Case 1:14-cv-00079-PAC-KNF Document 195 Filed 06/05/18 Page 1 of 14
`Case 1:14-cv-00079-PAC—KNF Document 195 Filed 06/05/18 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERNDISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`RBEANNXEASEBTESEEK/EANZ""""""""""""""""""x
`Plaintiff,
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`14-cv—79 (PAC)
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`AMERICAN SUGAR HOLDINGS, INC.,
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`OPINION & ORDER
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`Defendant.
`_____________________________________________________________ X
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`HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
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`Following a four-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff Rosanna
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`Mayo—Coleman on her sole claim that Defendant American Sugar Holdings, Inc. subjected her to
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`a hostile work environment in violation Of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
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`U.S.C. § 2000c, et seq. (“Title VII”) and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec.
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`Law § 290, et seq. (“NYSHRL”), due to her sexual harassment by her supervisor. The jury
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`awarded Plaintiff $1.7 million in compensatory damages and $11.7 million in punitive damages. .
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`Since the standard of proof for both statutes is the same, the jury was not asked to distinguish
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`between the Title VII and NYSHRL claims when awarding damages.
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`The NYSHRL does not provide for punitive damages, however, and Title VII caps the
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`sum of compensatory and punitive damages at $300,000. Accordingly, Plaintiff moves to
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`conform the verdict by allocating $1,699,999 Of her compensatory damages award to the
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`uncapped NYSHRL claim and the remaining $1 in compensatory damages to the Title VII claim
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`(for a total of $1.7 million in compensatory damages), allowing her to recover $299,999 in
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`punitive damages under the Title VII claim. In this way, Plaintiff seeks to recover a total of
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`$1,999,999. Defendant contends that Plaintiff is entitled to no more than $30,000 in
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`compensatory damages and no punitive damages. Hence, Defendant moves under Federal Rules
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`of Civil Procedure 50 and 59 for either a new trial on damages or, in the alternative, a remittitur
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`of the compensatory damages and vacatur or remittitur of the punitive damages. For the
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`following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to conform the verdict, GRANTS
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`Defendant’s request to remit the compensatory damages, and DENIES Defendant’s request to
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`vacate or remit the punitive damages.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`Under Rule 50, a court may grant judgment as a matter of law to the moving party after
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`the jury has found in favor of the non—moving party on an issue where there is no “legally
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`sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ.
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`P. 50(a)(l). Judgment as a matter of law is proper only upon a finding that:
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`(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the
`jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or
`(2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that
`reasonable and fair minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it.
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`Cruz v. Local Union N0. 3, 34 F.3d 1148, 1154 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation and alterations
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`omitted). In contrast, a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 may be granted when, in the court’s
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`opinion, “the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or the verdict is a miscarriage of
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`justice.” Song v. Ives Labs, Inc, 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (quotation and alterations
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`omitted).
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`In considering such a motion, the court normally is free to weigh the evidence itself and
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`need not view it in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. When considering
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`whether a damages award is excessive, however, all evidence and factual inferences are to be
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`construed in favor of the non—movant and the court is to give considerable deference to the jury’s
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`determinations. Scala v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc, 985 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1993).
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`Furthermore, the Seventh Amendment prohibits courts from simply reducing a jury’s
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`award of damages. 1d. at 684. Rather, “[i]f a district court finds that a verdict is excessive, it
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`may order a new trial, a new trial limited to damages, or, under the practice of remittitur, may
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`condition a denial of a motion for a new trial on the plaintiff’s accepting damages in a reduced
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`amount.” Tingley Systems, Inc. v. Norse Systems, Inc, 49 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1995). “Where
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`the basis for the remittitur order is the district court’s view that the award is intrinsically
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`excessive, i.e., is greater than the amount a reasonable jury could have awarded but the excess is
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`not attributable to a discernible error, the court should reduce the award only to the maximum
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`amount that would be .
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`.
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`. not excessive.” Rangolan v. Cnty. ofNassau, 370 F.3d 239, 244 (2d
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`Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted).
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`DISCUSSION
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`A. Allocation of Compensatory and Punitive Damages
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`There is no cap on compensatory damages for claims arising under the NYSHRL; but
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`punitive damages are unavailable, except in cases of housing discrimination. See N.Y. Exec.
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`Law § 297(9); Thoreson v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd, 606 N.E.2d 1369, 137273 (NY. 1992). The
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`sum of compensatory and punitive damages for claims arising under Title VII is limited to
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`$300,000 where, as here, the defendant has more than 500 employees. See 42 U.S.C.
