Case 1:22-cv-01479-DG-SJB Document 55 Filed 11/18/22 Page 1 of 30 PageID #: 6654
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`Petitioner,
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`Kathy Drew King, Regional Director of Region 29
`of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on
`behalf of the National Labor Relations Board,
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`-against-
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`Amazon.com Services LLC,
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`Respondent.
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`---------------------------------------------------------------X
`DIANE GUJARATI, United States District Judge:
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`MEMORANDUM & ORDER
`22-CV-01479 (DG) (SJB)
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`Pending before the Court is the Amended Petition for Temporary Injunction Under
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`Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (the “Amended Petition”), filed on July 8,
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`2022 by Petitioner Kathy Drew King, Regional Director of Region 29 of the National Labor
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`Relations Board, for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board. See Amended
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`Petition (“Am. Pet.”), ECF No. 44. The Amended Petition relates to the April 2020 discharge
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`from employment of Gerald Bryson by Respondent Amazon.com Services LLC (“Amazon”).
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`By way of the Amended Petition, Petitioner seeks certain injunctive relief, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
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`§ 160(j) (“Section 10(j)”), pending the disposition by the National Labor Relations Board
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`(“NLRB” or “Board”) of certain matters before the Board relating to the discharge of Bryson.
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`Petitioner alleges that there is reasonable cause to believe that Respondent has engaged in
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`unfair labor practices affecting commerce in violation of Section 8(a)(1) (“Section 8(a)(1)”) of
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`the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) with respect to Bryson, who Petitioner alleges was
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`unlawfully terminated from employment by Amazon for having engaged in certain protected
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`concerted activity. Respondent opposes the Amended Petition, arguing that Bryson was lawfully
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`terminated for cause – not because of his participation in protected concerted activity.
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`More specifically, Petitioner alleges that in March and April 2020, Bryson – then an
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`Amazon employee – engaged in certain protected concerted activity by advocating, with his co-
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`workers, for workplace health and safety protections in light of the Covid-19 pandemic and by
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`protesting with his co-workers Amazon’s failure to provide greater Covid-19 safety protections
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`to employees, and that Bryson was terminated in April 2020 as a result of his participation in
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`those protected activities. Petitioner alleges that Respondent’s discharge of Bryson and failure
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`and refusal to reinstate him – or to offer to reinstate him – violates Section 8(a)(1) and, therefore,
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`Respondent is depriving Bryson of his rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA.
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`Respondent, in turn, concedes that Bryson engaged in certain protected activity, but maintains
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`that he was terminated following an investigation by Amazon into his verbal altercation with
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`another Amazon employee in the parking lot of Amazon’s JFK8 Fulfillment Center in Staten
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`Island, New York (the “JFK8 Facility” or “JFK8”), during which Bryson and the other employee
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`verbally exchanged insults with one another in connection with the other employee voicing
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`skepticism about the protest in which Bryson was participating. Petitioner argues that Amazon
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`conducted a sham investigation into the altercation and that the reason given by Amazon for
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`Bryson’s termination was pretextual.
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`Petitioner seeks to have this Court enter an order directing Amazon, pending the final
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`disposition of the matters currently before the Board, to cease and desist from taking certain
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`actions and to take certain actions, including: reinstating Bryson to his position or to a
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`substantially equivalent position; rescinding Bryson’s discharge, expunging the adverse
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`employment action from Bryson’s employment records, and refraining from relying on the
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`discharge in assessing any future disciplinary actions; and posting physical copies of the order in
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`the JFK8 Facility, distributing electronic copies of the order to employees at the JFK8 Facility,
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`and reading the order to employees at one or more mandatory meetings.
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`For the reasons set forth below, and to the extent described below, the Court grants in
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`part and denies in part Petitioner’s request for temporary injunctive relief. The Court finds that
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`there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been committed by Amazon
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`with respect to the termination of Bryson, and determines that the issuance of an order directing
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`Respondent to cease and desist from taking certain actions and directing Respondent to post,
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`distribute, and read the Court’s order to employees at the JFK8 Facility is just and proper, but
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`that the requested affirmative relief specific to Bryson – i.e., directing Respondent to reinstate
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`Bryson to his position or to a substantially equivalent position, rescind Bryson’s discharge,
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`expunge the adverse employment action from Bryson’s employment records, and refrain from
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`relying on the discharge in assessing any future disciplinary actions – is not warranted under the
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`applicable legal standards governing the granting of relief in this context.
