`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`
`
`ECF Case
`
`
`
`Case No. 1:07-cv-02103 (LLS)
`(related case no. 1:07-cv-03582 (LLS))
`
`
` )
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`
`
`________________________________________
`
`VIACOM INTERNATIONAL INC.,
`COMEDY PARTNERS,
`COUNTRY MUSIC TELEVISION, INC.,
`PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION,
`and BLACK ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION
`LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
` v.
`
`YOUTUBE, INC., YOUTUBE, LLC, and
`GOOGLE INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`________________________________________
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’
`RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`Paul M. Smith (No. PS-2362)
`Scott B. Wilkens (pro hac vice)
`Luke C. Platzer (No. LP-0734)
`JENNER & BLOCK LLP
`1099 New York Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20001
`(202) 639-6000
`
`Susan J. Kohlmann (No. SK-1855)
`JENNER & BLOCK LLP
`919 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022
`(212) 891-1600
`
`Stuart J. Baskin (No. SB-9936)
`Kirsten Nelson Cunha (No. KN-0283)
`SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
`599 Lexington Avenue
`New York, NY 10022
`(212) 848-4000
`
`
`Matthew D. McGill (No. MM-4545)
`GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`1050 Connecticut Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 955-8500
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 2 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iii
`
`GLOSSARY.................................................................................................................................. vi
`
`INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................................................4
`
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................7
`
`I. QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING YOUTUBE’S AWARENESS OF
`INFRINGING ACTIVITY PRECLUDE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
`YOUTUBE’S DMCA DEFENSE. .......................................................................................7
`
`A. YouTube Has Not Shown That It Lacked Actual Knowledge or Awareness of
`Viacom’s Clips-in-Suit. ................................................................................................8
`
`B. Extensive Evidence of YouTube’s Willful Blindness Raises Multiple Factual
`Disputes That Preclude Summary Judgment in YouTube’s Favor. .....................10
`
`1. YouTube’s Motion Misconstrues The Second Circuit’s Willful Blindness
`Doctrine. ............................................................................................................10
`
`2. The Summary Judgment Record Raises Numerous Genuine Disputes Of
`Material Fact as to YouTube’s Willful Blindness. ........................................16
`
`a. YouTube Was Aware of a High Probability of Infringement of
`Viacom’s Copyrighted Works. .............................................................. 16
`
`b. YouTube Deliberately Shielded Itself From Learning Of Particular
`Infringements of Viacom’s Clips-In-Suit.............................................. 21
`
`C. YouTube’s Inaccurate Assertions About Viacom’s Marketing and Enforcement
`Practices Do Not Demonstrate the Absence of Fact Issues on YouTube’s
`Awareness of Infringement. ......................................................................................28
`
`1. Viacom’s Lawful Marketing Practices Did Not Deprive YouTube of
`Knowledge of Infringement. ............................................................................29
`
`2. Viacom’s Decision to Forebear from Some Copyright Enforcement Did Not
`Deprive YouTube of Knowledge of Infringement or Create an Implied
`License. ..............................................................................................................31
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 3 of 62
`Case 1:07—cv—02103-LLS Document 446
`Filed 03/29/13 Page 3 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`II. QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING YOUTUBE’S CONTROL OF AND DIRECT
`II. QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING YOUTUBE’S CONTROL OF AND DIRECT
`FINANCIAL INTEREST IN THE INFRINGING ACTIVITY PRECLUDE ENTRY
`FINANCIAL INTEREST IN THE INFRINGING ACTIVITY PRECLUDE ENTRY
`OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON YOUTUBE’S DMCA DEFENSE. .........................33
`OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON YOUTUBE’S DMCA DEFENSE. ....................... ..33
`
`A. Triable Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment for YouTube on the Control
`A. Triable Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment for YouTube on the Control
`Element of the DMCA. ..............................................................................................33
`Element of the DMCA. ............................................................................................ ..33
`
`1. Control Can Exist in a Variety of Factual Circumstances Including Those
`1.
`Control Can Exist in a Variety of Factual Circumstances Including Those
`Present in Grokster and Cybernet. .................................................................33
`Present in Grokster and Cybernet..................................................................33
`
`2. Triable Issues of Fact Exist as to YouTube’s Control Under Grokster and
`2.
