`
`Monaghan v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr,
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`85 N.Y.S.3d 475 (2018) .......................................................................................... 11, 12
`
`New York v. Schenectady Chems.,
`
`479 N.Y.2d 1010 (1984) ............................................................................................... 14
`
`People v. Pymm,
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`76 N.Y.2d 511, 561 N.Y.S.2d 687, 563 N.E.2d 1 (1990) ............................................... 5
`
`Pironti v. Leary,
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`42 A.D.3d 487, 840 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d Dep’t 2007) ....................................................... 15
`
`Raritan Dev. Corp. v. Silva,
`
`91 N.Y.2d 98 (1997) ..................................................................................................... 21
`
`Rocha v. GRT Constr. of New York,
`
`145 A.D.3d 926 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) ......................................................................... 7
`
`Roth v. City of St. Joseph,
`
` 147 S.W. 490 (Ks. Ct. App. 1912) ............................................................................... 11
`
`Saab v. Massachusetts CVS Pharmacy, LLC,
`
`452 Mass. 564, 896 N.E.2d 615 (2008) ........................................................................ 19
`
`Samiento v. World Yacht Inc.,
`
`10 N.Y.3d 70 (2008) ..................................................................................................... 20
`
`Seigle v. Bromley,
`
`124 P. 191, 195 (Colo. Ct. App. 1912) ......................................................................... 13
`
`Stock v. Ronan,
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`313 N.Y.S. 2d 508 (1970) ............................................................................................. 11
`
`Tierney v. Capricorn Inv’rs, L.P.,
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`189 A.D.2d 629 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1993) ................................................................. 24
`
`
`
`vi
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`
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`Trimarco v. Klein,
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`56 N.Y.2d 98, 436 N.E.2d 502 (1982) ............................................................................ 5
`
`Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory, Inc.,
`
`95 N.Y.2d 220 (2000) 21
`
`Vega v. CM and Assoc. Constr. Mgt., LLC,
`
`175 A.D.3d 1144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept 2019) ....................................................... 24
`
`Woodyear v. Schaefer,
`
`57 Md. 1 (1881) ............................................................................................................ 14
`
`
`
`FEDERAL RULES AND STATUTES
`29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 .................................................................................................................. 2
`
`29 C.F.R. § 1910.134 .............................................................................................................. 2, 9
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`29 C.F.R. § 1910.141 .................................................................................................................. 9
`
`29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) ............................................................................................................. 4, 7
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`29 U.S.C. § 659(c) ...................................................................................................................... 3
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`29 U.S.C. § 667(a) .................................................................................................................. 8, 9
`
`
`STATE LAWS
`
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`N.Y. Lab. L. §§ 191(1)(a)(i) ..................................................................................................... 20
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`N.Y. Lab. L. §§ 191(1)(a)(i)(d)................................................................................................. 20
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`N.Y. Lab. L. § 200 ...................................................................................................................... 6
`
`N.Y. Lab. L. §200(1) ............................................................................................................ 8, 10
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`N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 11 ............................................................................................... 18
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`N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 142 ............................................................................................. 18
`
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 821B, cmt. g (1979) ...................................................... 11, 12
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`2020 N.Y. Senate Bill S8091 § 5 .............................................................................................. 20
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`
`vii
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`
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 9 of 35 PageID #: 1547
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiffs allege longstanding state law claims asserting that Amazon’s failure to follow
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`New York public health and safety laws during the pandemic endangers workers and the public.
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`The coronavirus and its crippling consequences for New York may be novel, but Plaintiffs’
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`claims in this case are not.
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`Amazon urges the Court to defer to OSHA, an agency that has affirmatively decided to
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`ride out the pandemic on the sidelines and whose expertise is, in any event, not needed here.
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`Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint asserts violations of state law and guidance, bears little relation
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`to any OSHA standard, and alleges New York statutory and common law claims expressly
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`preserved by the OSH Act. Amazon’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing to seek injunctive relief
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`likewise is of no merit, as Plaintiffs raise ample concerns about the current conditions at JFK8
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`and the risk that COVID-19 will spread as a result. Finally, Plaintiffs’ wage claims under the
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`Labor Law are expressly contemplated by New York’s COVID-19 paid leave law.
