`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`-----------------------------------X
`KIAZA LOCCENITT,
`:
`:
`:
`-against-
`:
`THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
`:
`Defendant.
`-----------------------------------X
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`11 Civ. 5651 (PAC)(HBP)
`REPORT AND
`RECOMMENDATION
`
`PITMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:
`
`TO THE HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States
`District Judge,
`
`I. Introduction
`
`In a complaint filed on August 2, 2011 (Docket Item 2),
`plaintiff, pro se, brings this action for damages pursuant to 42
`U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York (the "City"). The
`City has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
`claim, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Notice of Motion to
`Dismiss, filed Feb. 17, 2012 (Docket Item 13)).
`For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recom-
`mend that the City's motion to dismiss be granted in all re-
`spects.
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 2 of 17
`
`II. Facts
`
`Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the New York
`City Department of Correction and housed on Rikers Island,
`alleges that he has suffered from a number of maladies, and fear
`of contracting maladies, as a result of his alleged exposure to
`environmental pollutants. Relying in principal part on an
`article in the New York Daily News which reported that several
`Corrections Officers assigned to Rikers Island had brought a
`lawsuit asserting similar claims (Complaint at 5 ), plaintiff
`1
`alleges that various substances in the soil on Rikers Island have
`either caused him harm or to suffer anxiety about contracting
`certain conditions in the future (Complaint at 6). Specifically,
`plaintiff alleges he has been exposed to the following contami-
`nants: wood, plastic, "decaying organics," radon, formaldehyde
`gas, petroleum by-products, M.T.B.E., methane, alkalis, acids,
`"black gas," bacteria, mold, mildew, viruses, mites, pollen,
`animal dander, water borne lead, atmospheric lead and asbestos
`(Complaint at 6). As a result of the alleged exposure, plaintiff
`claims to have suffered "post traumatic stress, sick building
`
` The complaint consists of the Court's form Section 1983
`1
`Prisoner Complaint and a three-page addendum inserted between
`pages three and four of the form complaint. I cite to the pages
`of the complaint as if the complaint were a single, unified,
`serially-paginated document.
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 3 of 17
`
`syndrome, shortness of breath, psychological and physical para-
`noia, back pains, headaches, stomach pain, skin rashes, & loss of
`hair" (Complaint at 3). Plaintiff also alleges that he received
`inadequate medical care for these conditions (Complaint at 3).2
`
`III. Analysis
`
`A.
`
`Standards Applicable to
`a Motion to Dismiss
`Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
`
`The standards applicable to a motion to dismiss pursu-
`ant to Rule 12(b)(6) are well-settled and require only brief
`review.
`
`When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule
`12(b)(6), [the court] must accept as true all
`well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint and
`draw all inferences in favor of the pleader. See City
`of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476
`U.S. 488, 493, 106 S.Ct. 2034, 90 L.Ed.2d 480 (1986);
`Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 27 n.2, 97 S.Ct.
`2490, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977) (referring to "well-pleaded
`allegations"); Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d
`1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993). "'[T]he complaint is deemed
`to include any written instrument attached to it as an
`exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in
`it by reference.'" Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v.
`
` Plaintiff's complaint is a ver batim copy of the complaint
`2
`filed in Cepeda v. Bloomberg, 11 Civ. 2914 (WHP). The Honorable
`William H. Pauley, III, United States District Judge, dismissed
`that complaint based on the plaintiff's failure to exhaust inmate
`grievance procedures and the plaintiff's failure to state a
`claim. Cepeda v. Bloomberg, 11 Civ. 2914 (WHP), 2012 WL 75424
`(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012).
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 4 of 17
`
`Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)
`(quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949
`F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)). The Court also may con-
`sider "matters of which judicial notice may be taken."
`Leonard T. v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, 199
`F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Allen v. WestPoint-
`-Pepperill, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991)). In
`order to avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must do more than
`plead mere "[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclu-
`sions masquerading as factual conclusions." Gebhardt
`v. Allspect, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
`2000) (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal
`Practice ¶ 12.34[a][b] (3d ed. 1997)).
`Hoffenberg v. Bodell, 01 Civ. 9729 (LAP), 2002 WL 31163871 at *3
`(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) (Preska, D.J.); see also In re Elevator
`Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007); Johnson &
`Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 336, 345-46 (S.D.N.Y.
`2007) (Lynch, then D.J., now Cir. J.).
`The Supreme Court has clarified the proper mode of
`inquiry for evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
`12(b)(6), which uses as its starting point the principle that
`"[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a
`short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
`is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
`[I]n Bell Atl[antic] Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
`127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Court
`disavowed the well-known statement in Conley v. Gibson,
`355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)
`that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
`to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
`the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
`his claim which would entitle him to relief." 550 U.S.