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`BACKGROUND
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`This case arises from Respondent’s termination of Gerald Bryson, who was an employee
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`at Respondent’s JFK8 fulfillment center. In Spring 2020, Bryson, along with others, protested
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`Respondent’s failure to take certain health and safety measures during the Covid-19 pandemic.
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`In late March 2020, Bryson and others organized and participated in a protest to demand that
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`Respondent provide employees with protective equipment and shut down JFK8 for proper
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`cleaning. Bryson and others then planned another protest for April 6, 2020 to continue to press
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`their Covid-19 safety concerns.
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`During the April 6, 2020 protest, Bryson got into a verbal altercation with another
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`Amazon employee, Dimitra Evans, who had called out to Bryson during the protest. The verbal
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`altercation between Bryson and Evans – which was recorded on video – escalated, with Bryson
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`and Evans trading insults.1 Evans eventually went inside the facility and stopped engaging with
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`Bryson. Neither Evans nor Bryson reported this incident to Respondent.
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`Respondent thereafter commenced an investigation regarding the incident between
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`Bryson and Evans. This investigation resulted in Bryson’s termination on April 17, 2020.
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`Evans, on the other hand, received only a written warning for her use of inappropriate language.
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`On June 17, 2020 – two months after he was discharged from employment by Amazon –
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`Bryson filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board in Case No. 29-CA-261755, alleging
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`that Respondent suspended and subsequently discharged him in violation of Section 8(a)(1). See
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`Am. Pet. ¶ 3. On December 22, 2020, Petitioner issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing in
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`Case No. 29-CA-261755, alleging that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the
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`meaning of Section 8(a)(1). See Am. Pet. ¶ 4. A trial before an Administrative Law Judge (the
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`“ALJ”) was held on various dates in 2021.
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`In or about April 2021, approximately one year after Bryson was terminated, Amazon’s
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`employees formed a union, the Amazon Labor Union (the “ALU”). See, e.g., Petitioner’s
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`Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Amended Petition for Temporary
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`Injunction Under Section 10(j) of the NLRA (“Pet. Br.”) at 10-11, ECF No. 45; Respondent’s
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`Brief in Opposition to Petitioner’s Amended Petition for a Section 10(j) Injunction (“Resp. Br.”)
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`at 8, ECF No. 46-1. On October 25, 2021, the ALU filed with Region 29 of the Board a petition
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`for a representation election to determine whether employees at Amazon’s four Staten Island
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`facilities wished to be represented by the ALU for the purposes of collective bargaining. See
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`Am. Pet. ¶ 8(c). The ALU withdrew that petition on November 12, 2021 because the ALU did
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`1 Familiarity with the specifics of these insults – as reflected in the record before the Court – is
`assumed.
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`not have a sufficient showing of interest to support the processing of the petition. See Am. Pet.
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`¶ 8(c). On December 22, 2021, the ALU filed a second petition for a representation election to
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`determine whether employees at the JFK8 Facility wished to be represented by the ALU. See
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`Am. Pet. ¶ 8(d). An election was thereafter scheduled for March 25, 26, and 28-30, 2022. See
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`Am. Pet. ¶ 8(d).
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`On March 17, 2022, months after the trial before the ALJ concluded but before the ALJ
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`had issued a decision, and only eight days before the ALU election was scheduled to begin,
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`Petitioner filed the first Petition for Temporary Injunction Under Section 10(j) (the “Initial
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`Petition”) in the instant action. See Initial Petition, ECF No. 1. In connection with the filing of
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`the Initial Petition, Petitioner argued that injunctive relief – including in the form of an order
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`directing Respondent to reinstate Bryson – was necessary in advance of the ALU election.