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`This case may raise difficult questions, including, ultimately, whether the current severity
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`of the pandemic and the working conditions at JFK8 justify an injunction. But there should be no
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`question that Plaintiffs plausibly allege the elements of these causes of action, which workers
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`and the public have traditionally used to protect themselves from violations of public health and
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`safety laws. These questions are not appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss. The Court
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`should deny Amazon’s motion in its entirety.
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`ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`The Court should not defer to OSHA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
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`1.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims are not within the special competence of OSHA.
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`Primary jurisdiction is a prudential doctrine that is “narrow” and intended to “guard
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`1
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 10 of 35 PageID #: 1548
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`against premature judicial encroachment upon an agency’s sphere of responsibility and
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`expertise.” Goya Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 846 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1988).
`
`Amazon points to four “factors” it says govern the doctrine, but the case it cites cautioned that
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`there is no “rigid formula,” and that the benefits of agency expertise must be weighed against the
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`“potential costs resulting from complication and delay in the administrative proceedings.” Ellis v.
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`Tribune Television Co., 443 F.3d 71, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Comparing the complaint against the Ellis factors and potential costs of delay reveals what a
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`poor fit this case is for relinquishing this Court’s oversight role to an overburdened agency.
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`The first two Ellis factors concern the agency’s expertise and discretion over questions
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`posed by the litigation. Here, if Plaintiffs were asking this Court to opine on the adequacy of
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`protective equipment provided by Amazon, or the quality of its respirators, then these factors
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`might counsel in favor of deferring to OSHA’s primary jurisdiction. See Defs.’ Br. at 4 (citing 29
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`C.F.R. § 1910.132 on PPE and 29 C.F.R. § 1910.134 on respirators, which are not used by
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`workers at JFK8). But this case involves the timeliness and adequacy of leave payments and
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`whether Amazon has sufficiently informed its JFK8 workers of policies it claims to have
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`implemented at the corporate level. These questions require the application of law to disputed
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`facts, matters well within the conventional expertise of judges. See Goya, 846 F.2d at 853; Nat’l
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`Commc’ns Ass’n v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1995) (“determining
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`whether NCA paid its bills on time . . . [does not present] technical issues”).
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`Amazon also points to Does v. Scalia, No. 3:20-cv-01260, ECF No. 1 (M.D. Pa. July 22,
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`2020) for the proposition that OSHA has the authority to regulate COVID-related hazards under
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`the general duty clause. Defs.’ Br. at 5. But OSHA’s theoretical authority to cite Amazon under
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`the general duty clause for conditions at JFK8 is a far cry from a pending administrative
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`2
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 11 of 35 PageID #: 1549
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`proceeding that might lead to inconsistent rulings if not allowed to run its course. Concerns about
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`parallel proceedings animate the third and fourth Ellis factors, and OSHA’s pattern of COVID-
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`related enforcement suggests those factors are not at play here. Does v. Scalia was filed precisely
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`because OSHA declined to exercise its authority despite several workers filing complaints with
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`the agency against the same employer over a three-month period. In that case, OSHA revealed
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`that it has issued only four COVID-related citations in response to 7,300 worker complaints.
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`Does v. Scalia, No. 3:20-cv-01260, ECF No. 43-1, at 96:8-16. 1
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`Even if a JFK8 worker did initiate an OSHA complaint and OSHA chose to respond with
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`an inspection, the agency could take up to six months to issue a citation and proposed penalty,
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`whose implementation would be stayed pending any appeal by Amazon. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c). In
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`short, waiting for OSHA to act when it may never do so would “impose[] enormous costs” that
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`the plaintiffs here should not have to endure simply because the OSHA process is an available
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`alternative. Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 46 F.3d at 225. Amazon’s effort to convert this alternative
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`option into a jurisdictional prerequisite should be rejected. See Defs.’ Br. at 6. This Court can
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`resolve the “relatively simple factual dispute” this case presents “far more expeditiously” than
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`would be possible through OSHA. Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 46 F.3d at 225. It should do so.
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`2.
`
`OSHA has no jurisdiction over public health and safety issues governed by state
`law.
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`The Court need not analyze the Ellis factors to reject Amazon’s primary jurisdiction
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`argument. Not only does this case not call upon OSHA’s special expertise; it does not even
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`attempt to enforce the laws that OSHA is charged with enforcing—or federal law at all.