`Triable Issues of Fact Exist as to YouTube’s Control Under Grokster and
`Cybernet ............................................................................................................39
`Cybernet............................................................................................................39
`
`B. Triable Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment for YouTube on the Direct
`B. Triable Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment for YouTube on the Direct
`Financial Benefit Element of the DMCA. ................................................................46
`Financial Benefit Element of the DMCA. ................................................................46
`
`III. TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER YOUTUBE’S
`III. TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER YOUTUBE’S
`SYNDICATION OF VIACOM’S WORKS TO THIRD PARTIES FALLS OUTSIDE
`SYNDICATION OF VIACOM’S WORKS TO THIRD PARTIES FALLS OUTSIDE
`THE SCOPE OF THE DMCA SAFE HARBOR. ...........................................................50
`THE SCOPE OF THE DMCA SAFE HARBOR.......................................................... ..50
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................54
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................54
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 4 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) .......................................34, 46
`
`ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc, 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001) ..................................5
`
`Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010) ............................................................9
`
`Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ................... 46-47
`
`Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ...................................... 25-26, 41
`
`Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) .....................5, 48
`
`Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. July 10, 2012).............................................................15
`
`Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ..........................32, 33
`
`Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) ...............................................................48, 49
`
`Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) .............................................46
`
`Gelb v. Bd. of Elections, 224 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2000).............................................................26, 40
`
`Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d
`Cir. 1971) ...................................................................................................................................9
`
`Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) ...................................12, 14, 26
`
`Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ...........................22
`
`Jackan v. New York State Department of Labor, 205 F.3d 562 (2d Cir. 2000) .............................15
`
`Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11 (2d Cir.1993) ...................................................26, 40
`
`Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal.
`2006) ........................................................................................................................................35
`
`Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) ................9, 34, 35, 38
`
`Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) .............................................................46
`
`Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal.
`2002) ....................................................................................................34, 36, 37, 42, 43, 48, 49
`
`Perfect10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CV-05-4753, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2008) .............6
`
`Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969) ........................8
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 5 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`Psihoyos v. Pearson Education, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ...............................33
`
`Redd v. New York State Division of Parole, 678 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2012) ......................................4
`
`Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
`132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012) ...............................................................................................................4
`
`Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012)..................................................27
`
`Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) ..................................46
`
`Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P., v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 211
`F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2000)..............................................................................................................33
`
`Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d
`in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) ....................................................................................27, 28
`
`Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) ...................................10, 11, 13, 15, 16
`
`Tur v. YouTube, No. CV 064436, 2007 WL 1893635 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007) .....................6, 44
`
`Ulloa v. Universal Music Video & Distribution Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y.
`2004) ........................................................................................................................................33
`
`UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009),
`aff’d, 667 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011) ....................................................................................6, 46
`
`Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d
`in part, rev’d in part, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012)....................................................................16
`
`Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) .............................. passim
`
`Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 BEARGRAM Co., 373 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2004) ........................6
`
`Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) .........................5, 48
`
`STATUTES
`
`17 U.S.C. § 106 ..............................................................................................................................53
`
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c) .........................................................................................................................53
`
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) ...............................................................................................................37
`
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) ...............................................................................................................47
`
`LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I) (1998) .....................................................................................................6
`
`
`
`iv
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 6 of 62
`Case1:07—cv—02103-LLS Document 446
`Filed 03/29/13 Page6of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`H.R. Rep. 105-551(II) (1998) .................................................................................................. 47-48
`H.R. Rep. 105-551(11) (1998) ................................................................................................ .. 47-48
`
`S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) ...........................................................................................................48
`S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) ......................................................................................................... ..48
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) ................................................................................................................ 7-8
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) .............................................................................................................. .. 7-8
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ........................................................................................................................4
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ...................................................................................................................... ..4
`
`11 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.40[1][C] (3d ed. 2012) ................. 6-7
`11 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore ’s Federal Practice 11 56.40[1][C] (3d ed. 2012) ............... .. 6-7
`
`3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12B04 (2012) .........................6
`3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § l2B04 (2012) ....................... ..6
`
`Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.02 (2006) ................................................................................19
`Restatement (Third) 0fAgency § 1.02 (2006) .............................................................................. .. 19
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 7 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`GLOSSARY
`
`Memoranda of Law & Rule 56.1 Statements
`YouTube’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’
`Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment; filed December 7, 2012
`Defendants’ Supplemental Statement of Material Facts As To Which
`There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Tried; filed December 7, 2012
`YouTube’s Reply Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
`Summary Judgment; filed June 4, 2010
`Brief for Defendants-Appellees in the United States Court of
`Appeals for the Second Circuit, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.