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`Petitioner represented that it was “imperative for employees to be reassured of their rights under
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`the National Labor Relations Act before the representation election has closed” to ensure that
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`Respondent did not benefit “in the election from the coercive effects of its unfair labor practices
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`at issue in this case.” See ECF No. 12 at 2; see also Transcript of March 23, 2022 Oral
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`Argument at 29-30, ECF No. 49 (“It is important to have this matter decided before the election
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`in order to ensure employees that they can freely exercise their rights in this election, and
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`generally, if they choose to support the [ALU] without fear of retaliation knowing that the
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`Government will protect their rights and act swiftly to achieve justice and restore them to the
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`workplace if Amazon somehow retaliates against them. So, in order to have a fair election, we
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`believe that it’s imperative to have Bryson restored to the workplace, or at least for this matter to
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`be resolved in advance of the election.”).
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`Petitioner requested that the Initial Petition be tried on the official evidentiary record
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`developed before the ALJ and on the sworn affidavits of Bryson, Derrick Palmer, Tristian
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`Martinez, and Christian Smalls, which Petitioner submitted in support of the Initial Petition, see
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`Affidavit of Gerald Bryson, ECF No. 5-14; Affidavit of Derrick Palmer, ECF No. 5-15; Affidavit
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`of Tristian Martinez, ECF No. 5-16; Affidavit of Christian Smalls (“Smalls Aff.”), ECF No. 5-
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`17, (collectively, the “Affidavits”). See generally Motion to Try Petition on the Basis of
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`Administrative Record, Including Hearing Transcript and Affidavits (“Motion to Try Petition”),
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`ECF No. 5. Petitioner specifically requested that the Court’s “just and proper” determination –
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`which, as discussed further below, is part of a Section 10(j) analysis – be based on the Affidavits,
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`noting that the just and proper issue was not before the ALJ. See Motion to Try Petition at 5-6;
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`see also Transcript of March 30, 2022 Status Conference before Magistrate Judge Sanket J.
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`Bulsara at 8, ECF No. 31 (“Our just and proper evidence is limited to four affidavits.”).
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`Petitioner argued that the Affidavits provided evidence to support Petitioner’s position that the
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`absence of injunctive relief could lead to irreparable harm. See Motion to Try Petition at 5. The
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`Affidavits submitted by Petitioner generally concern ALU organizing efforts and Bryson’s role
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`in the ALU. See generally Affidavits. When submitted to the Court, the Affidavits were
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`untested by Respondent and, inter alia, contained statements attributed to employees other than
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`the affiants. See generally Affidavits.
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`In reliance on the Affidavits, Petitioner asserted, inter alia, that even after Bryson’s
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`termination in April 2020, Bryson remained active in trying to organize JFK8 employees, see
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`ECF No. 7 at 19-20; that numerous employees were afraid to openly support the ALU primarily
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`based on Bryson’s termination, see ECF No. 7 at 2; that “Bryson’s termination [was] a specter
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`over the [ALU’s] efforts and [was] chilling employees’ willingness to freely support the [ALU],”
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`see ECF No. 7 at 21; and that “employees still talk[ed] about Bryson’s discharge and . . .
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`expressed their fear of supporting the [ALU] because Amazon fired Bryson and has not
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`reinstated him and their fears have not been allayed by the standard administrative legal
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`proceedings before the Board,” see ECF No. 7 at 21. Petitioner further asserted that, without
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`immediate injunctive relief, Respondent’s actions would “permanently end employee organizing
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`around working conditions, irreparably harm the national policy protecting workers’ right to
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`band together at work, and seriously undermine the Board’s remedial power.” See ECF No. 7 at
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`36; see also ECF No. 7 at 40-41.2
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`Respondent opposed the Initial Petition, arguing that Bryson was lawfully terminated for
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`having “publicly, viciously, and profanely berated a female coworker over a bullhorn and social
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`media broadcasts on April 6, 2020, after she dared to disagree with his advocacy that Amazon
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`should close its JFK8 facility in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.” See ECF No. 20 at
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`1. Respondent disputed Petitioner’s claim that Bryson’s termination in 2020 suppressed
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`organizing activity, see ECF No. 20 at 3, arguing that, to the contrary, the organizing efforts had
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`“flourished,” see ECF No. 20 at 6; see also ECF No. 20 at 14 (asserting that “the ALU’s
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`organizing efforts . . . began long after Bryson’s termination and are now in full bloom” and that
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`“[r]ather than having been nipped in the bud, the ALU’s organizing activity blossomed after
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`Bryson’s termination”). Respondent also took issue with the timing of the filing of the Initial
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`Petition, arguing that the Initial Petition was filed in an attempt by Petitioner to improperly
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`influence the outcome of the then-upcoming election and constituted an “abuse of the federal
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`2 Petitioner additionally argued that reinstatement of Bryson “offers the best chance of . . .