`
`
`1 See also Exclusive: OSHA Never Visited Missouri Poultry Facility After COVID-19 Complaints, KMBC Kansas
`City, available at https://www.kmbc.com/article/exclusive-osha-never-visited-missouri-poultry-facility-after-covid-
`19-complaints/33660429 (last visited August 23, 2020) (after receiving complaint, OSHA sent employer a letter
`stating it did not intend to conduct an inspection, and closed the file less than three weeks later, for a facility where
`371 workers later tested positive).
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`3
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 12 of 35 PageID #: 1550
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`Plaintiffs’ state law claims rely principally on New York’s “minimum requirements” for
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`businesses operating during the pandemic and New York leave law. To be sure, those mandates
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`incorporate some guidance from federal agencies, but they are state law. It defies reason and the
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`principles of federalism to suggest that when New York promulgated those requirements it
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`surrendered its jurisdiction to enforce them to a federal agency (or that it surrendered its
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`residents’ right to have those requirements enforced via private claims).
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`3.
`
`Amazon’s arguments as to the Court’s competence to decide this matter would
`apply to a wide swath of common law claims.
`
`Amazon’s primary jurisdiction argument appears not to be driven by the primary
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`jurisdiction doctrine itself, since it makes little sense to defer to OSHA’s enforcement in an area
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`where OSHA is not performing enforcement and with respect to state requirements over which
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`OSHA has no jurisdiction. Rather, the thrust of Amazon’s argument is that the Court should
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`defer because public safety and health claims raise complex questions of the appropriate standard
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`of care. That argument proves too much, sweeping in many of the kinds of claims traditionally
`
`litigated under state common law that are critical to protecting public health and safety. Yet
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`common law claims, even claims raising complex questions regarding the duty of care, have
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`historically “formed the bedrock of state regulation,” and are “a critical component of the States’
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`traditional ability to protect the health and safety of their citizens.” Desiano v. Warner-Lambert
`
`& Co., 467 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
`
`OSHA’s authority to protect workers (which it has not exercised here) exists alongside
`
`this state-law framework. OSHA has never displaced these enforcement mechanisms, and the
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`OSH Act’s savings provision expressly contemplates a role for private enforcement under state
`
`law. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4); Sakellaridis v. Polar Air Cargo, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 160, 163
`
`(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“There is a consensus that the savings clause operates to save state tort
`
`4
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`
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 13 of 35 PageID #: 1551
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`rules.”); Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 1991) (calling consensus “solid” and
`
`collecting cases); People v. Pymm, 76 N.Y.2d 511, 523-24, 561 N.Y.S.2d 687, 563 N.E.2d 1
`
`(1990), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1085 (1991). Moreover, the rights Plaintiffs seek to vindicate here
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`extend beyond the workplace and concern the health of the surrounding community, over which
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`OSHA has neither expertise nor legal authority. Steel Inst. of N.Y. v. City of New York, 716 F.3d
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`31, 33 (2d Cir. 2013). OSHA recently reiterated this limitation on its authority in the same case
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`Amazon cites here. Does v. Scalia, No. 3:20-cv-01260, ECF No. 46 at 15 n.9 (citing Lindsey v.
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`Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2007) for the proposition that “The [OSH] Act is
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`limited in scope, . . . as jurisdiction under the Act extends only to the employee-employer
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`relationship within the workplace.”).
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`To be sure, state law claims raising public safety and health questions will call on areas
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`of expertise with which courts may not have great familiarity. But that is so for many torts that
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`implicate standards of care, including medical malpractice claims. Plaintiffs’ claims are
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`substantially more straightforward than the typical claim raising a common law duty because
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`these claims are based on the mandatory “minimum requirements” of New York public health
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`law. E.g., Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09 Civ. 0395, 2010 WL 2925955, at *14 (E.D.N.Y.
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`July 21, 2010) (question whether corporation violated regulation “is one courts are well-
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`equipped to handle”); Segedie v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., No. 14 Civ. 5029, 2015 WL 2168374,
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`at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (similar). Those requirements provide the Court with the standard
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`of care Amazon owes its workers (under the § 200 claim) and the public generally (under the
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`public nuisance claim). Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98, 105, 436 N.E.2d 502, 505 (1982)
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`(where there is a customary “way of doing things safely, this custom may be proved to show that
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`[the one charged with the dereliction] has fallen below the required standard.”); see also N.Y.