`(No. 10-3270-cv), 2011 WL 1356930; filed March 31, 2011
`Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s Motion
`for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability and Inapplicability of
`the DMCA Safe Harbor Defense; filed March 5, 2010
`Viacom’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s
`Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; filed June 4, 2010
`Viacom’s Counterstatement in Response to Defendants’ Local
`Rule 56.1 Statement in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
`Summary Judgment; filed April 30, 2010
`Viacom’s Supplemental Counter-Statement in Response to Facts
`Asserted in Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
`Memorandum of Law But Omitted From Defendants’ Local Rule
`56.1 Statement; filed April 30, 2010
`Viacom’s Reply to Defendants’ Counterstatement to Viacom’s
`Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Its Motion for Partial
`Summary Judgment; filed June 4, 2010
`Plaintiffs’ Counterstatement in Response to Defendants’
`Supplemental Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is
`No Genuine Issue To Be Tried; filed January 18, 2013
`Declarations
`Declaration of William M. Hohengarten in Support of Viacom’s
`Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; filed March 5, 2010
`Declaration of Susan J. Kohlmann in Support of Viacom’s
`Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; filed
`April 30, 2010
`Declaration of Scott B. Wilkens in Support of Viacom’s
`Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment; filed
`April 30, 2010
`Declaration of Scott B. Wilkens in Support of Plaintiffs’ Reply
`in Support of Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
`filed June 4, 2010
`Declaration of Scott B. Wilkens in Support of Plaintiffs’
`Opposition to Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary
`Judgment; filed January 18, 2013
`
`vi
`
`
`
`YT Br.
`
`YT Supp. Submission
`
`YT Reply Br.
`
`YT 2d Cir. Br.
`
`Viacom Opening SJ Br.
`
`Viacom SJ Reply Br.
`
`CSUF
`
`SCSUF
`
`RSUF
`
`CSUF (01/18/2013)
`
`Hohengarten Decl.
`
`Kohlmann Decl.
`
`Wilkens Opp. Decl.
`
`Wilkens Reply Decl.
`
`Wilkens 01/18/2013
`Decl.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 8 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`
`Rubin Opening Decl.
`
`Rubin Reply Decl.
`
`Declarations (continued)
`Declaration of Michael Rubin in Support of Defendants’ Motion
`for Summary Judgment; filed March 5, 2010
`Declaration of Michael Rubin in Further Support of Defendants’
`Motion for Summary Judgment; filed June 4, 2010
`
`
`
`
`vii
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 9 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`Plaintiffs Viacom International Inc., Comedy Partners, Country Music Television, Inc.,
`
`Paramount Pictures Corporation, and Black Entertainment Television LLC (“Viacom”) submit
`
`this memorandum of law in opposition to YouTube’s renewed motion for summary judgment on
`
`its affirmative defense under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`On remand from the Second Circuit, Defendants have moved for summary judgment on
`
`their DMCA safe harbor affirmative defense, resting on the same factual record that was before
`
`the Court during the previous round of summary judgment briefing. Defendants’ motion must be
`
`denied as to all Viacom clips-in-suit uploaded to YouTube on or before May 31, 2008, because it
`
`relies on erroneous interpretations of the governing legal standards, and disregards large swaths
`
`of the factual record. Defendants cannot win summary judgment by rewriting the statute or by
`
`arguing their preferred interpretation of record evidence that clearly creates multiple triable
`
`issues concerning their eligibility for the section 512(c) safe harbor. Nor can they profit from
`
`any gaps in the proof by putting the burden on Viacom to negate their eligibility for the safe
`
`harbor.
`
`First, with respect to actual knowledge or awareness of specific instances of
`
`infringement, Defendants have failed to come forward with any evidence showing that they
`
`lacked such knowledge or awareness of Viacom’s clips-in-suit. They offer no sworn statement
`
`from YouTube’s co-founders or other key employees denying the company’s awareness of the
`
`clips-in-suit and no viewing or other administrative records that might establish the absence of
`
`awareness. Instead they argue that Viacom has no evidence showing which specific Viacom
`
`clips-in-suit they knew about. See YT Br. at 18-23 & YT Supp. Submission. But that argument
`
`impermissibly shifts the burden of proof, which rests on Defendants to support their claimed
`
`affirmative defense. If there is no evidence allowing a jury to separate the clips-in-suit that
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 10 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`Defendants were aware of from those they were not, there is no basis for applying the safe harbor
`
`affirmative defense to any of the clips. See infra 8-10.