`preserving the employees’ Section 7 right to engage in protected concerted activity generally,
`a level playing field in first contract bargaining at JFK8 if the [ALU] wins the election, a
`renewed campaign at JFK8 if the [ALU] loses the election, and employee free choice in the
`ongoing campaigns at the other Staten Island facilities,” and that “[w]hen the Board issues its
`final order, likely years from now because of parties’ appeal rights, it will likely be too late.”
`See ECF No. 21 at 3 (emphases in original).
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`court’s civil process.” See ECF No. 20 at 3-4. Respondent asserted that Petitioner’s filing of the
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`Initial Petition so close in time to the election “engineered a phony emergency.” See ECF No. 20
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`at 5. Respondent further asserted that the facts, principally drawn from the Affidavits,
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`demonstrate “that there has been no harm to either the ALU’s organizing efforts or the JFK8
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`associates’ interest in those efforts.” See ECF No. 20 at 13; see also ECF No. 20 at 15 (asserting
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`that union activity and interest increased during the period between Bryson’s termination and
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`mid-2021).
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`In connection with opposing the Initial Petition, Respondent requested discovery and an
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`evidentiary hearing to, inter alia, address the Affidavits, arguing that the Affidavits were beyond
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`the record before the ALJ, see Opposition to Motion to Try Petition at 6, ECF No. 18, constituted
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`and contained hearsay, see Opposition to Motion to Try Petition at 6-7, and remained untested,
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`see Opposition to Motion to Try Petition at 6-7 (“None of the affiants have been subject to cross-
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`examination on the content of their affidavits, which forms the sole basis for Petitioner’s ‘just
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`and proper’ argument under the Section 10(j) framework. . . . Amazon must be permitted the
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`opportunity to test the veracity of the affiants through cross-examination.”). Respondent asserted
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`that “a one-sided presentation of only [Petitioner’s] cherry-picked evidence . . . would constitute
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`a classic deprivation of due process.” See Opposition to Motion to Try Petition at 7.
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`On March 18, 2022, the Court held a conference to address the injunctive relief sought by
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`Petitioner by way of the Initial Petition. See ECF No. 14. On March 23, 2022, oral argument
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`was held on the Initial Petition. See ECF No. 26.
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`By Order dated March 24, 2022, the Court granted in part Respondent’s request for
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`discovery, limited to the issue of whether the injunctive relief sought by Petitioner was just and
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`proper, and referred the parties to Magistrate Judge Sanket J. Bulsara for discovery management.
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`See Order dated March 24, 2022. Judge Bulsara presided over the limited discovery, which took
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`place between March 30, 2022 and May 25, 2022. During discovery, the four affiants – Bryson,
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`Palmer, Martinez, and Smalls – were deposed.3 The deposition testimony largely concerned the
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`formation and organizing efforts of the ALU, Bryson’s role in the ALU, and employee interest in
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`the ALU.
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`Meanwhile, the election at JFK8 was held and, on April 1, 2022, it was determined that
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`the ALU had received the majority of the ballots cast. See Am. Pet. ¶ 8(e). Respondent filed
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`with the Board objections to the conduct of the election, and the General Counsel of the Board
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`transferred the matter to the Regional Director for Region 28 of the Board. See Am. Pet. ¶ 8(f).