`at 562. Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss under
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 5 of 17
`
`Twombly, a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to
`state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
`Id. at 570.
`Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 08-790 (DRH), 2009
`WL 1797627 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009).
`While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
`dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
`plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
`entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
`conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
`of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations
`must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
`speculative level, on the assumption that all the
`allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful
`in fact).
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations,
`internal quotations and alterations omitted).
`In evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
`must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged any facially
`plausible claims. See Smith v. NYCHA, 410 F. App'x 404, 405-06
`(2d Cir. 2011). A claim is plausible when its factual content
`"allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
`defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
`standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks
`for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
`unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009)
`(citations omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
`merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 6 of 17
`
`the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
`relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678, (internal
`quotations omitted). Accordingly, "where the well-pleaded facts
`do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
`of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not
`'show[n]' -- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft
`v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 679, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
`"[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of
`the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
`conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678; see
`also Reed Const. Data Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 745 F.
`Supp. 2d 343, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Sweet, D.J.). As a result, "a
`court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
`identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclu-
`sions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
`conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
`be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra,
`556 U.S. at 679.
`Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the
`complaint must be liberally construed to raise the strongest
`claims that the allegations suggest. Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d
`241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d
`Cir. 1994). This rule applies "with particular stringency to
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 7 of 17
`
`[pro se] complaints of civil rights violations." Phillip v.
`Univ. of Rochester, 316 F.3d 291, 293-94 (2d Cir. 2003).
`
`B. Defendant's Arguments
`
`Plaintiff brings his suit as a prisoner complaint under
`the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983.
`Section 1983 provides that:
`Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
`nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . .
`subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
`United States or other person within the jurisdiction
`thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
`or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
`shall be liable to the party injured . . . .
`In order to state a claim under Section 1983, "a
`plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was attrib-
`utable at least in part to a person acting under color of state
`law, and (2) that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right,
`privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the
`United States." Dwares v. City of N.Y., 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.
`1993); accord Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999).
`The City argues that plaintiff's claims should be
`dismissed because he (1) failed to exhaust available administra-
`tive remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42
`U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (2) fails to state a sufficient claim under
`the pleading standards of Iqbal v. Ashcroft, supra, 556 U.S. at
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 8 of 17
`
`678, (3) fails to demonstrate the existence of an unconstitu-
`tional municipal policy or custom , and (4) fails to allege a
`claim rising to the level of a constitutional violation (Memoran-
`dum of Law In Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed
`Feb. 17, 2012 (Docket Item 14) at 1).
`
`1.
`
`Plaintiff's Purported Failure
`to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
`
`Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, "[n]o action
`shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
`1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
`confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
`until such administrative remedies as available are exhausted."
`42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Where it appears from the face of the
`complaint that a plaintiff concedes lack of exhaustion, or non-
`exhaustion is otherwise apparent, a court may decide the exhaus-
`tion issue on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Pani v. Empire Blue
`Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) (an affirmative
`defense may be raised in a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion, without resort
`to summary judgment, if the defense appears on the face of the
`complaint); McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 250-52 (S.D.N.Y.
`2003) (Chin, then D.J., now Cir. J.) Because failure to exhaust
`is an affirmative defense, however, exhaustion need not be
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 9 of 17
`
`pleaded in the complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212
`(2007).
`
`Plaintiff states in his complaint that he has not
`exhausted his administrative remedies because his claims are
`"non-grievable" (Complaint at 7). However, in his opposition,
`plaintiff describes the four-step grievance process the Depart-
`ment of Correction offers and claims he has complied with each
`step (Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
`filed Apr. 2, 2012 (Docket Item 17), Point 1). Because plaintiff
`is proceeding pro se, I may consider the statements in his
`opposition papers as amendments to the complaint. See Washington
`v. James, F.2d 1134, 1138-39 (2d Cir. 1986). Because it is not
`clear whether plaintiff has exhausted his administrative reme-
`dies, the City's motion should not be granted on the basis of
`this argument.
`
`2.
`
`Plaintiff's Failure
`to State a Claim
`
`Even assuming plaintiff exhausted his administrative
`remedies, "dismissal would [still] be appropriate because the
`[c]omplaint makes only conclusory allegations devoid of any facts
`suggesting a plausible claim." Cepeda v. Bloomberg, supra, 2012
`WL 75424 at *2 citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678.