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`§ l981a(b)(3). Nevertheless, a plaintiff that recovers a single award under parallel statutes may
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`“be paid under the theory of liability that provides the most complete recovery.” Magee v.
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`United States Lines, Inc, 976 F.2d 821, 822 (2d Cir. 1992). Hence, courts regularly allocate all,
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`or nearly all, of the compensatory damages to the state law claims and the punitive damages to
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`the Title V11 claims in order to maximize plaintiffs’ recovery by removing the compensatory
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`damages from Title VII’S statutory cap. See, e.g., Anderson v. YARP Rest, Inc, No. 94—cv—7543,
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`1997 WL 27043, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allocating entire $65,000 in compensatory damages to
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`NYSHRL claim and entire $50,000 in punitive damages to Title VII claim in order to “permit[]
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`plaintiff to receive the full amount awarded by the jury without exceeding the legal limits placed
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`upon sexual harassment claims under Title VII and the HRL”); Torres v. Carribean Farms Mfr.,
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`286 F. Supp. 2d 209, 218-19 (D.P.R. 2003), afi’d and remanded sub nom. Rodriguez Torres v.
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`Carribecm Fonns Mfr., Inc, 399 F.3d 52 (lst Cir. 2005) (allocating $1 in compensatory damages
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`to Title VII claim “so as to allow for the imposition of punitive damages under said statute,”
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`allocating the remaining $249,999 in compensatory damages to state law claims, and allocating
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`$199,999 in punitive damages to Title VII claim). Plaintiff’s motion requests such an allocation.
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`Defendant’s sole objection to Plaintiff’s motion is that it is premature. Defendant argues
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`that there can be no allocation of damages until the Court rules on Defendant’s motion for a new
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`trial on damages or, in the alternative, a remittitur of the compensatory damages and vacatur of
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`the punitive damages. Defendant cites no caselaw in support of this argument, and there is no
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`reason why the Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s motion before turning to Defendant’s motion and
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`deciding whether the damages should be further remitted or vacated. Indeed, courts regularly
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`rule on both types of motions at the same time. See, e.g., Anderson, 1997 WL 27043, at *6—9
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`(ruling on allocation of damages and remittitur); Luciano v. Olsten Corp, 912 F. Supp. 663, 669-
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`76 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (ruling on allocation of damages and vacatur). Thus, in order to provide
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`Plaintiff with the opportunity for the most complete recovery, the Court allocates $1 of the
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`compensatory damages award to the Title VII claim, allocates the remaining $1,699,999 of the
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`compensatory damages award to the NYSHRL claim, allocates the entire punitive damages
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`award to Title VII, and reduces the punitive damages award from $11.7 million to $299,999 in
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`light of Title Vil’s statutory cap.
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`B. Remittitur of Compensatory Damages
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`Defendant argues that the jury’s $1.7 million award of compensatory damages for
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`emotional distress is excessive and should be remitted to $30,000 or less. Because $1,699,999 of
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`the award is allocated to the NYSI—IRL claim, the Court evaluates the excessiveness of the award
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`under New York law. See Stampfv. Long Island RR, 761 F.3d 192, 204 (2d Cir. 2014);
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`Anderson, 1997 WL 27043, at *8. Under New York law, a court “shall determine that an award
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`is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable
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`compensation.” NY. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c). This “deviates materially” standard is different from
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`the “shock the conscience” standard for reviewing jury verdicts in federal claims, and it allows
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`courts to more closely scrutinize jury awards. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S.
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`415, 422-24 (1996). “To determine whether a jury award is excessive within the meaning of
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`§ 5501(0), New York courts compare it with awards in similar cases.” Stampf, 761 F.3d at 204.
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`In making this comparison, courts consider “the duration of a complainant’s condition, its
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`severity or consequences, any physical manifestations, and any medical treatment.” In re New
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`York City TransitAuth., 577 N.E.2d 40, 55 (NY. 1991). Further, emotional distress damages
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`must be “reasonably related to the wrongdoing” of the defendant. Id.