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`On April 18, 2022, while discovery was taking place in the instant action and after the
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`ALU’s success in the representation election, the ALJ issued his decision in the underlying case
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`before the Board. See ALJ Decision, ECF No. 35-1. In his decision, the ALJ found that
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`Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by discharging Bryson because of his protected concerted
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`activity,4 and directed Respondent to, inter alia, cease and desist from discharging employees
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`because of their protected concerted activity, offer Bryson reinstatement to his former position
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`or, if his position no longer existed, to a substantially equivalent position, and post and distribute
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`3 Palmer was deposed on May 18, 2022. See Deposition of Derrick Palmer (“Palmer Depo.”),
`ECF No. 46-4. Martinez was deposed on May 20, 2022. See Deposition of Tristian Martinez
`(“Martinez Depo.”), ECF No. 46-5. Bryson was deposed on May 23, 2022. See Deposition
`of Gerald J. Bryson (“Bryson Depo.”), ECF No. 46-2. Smalls was deposed on May 25, 2022.
`See Deposition of Christian Smalls (“Smalls Depo.”), ECF No. 46-3. The record before the
`Court includes those portions of the deposition testimony filed by the parties.
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` In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted that there was “considerable evidence” that
`Respondent’s stated reason for discharging Bryson was pretextual, and noted, inter alia, that
`the evidence demonstrated that Respondent conducted a “skewed investigation” of the April
`6, 2020 altercation between Bryson and Evans. See ALJ Decision at 20. Familiarity with the
`ALJ’s findings and conclusions is assumed.
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`to employees notices reflecting the relief granted by the ALJ. See ALJ Decision at 20, 22-23.
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`There has not been a final disposition of the case before the Board, see Am. Pet. ¶ 10, as
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`Respondent has filed exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, see Respondent’s Exceptions to the
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`ALJ’s Decisions, ECF No. 47-23.
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`On June 24, 2022, following the close of discovery in the instant action and based on the
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`developments noted above – including the ALU’s success in the election and the issuance of the
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`ALJ’s decision – the Court held a conference. See ECF No. 42.5 At the conference, and in light
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`of Petitioner’s prior withdrawal of certain requested relief relating to Bryson’s suspension –
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`which withdrawal was made in a footnote to a letter dated April 20, 2022, see ECF No. 35 at 1
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`n.3 – the Court directed Petitioner to file an amended petition reflecting the relief still being
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`sought by Petitioner. See ECF No. 42.
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`On July 8, 2022, Petitioner filed the Amended Petition. See Am. Pet. The Amended
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`Petition is substantially similar to the Initial Petition, but accounts for the April 2022 ALU
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`election victory and the issuance of the ALJ’s decision and does not seek relief related to
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`Bryson’s suspension. See generally Am. Pet.
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`On August 17, 2022, oral argument was held on the Amended Petition. See ECF No. 50.
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`As set forth above, Petitioner argued in connection with the Initial Petition that injunctive
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`relief in the form of an order directing Respondent to reinstate Bryson was just and proper
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`principally because of the then-impending election. In contrast, Petitioner argues in connection
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`with the Amended Petition that because “Amazon has challenged the election results and its
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`5 In advance of the June 24, 2022 conference, the parties filed a joint status letter. See Joint
`Status Letter, ECF No. 40. Despite Respondent’s earlier request for an evidentiary hearing,
`Respondent indicated that it likely would not seek an evidentiary hearing but asked for the
`opportunity to supplement its position on this issue by June 23, 2022. See Joint Status Letter
`at 1-2. Respondent did not thereafter request an evidentiary hearing.