`In Cepeda v. Bloomberg, Judge Pauley dismissed an identical
`9
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 10 of 17
`
`complaint from another inmate on Rikers Island because he found,
`inter alia, that "[t]he Daily News article is not an adequate
`factual basis for Cepeda's claim that toxins have harmed him. It
`simply reports about another lawsuit where corrections officers
`made certain allegations against the City of New York." 2012 WL
`75424 at *2. Cepeda had failed to state factually plausible
`allegations that "current conditions at Rikers are harmful."
`Cepeda v. Bloomberg, supra, 2012 WL 75424 at *2. Plaintiff
`states that Rikers Island was built on a landfill (Complaint at
`6), and that an environmental report has shown that Rikers Island
`was built on a hazardous waste dump site (Response in Opposition
`to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra, at Point 3). Both
`statements, even if true, do not automatically mean conditions on
`Rikers Island are currently harmful. Furthermore, the complaint
`does not "imply that any toxic exposure caused or contributed to
`his condition." Cepeda v. Bloomberg, supra, 2012 WL 75424 at *2.
`No facts are alleged linking any of plaintiff's alleged condi-
`tions to any of the alleged environmental toxins; all the com-
`plaint offers are plaintiff's ipse dixit pronouncements. Such
`conclusory statements do not satisfy Twombly. In re Digital
`Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
`(Preska, D.J.); Fried v. LVI Servs., Inc. 10 Civ. 9308 (JSR),
`2011 WL 2119748 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011) (Rakoff, D.J.)
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 11 of 17
`
`("[C]onclusory, ipse dixit assertions are insufficient to satisfy
`the pleading standards of [Twombley and Iqbal.]")
`Accordingly, the complaint fails to allege facts
`sufficient to state a claim.
`
`3.
`
`Plaintiff Fails to Establish
`A City Policy or Custom
`
`Even assuming plaintiff's complaint did pass the
`plausibility standard, his claims should be dismissed because he
`fails to allege a custom or policy that could support municipal
`liability pursuant to Section 1983. Plaintiff alleges that the
`City violated his constitutional rights under the Eight Amendment
`(Complaint at 6) when the City, through an allegedly long-stand-
`ing policy, caused him to fear toxic exposure and to suffer from
`a number of maladies. Plaintiff also claims the City denied him
`proper medical attention. 3
`
` None of plaintiff's allegations identify any individual
`3
`who was personally involved in the alleged exposure to
`environmental pollutants and the alleged failure to provide
`adequate medical care for plaintiff's maladies. Because there is
`no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, Cash v.
`County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011), citing, inter
`alia, Connick v. Thompson, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359
`(2011), Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986), and Roe
`v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2008),
`plaintiff's claim against the City can proceed, if at all, only
`as a Monell claim.
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 12 of 17
`
`The conditions under which a municipality may be held
`liable under Section 1983 were succinctly summarized by the
`Honorable John F. Keenan, United States District Judge, in
`Gunderson v. City of New York, 96 Civ. 510 (JFK), 1999 WL 76901
`at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1999):
`A municipality may only be held liable for the acts of
`its employees if the municipality itself was somehow at
`fault. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 810,
`105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Monell v. De-
`partment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98
`S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). To establish munic-
`ipal liability, plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence
`of a municipal policy or custom that caused plaintiff's
`injuries; and (2) "a causal connection . . . between
`the policy and the deprivation of his constitutional
`rights." Vippolis v. Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d
`Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 1369,
`94 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
`471 U.S. 808, 823-24 & n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d
`791 (1985)). Plaintiff must establish that the identi-
`fied municipal policy was the "moving force [behind]
`the constitutional violation." Canton v. Harris, 489
`U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (quot-
`ing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 and Polk County v. Dodson,
`454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509
`(1981)). Municipal liability may not be predicated on
`a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell, 436 U.S.
`at 694-95.
`See also DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998); Ricciuti
`v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1991);
`Mejia v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 96–CV–2306 (JG), 1999 WL 138306
`at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1999).
`A policy that can subject a municipality to liability
`under Section 1983 may be tacit or explicit.
`
`12
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 13 of 17
`
`A municipal policy or custom may be pronounced or tacit
`in either action or inaction. In the latter respect, a
`"city's policy of inaction in light of notice that its
`program will cause constitutional violations is the
`functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself
`to violate the Constitution." Connick v. Thompson, 131
`S.Ct. at 1360 (internal quotations omitted); see also
`City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct.