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`For claims arising under the NYSHRL, “the range of acceptable damages for emotional
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`distress in adverse employment action cases lacking extraordinary circumstances seems to be
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`from around $30,000 to $125,000.” Watson v. ES. Sutton, Inc, No. 02~cv—2739, 2005 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 31578, at * 46—47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The cases in which courts permit higher damages
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`typically involve medical treatment and physical manifestation of symptoms such as “continued
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`shock, nightmares, sleeplessness, ‘weight loss, 01' humiliation, or of an inability to apply for a new
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`position or to enjoy life in general.” See id. at *44 (noting that decisions “approving multi—
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`hundred—thousand dollar awards for emotional damages all involve post-traumatic stress
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`disorder, and plaintiffs who were forced to be medicated and out of work for extended periods of
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`time”).
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`This case seems to fit within the category of cases with such extraordinary circumstances.
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`Plaintiff is a fifty—nine year old woman who works in Defendant’s sugar factory. (Tr. 11mm
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`116: 14.) From 2008 to 2013, her immediate supervisor was Tyrone Smith. (Tr. 127:6—20,
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`226225—2273.) Plaintiff testified that Smith repeatedly harassed Plaintiff by telling her that “he
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`would tap that ass if [she] wasn’t so old,” “[her] boobs got big,” and that she was “an old coon.”
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`(Tr. 183:6—7, 133124, 182:21—22.) Smith “was constantly leering” at Plaintiff, “licking his lips,”
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`and would “come next to [her] and start breathing real heavy like he’s having sex.” (Tr. 135:3-
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`8.) Three to four times a month, Smith would call Plaintiff into his office, instruct her to close
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`the door, force her to stand next to him, and subjected her to unwelcome verbal and physical
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`harassment, such as smacking her on her “rear end.” (Tr. 150:11—153zll, 17521—20.)
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`Plaintiff testified that she experienced severe emotional distress during this time: she
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`stopped eating; she lost weight; her hair fell out; her stomach was tied in knots; and she had
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`migraine headaches from the time she woke up until the time she went to sleep.
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`(Tr. 184: 14~
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`185:6.) Plaintiff became depressed, which impacted her relationship with her boyfriend of 12
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`years and caused them to break up. (Tr. 205: 15—206213.) From June 6 to August 13, 2012,
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`Plaintiff took medical leave from work upon her doctor’s orders that she was “extremely
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`depressed” due to “work stressors.” (Tr. 203 :3—12, 211210—17; Pl.’s Exs. 12, 16.) During this
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`leave, for the first time in her life, Plaintiff saw a psychiatrist and a therapist, and she began
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`taking psychotropic medications. (Tr. 203:3—205214, 228:20—229: 13.)
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`Plaintiff‘s testimony was supported by three of her couworkers who testified that Plaintiff
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`complained to them about Smith’s behavior and Piaintiff was visibly distressed by it, and by
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`contemporaneous handwritten notes that Plaintiff made in notebooks which she maintained
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`beginning in 2012.
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`(Tr. 33226637; Tr. 47:21—54:8', Tr. 85:5m90221; Tr. 180:14—182z20; P1.’S
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`Ex. 25.) Plaintiff’s expert psychiatric witness, Dr. Robert Goldstein, diagnosed her with major
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`depressive disorder, which is “one of the most serious psychiatric conditions.” (Tr. 311:9-19.)
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`Dr. Goldstein also testified that there was a direct causal link between Smith’s behavior and the
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`onset of this disorder.
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`(Tr. 31219—3138.) Given Plaintiff’s medical treatment, leave from work,
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`psychiatric diagnosis, physical manifestation of symptoms, breakdown in relationships, and
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`corroborating lay and expert testimony, the Court finds that this case contains circumstances that
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`would be considered “extraordinary” under New York law.
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`Even so, Defendant argues that the Court should remit compensatory damages to $30,000
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`or iess by citing several cases with similarly egregious facts, in which New York courts
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`nonetheless remitted awards to $50,000 or less. For example, in Matter ofState ofNew York v.
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`New York State Div. of Human Rights, the court remitted emotional distress damages from
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`$50,000 to $20,000 where: plaintiff’s supervisor made crude sexual comments; he called her into
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`his office, locked the door, and touched her inappropriately; and plaintiff’ s employment was
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`terminated due to her difficulties working with him. 284 A.D.2d 882, 883-84 (N.Y. App. Div.
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`3d Dep’t 2001). Further, in New York State Div. of Human Rights 1). Young Legends, LLC, the
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`court remitted emotional distress damages from $500,000 to $50,000 where defendant, a
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`sandwich shop owner, pressured plaintiff, a high school student working for him, into Visiting
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`him alone in his apartment, where he forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. 90 A.D.3d
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`1265, 1266, 1270 (NY. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2001).