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`objections are being litigated[,] . . . it is even more imperative that Bryson be reinstated to show
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`the [ALU’s] legitimacy and to allow the [ALU] the opportunity to maintain its level of support
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`through the challenge process if there is to be any chance of a level playing field between
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`Amazon and the nascent [ALU] when they bargain for an initial collective bargaining
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`agreement.” See Pet. Br. at 12; see also Pet. Br. at 16; Petitioner’s Response Brief to
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`Respondent’s Brief in Opposition (“Pet. Reply”) at 4, 6-8, ECF No. 48. Petitioner argues that
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`absent Bryson’s reinstatement, Amazon employees’ willingness to act in concert will be
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`irreparably harmed. See, e.g., Pet. Br. at 19-21; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 9. More specifically,
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`Petitioner contends that Bryson’s reinstatement would work to protect employees’ willingness to
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`engage in activities such as protests concerning workplace safety, see Pet. Br. at 20; is necessary
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`to protect employees’ interest in and willingness to openly and freely support the ALU and
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`engage in protected concerted activity, see Pet. Br. at 17-18; and would restore a “key figure” to
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`JFK8 that would empower the ALU to “level the playing field during first contract bargaining
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`and further protected concerted activity in support of the [ALU’s] bargaining goals” and “aid the
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`ongoing campaigns at Respondent’s other Staten Island facilities,” see Pet. Br. at 22. In support
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`of her position, Petitioner – as with the Initial Petition – relies on the official evidentiary record
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`developed before the ALJ and on the Affidavits. See generally Pet. Br.; Pet. Reply.6
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`6 Make the Road New York, a non-profit organization that represents Bryson in the underlying
`case before the NLRB – and that represented Bryson, Palmer, and Martinez at their
`depositions in the instant action, see Bryson Depo. at 2, 5; Palmer Depo. at 7; Martinez Depo.
`at 7 – and the ALU have each filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support
`of Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief. See ECF Nos. 30, 53. Courts have noted that
`“[t]here is no governing standard, rule or statute prescribing the procedure for obtaining leave
`to file an amicus brief in the district court, and so deciding whether to permit an individual to
`act as amicus curiae lies in the firm discretion of the district court.” See Sec. & Exch.
`Comm’n v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20-CV-10832, 2021 WL 4555352, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4,
`2021) (quotation marks omitted). Courts permit the filing of amicus curiae submissions when
`“they are of aid to the court and offer insights not available from the parties.” See Auto. Club
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`In response to Petitioner’s just and proper arguments, Respondent argues, inter alia, that
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`the record is devoid of evidence that Bryson’s termination caused harm to the ALU’s organizing
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`efforts or that the ALU will falter without Bryson’s reinstatement. See Resp. Br. at 3-4.7
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`Respondent further argues that there is no evidence that Bryson’s protests evolved into the ALU
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`organizing campaign a year later or that Bryson had a leadership role in the ALU. See Resp. Br.
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`at 21-22. Respondent contends that Petitioner would have sought Bryson’s reinstatement sooner
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`had the Board truly believed that Bryson’s reinstatement was integral to the protection of
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`employee rights during the ALU’s organizing campaign. See Resp. Br. at 22.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA in relevant part provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
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`an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
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`guaranteed in [Section 7].” 29 U.S.C § 158(a)(1). Section 7 of the NLRA in relevant part
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`provides that employees “shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
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`organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
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`engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
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`or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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`Pursuant to Section 10(j) of the NLRA, the Board “shall have power, upon issuance of a
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`of N.Y., Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 11-CV-06746, 2011 WL 5865296, at *1
`(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011). Here, each of the parties to this action is represented by able
`counsel and, having reviewed the respective proposed amicus curiae briefs, the Court
`concludes that the briefing does not assist the Court. Accordingly, the motions for leave to
`file amicus curiae briefs, ECF Nos. 30 and 53, are denied.
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` Indeed, at oral argument, Respondent asserted that ALU organizers would explain to Amazon
`associates who Bryson was and what had happened to him in order to bolster the ALU’s
`organizing efforts. See Transcript of August 17, 2022 Oral Argument (“Aug. 17, 2022 Tr.”)
`at 25-26.
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`Case 1:22-cv-01479-DG-SJB Document 55 Filed 11/18/22 Page 13 of 30 PageID #: 6666
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`complaint . . . charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice,
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`to petition [a] United States district court . . . for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order
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`. . . and [the court] shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or
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`restraining order as it deems just and proper.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). Section 10(j) “gives federal
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`district courts the power to grant temporary injunctive relief, pending the NLRB’s resolution of
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`an unfair labor practice charge.” Fernbach ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Raz Dairy, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d
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`452, 460-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Notably, injunctive relief under
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`Section 10(j) is “an extraordinary remedy.” See Kreisberg v. HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC, 732
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`F.3d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. HealthBridge
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`Mgmt., LLC v. Kreisberg, 574 U.S. 1066 (2014).