`
`Second, even if the record supported the conclusion that the Defendants avoided specific
`
`knowledge or awareness of all of the clips-in-suit, there is clear evidence that any such ignorance
`
`was the product of willful blindness. Under the Second Circuit standard articulated in Viacom
`
`and Tiffany, Defendants repeatedly engaged in intentional efforts to minimize knowledge of
`
`specific infringing clips, including Viacom’s clips-in-suit. Unable to explain away the extensive
`
`record evidence of willful blindness, Defendants attempt to turn the doctrine on its head by
`
`claiming that it applies only when a service provider is already aware of a specific clip but
`
`avoids learning of that clip’s infringing character. But that evasion misstates the law. As
`
`Viacom and Tiffany make clear, a service provider engages in willful blindness when it “has
`
`reason to suspect that users of its service are infringing a protected mark [or copyright],” but
`
`“shield[s] itself from learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking the other
`
`way.” The record evidence raises multiple triable issues of fact concerning whether Defendants
`
`were willfully blind when they, among other things, disabled community flagging to avoid
`
`notice, rejected proposed tools to identify and root out infringement, initially declined to provide
`
`Audible Magic filtering to protect movie studio content because copyright infringement was “a
`
`major lure” for YouTube’s users, and eventually used Audible Magic filtering only to protect the
`
`content of license partners, while refusing to provide it to Viacom (with whom licensing
`
`negotiations were unsuccessful). See infra 10-33.
`
`Third, regarding control and financial benefit, Defendants have failed to show under
`
`Grokster or Cybernet that they lacked the “something more” that the Second Circuit standard
`
`requires, or that they did not receive a direct financial benefit from the infringement that
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 11 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`indisputably drew users to YouTube and that enabled the founders to sell the company for $1.8
`
`billion within 18 months of its launch. Where, as here, a service provider takes active steps to
`
`run its site with the intent of promoting infringement, the service provider has the right and
`
`ability to control in the relevant sense under Grokster. Furthermore, where, as here, a service
`
`provider controls and dominates its site by exercising actual and ultimate control over site
`
`content, it has the requisite control under Cybernet. Defendants have not shown that they lacked
`
`Grokster intent, and they do not even address Cybernet. As to financial benefit, Defendants
`
`completely ignore the prevailing “draw” standard, which they obviously cannot satisfy given
`
`that, by Defendants’ own admissions, a majority of YouTube’s views were of pirated content.
`
`Instead, Defendants attempt to create a new legal standard that finds no support in the statute,
`
`case law, or legislative history. In short, multiple triable issues of fact as to control and financial
`
`benefit preclude a grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor as to all Viacom clips-in-
`
`suit. See infra 33-49.
`
`Fourth, with respect to syndication, Defendants do not dispute that Viacom clips-in-suit
`
`were syndicated to Apple, Sony, Panasonic, and other third parties. They claim that the kind of
`
`syndication at issue in those deals falls within the scope of the safe harbor because (unlike
`
`Defendants’ syndication deal with Verizon) it did not involve (1) manual selection of clips or (2)
`
`physical delivery of copies. But the critical feature of Defendants’ syndication deals that takes
`
`them outside the safe harbor is that they were entered into sua sponte by Defendants, for their
`
`own business purposes, and not at the direction of users. See infra 50-53.1
`
`
`1 Viacom incorporates herein by reference the factual record that it proffered during the previous
`round of summary judgment briefing, including, without limitation, the facts set forth in
`Viacom’s SUF, CSUF, SCSUF, and RSUF, and the facts set forth in and documents attached to
`the Hohengarten, Kohlmann, Wilkens Opp., and Wilkens Reply Declarations. Furthermore, to
`the extent that Defendants seek to rely on portions of declarations that Viacom objected to on
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 12 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`YouTube’s motion attempts to turn the long-established summary judgment burdens
`
`upside down by drawing every factual inference in YouTube’s favor, relying only on YouTube’s
`
`own self-serving evidence, and disregarding the evidence and inferences that favor Viacom as
`
`the non-movant. That is simply wrong. A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only “if the
`
`movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
`
`to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Thus, the “burden of demonstrating that
`
`no material fact exists lies with the moving party.” Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
`
`Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012). In evaluating a
`
`summary judgment motion, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed; all permissible
`
`inferences are to be drawn in [the non-movant’s] favor; and the court must disregard all evidence
`
`favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of
`
`Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result,
`
`“[s]ummary judgment is inappropriate when the admissible materials in the record ‘make it
`
`arguable’ that the claim has merit,” or “[w]here an issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved
`
`without observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility.” Id.
`
`(internal quotation marks omitted). “In sum, summary judgment is proper only when, with all
`
`permissible inferences and credibility questions resolved in favor of the party against whom
`
`judgment is sought, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, i.e., it is quite
`
`clear what the truth is.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`
`evidentiary grounds during the prior round of summary judgment briefing, Viacom incorporates
`herein and renews its Evidentiary Objections to Portions of Declarations Submitted in Support of
`Defendants’ Opposition to Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed under seal
`June 4, 2010.