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`These discrepancies, however, can be explained by the fact that, despite the reprehensible
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`behavior, the courts did not consider those plaintiffs’ emotional distress to be especially severe.
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`See State ofNew York, 284 A.D.2d at 884 (“However, considering all of the circumstances,
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`including the absence of any proof of the severity and consequences of her condition, we find
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`that the evidence cannot support an award in excess of $20,000.” (internal citation and quotations
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`omitted»; Young Legends, 90 A.D.3d at 1270 (“[S]he attended only two counseling sessions,
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`apparently required no further medical or psychological treatment, and within several months
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`was able to return to work for a different employer.”). Moreover, the Court respectfully
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`disagrees with the decision in Young Legends. A high school student who has been threatened
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`and raped by her employer surely deserves more than $50,000 in compensatory damages.
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`Relatedly, Plaintiff testified that she had been raped at the age of 14, and that Smith’s
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`behavior made her feel “violated all over again.” (Tr. 189220—190: 13.) As the Court previously
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`explained when ruling on Defendant’s motions in limine, and as the jury was instructed, the
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`defendant “takes the plaintiff as he finds her.” (Feb. 7, 2018 Conference Tr. at 15-l6; Tr.
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`828:13—22.) Thus, Plaintiff’s increased susceptibility to emotional distress from sexual
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`harassment due to her previous experience as a rape victim could be considered when calculating
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`compensatory damages. See Stampf, 761 F.3d at 207 n.5 (“Although the average victim of
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`malicious prosecution may not have experienced such a high degree of stress and anxiety from
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`Trigg's malicious prosecution, a defendant must take a plaintiff as she finds him and, therefore, is
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`responsible for the harm she inflicts on a person even if that harm is exacerbated by the person’s
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`unknown infirmities.” (quotations and alterations omitted)).
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`In its reply brief, Defendant seeks
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`to relitigate this issue by arguing that this instruction was improper because this “eggshell skull”
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`doctrine applies only when a plaintiff suffers physical injuries, but Defendant has already been
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`fully heard on this issue, and the Court will not reconsider its ruling. See United States v. Uccio,
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`940 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should
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`generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case”). In any event,
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`Plaintiff presented evidence of physical manifestations of her symptoms in the form of her
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`weight loss, hair loss, stomach problems, and migraines.
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`In light of these circumstances, Plaintiff argues that the Court should either allow the
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`jury’s verdict of $1.7 million to stand or, at most, remit it to $1.5 million. Many of the cases that
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`Plaintiff cites, however, are not sexual harassment cases and involve more harm than emotional
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`distress alone. See, e.g., Osorio v. Source Enterprises, Inc, No. 05—cv-10029, 2007 US. Dist.
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`LEXIS 18725, at *14—17 (S .D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2007) (denying motion for remittitur in unlawful
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`retaliation claim where jury awarded $4 million for emotional distress and damage to reputation).
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`In the sexual harassment cases, even when extraordinary circumstances are present,
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`courts seldom permit emotional distress damages in any amount close to the $1.7 million
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`awarded here. See, e.g., Singleton v. City ofNew York, 496 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (S.D.N.Y.
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`2007) (Rakoff, J.) (reducing jury award of $1 million in compensatory damages under NYSHRL
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`to $300,000, where plaintiff presented evidence that his supervisor’s sexual harassment led to the
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`dissolution of plaintiff” 3 relationship with the mother of his child, which in turn caused plaintiff
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`“extensive anxiety”); Bianca v. Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2009 NY. Misc. LEXIS 5275, at *17-
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`19 (NY. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. Sept. 11, 2009) (reducing jury award of compensatory damages
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`under NYSHRL from $8 million to $750,000 Where plaintiff presented lay and expert testimony
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`that she “suffered from post—traumatic stress disorder .
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`.
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`.
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`, major depressive disorder, flashbacks,
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`anxiousness and related emotional problems” as a result of sexual harassment). Moreover,
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`unlike other sexual harassment cases with extraordinary circumstances and large jury verdicts,
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`Plaintiff never stopped working in the same job that she held during the period of harassment.
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`Compare Kart v. City ofNew York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 313, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (upholding jury
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`award of $400,000 in compensatory damages where plaintiff was “suffering from permanent
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`mental disabilities, unable to work, unable to maintain sexual intimacy, [and] unable even to
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`perform household chores” as a result of sexual harassment), with Caravantes v. 53rd St.