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`The two-prong standard for Section 10(j) injunctive relief in this Circuit is well
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`established. See HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC, 732 F.3d at 141; see also Paulsen v. Remington
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`Lodging & Hosp., LLC, 773 F.3d 462, 468-69 (2d Cir. 2014); Ley v. Wingate of Dutchess, Inc.,
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`182 F. Supp. 3d 93, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). “First, the court must find reasonable cause to believe
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`that an unfair labor practice has been committed. Second, the court must find that injunctive
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`relief is just and proper.” Remington Lodging & Hosp., LLC, 773 F.3d at 468-69.
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`In considering whether a petitioner has demonstrated reasonable cause to believe that an
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`unfair labor practice has been committed, the district court “does not need to make a final
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`determination whether the conduct in question constitutes an unfair labor practice.” Hoffman ex
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`rel. N.L.R.B. v. Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 247 F.3d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Raz
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`Dairy, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 461. Rather, “reasonable cause to support such a conclusion is
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`sufficient.” Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 247 F.3d at 365; see also Raz Dairy, Inc., 881 F. Supp.
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`2d at 461 (“The [NLRB’s] Regional Director is not required to show that an unfair labor practice
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`Case 1:22-cv-01479-DG-SJB Document 55 Filed 11/18/22 Page 14 of 30 PageID #: 6667
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`occurred, or that the precedents governing the case are in perfect harmony, but only that there is
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`reasonable cause to believe that a Board decision finding an unfair labor practice will be
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`enforced by a Court of Appeals.” (alteration accepted) (quoting Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633
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`F.2d 1026, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1980))). District courts must afford “significant deference” to the
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`NLRB Regional Director’s determinations regarding reasonable cause. See Remington Lodging
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`& Hosp., LLC, 773 F.3d at 469 (citing Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 247 F.3d at 365). Where
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`factual issues are in dispute, the district court “should draw all inferences in favor of the NLRB”
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`and “should sustain the NLRB’s version of the facts as long as it is ‘within the range of
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`rationality.’” Blyer ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. P & W Elec., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (E.D.N.Y.
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`2001) (quoting Mego Corp., 633 F.2d at 1031). Indeed, “even on issues of law, the district court
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`should be hospitable to the views of the [NLRB’s] General Counsel, however novel.” Murphy v.
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`Cayuga Med. Ctr. of Ithaca, 715 F. App’x 108, 109 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mego Corp., 633
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`F.2d at 1031); see also Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 247 F.3d at 365 (“In this Circuit, when
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`considering § 10(j) petitions, we give considerable deference to the NLRB Regional Director.
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`As we have noted, with respect to issues of fact, the Regional Director should be given the
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`benefit of the doubt . . . and on questions of law, the Board’s view should be sustained unless the
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`court is convinced that it is wrong.” (quotation marks omitted)); Silverman v. Major League
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`Baseball Player Rels. Comm., Inc., 67 F.3d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Appropriate deference
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`must be shown to the judgment of the NLRB, and a district court should decline to grant relief
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`only if convinced that the NLRB’s legal or factual theories are fatally flawed.”); HealthBridge
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`Mgmt., LLC, 732 F.3d at 141 (“Generally, a preliminary injunction involves no preliminary
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`determination by a government enforcement agency, is resolved on the merits by a district court,
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`and is issued pursuant to the court’s equitable power rather than a specific statute. By contrast,
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`Case 1:22-cv-01479-DG-SJB Document 55 Filed 11/18/22 Page 15 of 30 PageID #: 6668
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`§ 10(j) petitions come from a unique statutory scheme that requires . . . deference to the NLRB,
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`which resolves the underlying unfair labor practice complaint on the merits and makes an initial
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`determination, prior to the filing of a petition, to file such a complaint.”). Moreover, where, as
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`here, the ALJ has ruled in the underlying matter before the NLRB, the district court must accord
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`appropriate deference to the ALJ’s decision. See Silverman v. J.R.L. Food Corp., 196 F.3d 334,
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`337-38 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Blyer ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Jung Sun Laundry Grp. Corp., No. 10-
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`CV-02975, 2010 WL 4722286, a