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 13 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`
`YouTube’s motion is also premised on a reversal of the applicable burdens of proof. It
`
`assumes that YouTube is entitled to summary judgment unless Viacom can negate YouTube’s
`
`eligibility for the Section 512(c) safe harbor. See, e.g., YT Br. at 15 n.5 (asserting Viacom bears
`
`“[t]he burden of proving that [YouTube] had disqualifying knowledge under § 512(c)”).2 But
`
`the DMCA is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the party asserting it. The Second
`
`Circuit was clear on this point: “[t]o qualify for protection under any of the safe harbors, a party
`
`must meet a set of threshold criteria” and “[b]eyond the threshold criteria, a service provider
`
`must satisfy the requirements of a particular safe harbor,” in this case § 512(c). Viacom Int’l,
`
`Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012).
`
`Moreover, other case law, the legislative history, and treatises all place the burden of
`
`proof squarely on the party asserting the DMCA safe harbor defense. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v.
`
`RemarQ Cmtys., Inc, 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]o qualify for this safe harbor
`
`protection [under § 512(c)(1)], the Internet service provider must demonstrate that it has met all
`
`three of the safe harbor requirements[.]”); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp.
`
`2d 627, 635-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving
`
`party must demonstrate each essential element of its infringement claim or defense.”); Wolk v.
`
`Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (moving party “must
`
`show, inter alia, that it did not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
`
`material on the system or network is infringing and was not aware of facts or circumstances from
`
`
`2 Nearly every subheading in the argument section of YouTube’s brief reflects this reversal of
`the applicable burdens. See, e.g., YT Br. at i-ii (“I.A. To Satisfy The DMCA, Viacom Would
`Have To Show That YouTube Had Actual Or Red-Flag Knowledge Of Particular Clips-In-Suit;”
`“II.A. As Limited By The DMCA, Willful Blindness Requires Viacom To Show That YouTube
`Consciously Avoid [sic] Confirming A High Probability That A Specific Clip-In-Suit Was
`Infringing;” and “III.B Viacom Cannot Show That YouTube Exerted A Substantial Influence
`Over The Infringement Of Any Clip-In-Suit”) (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 446 Filed 03/29/13 Page 14 of 62
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`
`which infringing activity is apparent”); Tur v. Youtube, Inc., No. CV064436, 2007 WL 1893635,
`
`at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007) (denying summary judgment to YouTube on identical Section
`
`512(c) defense because “YouTube’s ultimate eligibility for ‘safe harbor’ protection depends
`
`upon whether YouTube can prove that it satisfies . . . the specific elements of subsection (c) [of
`
`Section 512].”); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), at 26 (1998) (“[A] defendant asserting this exemption
`
`or limitation [codified at § 512(c)] as an affirmative defense in such a suit bears the burden of
`
`establishing its entitlement.”); 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §
`
`12B.04 at 12B-77 n.211 (2012) (“Given that all of Section 512’s limitations of liability constitute
`
`affirmative defenses, the service provider must prove its eligibility.”).3
`
`In short, YouTube as the movant has the burden of demonstrating that there are no triable
`
`issues of material fact, and in carrying that burden it cannot profit from the absence of evidence
`
`concerning a given issue, because it also bears the ultimate burden of proof on its affirmative
`
`defense. See, e.g., Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 BEARGRAM Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir.
`
`2004) (“If the evidence submitted in support of the summary judgment motion does not meet the
`
`movant’s burden of production, then summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing
`
`evidentiary matter is presented.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 11 James Wm. Moore et
`
`
`3 YouTube’s purported legal authority for reversing the burden of proof, which YouTube
`relegates to a footnote, does not withstand scrutiny. See YT Br. at 15 n.5. In UMG Recordings,
`Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th
`Cir. 2011), the court had already determined that, unlike here, the defendant had “provided
`substantial evidence that it fulfilled the requirements of section 512(c)(1)(A),” and only then, in
`the statement relied upon by YouTube, considered whether the plaintiff had adduced sufficient
`evidence to rebut the showing already made by the defendant. Id. at 1107, 1108, 1110.
`Similarly, YouTube misleadingly cites an order from Perfect10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
`CV-05-4753, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2008) (ECF. No. 221), to claim that it is plaintiff’s
`burden to prove ineligibility under the DMCA safe harbor. YT Br. at 15 n.5. But in that order,
`the Perfect10 district court concluded that the defendant bore the burden of proof: “the Court
`finds that [defendant] A9.com has not met its burden of establishing that it is eligible fo