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`Partners, LLC, No. 09—cv-7821, 2012 US. Dist. LEXIS 120182, at *70—78 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
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`2012) (finding after bench trial that supervisor’s harassment was “egregious” and the impact on
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`plaintiff‘s mental health was “significant” where plaintiff suffered trouble sleeping, marital
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`problems, major depressive disorder, and suicidal thoughts, but awarding only $150,000 in
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`emotional distress damages because plaintiff’s “condition is treatable” and plaintiff “is currently
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`working in a restaurant”). On the other hand, the Court also accounts for inflation and considers
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`the present value of the amounts awarded in these cases. See DiSorbo 12. Hay, 343 F.3d 172, 185
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`(2d Cir. 2003) (“When considering the sizes of the awards in earlier cases, we must take into
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`account inflation .
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`.
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`. .”).
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`Upon considering all of the above factors, the Court determines that an award of
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`$500,000 in compensatory damages under the NYSI—IRL is the greatest amount that can be
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`awarded without being excessive. Thus, the compensatory damages award will be remitted, and
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`it Will consist of $500,000 under the NYSHRL and $1 under Title VII.
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`C. Vacatur or Remittitur of Punitive Damages
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`Defendant argues that the punitive damages award of $299,999 should either be vacated
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`because the evidence does not support any award of punitive damages, or remitted to $30,000
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`because any greater award violates due process. In a Title VII claim, “a plaintiff may recover
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`punitive damages where the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant ‘engaged in a
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`discriminatory practice .
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`.
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`. with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
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`10
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`rights of an aggrieved individual.” Cash—Crawford v. Adchem Corp, 271 F.3d 352, 356 (2d Cir.
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`2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § l981a(b)(1)). The Due Process Clause, however, “prohibits the
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`imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.” State Farm Mat. Auto
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`Ins. Co. 1). Campbell, 538 US. 408, 416 (2003).
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`Here, the evidence supports an award of punitive damages. There is sufficient evidence
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`to support the jury’s finding that Defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference in failing
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`to address Smith’s sexual harassment of Plaintiff. For example, in one instance, Human
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`Resources Manager Robert “Bob” Jandovitz received a grievance from Plaintiffthat mentioned
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`overtime pay and referenced several articles in the governing Collective Bargaining Agreement
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`addressing discrimination. (Tr. 495:10—15; Pl.’s Ex. 11; Pl.’s Ex. 8 at DEF 0000617.) Jandovitz
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`admitted that he was “not a big fan of grievances” and that he did not look up the articles
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`referenced in Plaintiff” s grievance.
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`(Tr. 485 : 1 8—19, 495 :849616.) Upon meeting with Plaintiff,
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`Jandovitz told her “I don’t like grievances” and told her to go back downstairs and meet with her
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`immediate supervisor, Smith, about her grievance. (Tr. 197114—198125.) Smith, of course, was
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`the source of Plaintiff’s difficulties. Plaintiff testified that during this meeting, she attempted to
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`show Jandovitz notes detailing the sexual harassment, but Jandovitz told her she had “too many
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`notes” and that they could follow up that Friday, but Jandovitz never called Smith to have
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`Plaintiff released for a follow-up meeting. (Tr. 199:8—24, 200:25—201215.) Plaintiff testified that
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`after this meeting, she was at her lowest point because “now Bob knew, and they still ignore[d}
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`my cries for help.” (Tr. 201 :16-19.) Even assuming that Plaintiff did not clearly raise concerns
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`of sexual harassment in the grievance or the meeting, the jury was entitled to infer from
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`Jandovitz’s dismissiveness that Defendant recklessly caused Plaintiff to believe that her pleas for
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`help would be ignored and that she would first have to raise any complaints about sexual
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`ll
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`harassment with her harasser. Cf Fisher v. Mermaid Manor Home for Adults, LLC, No. l4—cv-
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`3461, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174364, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (finding sufficient
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`evidence to support punitive damages where defendant ignored plaintiffs’ pleas for help and
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`permitted co-worker to continue harassing plaintiff).
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`Moreover, Plaintiff presented evidence that Human Resources Manager Nicole
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`Copeland’s eventual investigation into Plaintiff 3 sexual harassment claims was a “sham." (Tr.
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`759:19—770:10, 772:1—12.) Copeland’s notes contained a list of nine “people to interview,” but
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`Copeland curiously failed to interview three of them—Fred Paniccia, Fred Gaffney, and Clark
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`Simpsonfieall of whom corroborated Plaintiff 5 complaints upon testifying at trial. (Pl.’s Ex. 5 at
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`1; Tr. 33:12—36:17; Tr. 47:21—54:8; Tr. 85:5w90:21.) Copeland determined, contrary to the jury’s
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`findings, that no sexual harassment occurred. Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that
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`Defendant acted with reckless and calious indifference to Plaintiff s federally protected rights.