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`5
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 14 of 35 PageID #: 1552
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`Pattern Jury Instr.--Civil 2:16.
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`Although the NY Forward guidelines are mandatory “minimum requirements,” the same
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`analysis would apply even if they were not binding. Non-mandatory guidelines are perfectly
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`good evidence of the accepted method of “doing things safely.” Daniels v. New York City Transit
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`Auth., 35 N.Y.3d 938, 939, 146 N.E.3d 1160 (2020) (finding that the “trial court properly
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`admitted plaintiff’s expert testimony regarding non-mandatory gap standards”).
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`And there is no due process problem with bringing common law claims to enforce public
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`health standards, whether or not they are binding on their own. All due process requires is that
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`“the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is
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`forbidden.” United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137, 1149 (2d Cir. 1978). NYLL § 200 and New
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`York’s public nuisance doctrine provide this warning. That they do not delineate exactly what
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`acts will lead to liability is immaterial. Binenfeld v. New York State Dep’t of Health, 226 A.D.2d
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`935, 936, 640 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (1996). It should come as no surprise to Amazon that it will be
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`held to a reasonable standard of care, and—for the reasons described above—that state- and
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`federally-promulgated guidelines will be relevant to determining where that standard lies.
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`B.
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`Plaintiffs state a NYLL § 200 claim.
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`1.
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`Plaintiffs’ § 200 claim is not preempted by the OSH Act.
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`Plaintiffs’ § 200 claim is not preempted. The OSH Act “was not intended to be all
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`encompassing[.]” Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 102 (1992) (plurality);
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`see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (presumption against preemption). To the
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`contrary, Congress “expressly saved two areas from federal pre-emption.” Gade, 505 U.S at 96.
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`The OSH Act declares that nothing in the Act shall be interpreted to (1) supersede or otherwise
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`affect “common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under
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`6
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 15 of 35 PageID #: 1553
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`any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course
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`of, employment,” 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4); or (2) “prevent any State agency or court from asserting
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`jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no
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`standard is in effect under section 655 of this title.” Id. § 667(a). Each of these clauses provides
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`an independent basis for rejecting Amazon’s preemption arguments in this case.
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`As an initial matter, as discussed in § I.B., supra, the “savings clause” of § 653(b)(4)
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`expressly preserves state tort and statutory claims like the right to a safe workplace codified at
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`NYLL § 200, which is “a codification of the common-law duty of property owners and general
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`contractors to provide workers with a safe place to work.” Rocha v. GRT Constr. of New York,
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`145 A.D.3d 926, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In
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`Sakellaridis v. Polar Air Cargo, Inc., a court in this district rejected a preemption challenge to
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`New York’s scaffold law, concluding that “[i]t is not consequential that the standard of care is
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`prescribed by the common law, a separate statutory scheme, or an administrative scheme.
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`Because [the scaffold law] provides a remedy for personal injuries suffered in the course of
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`employment, it is not preempted.” 104 F. Supp. 2d at 162; see also Businesses for a Better New
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`York v. Angello, 341 F. App’x 701, 706 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting preemption challenge to
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`scaffold law, noting “OSHA is not intended to ‘diminish or affect’ the ‘statutory rights, duties, or
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`liabilities of employers’ with respect to work-related injuries” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4)).
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`Gade v. Nat’l. Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n. does not alter this analysis. Unlike the state law
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`at issue in Gade, § 200 does not “directly and substantially regulate worker health.” Steel Inst. of
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`New York v. City of New York, 832 F. Supp. 2d 310, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 716 F.3d 31
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`(2d Cir. 2013) (citing Gade). Instead, § 200 codifies a common-law general duty of care to
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`provide a safe workplace. See Rocha, 145 A.D.3d at 927. Moreover, § 200’s protections extend
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`7
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`Case 1:20-cv-02468-BMC Document 68 Filed 08/25/20 Page 16 of 35 PageID #: 1554
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`not just to employees, but to “all persons…lawfully freque