`1197 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
`in part) ("Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that
`the facts available to city policymakers put them on
`actual or constructive notice that the particular
`omission is substantially certain to result in the
`violation of the constitutional rights of their citi-
`zens, the dictates of Monell are satisfied.")
`Cash v. County of Erie, supra, 654 F.3d at 334.
`To the extent the complaint can be construed to allege
`that the City employed a tacit policy of inaction by not correct-
`ing the allegedly harmful conditions and knew or should have
`known that its omission would lead to (and was the "moving force"
`behind) plaintiff's harm, plaintiff's claims still lack merit.
`While a municipality has an "affirmative duty to protect those
`held in their custody," Villante v. Dep't of Corr., 786 F.2d 516,
`519 (2d Cir. 1986); cf. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
`Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) ("[W[hen the State
`takes a person into its custody and holds him against his will,
`the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
`some responsibility for his safety and general wellbeing.") Cash
`v. County of Erie, supra, 654 F.3d at 335, plaintiff points to no
`facts that were available to the City that put it on notice that
`
`13
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 14 of 17
`
`its inaction to correct the allegedly harmful conditions would
`lead to the harm plaintiff alleges. Plaintiff does no more than
`cite the Daily News article about a different lawsuit and state
`that Rikers Island is built on a landfill (Complaint at 6) and
`hazardous waste dump site (Response in Opposition to Defendant’s
`Motion to Dismiss, supra, at Point 3). Plaintiff then merely
`states that the Mayor and various City employees "make policy for
`the municipality," "create, orchestrate, and institute customs
`and practices," and "that this custom and practice is widespread
`and long existing" (Complaint at 6). Bald conclusory allegations
`do not amount to the actual existence of a custom or policy, be
`it pronounced or tacit. See Dwares v City of N.Y., supra, 985
`F.3d at 100-01 ("mere assertion . . . that a municipality has
`such a custom or policy is insufficient in the absence of allega-
`tions of fact tending to support, at least circumstantially, such
`an inference.").
`Additionally, there is nothing in plaintiff’s papers
`here that even remotely suggests that a municipal custom or
`policy was the "moving force" behind the alleged failure to
`provide proper medical attention to plaintiff. Plaintiff merely
`states the City "must afford the necessary medical needs to the
`plaintiff" (Complaint at 5) and baldly alleges he received
`improper medical attention (Complaint at 3). Such an allegation,
`
`14
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 15 of 17
`
`even if true, does not allege conduct undertaken pursuant to a
`custom or policy.
`Accordingly, plaintiff's Monell claims against the City
`should be dismissed. See Brickhouse v. City of N.Y., 09 Civ.
`9353 (NRB), 2010 WL 3341845 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2010)
`(Buchwald, D.J.) (dismissing claim against City of New York
`because "plaintiff . . . has pointed to no policy, custom, or
`practice on the part of the City that might have caused his
`alleged constitutional injuries"); Moore v. City of N.Y., 08 Civ.
`8879 (PGG), 2010 WL 742981 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2010)
`(Gardephe, D.J.) (same). 4
`
`IV. Conclusion
`For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that
`the motion to dismiss made by defendant The City of New York
`(Docket Item 13) be granted in its entirety. If accepted, this
`Report and Recommendation will result in the dismissal of all
`claims against the City of New York.
`
`
` Because plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim or
`4
`establish any municipal policy or custom under which the City may
`be liable, I need not reach the City's last argument that
`Plaintiff failed to allege a claim rising to the level of a
`constitutional violation.
`
`15
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 16 of 17
`
`V. Objections
`
`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b)(2)
`of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have
`fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and Recommenda-
`tion to file written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)
`and 6(d). Such objections (and responses thereto) shall be filed
`with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to
`the chambers of the Honorable Paul A. Crotty, United States
`District Judge, 500 Pearl Street, Room 735, New York, New York
`10007, and to the chambers of the undersigned, 500 Pearl Street,
`Room 750, New York, New York 10007. Any requests for an exten-
`sion of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge
`Crotty. FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT
`IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.
`Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v.
`Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968
`F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d
`
`16
`
`
`
`Case 1:11-cv-05651-PAC-HBP Document 20 Filed 07/30/12 Page 17 of 17
`
`55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1988) i McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237
`
`38 (2d Cir. 1983).
`
`Dated: New York, New York
`July 30, 2012
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Copies mailed to:
`
`Mr. Kiaza Loccenitt
`ID # 875-1002-495
`Rikers Island
`09-09 Hazen Street
`East Elmhurst, New York 11370
`
`John M. Buhta, Esq.
`NYC Law Department
`100 Church Street Rm. 2-164
`New York, New York 10007
`
`17