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`See Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc, 239 F.3d 848, 861 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court‘s
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`decision to prohibit punitive damages where jury could have inferred from evidence that
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`management conducted “sham” investigation designed to discredit plaintiff and protect managers
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`who should have taken action sooner); Baty v. Willamette, Inc, 172 F.3d 1232, 1244-45 (10th
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`Cir. 1999) (affirming award of punitive damages based on evidence that management conducted
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`sham investigation and condoned harassment).
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`The punitive damages award of $299,999 also does not violate due process. To
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`determine whether punitive damages are grossly excessive, courts consider three “guideposts”:
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`“(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the
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`actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
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`difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized
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`or imposed in comparable cases.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418. Here, each of these guideposts
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`weighs against finding the award to be grossly excessive.
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`First, the evidence supports a finding of particularly reprehensible misconduct.
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`Aggravating factors that contribute to the degree of reprehensibility include: “(1) whether a
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`defendant’s conduct was violent or presented a threat of violence, (2) whether a defendant acted
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`with deceit or malice as opposed to acting with mere negligence, and (3) whether a defendant has
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`engaged in repeated instances of misconduct.” Lee 1). Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 809 (2d Cir.
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`1996). Defendant’s failure to act, although not violent in itself, allowed Smith to continue
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`harassing Plaintiff, which caused Plaintiff great mental anguish and forced her to take a mental
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`health leave. Such conduct by Defendant suggests “indifference to or reckless disregard for the
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`health and safety of others,” which is more reprehensible than conduct that inflicts harm that is
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`“purely economic in nature.” BMW ofNorth America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 (1996), As
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`detailed above, there was sufficient evidence, including the evidence that Nicole Copeland
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`conducted a “sham” investigation, to allow the jury to conclude that Defendant acted with malice
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`or deceit. Plaintiff also presented evidence that Defendant engaged in repeated instances of
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`misconduct by ignoring complaints about Smith’s harassment on multiple occasions. In addition
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`to Jandovitz’s rejection of Plaintiff’s grievance and Copeland’s investigation findng no sexual
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`harassment, Fred Paniccia testified that he previously reported Smith’s harassment of Plaintiff to
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`Assistant Human Resources Manager Debbie Troche, but she did nothing in response. (Tr. 33:2—
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`36:3.)
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`Second, there is little disparity between the award of $299,999 in punitive damages and
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`the award of $500,001 in compensatory damages. Although a punitive damages “award of more
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`than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
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`impropriety,” the punitive damages award here is less than the award of compensatory damages.
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`State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. Thus, the punitive damages are “reasonable and proportionate to
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`the amount of harm to the piaintiff and to the general damages recovered.” Id. at 426.
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`Third, the punitive damages award is also reasonable in comparison to damages awards
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`in other cases. See, e.g., Luciano v. Olsten Corp, 110 F.3d 210, 222 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding
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`$300,000 punitive damage award against wealthy defendant as “‘modest”); Quinby v. WestB
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`AG, No. 04-cv—7406, 2008 US. Dist. LEXIS 62366, at *i3-i4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2008)
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`(remitting punitive damages from $i.3 million to $750,000 in gender discrimination case where
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`compensatory damages were $500,000); Thomas v. iSfar Fin. Inc, 508 F. Supp. 2d 252, 263
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The federal cap .
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`.
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`. provides guidance on what is considered an appropriate
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`civil penalty of comparable misconduct”), Therefore, the punitive damages award does not
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`violate due process, and it is neither vacated nor remitted.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons stated above, the Court adjusts Plaintiff’s damages as follows: $500,000
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`in compensatory damages under the NYSHRL, $1 in compensatory damages under Title VII,
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`and $299,999 in punitive damages under Title VII, for a total of $800,000 in damages. Plaintiff
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`may elect either to accept these amounts or to proceed to a new trial on damages. Plaintiff has
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`30 days from the date of this order to inform the Court of her decision. The Clerk of Court is
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`directed to terminate the pending motions at Docket 181 and Docket 183.
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`Dated: New York, New York
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`SO 0
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`ERED
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`June 5, 2018
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`
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`%
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`PAUL A. CROTTY
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`United States District Judge
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`l4
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`